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                                            ABSTRACT
Oil and gas exploitation and production in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta
region, is awash with pollution incidents with its attendant impact on the health of
locals as well as foreseeable damage on the biodiversity of the region. Owing to
this  development,  victims  of  environmental  pollution  have repeatedly  instituted
legal  actions  against  transnational  corporations  (TNCs)  and  the  Federal
Government with a view to recovering damages and enforcing rights via statutory
claims (which basically reflects traditional English common law rules on liability).
Notwithstanding,  it  is  observed  that  such  claims  have  not  availed  victims  of
pollution  with  the  basic  reliefs  sought,  and  this  is  seemingly  traceable  to  the
‘economic  interest’  which  government  retains  in  oil  and  gas  activities,  the
technicalities in proving negligence on the part of TNCs; as a vast majority of oil
pollution incidents are caused by ‘acts of third parties’, and under such scenarios,
TNCs will only be liable where they neglect to protect oil facilities, and the lack of
direct legal provisions to provide for fundamental rights to a clean environment,
although even before Nigeria attained her independence in 1960 the Oil Pipelines
Act of 1955 addressed some oil-related environmental problems. These challenges,
amongst others have prompted victims of environmental pollution in Nigeria, in
recent years, to seek for legal redress in foreign jurisdictions.
The current research opted for turnaround in the environmental justice system by
considering whether there is any legal nexus between environmental pollution and
breach of fundamental rights (‘rights to a healthy environment’) of the people, and
whether  such  right  will  generate  an  absolute  liability  against  TNCs?  It  is
recognised that ‘fundamental rights’ which are found in the Nigerian Constitution
have higher status over other rights as contained in statutes, and where these rights
are violated, liability will be either strict or absolute as the case may be; this is
pursuant to findings in the current research that the defence of ‘act of third parties’
and others may not be sustained in fundamental rights enforcement proceedings,
and owing to this, victims of environmental pollution incidents in Nigeria will be
able to get adequate redress and secure higher standards of environmental quality.
This conclusion is reached through a close examination of legal instruments, case-
law and opinions of experts in Nigeria and a limited number of other jurisdictions.
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                                         INTRODUCTION
Environmental Justice in Nigeria: What are the Challenges?
The current research is anchored on the growing reports of environmental pollution incidents
in Nigeria, the attendant negative impact on the environment (particularly in the Niger Delta
Region)1 and the commitment  of  victims  of  oil  and gas  pollution  incidents  to  seek legal
redress both in  municipal  and foreign courts.  It  is  observed that  obtaining environmental
justice  in  Nigeria  is  enmeshed  with  difficulties  ranging  from  inadequate  compensation
complaints,  judicial  favouritism  towards  government  and  oil  transnational  corporations
(hereinafter ‘TNCs’) as against victims of oil pollution, issues of judicial technicalities, the
lack  of  public  awareness  on  environmental  matters;  particularly  the  lack  of  access  to
environmental justice. In view of this, significant environmental pollution cases are pursued
abroad in recent years. Recently, a Nigerian farmer and fisherman instituted legal claims for
damages occasioned by oil spills  from SPDC’s (Shell  Petroleum Development Company)
facilities  between  2006  and  2007  against  Royal  Dutch  Shell  (SPDC’s  parent  company
headquartered in Netherlands) in a Hague District Court.2 Commenting on a more recent oil
spill amounting to around 3,800 barrels and the rationale for foreign legal redress, a Bonny
Island Community leader in Rivers State of Nigeria, Amasenibo, remarked that:
Normal life has stopped here because of the spill. This was just the last of
multiple spills we have experienced. Shell has still not done the clean-up
here. They are a big company and if we go to the Nigerian courts, they
will win.3
1
 Ibibia L Worika, ‘Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither Environment and Human Rights
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta? (2001-2002) 8 (1) JICL 5-6.
2
 FA Akpan & Anor v Royal Dutch Shell & Anor (District Court of The Hague) Case No. C/09/337050/
HA  ZA  09-1580,  30  January  2013<https://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-judgment-
shell-oil-spill-ikot-ada-udo> accessed 12 January 2016. 
3
 John Vidal, ‘Niger delta communities to sue shell in London for oil spill compensation’ The guardian
(London, 7 January 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/07/niger-delta-communities-to-
sue-shell-in-london-for-oil-spill-compensation> accessed 15 October 2015.
2
Lately, in  The Bodo Community v The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
Ltd,4 more than 15,000 claimants sought damages at common law and statutory compensation
under Nigerian law in a London High Court in relation to oil spills  alleged to have been
caused by Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC). It is observed that the
aforesaid case and other related cases bordering on claims for oil spill damages are anchored
on common law principles of liability (such as nuisance, negligence and the strict liability
rule),  which  have  been  transplanted  into  municipal  laws  in  Nigeria.  The  Nigerian  legal
system is closely based on the English law.5 The Bodo community is in the Gokana Local
Government Area in Rivers State, one of the major oil producing states in the Niger Delta
Region.  Over  the  years,  there  have  been  a  series  of  court  proceedings  against  Shell  by
individuals, communities and other representative bodies within domestic courts in Nigeria.
In the Bodo Community case, both the claimants and the defendant, by agreement, but subject
to some jurisdictional reservations,6 opted for an English court (Technology and Construction
Court) to determine, primarily: whether SPDC can be liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by oil from its pipelines that has been released owing to illegal refining7 between 2008
and 2009, amongst others.
It is observed that the traditional principles of liability in environmental pollution cases, such
as the strict liability rule, torts of nuisance and negligence are vague, or overtly unsatisfactory
and undermines the legal rights of the inhabitants of such pollution prone areas to enjoy a
safe, or healthy environment. In view of these shortcomings, Kalu and Stewart reasoned that:
Litigation in regular courts has not helped the situation. This is primarily
because the highly scientific,  technical  and sophisticated nature of the
operations of oil companies makes it imperative for a plaintiff to be well
4
 [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC).
5
 Lee J McConnell, ‘Establishing Liability for Multinational Companies in Parent/Subsidiary 
Relationships’ (2014) 16 ELR 50, 53.
6
 See Bodo Community case (n 4) [9]. One of the preliminary issues (Issue 6), was whether the English 




versed in this area to be able to recover damages for his losses in suits for
compensation or negligence.8
Kalu and Stewart’s position above deserves support in view of the legal burden encountered
in establishing torts of negligence and other related torts in environmental pollution cases,
particularly where most victims do not fully understand the operational rules and activities of
the oil operators. In addition, it is shown in a plethora of decided cases that TNCs mostly
furnish the defence of ‘malicious act of third parties’ to escape liability,  arguing that the
cause of oil spills is an effect of illegal oil bunkering and/or intentional pipeline vandalism by
saboteurs, and this defence is valid in both common law and extant statutory schemes on
environmental liability in Nigeria,9 particularly the Oil Pipelines Act 2004.10 
Owing to the technicalities involved in establishing liability based on the above mentioned
traditional tortious rules, it becomes necessary in the current research to explore ‘fundamental
rights enforcement proceedings’ as a tool for obtaining environmental justice and protection;
and fundamental rights, being considered as ‘absolute rights’ may project a stricter or even an
absolute liability on environmental polluters than the aforementioned common law principles
which  are  evidently  embodied  in  various  environmental  statutory  schemes  in  Nigeria,
particularly the Oil Pipelines Act 2004.11
It is maintained that the oil and gas activities engaged by TNCs are profitable to the state,
thereby promoting the economic well-being of the state,  and applying strict  principles  of
liability in incidents of environmental pollution would expose TNCs to a series of litigation
and compensation claims which would adversely affect the profits accruing to the state. It is
worth noting that the Nigerian economy is substantially dependent on crude oil, as the oil
sector  remains  the core revenue earner  of  the Nigerian  economy accounting  for  over  80
8
 Victoria E Kalu and Ngozi F Stewart, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crises and Resolution of Oil and Gas 
Related Disputes: Need for a Paradigm Shift’ (2007) 25 JENRL 244, 253.
9
 See Bodo Community case (n 4) [93] (Mr Akenhead).
10
 Cap O7 LFN 2004, s 11(5)(c).
11
 McConnell (n 5) 53.
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percent of the country’s total export earnings and about 70 percent of government revenue.12
The interest which the Nigerian state has in the oil sector is clearly reflected in section 44(3)
of  the  1999  Constitution  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria  (as  amended),  vesting  the
ownership and control of mineral oils and natural gas in the Government of the Federation. In
view  of  the  foregoing,  Atsegbua  observed  that  if  the  fundamental  right  to  a  clean
environment  is  directly  inculcated  in  the  1999  Constitution  of  Nigeria,  and  becomes
enforceable, the oil communities of the Niger Delta will begin to assert their constitutional
rights, and that the government may feel that such a step will expose it to litigation by the oil-
producing communities of the Niger Delta.13 In the same vein, in the case of  Allar Irou v
Shell BP,14 where the claimant sought for an injunction to restrain the defendant (Shell BP)
from continuous pollution of his land, the High Court refused the request with the reasoning
that granting the order would truncate activities of the defendant (SPDC), noting that mineral
oil is the main source of Nigeria’s revenue.15 
The above reasoning, amongst others, confirms the concern earlier raised by Amasenibo to
the effect that Shell is a ‘big company and if we go to the Nigerian courts, they will win.’ 16 It
is  submitted  that  this  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  (economic  reason)  most  victims  of
environmental pollution are unsuccessful in seeking justice before Nigerian courts.
Furthermore,  it  is  observed  that  the  lack  of  access  to  environmental  information  (which
includes crucial environmental education in schools), public participation in environmental
decision-making as well as access to environmental justice have hindered the enforcement of
fundamental rights to a clean environment.
12
 Olanrewaju Fagbohun, The Law of Oil Pollution and Environmental Restoration A Comparative 
Review (Odade, Lagos 2010) 156.
13
 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘Environmental rights, pipeline vandalisation and conflict resolution in Nigeria’ 
(2001) 5 IELTR 89, 90.
14
 Suit No. W/89/71, Warri High Court, November 26, 1973.
15
 Allar Irou(n 14).
16
 John Vidal, ‘Niger delta communities to sue Shell in London for oil spill compensation’ (n 3).
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It  is  maintained that  the legal  burden to establish that  TNCs have failed in their  duty to
adequately protect pipelines and other oil facilities, thereby leading to oil spills, the lack of
enforcement of environmental legislation, the lack of direct legal provisions on fundamental
rights  to  a  safe  environment,  and  the  interest  which  government  retains  in  oil  and  gas
activities due to its economic benefits to the state as well as the lack of public awareness on
environmental matters,17 are the key challenges confronting environmental justice in Nigeria
as observed in the current research.
It is equally noted that allegations of corruption against TNCs and government agencies have
contributed  immensely  against  the  attainment  of  environmental  justice.  For  instance,  the
Special  Task Force set up by the Nigerian government (under former president Goodluck
Jonathan) to look into the rot in the Nigerian oil industry which was headed by Nuhu Ribadu
in 2012, implicated the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, which is the state oil firm,
ministers, government agencies and oil majors in dodgy deals and mismanagement which is
estimated to have cost Nigeria $35 billion over the last 10 years.18 It is observed that most
government  agencies  implicated  in  such  corruption  issues  are  basically  mandated  with
statutory obligations to execute court judgments or enforce policies relating to environmental
pollution caused by oil and gas activities.
Nigeria’s Independence and Environmental Legislation: An Evaluation Thereof
Nigeria gained independence in 1960, and before then, her legal system was substantially a
replica of the English legal system, being a former British colony. In the oil and gas sector,
Shell-BP’s exploration licence covered the whole mainland of Nigeria, and at independence,
legislative changes were introduced that allowed other oil operators to come in, (some of the
companies include Gulf, Agip, Safrap (now Elf), Tenneco and Amoseas (now Texaco and
Chevron)  and Mobil.19 But the legislative  revolution  at  that  period was more focused on
17
 See chapter 3 of this research on ‘a critical analysis of the issues and challenges in environmental 
rights enforcement in Nigeria’.
18
 Reuters, ‘Exclusive: Nigeria loses billions in cut price oil deals-report’ 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-oil-idUSBRE89N0VV20121024> (Nigeria 24 October 2012) 
accessed 27 June 2017. Some of these issues are discussed in chapter 3 under figure 3.3.1.
19
 Olufemi  O Amao,  ‘Corporate  Social  Responsibility,  Multinational  Corporations  and  the  Law  in
Nigeria: Controlling Multinationals in Host States’ (2008) 52 JAL 89, 92.
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regulating  activities  of oil  operators vis-à-vis the economic benefits  to the State  than the
impact such activities would project on the environment. This was the case until the Koko
incident of 1988. In the Koko incident, an Italian vessel dumped toxic wastes in the village of
Koko,  a  community  in  Delta  State  of  Nigeria,  which  sparked  public  outcry  due  to  the
environmental impact it had on the community and its attendant health hazards on locals. But
due to the deficit of environmental laws at that time, the culprits were not prosecuted.20 In this
vein, Ekhator had observed that ‘the Koko incident changed the dynamics of environmental
protection in Nigeria,’ maintaining that ‘prior to the Koko incident of 1988, there were no
comprehensive laws specifically regulating the Nigerian Environment’.21
Okon had equally confirmed the shift in environmental consciousness in Nigeria as a result of
the Koko incident of 1988, when he observed that:
While  it  is  true  that  Nigeria  has  enacted  environmental  legislation
covering such areas as water pollution, air pollution, protection of wild
life, conservation of forests, preservation of antiquities and monuments, it
is also pertinent to note that environmental protection was not part of the
general societal consciousness in the country until the 1988 Koko port
toxic waste incident.22 
Following the  Koko incident,  the  National  Policy  on the Environment  was developed in
1989.23 The goal of the Policy is to ensure environmental protection and the conservation of
natural  resources  for  sustainable  development.24 Thereafter,  a  robust  statutory  framework
bordering  on  environmental  liability  was  put  in  place,  particularly  the  Harmful  Waste
20
 Eghosa O Ekhator, ‘Environmental Protection in the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: the Roles of




 Emmanuel E Okon, ‘The environmental perspective in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution’ (2003) 5 ELR
256, 258.
23
 The National Policy on Environment, Nigeria ‘Guiding Principles’ (1999) 
<http://www.environment.gov.ng/index.php/downloads/6-national-policy-on-environment> accessed 4 August 
2015.
24
 ibid para 1.2
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(Special  Criminal  Provisions)  Act,25 Oil  in  Navigable  Waters  Act,26 Associated  Gas  Re-
Injection Act,27  and amendments to the Oil Pipelines Act,28 the Petroleum Act,29 amongst
others. The Oil Pipelines Act (OPA) was first enacted in 1956 following the discovery of oil
in  Oloibiri  (the  present  Bayelsa  State),  and  as  observed  by  Mr  Akenhead  in  the  Bodo
Community case, the OPA was basically a  legislation for the creation of the oil industry in
Nigeria,  particularly  for  the  transmission  of  any  oil  discovered.30 Liability  principles,  as
encapsulated  in  the  aforementioned  laws,  hover  around tortious  principles  of  negligence,
nuisance and the strict liability rule.31
The  nascent  environmental  awareness  in  Nigeria  can  be  witnessed  with  the  recent
incorporation  of  environmental  provision  in  the  Constitution  of  the  Federal  Republic  of
Nigeria 1999 (as amended). It is noted that the first time environmental provision is directly
incorporated in the Constitution of Nigeria, was in 199932 under the Fundamental Objectives
and Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter II of the Constitution. The relevant section
provides that ‘the State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water,
25
 Cap H1 LFN 2004.
26
 Cap O6 LFN 2004.
27
 Cap A25 LFN 2004.
28
 Cap O7 LFN 2004.
29
 Cap P10 LFN 2004.
30
 Bodo Community (n 4) [3].
31
 See chapter 5 of the research, particularly figure 5.3 on ‘the Nigerian legal framework and issues of 
environmental responsibility’.
32
 Okon (n 22) 265.
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air and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria.’33 Unfortunately, even this provision cannot be
enforced  against  the  State  in  any court  of  law by virtue  of  section  6(6)(c)  of  the  same
Constitution.
In view of the non-justiciability of section 20 of the Nigerian Constitution bordering on the
protection of the environment, legal experts in Nigeria, in the likes of Atsegbua,34 Anaebo
and Ekhator,35 Ruth and Chinewubeze, Jonathan,36 Okon,37 amongst others have alternatively
given reasonable focus to the possibility of utilising the constitutional safeguards in Chapter
IV of the Constitution dealing on Fundamental Rights (particularly the rights to life, dignity
of human person and right to private and family life) for the protection of the environment.
Basically,  can  incidents  of  environmental  pollution  trigger  the  violation  of  the  aforesaid
fundamental  rights?  This  remains  a  contentious  aspect  of  the  Nigerian  law,  and  diverse
opinions have been put forward. Atsegbua had observed that if the fundamental right to a
clean environment is directly inculcated in the Constitution of Nigeria 1999, and becomes
enforceable, victims of oil and gas pollution will begin to assert their constitutional rights,38
and constitutional rights, being given enhanced status in the Nigerian legal system, may turn
around existing  case  law on environmental  liability  in  Nigeria,  tilting  more  in  favour  of
victims  of  environmental  pollution.  The  current  research  is  focused  on  examining  the
33
 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 20.
34
 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘Environmental rights, pipeline vandalisation and conflict resolution in Nigeria’
(2001) 5 IELTR 89.
35
 Onyeka K Anaebo and Eghosa O Ekhator, ‘Realising substantive rights to healthy environment in
Nigeria: a case for constitutionalisation’ (2015) ELR 17(2) 82.
36
 Ehusani A Jonathan, ‘Fundamental Human Right to Healthy Environment (a case for justiciability)’
(2011)  Human  Rights  Review-  An  International  Human  Rights  Journal-An  Annual  Publication  of  the
Department of Public Law, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and the National Human Rights Commission of
Nigeria 2(2) July.
37
 Okon (n 22) 258.
38
 Lawrence Atsegbua (n 34) 90.
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intricacies  of a  fundamental  right  to  a  clean  environment  in Nigeria  and the standard of
liability it would project therein, as against liability principles found in torts of negligence,
nuisance and strict liability, which are seen to be prevalent in the current statutory schemes
and case law on environmental pollution in Nigeria caused by oil and gas activities of TNCs.
The Right to a Healthy Environment as a Fundamental Right
It is mentioned that the correlation between environmental pollution and fundamental rights
violation  remains  a  contentious  issue  in  many  jurisdictions,  in  that  the  primary  legal
provisions on fundamental rights issues in Nigeria (the Nigerian Constitution) as well as in
England and Wales (the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 as encapsulated in the
Human Rights Act 1998) do not directly capture the right to a healthy environment. However,
in chapters 2 and 6 of the current research, it has been shown that the courts, through the case
law, through creative and expansive interpretation of the law, are open towards considering
fundamental rights enforcement as a tool for environmental protection and preservation.
The current research has recognised the need for a new legal approach in addressing incidents
of environmental pollution, through fundamental rights enforcement proceedings. It is shown
that where the environment is polluted, there is bound to be an infringement of fundamental
rights of victims, particularly the rights to life, dignity of human person and right to private
and family life. Albeit there is insufficient case law in Nigeria to back up existence of breach
of  the  aforementioned  fundamental  rights  within  the  ambit  of  environmental  pollution
litigation, a Federal High Court (Benin judicial division), in a far-reaching judgment in the
case of  Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nig Ltd39 had maintained
that sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution,40 which deals with the right to life
and the right to dignity of human person respectively, inevitably include the right to a safe
environment.41 In the same vein, the aforesaid provisions are reinforced by Articles 4, 16 and
24 of the African Charter (hereinafter ‘Charter rights’).42 A combined reading of the aforesaid
39
 [2005] AHRLR 151 (Federal High Court). The case can be found in the court records with suit No. 
FHC/B/CS/153/2005 (Federal High Court Benin Division) (Justice Nwokorie).
40
 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (n 23).
41
 Jonah Gbemre (n 29) 155.
42
10
Articles provides for the rights to life and integrity, right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health, and the right to a satisfactory environment respectively, which
were equally upheld by the Federal High Court in the  Jonah Gbemre case as fundamental
rights  relating  to  a  healthy  environment.43 At  the  international  level,  the  United  Nations
Human  Rights  Committee  rightly  cautioned  that  the  right  to  life  as  contained  in  the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, should not be interpreted narrowly,44
noting further that ‘the expression ‘‘inherent right to life’’ cannot properly be understood in a
restrictive manner’.45
The  correlation  between  environmental  pollution  and  human  rights  violation  has  been
affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Hatton and others v United
Kingdom,46 Powell  and Rayner  v UK,47 Lopez Ostra v Spain,48 Guerra v Italy,49 amongst
others. The Indian Supreme Court toed the same line in MC Mehta v Union of India.50 The
ECOWAS Court  equally  maintained  the  nexus  between human rights  and environmental
 African Charter  on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement)  Act Cap A9 LFN
2004.
43
 Jonah Gbemre (n 39) 155.
44
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Assembly Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to life) UN Doc
HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1 at 6 (1994) para 1.
45
 UN Human Rights Committee (44) para 5.
46
 [2003] 37 EHRR 611, [2003] All ER (D) 122.
47
 [1990] 12 EHRR 355, [1990] ECHR 9310/81.
48
 [1994] 20 EHRR 611, [1994] ECHR 16798/90.
49
 [1998] 26 EHRR 357, [1998] 4 BHRC 63.
50
 [1987] AIR SC 1086.
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pollution  in Socio-Economic  Rights  and  Accountability  Project  (SERAP)  v  The  Federal
Republic of  Nigeria.51 In the communication of  Social and Economic Rights Action Centre
(SERAC) and Another v The Federal Republic of Nigeria,52 the African Commission held the
Nigerian government liable for the violation of the Charter rights (particularly Articles 4, 16
and 24 of the Charter on the rights to life and integrity, enjoyment of physical and mental
health, and satisfactory environment respectively)53 due to oil and gas activities resulting to
environmental degradation and health problems among the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta.
In its final ruling, the Commission stated that: 
These rights recognise the importance of a clean and safe environment
that  is  closely  linked  to  economic  and  social  rights  in  so  far  as  the
environment affects the quality of life and safety of the individual.54 
The African Commission, particularly went further to establish the nexus between the right to
life  and environmental  pollution  when it  observed that  ‘Given the  widespread violations
perpetrated by the government of Nigeria and private actors, the most fundamental of all
human rights, the right to life has been violated.’55 However, it is made clear in chapter 3 that
after the latter ruling and others, the Nigerian government has taken various steps to remedy
environmental challenges in the Niger Delta region.56 In view of the foregoing, it has been
established  through  a  series  of  case  law  and  legal  provisions  that  there  is  arguably  a
51
 [2012] Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS (Judgment N0 ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12).
52
 [2001] AHRLR 60 Communication 155/96, decided at the 30 th ordinary session, October 2001 of the
African commission.
53
 African Charter (n 42).
54
 SERAC (n 52) [51].
55
 SERAC (n 52) [67].
56
 See figure 3.3.1. The establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission, the Niger Delta
Ministry,  the Niger Delta  Amnesty Programme, and of recent,  measures  taken for  the Ogoni Oil  Clean-up
amongst others, are landmarks with a view to curbing environmental challenges and the general welfare of the
region.
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fundamental  right  to  a  healthy  environment,  whilst  equally  noting  that  the  issue  remains
contentious.
The Gap in the Current Law: The Lack of Enforcement of Environmental Rights in Nigeria
Having examined the current challenges facing environmental justice in Nigeria, particularly
with regard to the standards of liabilities applicable in the common law torts of negligence,
nuisance and under the strict liability rule and their attendant technicalities and loose nature
which  are  partially  incorporated  into  the  Nigerian  statutory  scheme  on  environmental
liability,57 the current research has opted for a turnaround  in the environmental justice system
by considering the possibility of obtaining a stricter liability/or even absolute liability as a
solution.
Although the strict liability rule is considered by some writers as a ‘no fault liability rule’,58
this  is  a  misnomer,  owing  to  the  numerous  defences  attached  to  the  rule.  Hence,  it  is
maintained that on a scale of zero to ten (0-10), where 5 represents ‘strict liability’ and 10
represents ‘absolute liability’, environmental liability under fundamental rights enforcement,
as argued in the current research should be pinned under 9, with limited space left for illegal
activities of ‘third parties’ where pollution is shown to be manifestly unavoidable in events
relating to illegal oil bunkering and acts of sabotage by vandals.59 This premise is predicated
on the  outcome of  the  judgment  in  Jonah Gbemre v  SPDC by a  Federal  High Court  in
Nigeria  declaring a major traditional  defence of ‘statutory authority’,  permitting TNCs to
flare gas, which is applicable under the strict liability rule, laws of negligence and nuisance,
and which is reflected in extant environmental statutes and regulations, inconsistent with the
constitutional rights to life and dignity of human person.60 Even with the aforesaid premise, it
57
 McConnell (n 5) 53.
58
 See Ayodele O Akinsola, ‘Civil Liability for Oil Pollution under Nigerian Law’ The Nigerian Institute
of  Advance  Legal  Studies  (Journal  of  Law  and  Public  Policy)  293
<http://www.nials-nigeria.org/journals/Ayodele%200Oladiranlawp  >   accessed 4 June 2014. See also figure 1.5
on the basic defences to the strict liability rule.
59
 The justification for this proposition is argued in chapter 6 of this research, particularly in figures 6.4,
6.4.1, 6.5 as well as 6.6 with regard to the strict position of the Indian courts on environmental liability. This
proposition cannot be applicable to the enforcement of Conventions rights in the UK owing to the defences
against enforcement of the Convention rights.
60
13
is  argued  that  liability  ought  to  be  absolute  in  that  such  activities  of  ‘third  parties’  are
foreseeable  and the defence of ‘act of third parties’,  ordinarily,  should not hold because
TNCs have foresight of such activities. If TNCs are proactive and diligent enough in curbing
pollution,  they  would  substantially  forestall  such  acts  of  ‘third  parties’  owing  to  the
obligation of government and TNCs to protect oil and gas facilities,61 particularly within the
perspective  of  fundamental  rights  enforcement.62 It  follows  that,  where  government  and
TNCs are shown to have contributed to environmental pollution, either by commission or
omission,  liability  should  be  absolute,  but  in  practical  terms,  an  argument  for  breach of
environmental rights would project a stricter liability than the common law strict  liability
rule.
Contemporary legal literature in Nigeria and other relevant jurisdictions considered in this
research have shown intellectual reasoning, drawing analogies from legal instruments and
case law, regarding whether there can be an argument for breach of the fundamental rights to
life, dignity of human person and private and family life (hereinafter ‘fundamental right to a
clean  environment’)  in  events  of  environmental  pollution.63 But  it  is  observed  that  no
adequate attempt has been made to compare the measure of liability that can be obtained
from  the  fundamental  right  to  a  safe  environment  with  comparative  analyses  to  other
measures of liabilities in the applicable common law principles for environmental pollution
(such as negligence, nuisance and the strict liability rule) which have gained entrance into
extant legal framework and case law on environmental pollution adjudication in Nigeria. The
comparison proves to be necessary on the basis that fundamental rights are basically given
higher status over other rights and there could be the practical possibility that these rights
would generate a higher standard of liability to curb incessant cases of oil and gas pollution in
 Jonah Gbemre (n 36) 155.
61
 See the  Bodo Community Case (n 4) [93] on the possibility for an absolute liability against TNCs
where damage is foreseeable and preventable under the traditional rules of liability and the Oil Pipelines Act
2004.
62
 See the argument for a stricter or absolute liability under environmental rights enforcement in figures
6.4, 6.4.1 and 6.5
63
 See  Chapter  2  of  the  research  on  ‘awareness  of  fundamental  rights  as  a  tool  for  environmental
protection’, particularly figures 2.3 and 2.5 for England and Wales and Nigeria respectively. See also figure 6.6
of chapter 6 on the correlation between the right to life and environmental protection in India.
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Nigeria, thereby enabling victims of environmental pollution to push for constitutional rights
to a healthy environment on one hand, whilst ensuring higher responsibility from the part of
TNCs on the other. It is this gap in the standard of liability between these two approaches to
environmental justice that the current research seeks to examine and fill. In this vein, it is
hoped that the current research will have a significant impact on the human right community
in Nigeria and related jurisdictions on the imperatives in enforcing environmental rights.
It is submitted that the analysis in the current research focusing on the major challenges to
environmental justice, such as the lack of public awareness on environmental matters and the
economic benefits of the state in oil and gas activities would generate a reconsideration of the
dynamics in the enforcement of fundamental environmental rights.
How may the Current System be Improved?
It  is  submitted  that  the  legal  hurdles  encountered  by  victims  of  oil  and gas  pollution  in
Nigeria in proving cases of environmental pollution against TNCs are associated with the
nature of the prevailing standards of liability retained by the courts. At present, the duty to
prove negligence on the part of TNCs is more utilised by the Courts.64 It is submitted that due
to the technicalities involved in proving negligence,65 an argument for breach of fundamental
rights to healthy environment would generate a stricter liability as well as curb the common
defence of ‘statutory authority’ and others usually advanced by TNCs as shown in the Jonah
Gbemre case,66 and  this  would  be  more  feasible  where  there  are  direct  constitutional
provisions for fundamental rights to healthy environment. 
With regard to the lack of public awareness on environmental matters as a key challenge
confronting  environmental  justice  in  Nigeria,  the  research  has  proffered  solutions  for
improved access to available environmental information;67 which entails adequate education
64
 See the Bodo Community Case (n 4) [93]. See also section 11(5)(b) of the Oil Pipelines Act (n 20).
65
 It is observed that oil operations involve the use of high technology, and victims of oil pollution would
be confronted with the task of showing that TNCs were negligent in handling such technology.
66
 Jonah Gbemre (n 39).
67
 See figure 4.3 on access to information on environmental issues.
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on environmental matters,68 public participation in environmental decision making69 as well
as access to justice.  With regards  to access to justice,  State  High Courts  in Nigeria lack
jurisdiction to entertain matters bordering on oil mining,70 except the argument raised under
fundamental rights actions in chapter 4 relating to environmental rights.71 It is recommended
that the Nigerian Constitution be amended to openly pave way for State High Courts to retain
concurrent jurisdiction alongside Federal High Courts in entertaining matters on oil and gas
exploration and production.  This is due to the limited number of Federal High Courts as
against  State  High  Courts  which  currently  maintain  divisions  in  almost  every  local
government in Nigeria.72
On the best solution to ‘economic benefits of oil and gas activities’ which has been identified
as  a  barrier  to  the  advancement  of  constitutional  rights  to  a  healthy  environment,  John
Gordon’s advice on maintaining  moderate  approaches  to environmental  liability  issues as
quoted in Abel’s article73 would be instructive here. Gordon aptly stated that:
I suggest there is little profit for anyone in extreme positions. Resource
development must go on; otherwise we shall all starve. The environment
must be protected; otherwise man and all livings things will perish.74
68
 See figure 4.3.2 on education in environmental matters.
69
 See figure 4.4 on public participation in environmental decision making.
70
 See section 251(1) (n) of the Nigerian Constitution (n 33) on the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal High
Courts on causes of action arising from oil mining. See also Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
Ltd v Abel Isaiah and others [2001] 2NWLR (Pt 723) (SC).
71
 See figure 4.5.1 on access to environmental justice and jurisdiction of courts.
72
 See figure 4.5.1 on access to environmental justice and jurisdiction of the courts.
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 Wolman Abel, ‘Global Pollution and Human Rights’ (1972) 12 NRJ 195.
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Whilst noting that Gordon’s stance above deserves support, it is maintained that fundamental
rights must not be sacrificed on the altar of profit-making, and bearing in mind the enhanced
status attached to fundamental rights, it is suggested that the courts should be more inclined
to enforce environmental rights, particularly via a creative and expanded interpretation of the
rights to life, dignity of human person and private and family life, in the absence of direct
provisions to a healthy environment. 
Also, to support the locals in areas more prone to oil and gas pollution,  government and
TNCs must jointly promote direct Special Funds and Committees to aid in the dissemination
of environmental information as well as improve the lives of inhabitants of oil producing
communities with a view to curbing incessant breach of environmental rights. Furthermore,
the  Human  Right  Community,  particularly,  environmental  activists  whom  the  current
research is more useful to, would have to constantly advance bills (on environmental rights)
to legislators as well as promote awareness on environmental rights.
Hypotheses
The current  research is entitled,  ‘the doctrine of absolute liability  and the right to a safe
environment: issues and challenges in the liability of environmental polluters in Nigeria’. In
explaining the content of the research, the following hypotheses are formulated:
1. Is there any legal nexus between environmental pollution and breach of fundamental
rights (‘rights to a healthy environment’) of people?
2. Whether the current techniques of measuring liability, particularly under tort law is
sufficiently clear in Nigerian law.
3. Whether  public  awareness  may  contribute  to  reduce  the  risk  of  environmental
pollution.
4. Whether the doctrine of absolute liability may be applied to the issue of the protection
of the environment when the protection has been disregarded by TNCs within the
ambit of fundamental rights enforcement.75
It is observed that the common law doctrine of strict liability as shown in the case of Rylands
v Fletcher76 imposes liability on environmental polluters where it is shown that the defendant
75
 Traditionally, environmental liability principles in Nigeria are fault-based. See section 11(5) of the Oil
Pipelines Act (n 8).
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has brought ‘dangerous things’ to its land which is in ‘non-natural use’ of the land, which
eventually escapes to cause damage to the claimant, without any need for the claimant to
establish fault on the part of the defendant. Whilst the strict liability rule has been highlighted
as a unique principle in the law of tort, particularly for isolated escapes of dangerous things,77
many legal experts have argued that in practical terms, the strict liability doctrine is similar to
torts of nuisance and negligence, submitting that the strict liability rule is on its death bed.78
Even suggesting that there would be no circumstance where a claimant would succeed under
strict liability principle without succeeding in negligence and nuisance.79 In view of this latter
position, it is maintained that in the absence of the defence of ‘statutory authority’, the strict
liability rule maintain its uniqueness. In the context of oil and gas activities, it is clear that
government, in almost all cases authorises the activities of TNCs via issuance of licences,80
and in this vein, claimants would be obligated to prove that oil operators acted negligently or
unreasonably in causing the alleged injury suffered, even if the strict liability rule is pleaded.
This aligns the standard of liability under the strict liability rule with that required in nuisance
and negligence, which basically forms legal requirements for establishing liability in most of
the statutes on environmental pollution liability in Nigeria.81 This explains the reason why
judges seem to apply the aforesaid common law principles collectively in most environmental
pollution claims, although these common law rules retain their legal uniqueness, they share
many similar features. For example, in the Bodo Community case, the claimants based their
claims on private and public nuisance, negligence, Rylands v Fletcher rule and under the Oil
 [1861-73] All ER Rep 1 (HL).
77
 Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Plc [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL), 306 (Lord Goff).
78
 Peter M Gerhart, ‘The Death of Strict Liability’ (2008) 56 BLR 245, 246.
79
 John Murphy, ‘The Merits of Rylands v Fletcher’ (2004) 24 OJLS 643.
80
 In  the  Nigerian  case  of  San  Ikpede  v  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Company  Nigeria  Ltd
[1973]MWSJ 61 the court refused to apply the strict liability rule noting that oil and gas activities of TNCs are
under the exception of ‘statutory authority’.
81
 See Oil Pipelines Act (n 28), s 11(5)(b).
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Pipelines Act in Nigeria.82 Although, it is shown that the strict liability rule, as expounded in
Rylands  v  Fletcher encompasses  certain  features  which  are  considered  unique,  the  rule
arguably shares major similarities with claims relating to torts of nuisance and negligence as
well.83 
Again,  a  question  may be  raised  on why much attention  is  given to  the  analysis  of  the
measure of liability obtainable in the aforesaid common law principles? It is worth noting that
the research is  aimed at  establishing a  triangular  assessment  of standards of liabilities  in
common law and the prevailing environmental statutory regimes with a view to examining
their  relationship with the standard of liability  in fundamental  rights enforcement  actions
within the sphere of environmental pollution. This is done to justify the emphasis given to the
latter in the current research as it offers a more effective means of seeking justice.
The  step  beyond  the  strict  liability  principle  is  the  doctrine  of  absolute  liability.  Under
absolute liability, where the cause of pollution can be traced to the defendant, it would result
in  them being  directly  liable  to  the  claimant84 without  any  of  the  defences  of  statutory
authority, Act of a third party, and others as discussed in chapter 1.85 Such liability within the
framework of fundamental  rights enforcement,  is  linked to  an ‘absolute  right’  to a  clean
environment,  without  any  need  for  oil  operators  to  prove  exercise  of  due  care  or
reasonableness in conduct, statutory authority and act of a third party, provided the oil spill
and/or gas flaring in the circumstance has infringed the rights to life, dignity of the person or
enjoyment of private and family life of inhabitants, as the case may be.
Going  further,  it  is  shown  that  the  correlation  between  environmental  pollution  and
fundamental  rights  violation  is  not  a  settled  one,  in  that  the  primary  legal  provisions  on
human rights issues in England and Wales as well  as in Nigeria do not comprehensively
82
 Bodo Community (n 4) [9]
83
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encapsulate the right to a clean environment. However, in chapters 2 and 6 of the research, it
has been shown that the courts, through case law, are open towards considering fundamental
rights enforcement as a tool for environmental protection. It is submitted that the denial of the
existence of the aforementioned rights,  and alleged economic marginalisation of locals in
Nigeria,  particularly  in  the  Niger  Delta  region,  are  responsible  for  a  series  of  protests,
sabotage on oil and gas facilities, civil unrests, and consequently under-development of the
region.
It is certain that approaching the courts via fundamental rights enforcement proceedings in
events of environmental pollution would facilitate a speedy dispensation of justice due to the
urgent nature for disposing such matters and the legal importance attached to such rights as
emphasized in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009.86 Equally, an
application for the enforcement of fundamental rights under the Rules cannot be affected by
any limitation statute whatsoever.87 It is in view of these advantages, among others, that the
researcher  elected  to  reconsider  environmental  litigation  but  within  the  framework  of
fundamental  rights  enforcement  with the  aim of  offsetting  some of  the  major  procedural
challenges (particularly on the standard of liability) encountered in the prevailing common
law and statutory liability proceedings as can be seen under the strict liability rule, nuisance,
negligence and various statutes relating to environmental liability as discussed.
A pertinent question to address is whether the advancement of fundamental rights relating to
environmental  pollution  issues  will  deter  TNCs  and/or  the  Federal  Government  from
activities that would harm the environment or disregarding environmental protection? It is
worth mentioning that fundamental rights, in view of their nature are conventionally given
enhanced  status  over  and  above  other  rights,  and  if  utilised  within  the  sphere  of
environmental  pollution  will  secure  higher  standards  of  environmental  liability  and
consequently promote a more quality ecological system. It is observed in chapter 688 that an
absolute  liability  regime  under  fundamental  rights  will  ensure  a  more  transparent,
86
 See FREP Rules 2009, Ord IV, r 2.
87
 ibid, Ord III, r 1.
88
 See figure 6.3 entitled ‘The Rationale for an Absolute Liability Regime’.
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accountable and efficient compensation regime, than the arbitrary and isolated application of
common law principles.  However, Bukola Saraki (in the Nigerian Senate) had maintained
that due to the lack of penalties and cost framework, much of the spills in Nigeria have been
‘ignored, neglected and in most cases never cleaned up or the sites remediated’.89 In the same
vein,  Atsegbua had observed that  ‘the  denial  of  the  existence  of  environmental  rights  is
primarily responsible for the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta area.’90 It follows that if
environmental  rights,  as  argued  in  this  research  are  given  consideration  by  the  Nigerian
courts,  and  judgments  are  enforced  by  relevant  government  agencies,  corruption  issues
relating to negligent handling of oil and gas pollution incidents by the Nigerian Government
and TNCs will be curbed to a high degree.
In view of the complex nature of the concept of ‘human rights’, a conscious attempt is made
to differentiate between human rights and fundamental rights, and to demystify both terms.
Whilst the former is considered an umbrella concept, capturing a wide range of rights; both
enforceable  and unenforceable  rights,91 fundamental  rights are rights only recognised and
enforced  by  legal  instruments  and  governments  due  to  their  significance.  For  example,
Chapter  IV  of  the  Nigerian  Constitution  focusing  on  enforceable  rights  is  entitled  as
‘Fundamental Rights’, connoting the significance and sacredness of the rights therein. Again,
the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009 in Nigeria (the FREP Rules),
defined the term, ‘Fundamental Right’ as ‘any of the rights provided for in Chapter IV of the
Constitution, and includes any of the rights stipulated in the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act’,92 meanwhile ‘human rights’, according
to the FREP Rules, ‘include fundamental rights’,93 and human rights in this context could be
89
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linked  with  conventions,  treaties  and  policy  documents  promoting  rights  which  can  be
persuasive  in  arguments  for  fundamental  rights  proceedings.  For  example,  under  the
Preamble to the Fundamental  Rights (Enforcement  Procedure) Rules 2009 in Nigeria,  the
courts are expected to give credence to regional, international and other bills of rights for the
purpose  of  advancing  the  applicant’s  rights  and  freedoms.94 This  does  not  necessarily
presuppose that such bills of rights are enforceable; but they contain human rights provisions.
The conundrum relating to the significance and use of the aforesaid terms is discussed in
chapter 2 of this research.95 It is admitted that the terms are still used interchangeably without
being seen as a misnomer; perhaps it is an issue of legal jurisprudence based on choice of
terms,  perception,  the  jurisdiction  in  question  and the  context  which  it  is  being  applied.
Nevertheless,  this  researcher  is  obliged  to discuss  ‘human rights’  because  of the popular
usage of the term to refer to ‘rights’ as a whole, but the current research is inclined toward
advancing environmental pollution incidents as a matter of fundamental rights violation.
Utilising  fundamental  rights  enforcement  proceedings  as  a  legal  tool  in  environmental
pollution  litigation  is  not  without  challenges.96 Whilst  observing  the  jurisdiction  of  the
European Court on Human Rights as well as the English Courts, it is shown that the courts do
retain substantial discretion in over-ruling individual rights in a system of priorities where the
economic  benefits  of  the state  is  involved.  In  essence,  the  courts  are  obliged to  strike a
balance  between  the  interest  of  the  individual  and  that  of  government  in  cases  for  the
enforcement  of  Convention  rights,  thereby  anchoring  liability  on  the  ‘reasonableness’  of
conducts of public authorities. This is affirmed by the Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights in the case of Hatton and others v United Kingdom,97 and later reaffirmed
by the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) in the English case of Marcic v Thames Water
 ibid.
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Utilities Ltd.98 The aforesaid approach is otherwise referred to as the doctrine of the Margin
of Appreciation as first developed by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Powell and Rayner v UK.99 
It is submitted that the doctrine of the margin of appreciation100 as reflected in decided cases
discussed  in  the  body  of  the  research  is  capable  of  frustrating  successful  pursuit  of
fundamental rights, in that fundamental rights, due to their sacred nature, should be given
higher priority over economic issues and must not be seen to be undermined on the grounds
of profit-making by the State. This, raises a big question mark on the ‘significance’ of the
Convention  rights,  and  generates  the  need  for  further  considerations  on  the  difference
between liability under the Convention’s rights and common law tort principles relating to
environmental pollution as discussed in the research. Hence, it is asked: why are Convention
rights generally adjudged to be of higher status to other rights if liability for breach of such
rights is predicated on the ‘reasonableness of conduct’ of public authorities or on the margin
of appreciation principle? It is shown in chapter 2 of the research that in case-law analysis,
the same measure of liability applied in the law of nuisance and negligence is deployed in
determining violation  of  Convention  rights  in  England and Wales  as  encapsulated  in  the
Human Rights Act 1998.
A critical analysis of some of the problems encountered in fundamental rights enforcement
proceedings are discussed, and one of these is the ‘economic factor’. It is noted that most of
the  European  Court  of  Human Rights  cases  mentioned  in  chapter  2  of  this  research  are
predicated  on Article  8  of  the  European Convention on Human Rights  and Fundamental
Freedoms (Hereinafter ‘the Convention rights’)101 which borders on the right to respect for
individuals’ private and family life, his home and his correspondence, and the grounds under
98
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which such rights can be interfered with were mentioned to include: national security, public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others as well as the for the economic well-being of
the country.102 A similar provision to that of Article 8(1) of the Convention rights in Nigeria
can be found in section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution (right to private and family life) and
the same exceptions applicable to Article 8(1) as seen in Article 8(2) of the Convention rights
are equally attached to the right to private and family life as seen in section 45(1)(a) and (b)
of the Nigerian Constitution, except the defence relating to the ‘economic well-being of the
state’  which  is  clearly  missing  in  the  Nigerian  Constitution.  This,  as  argued,  ordinarily
presupposes that  the individual’s  right to private  and family life  in Nigeria  could not  be
interfered with for the purposes of the ‘economic benefits’ of the state (economic grounds).
Despite the absence of this defence, it is theoretically explained in chapter 3 that due to the
benefits  which  government  derives  from  oil  and  gas  activities,  the  enforcement  of
fundamental rights relating a safe environment have been dimmed.
Furthermore, it is mentioned that the lack of public awareness on environmental matters has
affected  the  pursuit  of  fundamental  rights  relating  to  a  safe  environment.  Due  to  the
significance  and  intricate  nature  of  this  challenge,  chapter  4  of  this  research  has  been
dedicated to it, taking into cognisance relevant international treaties, domestic laws in Nigeria
as well as in England and Wales. It is concluded that the lack of access to environmental
information, which includes crucial environmental education in schools, public participation
in environmental decision-making as well as access to environmental justice have truncated
the enforcement of fundamental rights to a clean environment. In view of this, this research
proffered solutions with a view to expanding the frontiers of fundamental rights enforcement
with regard to oil and gas pollution incidents in Nigeria.
Going further to the focal point of this research, which borders on the standard of liability
obtainable  in  fundamental  rights  enforcement  proceedings  relating  to  environmental
pollution, the research delved into issues of state responsibility and environmental protection.
The research critically examined the interplay of national and international laws with a view
to  ascertaining  the  measure  of  liability  obtainable  in  legal  proceedings  relating  to
environmental  pollution.  Liability  principles  under the Oil  Pipelines  Act 2004 (OPA) are
generically utilised as the benchmark for standards of liability in the Nigerian environmental
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liability regime, particularly for compensation claims relating to oil spills, and this hovers
around principles of the torts of nuisance, negligence and strict liability doctrine as discussed
in Chapter 1 of this thesis. This latter position was corroborated by Mr Akenhead in the Bodo
Community case103 to the effect that ‘there is a sufficiently comprehensive code within the
OPA to cover the key aspects of the whole process involved in the pipelines,’104 and that the
statutory  scheme  of  the  OPA retains  a  wider  scope  than  the  common  law principles  in
nuisance,  negligence  and  the  rule  in  Ryland  v  Fletcher.105 Nevertheless,  the  aforesaid
common law principles, underpins the applicable measure of liability found in the various
statutory regimes relating to environmental liability for oil and gas activities.
At an international level, the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Argentina
v Uruguay106 (hereinafter  ‘the  Pulp  Mills  Case’),  serves  as  a  pointer  on  the  standard  of
liability involved. The primary obligation according to the Stockholm Declaration and other
significant world treaties is that states must take responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction and control do not cause damage outside of their jurisdiction, and where
damages occur due to activities of states, states will have to cooperate to develop further the
international  law regarding liability  and compensation  for victims of pollution  caused by
activities within the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdictions;
and in line with the Pulp Mills Case, the ICJ observed that the principle of prevention, as a
customary rule has its origins in the due diligence that is required of a state in its territory,
and according to  the  ICJ,  such principle  ‘is  now part  of  the  corpus of  international  law
relating to the environment’.107 It is submitted that the element of ‘due diligence’ is a key
requirement which the defendant must raise to escape liability in the tort of negligence.
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Another  remarkable  international  document  regarding  liability  for  oil  pollution,  is  the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (later revised and
amended in 1992), which provides that a ship owner is strictly liable for the damage caused
to a sufferer of an oil spill, and the same exceptions under which a defendant can absolve
liability under the strict liability doctrine are in line with those listed in the Convention except
the defence of statutory authority.108 This is understandable since such a defence could not be
applied at the international level as a single state would not be obliged under international
law to permit pollution of any sort. The question to ask is: what do we stand to achieve in
discussing  liability  as  a  whole  in  a  research  that  is  fundamental  rights  based?  The  fact
remains  that:  discussing  the  standard  of  liability  obtainable  in  fundamental  rights
enforcement proceedings without a focus on ordinary liability principles would render the
research nugatory. In examining liability for ordinary claims and the bottlenecks involved,
explains the need for higher responsibility on the part of polluters which fundamental rights
proceedings potentially offers.
It is proposed that there is no incompatibility between incidents of environmental pollution
and fundamental rights violations. Whilst the Nigerian Constitution under Chapter IV made
provisions for the rights to life, dignity of the human person, and the right to private and
family life, Article 24 of the African Charter (which is now a municipal law in Nigeria) is
more explicit and direct on the fundamental right to a safe environment. It provides that ‘all
peoples  shall  have  the  right  to  a  general  satisfactory  environment  favourable  to  their
development’.109 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Fundamental  Rights  (Enforcement
procedure) Rules 2009, under Order II Rule 1 recognises provisions in the African Charter as
‘fundamental’  alongside the fundamental rights provisions contained in Chapter IV of the
Nigerian Constitution.
The aforesaid rights have been theoretically described in the current research as ‘absolute
rights’,  in  that  looking  at  the  various  exceptions  or  conditions  under  which  they  can  be
infringed,  there  is  no such exception  that  would exonerate  environmental  polluters  if  the
rights are to be interpreted from a human rights perspective. This is further buttressed by the
108
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judgment of the Federal High Court (Benin Division) in Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum
Development Company Nig Ltd110 to the effect that section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Associated
Gas Re-Injection Act,111 as well as  section 1 of the Associated Gas Re-Injection (continued
flaring of Gas) Regulations, section 1.43 of 1984, under which gas flaring may be permitted
are inconsistent with the applicant’s rights to life and or dignity of human person as captured
in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution respectively, and articles 4, 16 and
24 of the African Charter, having regard to the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution and
the fundamental nature of the rights captured under the African Charter.112 This automatically
suppresses  the  traditional  defence  of  ‘statutory  authority’  commonly  furnished  by  oil
operators  in  environmental  pollution  claims.  It  follows  that,  the  absolute  nature  of  the
aforementioned guaranteed rights can only be argued within the framework of fundamental
rights based arguments on environmental issues, but not with the other circumstances clearly
indicated by the Constitution as exceptions.113
It  is further maintained that at the regional level,  the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the
African Commission in a handful of cases have utilised a standard of liability relating to
environmental pollution damage, even within a human rights perspective that is in line with
the requirement of the tort of negligence. It is shown that states must exercise ‘vigilance and
diligence’ in their handling of environmental matters in order not to violate environmental
rights. The ECOWAS Court whilst putting blame on governments’ negligence on handling
environmental issues, was specific on its measure of liability in the case of  Socio-Economic
Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v The Federal Republic of  Nigeria,114  when it
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said that ‘it is this omission to act, to prevent damage and to hold accountable, environmental
polluters that has characterised the violations of the Charter rights’.115 It is submitted that this
latter position of the court is in line with the standard of liability in the tort of negligence.
Furthermore,  whilst  drawing  an  analogy  with  the  Indian  jurisdiction  with  regards  to  the
measure of liability obtainable in breach of fundamental rights in environmental pollution
incidents, the Supreme Court of India observed in  MC Mehta v Union of India,116 that an
enterprise engaged in inherently dangerous activities which poses threat to health and safety
of inhabitants owes an absolute duty to the community to ensure that no harm results  to
anyone. In essence, Indian courts have interpreted the constitutional right to life to include
environmental protection,117 and it  is in line with the  MC Mehta case and others that the
argument  for  an  absolute  liability  is  raised  in  the  Nigerian  jurisdiction  through  the
instrumentality of the Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter, whilst drawing judicial
support from the judgment of  Jonah Gbemre at the Federal High Court in chapter 6 of the
research. 
A further question on the argument for absolute liability is whether the polluter will be liable
for  breach  of  environmental  rights  where  the  pollution  incident  is  traceable  to  acts  of
sabotage by third parties? It is worth noting that the Federal High Court in Jonah Gbemre did
not tackle the issue.  However,  in  FA Akpan & Anor v Royal Dutch Shell  & Anor,118 the
second plaintiff (Melieudefensie) moved for a declaratory judgment whilst making reference
to the Jonah Gbemre case in a Dutch Court to the effect that SPDC was liable for affecting
Akpan’s  (first  plaintiff)  right  to  physical  integrity  due  to  the  contamination  of  his
environment. The District Court of The Hague, in turning down the request, reasoned inter
alia, that in  Gbemre, the Court ruled that SPDC had infringed a human right by its ‘active
115
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conduct’ by deliberately flaring gas during a long period, whereas, in the Akpan case, SPDC
could not be blamed for any active conduct, except negligence. Noting that there have been
no Nigerian rulings in which an event of sabotage by third parties is considered to be an
infringement  of  a  human  right.119 The  position  of  the  District  Court  of  Hague,  deserves
support.  Notwithstanding,  the  current  argument  for  absolute  liability  is  anchored  in  the
fundamental nature of the rights captured in Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution, and in
this regard, it is maintained that government owes a duty to preserve the aforesaid rights, and
this entails securing oil and gas facilities in order not to violate rights of law-abiding citizens.
In view of the aforesaid, particularly with regard to the  Akpan case above, it is maintained
that  liability  under  environmental  rights enforcement  will  be stricter  than the measure of
liability as obtainable under the strict liability rule.
It is admitted that the limitation of the argument in the current research lies in the fact that the
Judgment of the Federal High Court in Jonah Gbemre is subject to further validity test in that
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court are yet to make similar rulings on that same
position.
Methodology
Chatterjee has given a comprehensive overview of what a research design connotes. He states
that ‘Research design is concerned with the structure, plan and method(s) of investigation
with a view to reaching acceptable answers to research questions’,120 and one of the most
important  objectives  of  a  research  is  to  ‘collect  information  with  a  view  to  solving
problems’.121 In the current research, information is collated to test some hypotheses, and the
most significant of all in the current research, is to examine ‘Whether the doctrine of absolute
liability may be applied to the issue of the protection of the environment when the protection
has been disregarded by TNCs within the ambit  of fundamental rights enforcement’.  It is
observed that victims of environmental pollution in Nigeria customarily seek for legal redress
relying on common law torts principles and statutory liability provisions, and these methods,
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as observed could no longer sustain an effective redress of recurrent injuries  suffered by
inhabitants of oil pollution areas and serious ecological harm caused by activities of oil and
gas exploration and production in Nigeria by oil operators, particularly in the Niger Delta
Region. A group of issues have been identified by the researcher as impediments to effective
environmental justice, and as observed earlier with particular concern, are the numerous legal
defences raised by the oil operators to escape liability, particularly the defences of ‘statutory
authority’ and ‘act of a stranger’.
Morris and Murphy, whilst commenting on the importance of legal research methodologies
reasoned that ‘there is no one right methodology or perfect methodology and you may find
that your work incorporates one or more methodologies depending on the nature and needs of
your research.’122 The current research utilised a mixed method of Black Letter Law, Socio-
Legal and a Comparative Legal Analysis approaches in exploring the gaps in knowledge as
well as addressing and testing the aforementioned hypotheses.
The researcher basically utilised a black letter law approach (or the doctrinal method) in the
sense that there is a substantial  reliance on case law, scholarly journals,  articles,  statutes,
principles  of  law123to  systematically  establish  the  correlation  and  consistency  between
environmental  pollution and human rights violation  as well  as the absolute  nature of the
rights  to  a  pollution-free  environment  (environmental  rights).  Initial  effort  is  made  to
establish  the  premise  that  environmental  pollution  would inevitably  infringe  fundamental
rights of victims and then the key principles of liability under common law torts and statutes
are applied to such environmental breaches on one hand, and a further consideration is given
to constitutional guaranteed rights and fundamental rights in the African Charter relating to
environmental protection with a view to ascertaining the measure of liability on the other. In
this  vein,  Morris  and  Murphy whilst  explaining  the  nature  of  Black  Letter  or  Doctrinal
Analysis methodology aptly observed that:
The role of the black letter lawyer is to bring consistency and coherence
to a set of rules that might appear at first glance to be an unrelated or
jumbled  mass…once  the  premise  is  discerned,…then  the  law  can  be
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assessed  for  compliance  with  relevant  principle(s)  and  explained
according to that framework.124
Morris and Murphy observed that the Black Letter or Doctrinal  Analysis ‘focuses almost
entirely on law’s own language of statutes and case law to make sense of the legal world’, 125
and this is basically carried out by way of deductive reasoning and arguments by analogy.126
In the same vein, Hutchinson had observed that: 
The  doctrinal  method  is  normally  a  two-part  process  involving  both
locating the sources of the law and then interpreting and analysing the
text…this step involves the use of reasoning and problem solving skills
such as deductive logic, inductive reasoning and analogy.127 
It is shown in the course of the research that apart from the African Charter128 which clearly
provides  for  the  right  to  a  ‘satisfactory  environment’,  the  fundamental  right  to  a  clean
environment  is  inductively  derived from the  rights  to  life,  dignity  of  human  person and
private and family life, and in this regard, analogies were drawn from case law, depicting
how the courts have expansively and creatively interpreted the aforesaid rights to include the
right to a safe environment.
Whilst  showcasing the difference between Black letter  law and the Socio-legal  approach,
Morris and Murphy maintained that the socio-legal method looks beyond legal doctrine to
understand  law  as  a  social  phenomenon.  In  view  of  this,  most  legal  researchers  have
considered  the  socio-legal  approach  as  ‘law  in  action’  rather  than  ‘law  in  books’.129
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Conversely, Hutter had observed that the latter position is not to conclude that socio-legal
studies ignore the law in books.130 It should be made clear that socio-legal studies tend to
express the practical application of the law in relation to prevailing social needs rather than
the ordinary wordings of law or books. In relation to the current research, it has been shown
that in most cases, courts have given a more creative and expansive interpretation of certain
fundamental  rights  provisions  to  curb  social  problems  relating  to  dangerous  industrial
activities affecting inhabitants, even if it could be argued that legislators never contemplated
on the application of such rights to address environmental problems. Also, it is recognised
that  the lack of public  awareness on environmental  matters  has significantly  affected the
health  and  general  well-being  of  inhabitants  in  pollution  prone  areas  as  well  as  the
enforcement of fundamental rights. This discussion, as raised in chapter 4 is showcased to
reflect how social problems influence the law-making.
It is worth noting that the current research brings basic principles under the law of torts and
human rights law into environmental law. It is shown that these aforementioned areas of law
retain principles and practices that relate to the protection of the environment. The current
research is socio-legal in nature because of its objective to enforce social regulation within
the  ambit  of  environmental  pollution.  It  directs  attention  to  the  intervention  of  the  state
through  law131 and  specifically  focuses  on  the  need for  the  government  and judiciary  to
implement fundamental rights to life, dignity of the person and private and family life with a
view to protecting the environment. 
Hutter observed that socio-legal scholars are particularly concerned with comprehending the
social, political and economic processes that bring law about and shape its form and content
as regards enforcement and its daily impact.132 This latter feature of the socio-legal study is
clearly reflected and deployed in chapter 3 of the research which focuses on some of the
numerous challenges encountered by victims of environmental pollution in enforcing their
fundamental rights to a safe environment. At the forefront of these hurdles is the economic
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reason, which is explained to influence the disposition of judges in such a manner that dims
the effective enforcement of environmental rights due to the benefits that the state derives
from activities of the oil and gas industry,133 and this briefly associates the research to the
jurisprudential  perspective  of  ‘Law  and  Economics’,  which  explains  the  behaviours  of
stakeholders  in  the  legal  system.134 Legislators  are  seen  to  inculcate  certain  defences  in
legislation under which oil operators would run smoothly with limited environmental liability
bottlenecks and judges seem to recognise such moves for the economic benefit of the state.
The research took into consideration the measure of liability relating to fundamental rights
enforcement  proceedings  as  regards  environmental  pollution  incidents  in  three  major
common law jurisdictions, bearing in mind that every jurisdiction retains its peculiar features
and  legal  background,  defined  by  economic,  political  and social  factor:  notwithstanding,
issues of human rights are beyond national boundaries and deserves universal approach.135 In
the current argument for absolute liability relating to environmental pollution, the researcher
maintains similar position with  The District Court of The Hague in  FA Akpan & Anor v
Royal Dutch Shell & Anor,136 with little reservations. In that case, the second plaintiff moved
for a declaratory judgment whilst making reference to the  Jonah Gbemre case in a Dutch
Court, that SPDC is liable for affecting Akpan’s (first plaintiff) right to physical integrity due
to the contamination of his environment. The District Court of The Hague, in dismissing the
request, reasoned inter alia, that in the Gbemre case, the Court ruled that SPDC had infringed
a  human  right  by  its  ‘active  conduct’  by  deliberately  flaring  gas  during  a  long  period.
Meanwhile in Akpan (case at issue), SPDC cannot be blamed for any active conduct except
negligence; noting that there have been no Nigerian ruling in which event of sabotage by
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third parties is considered to be an infringement of a human right.137 Theoretically, the author
maintains that there is reasonable argument for absolute liability under fundamental rights
enforcement against environmental polluters as shown in chapter 6 of the research,138 but in
practical  terms,  the  Nigerian  courts  will  take  into  consideration  acts  of  third  parties  in
determining liability. Notwithstanding, it is observed throughout the research that there is a
stricter liability under fundamental rights to a clean environment than could be witnessed
under the strict liability rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 
Whilst the research is centrally focused in the Nigerian jurisdiction, related aspects of the law
in England and Wales as well as the Indian jurisdictions were given credence, noting that all
three jurisdictions retain a common law background and possess several similarities in their
legal systems; Nigeria and India, being former British colonies. This explains the utilisation
of the Comparative Legal Analysis Methodology. The key purpose of utilising this approach
in the instant research is to look outside the Nigerian jurisdiction into almost similar legal
jurisdictions to see how victims of environmental pollution are treated within the framework
of fundamental rights enforcement. This opens the mind of the researcher to new ways or best
practices in handling environmental pollution from a human right angle.139 Also, principles of
international law regarding environmental liability, as a whole, are considered. This has been
useful  in  the  series  of  comparative  analyses  and  arguments  made,  since  the  national
jurisdictions considered in the research are member states of some of the conventions and
treaties considered. 
The researcher has explored the issues and challenges raised in the current research through
literature search. Both primary and secondary sources are utilised. The key primary sources
are case law, statutes, regulations,  treaties,  government policy documents and websites of
various  institutions.  The researcher  visited  the  Federal  High Court  in  Edo State,  Nigeria
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Gbemre relied upon as the case study in the current research, being the first of its kind and
due to various reports surrounding the judgment, particularly on allegations that the case file
is missing and the judge was sacked in view of the significance and underlying political and
economic  impact  of  the  judgment.  On the  secondary  sources,  there  is  heavy reliance  on
opinions of legal experts, books and published articles, including newspapers.
According to Chatterjee, ‘the purpose of a literature search is not to look for new ideas but to
find out what has already been explored in a related area and under what conditions’.140 It is
observed  that  the  relationship  between  environmental  pollution  and  fundamental  rights
violation in Nigeria has not been given much attention that it deserves by academics, bearing
in mind the increasing reports of incidents of environmental pollution which are clearly seen
to affect well-known constitutional rights of victims. It is equally noted that no substantive
information exists  on the critical  appraisal  of the measure of liability  that  could apply to
actions of fundamental rights enforcement within the perspective of environmental pollution
in comparison with existing principles of liability in common law torts and statutory liability
relating  to  environmental  pollution  in  Nigeria.  The  shortage  or  modicum  of  academic
information in the present area of study is equally explained on the failure of the Nigerian
Courts to give adequate judgments linking environmental pollution incidents to fundamental
rights violation. It is trite that by identifying the gaps in the existing literature, the researcher
would be best placed to make original contribution to the field of study.141 Having regard to a
series of legal  analyses in succeeding chapters,  the argument  for an absolute  liability  for
fundamental  rights  violation  within  the  sphere  of  environmental  pollution  incidents  was
vividly showcased, particularly in chapter 6 of the research.
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                                                        CHAPTER 1
REFLECTING ON THE DOCTRINES OF STRICT AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITIES
1.1   Introduction
The doctrines of strict and absolute liabilities are basic principles of law that can be utilised in
determining the liability of environmental polluters. The terms ‘strict’ and ‘absolute’ appear
to have a synonymous usage in ordinary legal interpretations and their meanings seem not to
be ambiguous. For example, ‘strict liability; absolute liability; liability without fault’ are seen
as  synonymous  phrases  by  Garner  to  mean  ‘liability  that  does  not  depend  upon  actual
negligence  or  intent  to  harm,’1 but  the  aforementioned  terms  are  complex  when brought
before legal  minds for interpretations,  particularly in  the context  of issues relating  to the
determination of environmental liability. The jurisdiction in which the doctrines of strict and
absolute liabilities are used has significant legal effect on the context and interpretation given
to them. Notwithstanding, it would be a legal misnomer to use both ‘strict’ and ‘absolute’
liabilities  as  interchangeable  terms.  Waite  had maintained  that  in  absolute  liability,  ‘it  is
unnecessary  to  prove either  causation  or  fault  on the  part  of  the  defendant,’  while  strict
liability ‘requires proof of causation but not fault’.2 Contrary to the connotation of ‘no-fault’
liability  given to  the  strict  liability  rule,  Reid  maintained that  ‘the  assumption  that  strict
liability is “stricter” than fault based liability is implicit,’3 and that such assumption should
not go unchallenged owing to the fact that ‘codified provisions imposing strict liability often
permit a range of defences’.4 These discrepancies in the meanings of the aforesaid terms,
makes the current reflection a worthwhile task.
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This chapter briefly reflects on the doctrines of strict and absolute liabilities by considering
their legal meanings and usage in English law, as English law forms a substantial part of the
Nigerian legal  system.5 This is  done by taking into cognisance case law and opinions of
various legal experts, but more on a practical perspective rather than theoretical. The essence
of delving into these legal terms at this initial stage is to expunge the likelihood of using these
terms  interchangeably  and  possibly  draw  a  clear  line  in-between  the  terms.  But  more
importantly, this is done to respond, in part, to one of the key hypotheses in this research
‘whether the current techniques of measuring liability, particularly under tort law are clear in
Nigeria’.
Also, the current ‘reflection’ is aimed at laying a proper foundation and a skeletal preview of
what is intended to be analysed in the later part of this research, thereby avoiding the use of
strange  legal  concepts  and  principles  of  law.  The  analysis  contained  in  this  chapter
substantially  underpins  and  explains  the  basis  for  the  argument  for  an  absolute  liability
against oil transnational corporations (TNCs) in chapter 6, which affirms that on a scale of
zero to ten (0-10), where 5 represents ‘strict liability’ and 10 represents ‘absolute liability’,
environmental liability under fundamental rights enforcement, should be pinned under 9, with
limited  space  left  for  illegal  activities  of  ‘third  parties’  where  pollution  is  shown to  be
manifestly unavoidable in events relating to illegal oil bunkering and acts of sabotage by
vandals.6 But even with this standpoint, it is argued that liability ought to be absolute in that
such  activities  of  ‘third  parties’  are  foreseeable,  and if  TNCs are  proactive  and diligent
enough in curbing pollution, they would forestall such acts of third parties.7
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Furthermore, the current chapter highlights the key legal differences between the doctrine of
strict liability and other related terms such as nuisance and negligence.8 This is done as the
aforementioned terms share certain similar ingredients with the strict liability rule. It should
be borne in mind that the current research is focused on determining whether the doctrine of
absolute liability may be applied to the issue of the protection of the environment when the
protection  has  been  disregarded  by  TNCs  within  the  ambit  of  fundamental  rights
enforcement. In view of this, tortious liability principles discussed in the current chapter are
not  given  too  much  detail  since  it  is  a  preliminary  discussion  for  guidance  and  cross
referencing  on  the  critical  analysis  of  the  supposed  measure  of  liability  that  would  be
deployed in violation of environmental rights in Nigeria. 
The rationale for relying on English cases in the current chapter is informed on the basis that
the key tortious liability principles discussed herein have their origins in the English legal
system and hitherto remain persuasive in Nigerian courts,9 and in most court proceedings on
environmental liability in Nigeria, English common law principles in the torts of nuisance,
negligence and strict liability form the benchmark for determining liability.10
1.2   The Common Law Doctrine of Strict Liability: A Brief Background 
The  common  law  doctrine  of  strict  liability  which  is  popularly  linked  with  the  much
celebrated case of Rylands v Fletcher11 was known ab-initio by legal writers and the Courts as
the law of nuisance.12 The doctrine of strict liability emerged in the 19th century as a result of
immense  growth  in  economic  activities,  resulting  from  the  commercial  and  industrial
8
 These terms are briefly discussed under figure 1.4
9
 Lee  J  McConnell,  ‘Establishing  liability  for  multinational  companies  in  parent/subsidiary
relationships’ (2014) 16 ELR 50, 53.
10
 The Bodo Community v The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd  [2014] EWHC
1973 (TCC) [5].
11
 [1861-73] All ER Rep 1 (HL).
12
 Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather  Plc [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL), 298-300 (Lord
Goff).
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revolution. Both public and private investors were engaged in industrial activities on their
lands, which in some instances caused discomfort and often damage to neighbouring land
users. The strict liability rule was therefore established by the courts to address such damages
and discomforts, the courts deemed it justifiable that if an individual uses his land to make
profits and in the course of such use, caused damage to an adjourning user, the user of the
land  should  be  ‘strictly  liable’  for  the  consequential  damages  caused  to  his  neighbours
without any need for his neighbours to establish fault. This is the focal point of the doctrine
of strict liability, it is otherwise known as ‘liability without fault’, since the need to prove any
fault  on the  part  of  the  defendant  is  not  required,  so long as  the  claimant  suffered  loss.
However, Nolan had observed that opinions differ as to the intentions of those who created
this rule.13
In the case of Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Plc14 the doctrine of strict
liability  was  described  as  a  sub-species  of  the  law of  private  nuisance.  A succession  of
academics have maintained this view.15 Conversely, Lord Porter in  Read v J  Lyons & Co
Ltd,16 has assumed liability in the law of tort to principles of negligence. This was evident
when he said that:
 Normally at the present time in an action of tort for personal injuries if there is
no negligence there is no liability. This rule, however, the appellant contends
that there are certain exceptions, one of the best known of which is to be found
under the principle laid down in Rylands v Fletcher.17
However, there are certain features relating to the doctrine of strict liability as established in
Rylands  v  Fletcher which  makes  it  unique  and  different  from  both  the  laws  of  private
13
 Donal Nolan, ‘The distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher’ (2005) 121 LQR 421, 422.
14
 Cambridge Water Co Ltd (n 12).
15
 Nonal (n 13)
16




nuisance and negligence, and therefore deserves to be given consideration.18 Also, the torts of
nuisance  and negligence,  in  some aspects,  share  common features  in  law.  All  these,  are
adequately addressed in this chapter.
1.3   The Nature and Scope of the Doctrine of Strict Liability
The strict liability rule, as observed, is not straightforward, as the courts and legal experts
have taken different views in relation to certain aspects of the rule.19 It is on this note that
consideration  is  given to  the  original  facts  of  the  case  and the  position  of  the  courts  in
Rylands v Fletcher and other subsequent cases in order to decipher the scope of the doctrine.
The strict liability rule and other related terms are analysed with a view to comparing the
measure  of  liability  obtainable  in  them  with  the  measure  of  liability  obtainable  in
environmental  rights  enforcement  in  Nigeria,  England  and  Wales,  as  well  as  the  Indian
jurisdictions. It is observed that the standard of liability in environmental rights enforcement
in England and Wales is synonymous to that obtainable in the common law tort principles of
nuisance and negligence as shown in the English case of  Marcic v Thames Water Utilities
Ltd.20 Meanwhile, environmental rights issues are treated differently in Nigeria and India with
a stricter standard of liability than is obtainable in the above mentioned common law torts.21
Whilst describing the dynamic nature of the strict liability rule, Nolan stated that, ‘the waxing
and waning of the rule’s popularity has been accompanied by shifting perceptions as to the
intentions of those who created it’.22 In the same vein, Waite submitted that: 
18
 The differences between strict liability and other related torts have been fully discussed in the body of 
this work, particularly in figure 1.4.
19
 Nonal (n 13)
20
 [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42. This case is discussed under figure 2.3 in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
See also figure 6.4.1 on the measure of liability obtainable in breach of Convention rights relating to a safe 
environment.
21
 See figure 6.6 on ‘The Measure of liability in Fundamental Rights Violation Claims: A Brief 
Comparative Analysis between the Nigerian and Indian Jurisdictions’.
22
 Nonal (n 13) 421.
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In 1860, as Rylands contemplated the new reservoir constructed to supply
water to Ainsworth Mill, he did not know that he had triggered a chain of
events  which  was  to  have  a  profound,  if  chaotic,  effect  on  the
development of the common law of tort.23 
It is against this background that attention is given to the ‘chain of events’ embodied in the
strict liability rule as established in the Rylands case. In Rylands v Fletcher,24 the defendants
who lived near Ainsworth in Lancashire had a water mill which they wanted to improve.
They obtained permission from relevant authorities in order to construct a reservoir, and they
retained expert engineers to carry out the construction. In the course of the construction of the
reservoir the engineers discovered some disused mine shafts and failed to seal them properly.
When the reservoir was filled with water, the water flowed through the shafts and flooded the
plaintiff’s coal mine, causing damage.25 The case was first taken to the Court of Exchequer
which found in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff consequently took the case to the Court
of Exchequer Chamber via a writ of error and obtained judgement. The defendants further
appealed to the House of Lords and the case was dismissed.
The decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber happened to expose the celebrated doctrine
of strict liability. Whilst delivering the Judgment, Blackburn J said:
…We think  that  the  rule  of  law is,  that  the  person who for  his  own
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not
do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape.26
The above meaning of strict liability as enunciated by Blackburn J contains certain elements
which this  research has  given considerable  attention  to,  but this  has  been done from the
perspective of oil and gas pollution activities, as the rule has equally found its way into the
23
 Andrew J Waite, ‘Deconstructing the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ (2006) 18 JEL 423.
24
 Rylands v Fletcher (n 11).
25
 Tony Weir, A CaseBook on Tort (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 453.
26
 Rylands (n 11).
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Nigerian legal system as shown in numerous cases dealing with environmental pollution,27
and more  recently  as  enunciated  by Mr Akenhead in  The Bodo Community v The Shell
Petroleum Development  Company of  Nigeria  Ltd,28 just  as  it  is  common knowledge that
‘Received English Law’ is a major source of Nigerian law.29 
Lord Cairns added a further requirement to that of Blackburn J in the same case of Rylands v
Fletcher which the claimant must prove to succeed. The additional requirement was that the
‘thing’ brought to the land must be a ‘non-natural’ use of the land.’30 
To fully appreciate the meaning of the strict liability rule as stated by Blackburn J in Rylands
v Fletcher, it is necessary to consider the basic elements of the tort, briefly. There are four
basic elements which are deducible both from Blackburn J. and Lord Cairns’s positions as
seen above in order for the claimant to succeed in any claim under strict  liability.  These
elements are now discussed.
1.3.1   The Bringing of the Thing to the Land
In order for a claimant to succeed in a case brought under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, the
claimant must show that the ‘thing’ which has caused damage was brought to the land by the
defendant(s). In essence, if the thing which has caused damage to the claimant is already
naturally present on the land then the defendant cannot be held liable under the rule of strict
liability as established in Rylands v Fletcher.31 This position has been affirmed by the English
courts  in a plethora of cases. One of such cases is the case of  Ellison v  The Ministry of
Defence32 where the plaintiffs  claimed damages for damage caused to their  land by flood
27
 Some of the landmark Nigerian cases bordering on the strict liability rule are discussed in figure 1.7.
28
 [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC) [5].
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30
 Chris Turner, Tort Law (2nd edn, Hooder Arnold 2007) 145. See also Rylands v Fletcher (n 11) [11] 
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31
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which was adjacent to Greenham Common airfield which was occupied by the defendants.
The Court dismissed the claimant’s claim on the grounds that the accumulated water was a
natural occurrence. This decision could have been different if the ‘accumulated water’ was
brought by the defendants. Another interesting fact is that the person who brings the thing on
to the land does not necessarily have to be the owner of the land, someone who is granted a
licence can equally fall within this principle,33 and this extension of the rule of strict liability
covers cases of oil companies who are mostly under the licence from government authorities. 
The crux in  this  aspect  of the doctrine  of  strict  liability  is  that  the defendant  must  have
brought  something  on  the  land  which  was  not  naturally  part  of  the  land  for  ‘its  own
purposes’. In the case of Dunne v North Western Gas Board34 the defendants were exonerated
from any liability in the escape of gas leading to explosion in highway which caused injury to
the plaintiff  since their  services to supply gas to customers were not for the ‘defendant’s
purposes’  but  for  the  public.35 An important  question  could  be  raised  regarding  whether
activities  of  oil  operators  are  for  the  interest  of  the  public  in  this  regard?  This  can  be
answered in two perspectives. It can be said that oil companies are involved in private; profit-
making  businesses,  and  as  such  could  be  considered  to  be  engaged  in  the  ‘defendant’s
purposes’ and therefore not for public interest. This latter position can be countered on the
grounds that proceeds of sales from oil and gas are utilised for the economic well-being of the
state, and such oil mining activities can be considered as a pursuit for public interest. That,
notwithstanding, could it be said that a defendant would escape liability only by showing that
its activities were for public benefit? 
It is observed that the position of the Court of Appeal in the Dunne case above is trite in law
but needs to be demystified in that the plaintiff’s claim centred on the torts of negligence,
nuisance  and  the  strict  liability  rule,  and  given  that  the  defendants’  undertakings  were
authorised by statute and defendants were found not to be negligent in injuries caused to the
 [1996] 81 BLR 101 (QB).
33
 Turner, Tort Law (n 28) 147.
34
 [1964] 2 QB (CA) 806.
35
 ibid 831[Seller LJ].
43
plaintiff, liability could not be established.36 It is submitted, having regard to the entire verdict
of the Court in  Dunne that the defendants were exonerated from liability basically on two
grounds-(a) that there was no negligence on the part  of the defendants37 and (b) that the
defendants’ activities were authorised under statute and therefore, they were not collecting
and  distributing  gas  for  their  ‘own purposes’,  but  for  purposes  authorised  by  the  State38
(which incidentally is for public good as shown in the facts of the case). In essence, liability
would  emanate  where  the  defendants  were  found  negligent,  even  if  their  activities  are
permitted by statute and are of a kind which is beneficial to the public. One may state that
there is no case law or statutory provision to the effect that a defence of ‘public interest’ does
exist or sustains a defendant without reference to the defence of statutory authority under the
strict liability rule.
In the light of the above, it would be probable to conclude that since oil and gas activities are
permitted by statute and proceeds from oil and gas sales are beneficial to the state, liability
would not hold in incidents of oil and gas pollution, except it is shown that there is a case of
negligence on the part of oil operators.39 This is distinguishable from the Rylands case where
defendants’ activities were carried out by an independent contractor solely acting for private
profits and without statutory obligation, even though the activities in that case were permitted
by law (that is, not illegally executed).
1.3.2   The Thing Likely to do Mischief if it Escapes
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  tort  of  strict  liability  is  basically  concerned  with  the
‘dangerous’  activities  of  the  defendant.40 It  is  to  be wondered  why the doctrine  of  strict
36
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liability is applicable to a defendant’s conduct which was permitted by law; that is, if ‘the
bringing to the land’ of the thing which has caused damage is allowed by the law of the place
where the damage is caused then why would a defendant be strictly liable for the aftermath
effects of such a ‘thing’? The response to this question is the foundation of the ‘foreseeability
test’. The foreseeability test in a claim brought under the rule of Rylands v Fletcher requires
that the court must decipher from the available evidence and the facts of the case that the
defendant  had knowledge,  or must have reasonably foreseen that  the ‘thing’ if  it  escapes
would cause damage,41 but remains negligent in the circumstance.
1.3.2.1 What is a Dangerous Thing?
An important question to address is: what is a dangerous thing? The phrase ‘dangerous thing’
in the context of strict liability doctrine and as it relates to environmental pollution can be
vague and ambiguous in the jurisprudence of tortious liability. In determining what amounts
to a dangerous thing, Rogers pointed out that the crux is to be able to ascertain whether the
‘thing’ at its escape would be likely to cause damage.42 It follows that, the scale of the risk
presented by the defendant43 must be taken into consideration to determine liability. Whilst
drawing an instance, Rogers submitted that ‘A box of matches or a glass of water do not
really fall within the rule, a million boxes of matches in a store or a reservoir may do so.’44
What should be bore in mind is that the likelihood of the thing to cause damage must not be
interpreted in isolation, it must be interpreted in line with the requirement of ‘non-natural
use’  of  land.45 Nevertheless,  the  dangerousness  of  the  ‘thing’  which  has  caused  damage
should be determined by a reliable body of scientific knowledge at the time of the escape.46 It
41
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 See figure 1.3.3 on the meaning of ‘non-natural user’.
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is  submitted  that  what  is  dangerous  could  be  informed  based  on  the  circumstances
surrounding the case in issue, and possibly the jurisdiction. The entire burden falls on the
court to determine what is dangerous, which could be obtained with regards to contemporary
considerable body of scientific knowledge.
A close analysis of Blackburn J’s judgment as enumerated by Rosalind English,47 reveals that
the  ‘thing’  which  is  brought  to  the  land  may  be  harmless  whilst  it  remains  within  the
defendant’s vicinity, but such harmless ‘thing’ can fall within the rule if it escapes and causes
damage  to  the  claimant.  This  therefore  implies  that  the  thing  itself  does  not  have  to  be
‘dangerous’ in its original form, for the ‘dangerousness’ of the thing will be determined by
the negative impacts which it will cause, bearing in mind the defendant’s knowledge on the
possibility of such a ‘thing’ to cause damage on its escape. Considerations on the defendant’s
state  of mind,  therefore plays an important  role  in establishing  liability  in cases of strict
liability under Rylands v Fletcher.48 This was complemented when Blackburn J said:
...  It  seems  but  reasonable  and  just  that  the  neighbour,  who  brought
something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless
to others so long as it is confined to his property, but which he knows to
be mischievous if it gets on to his neighbour’s shall be obliged to make
good the damage which ensues…49
The term ‘reasonable foreseeability’ depicts that the defendant will not be liable for damages
which he could not have reasonably foreseen.50 The dangerous things which are likely to
cause mischief in cases of strict liability have been mentioned to include but not limited to;
 Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (n 42).
47
 Rosalind English, ‘No fault liability; the Cambridge Water case’ (1993) JPEL 409-416.
48
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fire,  gas,  blasting  and munitions,  electricity,  noxious  fumes,  poisonous vegetation,  a  flag
pole, vibrations, and oil and petrol.51
It is useful to come across cases where pollution caused by gas and petrol were interpreted by
the courts as amounting to ‘dangerous things’ which fall within the scope of the strict liability
rule, since this work is concerned with the liability of polluters. In the case of  Batcheller v
Tunbridge Wells Gas Co,52 the defendants were the owners of a gas pipeline laid under a
high-way which was very close to a pipe supplying waters to the plaintiff’s  houses.  The
plaintiffs  were  entitled  to  a  declaration  by  the  court  preventing  further  contamination  or
pollution caused by the gas pipes of the defendants to the plaintiff’s water supply. In another
case of  Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK plc,53 proceedings arose as a result of a
number of explosions caused by a large fuel tank used by a number of oil companies. The
explosions  caused damages  to  the  claimants’  properties.  In  the  cause  of  the trial,  it  was
agreed that all damages sustained by the claimants were all a ‘foreseeable consequence’ of
the explosion.  There is  a  growing body of judicial  cases to  the fact  that  oil  and gas are
dangerous things, and there is no doubt that courts have taken judicial notice of this fact.
Furthermore, the Health and Safety Executive in the UK recognises gas and related harmful
chemicals as oil to be substances hazardous to health. 54
1.3.3    A Non-Natural Use of the Land
Another important element which the claimant is expected to establish in order to succeed in
a claim under the rule in Rylands is to establish that the ‘thing’ which has caused damage to
the claimant is a ‘non-natural user’ of the land, that is, the thing is not naturally part of the
defendants’ land. However, there are difficulties in establishing what actually amounts to a
51
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‘non-natural use of land’.55 Shields defined ‘natural’ to mean anything which exists by nature
and is not artificial, and that in a secondary sense it can also mean ‘that which is ordinary and
usual, even though it may be artificial’.56 From Shields’ definition, it is obvious that what
amounts to a ‘non-natural’ use of land will depend on the circumstances of the case before
the courts since the term is not conclusive.57
In the case of Read v J Lyons & co Ltd,58 Lord Porter briefly construed the meaning of the
concept of non-natural use when he said ‘…to bring the thing to the position in which it is
found is to make a non-natural use of that place’.59 It is apparent that Lord Porter was not
comfortable with the aforesaid meaning given to the concept of non-natural use of land, and
whilst acknowledging the varied opinions of Judges, he added:
For the present I need only say that each seems to be a question of fact
subject to a ruling of the Judge whether…the particular use can be non-
natural, and in deciding this question I think that all the circumstances of
the  time  and  place  and  practice  of  mankind  must  be  taken  into
consideration so that what might be regarded as…non-natural may vary
according to those circumstances.60
One important  determinant  of  the term ‘non-natural  use’ which has  been relied upon by
writers on strict liability was provided in the case of Rickards v Lothian61 by Lord Moulton
55
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who said that for the rule to apply ‘it must be some special use bringing with it increased
danger to others and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such use as is proper
for the general benefit of the community’.
In the case of Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Plc,62 the issue of non-
natural user was raised where the question of spillages of industrial effluent which affected
ground water were held not to be ‘non-natural’, owing to the fact that chemical spillages were
regarded  as  normal  in  the  particular  industry  at  the  time.  Ordinarily,  through  a  literal
interpretation of the meaning of ‘non-natural’, or from the above definitions, one could argue
that the spills of industrial effluents which affected ground water in the  Cambridge Water
case were a non-natural use of land. But this variation of judges in the course of interpreting
what amounts to a non-natural use of land is in line with Lord Porter’s position in the Read
case63 regarding the need to take into consideration ‘all the circumstances of the time and
place and practice of mankind’. It is submitted that this dynamic nature of the meaning of
‘non-natural’ is more largely dependent on the circumstances of the case at issue rather than a
rigid interpretation of the law.
From the foregoing, it is clear that for the rule to apply, the defendant must have brought the
‘dangerous thing’ for his special use, and on this note, even if the thing brought is dangerous
it can still be considered as a ‘natural use’ of the land insofar as it serves the community or it
is  for the public  use.  In essence,  liability  will  not be ‘strict’  if  the thing that has caused
damage is  recognised as being so desirable  that  it  will  almost  become obligatory for the
community to benefit from such ‘thing’.64 However, this position cannot be conclusive.
1.3.4   The Thing Must Actually Escape
One final element to establish in strict liability under  Rylands v Fletcher is that the thing
which has caused damage must escape from the defendant’s land to that of the claimant. This
element is necessary because accidents that will befall a claimant who is in the defendant’s
62
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land are totally excluded from the rule.65 This requirement appears to be direct and conclusive
but  there  is  the  possibility  of  the  courts  exercising  discretion  based  on  the  particular
circumstances of the case. However, a benchmark for enforcing this requirement has been set
in the case of  Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd66 when Viscount Simon said: ‘Escape… means
escape from a place which the defendant has occupation of, or control over, to a place which
is outside his occupation or control’. In this regard, once there is an escape, it does not matter
if the claimant does not share a common boundary with the defendant, what seems relevant to
establish liability is that the claimant has suffered damage as a natural consequence of the
escape.
1.3.4.1 Contributory or Joint Liability
One significant issue in environmental liability claims is: who can be sued in environmental
pollution incidents? It can be noted that in cases of oil spillage and gas flaring, liability can be
‘contributory’  or  ‘jointly  shared’  between  the  state  and  the  oil  operators.  That  is,  a
transnational corporation, can, by way of a defence in a strict liability claim allege that the
‘escape’ of oil or gas was as a result, partly of the negligence or the foreseeable act of the
state  government.  Blackburn  J  had  observed  in  Rylands that  the  strict  liability  principle
applies to ‘the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief.’67 It is appears to be settled that a licensee who had
accumulated the dangerous thing on the land of another would be liable  for any damage
arising from such accumulation. In  Westhoughton Coal and Cannel Company Ltd v Wigan
Coal Corporation Ltd,68 the test for liability was anchored on ‘control’. That is liability will
accrue to the person in control of the land. In the latter case, the Court of Appeal exonerated
the defendant from liability since the he had ceased to possess or control the right in land
sixteen years ago before the water flowing through a tunnel on the said land flooded the
65
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plaintiffs mine.69 In the same vein, it can be seen that in the case of Rylands v Fletcher, the
defendant  only  had  a  licence  from  the  relevant  authority  for  the  construction  of  the
reservoir.70 It  is worth noting that  the proper party to sue would basically  depend on the
prevailing circumstance and it could not be a settled matter in law. But for the State to escape
liability, it would be clear that it acted reasonably without negligence as a regulator or policy
maker. This latter position was affirmed by the then House of Lords in  Marcic v Thames
Water Utilities Ltd.71
In  Nigeria,  the  Nigerian  National  Petroleum  Corporation  (NNPC)  operates  in  joint
partnership with the major oil companies and this partnership is guided by production sharing
contracts.72Being that liability is circumstantial and the oil companies are operating under a
concession system as independent legal entities, it follows that the relevant government will
escape liability, if it can be inferred from available evidence that the State did take reasonable
steps as the regulator to truncate environmental damage or either enjoined oil operators to
fulfil their statutory obligations or contractually passed on the relevant obligations as part of
the concession agreement. The courts, suo moto, or on the application of a party can order for
joinder of parties in a lawsuit where it is obvious that a right to a relief sought by the plaintiff
can be established against such party or where a party is the alter ego of any injury suffered
or their action is ancillary or incidental to the cause of action and was a proper party even
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can be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.74Furthermore, the Nigerian
Oil Pipelines Act75 is instructive on issues of responsibility on oil pollution damage. Section
11(5)(a) of the Oil Pipelines Act provides that:
The holder of a licence shall pay compensation to any person whose land
or interest in land (whether or not it is land in respect of which the licence
has  been  granted)  is  injuriously  affected  by  the  exercise  of  the  right
conferred by the licence, for any such injurious affection not other-wise
made good.76 
It  is  pertinent  to  note  that  the  court  retains  substantial  discretion,  after  hearing  from the
parties or even on its own to order for joinder of a necessary party, provided the presence of
such party is necessary to completely determine all issues in the proceeding; and joinder of
parties can be made at any stage of the proceeding.77 It follows that all necessary parties must
be joined. Again, in most cases where there is a contractual nexus or a correlation in the
nature  of harm suffered,  the claimants  traditionally  join the government  and its  agencies
alongside the oil company directly involved in environmental pollution claims, provided such
government agents would be bound by the outcome of the lawsuit. The Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation in most cases is included as a necessary party owing to its stakes in oil
companies operating in the country as well as its regulatory role and as a primary stakeholder
in the Nigerian petroleum contract system.78 In the same vein, the Attorney General of the
Federation  is  usually  a  party  to  proceeding  due  to  its  executive  role  in  enforcing  court
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judgments, and this does not necessarily mean that the defendants will be interested in all the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs.79
There exists a plethora of judicial cases suggesting joint liability between government and oil
operators.  In the Nigerian case of  Jonah Gbemre v SPDC Nigeria Ltd and others,80 in a
matter of fundamental rights enforcement against the continuous gas flaring in the course of
oil extraction by the first defendant (SPDC), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
and the Attorney General of the Federation were included as proper parties, and the court
made direct judicial pronouncements affecting the aforementioned parties. This is in line with
the principle of contributory or joint liability as mentioned in the current research.
Having considered the basic elements which are necessary to establish a case of strict liability
in Rylands v Fletcher, it is important to briefly look at other related concepts in establishing
liability in cases of oil and gas pollution.  Although, the majority of precedents which are
being referred to in establishing the elements of strict liability are not directly connected with
cases  of  oil  and  gas  pollution,  they  are  mostly  common  law  precedent.  However,  the
circumstances and the necessary legal  elements  which the courts  will  require  to establish
‘strict liability’ in oil and gas pollution are the same. In essence, the only major difference
which  can  arise  between the  facts  of  Rylands v Fletcher and other  cases  of  oil  and gas
pollution will be the ‘thing which escapes’, whilst in the case of Rylands it is ‘water’, most of
the subsequent cases analysed in the research are on ‘oil and gas’.
1.4   Other Related Concepts in Determining the Liability of the Defendant
It is important to note that there are other related common law concepts which contain basic
ingredients as those found in the case of  Rylands v Fletcher with certain exceptions, and if
not clearly enunciated, one might take them for the same as ‘strict liability’ cases. It has been
noted by Gerhart that strict liability as a doctrinal category of accident law is dying, that in
fact the doctrine is on its death bed.81 This submission would not be unconnected with the
perceived  generic  application  of  the  four  basic  elements  discussed  above  as  criteria  for
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bringing a claim under strict liability, more particularly the requirement of ‘foreseeability of
harm’ which has been adjudged as a similar requirement in related torts. On the other hand,
Amirthalingam had observed that the demise of  Rylands (strict liability rule) will create a
lacuna in the law,82 and this lacuna will be more conspicuous on the social reasons for the
establishment of the doctrine. In  Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council,83
reasoning was proposed that  a  possible  justification  for  retaining  Rylands’s case  was  on
social grounds. In essence, the background to the case of  Rylands was to calm the public
anxiety about the safety of reservoirs, and in general terms, the principle of strict liability can
be said to be governing a category of exceptional or unusual risks,84 and in the  Cambridge
water Case85 the doctrine was uniquely classified to cover ultra-hazardous activities by the
defendant. This implies that the position of the House of Lords in the Transco case that the
doctrine of strict liability was basically on social grounds could be countered. Having regard
to the usefulness of the doctrine in environmental protection, it is submitted that the doctrine
of strict liability serves both economic and environmental interest as well.
Alternatively, supposing Gerhart’s view is to be given credence, that is, ‘that the doctrine of
strict liability is on its death bed’,86 then, the question to pose is: ‘what aspects of the law can
comfortably act as the heirs of the strict liability doctrine at its death?’ In response to this
question, it will be necessary to briefly consider the alternative branches of common law that
could replace strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher.
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1.4.1   Nuisance
If the doctrine of strict liability is to be expunged automatically, it will possibly be replaced
with the common law of nuisance. This is based on the assertion that the rule of strict liability
as  established  in  Rylands v Fletcher has  its  roots  in  the  law of  nuisance.87 Nuisance  is
basically  concerned with the protection of the environment;  the law protects  the claimant
from anything that will affect the comfort or convenience of the claimants’ land.88
In the case of  Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Plc,89 the defendant
maintained a tannery which used a chemical solvent in its tanning process. In the course of
the process, there were spillages of small amounts of solvent which reached the strata from
which the claimants extracted water for domestic use via a borehole. The claimants brought
an  action  against  the  defendants  claiming  damages  in  negligence,  nuisance  and  under
Rylands v Fletcher for the contamination of their water. The Court of first instance dismissed
the claim on the grounds that the defendants could not have foreseen that the spillages of
chemicals would enter the claimants’ water and the case brought under  Rylands v Fletcher
failed on the ground that the use of the solvent by the defendant amounted to the natural use
of  land.  The claimants  appealed  and the  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  the  defendants  were
strictly  liable  for  the contamination.  The defendants,  being not  satisfied,  appealed  to  the
House of Lords where it was held that irrespective of whether the rule in Rylands v Fletcher
was treated as a sub-specie of nuisance, ‘foreseeability of damage’ of the thing likely to do
mischief when it escapes was a prerequisite of liability in the law of nuisance.90 On this note,
the House of Lords held that the defendants were not liable under the Rule in  Rylands v
Fletcher. 
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In the light of the case of  Cambridge waters,  it  is clear that ‘foreseeability’  as discussed
above is both a requirement in Rylands v Fletcher and in the law of nuisance. 91
The assertion of Gerhart92 ‘that the doctrine of strict liability is on its death bed’, particularly,
in the United Kingdom, having regard to the case of  Cambridge Water Co Ltd as analysed
above, deserves support. Murphy in his article ‘The Merits of Rylands  v Fletcher,’93 made
reference to a New Zealand judge (extra-judicially) who said that: ‘there will never be a case
where a plaintiff will succeed in  Rylands v Fletcher without also succeeding in nuisance’.
However, it is clear from case law that there would be no liability (both in nuisance and strict
liability)  if  the  defendant’s  undertakings  which  had  caused  injury  to  the  claimant  was
expressly authorised by statute, provided there is no negligence on his part.94 This suggests
that the claimant will succeed in both strict liability and nuisance under this circumstance
where  negligence  is  established  on  the  part  of  the  defendant.  Furthermore,  where  the
defendants conduct is the kind that is not authorised by statute, proof of due care or exercise
of reasonableness would not avail the defendant under the strict liability rule as discussed in
Rylands v Fletcher, suggesting that the claimant will succeed, as it is a ‘no fault’ liability
rule. Meanwhile, proof of due care and reasonableness on the part of the defendant would
exonerate the defendant in the tort of nuisance in most cases, suggesting that the claimant
would not then succeed. This contradicts the above assertion that ‘there will never be a case
where a plaintiff will succeed in Rylands v Fletcher without succeeding in nuisance’.
However, it is admitted that nuisance and strict liability rule have many features in common,
and the requirement of ‘foreseeability of harm’ is one among others. It is submitted that the
doctrine of strict liability in Rylands v Fletcher would have been more of a ‘stricter liability’
if the requirement of ‘foreseeability’ of harm was not needed by the courts.
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1.4.2   Negligence
Towards the end of the 18th century judges established the doctrine of negligence which was
premised on grounds that the defendants ought to be liable for being reckless, particularly
where they cause foreseeable loss or injury to the claimant.95 In essence, the defendant must
exercise ‘care’ in his dealings in order to avoid causing damage to his neighbour which will
attract  liability  in  law.  The  principle  of  negligence  was  then  extended  in  the  case  of
Donoghue v Stevenson,96 where Lord Atkin stated, that:
…You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who
then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are
so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in question….97
The above principle as established by Lord Atkin in the Donoghue case is otherwise known
in law as the ‘neighbour principle’ and it is based on the same requirement of ‘foreseeability
of harm’98 as is required in Rylands v Fletcher and nuisance as earlier discussed. From Lord
Atkin’s position as stated above, there are basic elements which the claimant must establish
in order to succeed in a claim of negligence. The claimant must establish that the defendant
owed him a duty of care, and that there is a breach of that duty and finally that the breach has
occasioned damages.99
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Gerhart has contended100 that courts should determine the responsibility for accidental acts by
taking into consideration the usual requirement of ‘reasonability’, in that regard, the issues
needed to determine liability should be ‘whether the defendant took due care’ and secondly
‘whether  the  defendant’s  conduct  was  reasonable’.  Gerhart  was  of  the  view  that  the
application of the above questions in determining liability will abolish the name of ‘strict
liability’ but will preserve the current objective of strict liability; which, according to him is
to allow the courts to impose liability on a defendant who has caused unreasonable harm to
others through its activities.101
According to Gerhart, a close reading of the decisions of courts on strict liability reveals that
the defendant’s activities which consequently occasioned harm are measured with the scales
of  ‘unreasonableness’  and  consequently  apply  the  label  of  ‘strict  liability.’  In  essence,
Gerhart is calling that ‘strict liability’ should be submerged into the common law doctrine of
‘negligence’.102 Gerhart  has  openly  assaulted  the  doctrine  of  strict  liability  when  he
said:‘Strict liability is a doctrinal shadow, and the attempt to perpetuate the notion of strict
liability is an analytical failure that seeks to prove what the law is thought to be, rather than
what  the  law  manifestly  is.  The  emperor  of  strict  liability  doctrine  has  no  clothes.’103
Gerhart’s attack on the strict liability rule, particularly on the need to submerge the rule under
other related torts as shown above may not be given total support. This is because, the strict
liability rule has been considered unique, particularly in isolated escapes and ultra-hazardous
activities of the defendant.104
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1.4.3 Meaning of Due Care and Reasonable Foreseeability: The Connection between 
Nuisance and Negligence
Foreseeability of damage is a requirement in the law of nuisance.105 Whilst addressing the
issues on the law of Negligence, it was pointed out that the defendant must have exercised
due care and avoid acts or omissions which could be reasonably foreseen to cause injury to
his neighbour.106 In this vein, it is submitted that acting unreasonably and/or exhibiting lack
of care for a foreseeable harm could result to a claim in nuisance and negligence. In essence,
it  could  be  stated  that  nuisance  is  an  act  of  negligence  and  vice  versa.  Two  pertinent
questions  to  address  are:  at  what  point  can  one  say  that  the  defendant  has  manifestly
exhibited  ‘reasonable  care?’,  secondly,  what  could  be  the  standard  for  measuring
‘foreseeability of harm’, since everyone has its foresight on different circumstances?
In determining the first question which borders on the standard for measuring ‘due care’, the
English case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee107 would provide a useful
legal response. In that case the plaintiff who was suffering from mental illness, was given
treatment in the defendants’ hospital without being warned of the risk of fracture involved,
although the risk of fracture was very minimal. No relaxant drugs or manual control (save for
support of the lower jaw) were used, but a male nurse stood on each side of the treatment
couch throughout the treatment. When the treatment was given in the defendants’ hospital,
the plaintiff sustained fractures. It was admitted in the course of the proceedings that the use
of relaxant drugs would have removed the risk of fractures. Also, there were two competent
opinions suggesting that if  relaxant  drugs were not used,  manual control should be used.
Furthermore, different views were held among competent professional men on the question
of whether a patient should have been expressly warned about risk of fracture before being
treated, or should be left to inquire what the risk was; and there was evidence in the course of
the proceedings that in cases of mental illness, explanation of risk might well not affect the
patient’s decision whether to undergo the treatment or not.108 The plaintiff brought a claim
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against  the  defendants  for  negligence,  alleging  the  failure  of  the  defendants  not  to  use
relaxant  drugs  or  some form of  manual  control,  and  in  failing  to  warn  him of  the  risk
involved before the treatment was given. McNair J, whilst responding to the issues, defined
negligence as: 
Some failure to do some act which a reasonable man in the circumstances
would  do,  or  doing  some  act  which  a  reasonable  man  in  the
circumstances would not do; and if that failure or doing of that act results
in injury, then there is a cause of action.109
McNair J further stressed: ‘how do you test whether this act or failure is negligent?’110 In
response, and in setting the ultimate standard which became known as the  Bolam Test for
determining ‘due care’, McNair J said:
Counsel for the plaintiff put it in this way, that in the case of a medical
man negligence means failure to act in accordance with the standards of
reasonably  competent  medical  men  at  the  time.  That  is  a  perfectly
accurate statement, as long as it is remembered that there may be one or
more perfectly proper standards; and if a medical man conforms with one
of those proper standards then he is not negligent.111
From the foregoing, it could be extrapolated that what amounts to ‘due care’ will vary based
on the  jurisdiction  and the  perception  of  reasonably  competent  persons  involved,  and in
determining  what  is  ‘reasonable,’  the  courts  will  consider  what  the  standard  is,  that  is
obtainable in that sphere and this will come from the most competent individuals. It was
made  clear  that  since  the  defendants  acted  in  accordance  with  a  practice  of  competent
respected professional opinion, and being in line with one of the two practices obtainable in
electro-convulsive therapy, then, it would be wrong to hold that the defendant was negligent.
McNair J was very precise when he said: ‘A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted
in accordance  with a  practice  accepted  as proper  by a responsible  body of medical  men
 Bolam (107).
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skilled in that particular art.’112 McNair J went further to enter a caveat to the aforesaid test113
when he said that: 
…That  does  not  mean  that  a  medical  man  can  obstinately  and  pig-
headedly carry on with some old technique if it has been proved to be
contrary to what is really substantially the whole of informed medical
opinion. 
It is pertinent to note that the personal belief of the defendant regarding what amounts to
reasonable care does not suffice. Such belief, if it will be adhered to, ought to conform to a
standard practice of a contemporary professional opinion. 
In the case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and others,114  Lord Bridge pointed out that
the three criteria for the imposition of a duty of care were: (a) foreseeability of damage, (b)
proximity between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed, and (c) that the
situation should be one in which the court considers fair, just and reasonable that the law
should impose a duty of care.115 In the case of Chandler v Cape plc116 the claimant (Chandler)
brought a claim under negligence for contracting asbestosis as a result of exposure to asbestos
dust during his employment with a subsidiary company (CBP) of the defendant (Cape plc).
The judge found that the asbestos dust was allowed to escape from the factory without any
regard for the consequences. It was maintained that the risk of asbestos-related disease from
exposure to asbestos dust was obvious and there could be no doubt that the defendant should
have foreseen the risk of injury to the claimant,117 given that the defendant controlled at least
some aspects of the business of CPB (the subsidiary) and had assumed responsibility  for
112
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CBP’s employees,118 including medical care. In essence, there was a causal link between the
parent company and its subsidiary.
The defendant appealed on the grounds that there is no link between the defendant and the
claimant since the claimant only worked for CBP, a subsidiary of the defendant. Arguing that
the fact that defendant (Cape) is the parent company of Mr Chandler’s employer does not of
itself give rise to duties to protect the respondent from injury at work.119 This appeal was
dismissed.  The question  was whether  the  defendant  should assume responsibility  for  the
‘negligence’ of its subsidiary? In the course of the proceedings, the Court of Appeal made
reference to Lord Goff’s obiter in the case of Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd,120 where
Lord Goff observed that there is in general no duty to prevent third parties causing damage to
another, but with certain exceptions, example where there was a ‘relationship between the
parties which gives rise to an imposition or assumption of responsibility on the part of the
defendant’.121 The Court pointed out in the Chandler case that a subsidiary and its company
are separate entities, and there is no imposition or assumption of responsibility by reason only
that  a company is  the parent  company of  another.122 But  it  was observed that  Cape was
issuing instructions  about  the  products  of  its  subsidiary  in  accordance  with  its  company
policy,123 thereby suggesting a significant level of control activities of CBP.124 It is submitted
 For the meaning of foreseeability of harm see figure 1.3.2 on ‘the thing likely to do mischief if it
escapes’ and figure 1.3.2.1 on ‘what is a dangerous thing?’
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that a parent company would be liable for injuries caused by its subsidiary if claimant can
show that sufficient degree of proximity between the parent company and the subsidiary in
question  exists.  In  the  Chandler case,  Arden  LJ  reasoned  that  the  law  might  impose
responsibility on a parent company for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees in
circumstances where: (i) the business of the parent company and subsidiary were in a relevant
respect the same; (ii) the parent had, or ought to have superior knowledge on some relevant
aspect of health and safety in the particular industry; (iii) the subsidiary’s system of work was
unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (iv) the parent knew or
ought  to  have foreseen that  the subsidiary or  its  employees  would rely on its  using that
superior knowledge for the employee’s protection.125 These aforementioned circumstances
form a fourth condition to be considered alongside the three-fold test mentioned above in the
Caparo case. In  Thompson v Renwick Group Plc,126 the Court of Appeal applied the three-
fold test in the Caparo case as well the four circumstances mentioned in the Chandler case in
establishing negligence against a parent company, but concluded that there is no evidence
that the Appellant (Renwick Group Ltd) at any time carried on any business at all with the
respondent’s employer (David Hall & Sons Ltd, a subsidiary of the Appellant) apart from that
of holding shares in David Hall & Sons Ltd and others who earlier employed the Respondent
(Thompson).127 In view of the foregoing, the Court maintained that there is no basis upon
which a conclusion can be reached that Renwick Group Ltd either did have or should have
had  any  knowledge  of  the  risk  (exposure  to  asbestos  dust)  superior  to  that  which  the
subsidiaries  (Respondent’s  employers)  could  be  expected  to  have.128 Consequently,
Appellants’ appeal was allowed. It follows that the three-fold test maintained in the Caparo
case129 by the House of Lords as well as the four circumstances mentioned in the Chandler
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case above,130 and further reiterated in  Thompson case, remain the standard in determining
cases of negligence.
Having considered the basic elements required to establish a case of strict liability and other
related common law branches such as nuisance and negligence, it is pertinent to bear in mind
that there is a high level of similarity in terms of the basic elements required to establish
liability under the strict liability rule as established in Rylands v Fletcher and the other related
concepts as enumerated.
1.5   Basic Defences to the Strict Liability Rule
Although,  from the  enumeration  of  the  case  of  Rylands v Fletcher,131 it  seems from the
decision of the court that ‘strict  liability’ is imposed on the defendant who deliberately132
engages in dangerous activities,133 a cursory look at the outcome of the case reveals that the
liability  on the defendants  is  not  absolute.  Some courts  and authors  use the terms ‘strict
liability’ and ‘absolute liability’ interchangeably to indicate liability of the defendant without
proof of negligence or fault.134 Woodside stated135 that the primary difference between the
two concepts is that under the strict liability rule, there are defences which are available to the
defendants, whereas in cases of absolute liability there are no defences that will prevent the
claimant from obtaining damages. On this note, it will be necessary to look briefly at the
basic defences which can be available to the defendant under the strict liability rule.
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1.5.1   Statutory Authority
A statute may impose a duty on the defendant to carry out a particular task which might lead
to the escape of a substance that would cause injury to the claimant.136 This defence can be
raised by the defendant in cases of strict liability actions, stating that the entire ‘act’ which
has caused damage to the claimant was authorised by the law of the place which the damage
was caused. The two major conditions in raising this defence are that the defendant must not
be  negligent  on  his  part  and  secondly,  the  damage  caused  must  be  the  ‘inevitable
consequence’  of  the  exercise  of  the  statutory  powers.137 In  the  case  of  Charing  Cross
Electricity Co v London Hydraulic Power Co,138 the claimant’s underground electric cables
were  damaged  as  a  result  of  the  escape  of  water  maintained  at  high  pressure  from the
defendant’s  underground  mains.  Both  the  claimants  and  the  defendants  were  companies
carrying on undertakings for profit,  for the purpose of which they had obtained statutory
permission and under powers granted by Acts of Parliament. The court held the defendants
liable  on the ground that  the escape of water  causing nuisance to  the claimant  was as a
technical  error  on  the  defendants’  engines139 and  the  ‘statutory  powers’  only  permit  the
provision of water for industrial purposes. In essence, there was no duty to maintain water
under high pressure and therefore the ‘escape’ was not the inevitable  consequence of the
exercise of the statutory powers.140 
1.5.2   Consent of the Claimant
Another defence which can be raised by the defendant in a case of strict liability is that the
claimant consented either expressly or impliedly to the presence of the source of danger, but
there must be no negligence on the part of the defendant.141 This defence simply illustrates the
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Latin maxim: ‘Volenti  non fit  injuria’,  which serves as a defence in legal actions,  and it
means that one who has voluntarily entered into an agreement cannot complain of an injury
which arises as a result  of that  agreement.  However,  it  is pertinent  to point out that this
defence appears not to be utilised or seen in oil and gas cases, as inhabitants of oil producing
areas cannot be seen to give consent to environmental degradation and its attendant harm on
human health.
1.5.3   Act of a Stranger
A defendant will escape liability in an action under  Rylands v Fletcher where he can show
that the escape of the ‘thing’ which has caused damage was caused by an unforeseeable act of
a stranger.142 In the case of Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd143 a child threw a lighted match
into an empty petrol tank which exploded and injured the claimant. The court held that the
defendants  were not  liable  under the rule in  Rylands v  Fletcher since the conduct  which
resulted  to  the  explosion  were  the  acts  of  a  stranger  over  whom the  defendants  had  no
control.  The  defence  of  ‘act  of  a  stranger’  is  significant  within  the  framework  of
environmental liability in Nigeria, particularly with regard to oil spills caused via sabotage. In
the Nigerian case of Anthony Atubin & ors v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria
Ltd,144 the Court maintained that even if oil spillage had caused damage to the plaintiff, the
defendant could not be held liable for the damage that was caused by mischievous third party
in the absence of negligence. 
Against  the above stance,  there  is  the  proposition  in  law that  the  defendant  is  liable  for
escapes caused by a third party where the defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen the act
of the third party and had adequate control of the premises to be able to control it.145 This
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literally  presupposes  that  nobody is  actually  a  ‘stranger’,  provided there  is  a  causal  link
between the defendant and the activities of the ‘third party’.
In the case of  Bodo Community v The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
Ltd,146 the issue was raised before the London High Court regarding whether Shell could be
liable  under  the  Oil  Pipelines  Act  2004  (OPA)  in  Nigeria  to  pay just  compensation  for
damage  caused  by  oil  from  its  pipelines  that  has  been  released  as  the  result  of  illegal
bunkering  and/or  illegal  refining?   The  Court   responded to the  issue  in  the  negative,147
observing that looking at existing case law, judges are reluctant to find Shell liable where the
spillages have been caused by third party interference either under the Oil Pipelines Act or at
common law. The Court observed further that liability can lie where there is neglect on the
part of oil operators, and such neglect has been proved to be the cause of preventable damage
to the pipeline by people illegally engaged in bunkering which causes damage.148 This has
been  admitted  by  the  Court  as  a  difficult  thing  to  prove,  but  there  is  the  ‘theoretical
possibility’.149 In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that the defence of ‘act of a stranger’
is  not  conclusive  in  that  the  courts  would  still  examine  the  defendants’  actions  and/or
inactions with a view to establishing due diligence.
1.5.4   Default of the Claimant
In a case of strict liability, the defendant will not be held liable if the damage is caused solely
by the  act  or  default  of  the  claimant  himself.150 In  the  case  of  Ponting v  Noakes,151 the
claimant’s horse was poisoned as a result of eating leaves of a yew tree which grew upon the
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defendant’s land and died. The Court held that the defendants are not liable for damages since
the injury sustained by the horse was as a result of wrongful intrusion on the defendant’s
land. Also, there was no escape of vegetation.
1.5.5   Act of God
The defence of ‘Act of God’ can be used by the defendant in circumstances where the escape
of  the  thing  which  has  caused  damage  occurred  in  natural  circumstances  without  the
intervention  of  the  defendant  or  which  no  human  foresight  can  provide  against.152 This
defence was upheld in the case of  Rylands v Fletcher, when Blackburn J, referring to the
bringing of the ‘thing’ by the defendant said: ‘He can excuse himself by showing that… the
escape was the consequence of vis major or the act of God’.153 In practical terms, it is noted
that whether a particular incident would amount to an act of God is a question of fact.154
Rogers had observed that the criterion under this defence is whether human foresight and
prudence could reasonably recognise the possibility of the event which has caused injury.155
This latter position can easily be linked with the level of reasonability and prudence required
under  the  discussion  of  the  defence  of  ‘acts  of  a  third  party’,  which  ordinarily  requires
exhibition of reasonable foresight on the part of the defendant in acting against preventable
damage  of  a  stranger,  so  that  the  defendant  may  escape  liability  where  there  was  no
reasonable foresight of the harm. Conversely, having regard to the strict nature (‘no fault
liability’) of the doctrine of strict liability, accidental escape which is caused by forces of
nature can be classified within the risk which the defendant must accept by accumulating
substances on his land.156
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Within  the  context  of  oil  and  gas  pollution  incidents,  the  defence  of  Act  of  God  is
synonymous with the defence of ‘force majeure’, which ordinarily cover incidents that are
beyond  the  reasonable  control  of  TNCs.  However,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  no  force
majeure is essentially contractual in the English jurisdiction.  ‘Act of God’ or ‘frustration’
operates as part of the common law. Whereas, in most jurisdictions outside the common law,
it is essential that parties in oil and gas agreements negotiate on incidents that would amount
to force majeure.157 
The defence of ‘Act of God’ remains vague, except the occurrences that can be considered as
‘Acts of God’ are expressly mentioned in a relevant instrument. However, it is certain that
irrespective  of  the  incidents  that  form part  of  ‘Acts  of  God’,  foreseeability  of  harm and
negligence on the part of the polluter will form determinant factors in apportioning liability.
Oil  TNCs in  Nigeria  are  mostly  enmeshed in  incidents  leading  to  proclamation  of  force
majeure.  Recently,  Exxon  Mobil  had  declared  force  majeure  in  its  oil  production  due
accidental  damage  on  a  subsea  pipeline  linked  to  Qua  Iboe  (crude-export  facility)  by  a
drilling rig.158 Again, force majeure was declared on 4th and 8th of August, 2016 by Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria on its gas supply to Nigeria NLNG.159 
It is acknowledged that the force majeure clause in petroleum contracts allows TNCs to stop
deliveries without breaching the contracts.160 In this vein, Delaume had maintained that Force
Majeure clauses are essentially intended to provide parties in contractual commitments with a
‘cooling-off period’ and permit them to resume in due course the normal course of their
relations.161 But on the impact of alleged ‘force majeure’ incidents on the environment with
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regards liability, it is obvious that TNCs must show that such incidents were not foreseen and
due care was exercised in the circumstance in order to escape liability.
1.6   Is the Strict Liability Doctrine Still Alive?
This research has put much emphasis in comparing the strict  liability  doctrine with other
related terms with a view to determining the essence of the doctrine and the fate of victims of
environmental  pollution  caused by oil  and gas  pollution.  The question whether  the  strict
liability doctrine is still in existence is crucial, and it is one that requires careful analysis. In
the course of this research, the principle of strict liability as enunciated by Blackburn J in the
well-known case of Rylands v Fletcher162 and other related common law principles (such as
nuisance and negligence) have been clearly shown. In Rylands v Fletcher and other related
cases which established the principle of strict liability, four basic elements which constitute
the legal firmament under which the doctrine can be said to apply were discussed. The four
basic elements for establishing the defendant’s liability  are that;  the defendant must have
been said to bring the ‘thing’ which has caused damage to the claimant on the defendant’s
land, the thing must be something that is likely to do mischief if it escapes, the thing must be
a non-natural use of land, and finally, the thing must escape. It is implied that the absence of
proof of any of the aforementioned elements will amount to a shortcoming in establishing
liability  under  strict  liability  principle.  The  major  issue  that  has  always  arisen  in  most
arguments on the existence of the doctrine of strict liability is whether having regard to the
legal battle in establishing the aforementioned elements, whether it will be logical to say that
the liability in Rylands v Fletcher is ‘strict’, or whether the doctrine is still alive?
Some authors, in their  arguments in support of the need to expunge the doctrine of strict
liability as established in the case of  Rylands v Fletcher have argued that the common law
tort of nuisance is the most appropriate to replace the tort of strict liability, while others have
argued that the common law of negligence almost serve the same purpose to that of strict
liability.163 The general assumption has always been that  the doctrine of strict  liability  as
found in the case of  Rylands v Fletcher imposes absolute liability on the defendant. This
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latter assumption that strict liability in the case of  Rylands v Fletcher imposes an absolute
liability on the defendant was made clear by Avinst164 in the 1970’s. This latter view has been
common, and according to Avinst if a person is engaged in an extra hazardous activity, and as
a  result  of  such  activity  causes  damage  to  the  land  belonging  to  another,  he  is  legally
responsible for the damage, irrespective of the fact that the person was careful or whether
there was any trace of fault.165 Avinst equally mentioned that the rules of ‘absolute liability’
and what he described as ‘absolute nuisance’ in relation to ultra-hazardous activities of the
defendant are the same, but with different terminology.166 It is clear that Avinst seems to
apply the terms of strict and absolute liabilities interchangeably, and this position does not
conform to existing legal literature and argument in the current research. Furthermore, even
the attempt to link strict liability principle to extra hazardous activities of the defendant has
been frowned at in the Cambridge Water Case. Lord Goff observed as follows: ‘I incline to
the opinion that,  as a  general  rule,  it  is  more appropriate  for strict  liability  in respect  of
operations of high risk to be imposed by parliament, than by the courts.’167 In essence, placing
incidents  of high risk under  the rule  of strict  liability  cannot  be considered  as a  general
principle except it is clearly spelt out by relevant enactment.
In the light of the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Cambridge Water Co Ltd v
Eastern Counties Leather Plc,168 it can be pointed out that there are similarities between the
common law doctrine of strict liability as established in the case of Rylands v Fletcher and
the tort of nuisance. This similarity can be depicted from the obiter of Lord Goff when he
pointed out, inter alia, that the liability of a person who has created a nuisance remains strict
irrespective of the fact that reasonable care was taken and that a defendant cannot be held
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liable  for  damage  of  a  type  which  he  could  not  reasonably  foresee.169 In  essence,  the
requirement  of  foreseeability  in  establishing  nuisance  and  strict  liability  are  the  same.
However,  the  uniqueness  of  the  strict  liability  rule  was  identified  by  Lord  Goff  in  the
Cambridge Water case when he maintained that:
… It  would  moreover  lead  to  a  more  coherent  body of  common law
principles if the rule were to be regarded essentially as an extension of
the law of nuisance to cases of isolated escapes from land, even though
the  rule  as  established  is  not  limited  to  escapes  which  are  in  fact
isolated.170
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  hard  to  trace  larger  similarities  between  the  strict  liability
requirements as established in the case of Rylands v Fletcher and that of negligence. In the
tort  of negligence,  as it  is  plainly explained in the case of  Donoghue v Stevenson,171 the
requirement of ‘foreseeability’ and that of ‘reasonable care’ are obviously interwoven in the
sense that whilst the defendant is expected to know that the ‘thing’ is likely to do mischief, he
is  also  expected  to  take  reasonable  care  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  injury  caused  to  his
neighbour. On the other hand, in strict liability, the defendant is only required to have the
knowledge that the thing brought to the land is likely to do mischief (foreseeability), but the
defendant will be liable for any damage caused if the ‘thing’ escapes irrespective of whether
he is negligent or not. Blackburn J when referring to the strict nature of the doctrine of strict
liability in the case of Rylands v Fletcher stated thus:
…The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaped cattle of
his  neighbour,  or  whose  mine  is  flooded  by  the  water  from  his
neighbour's  reservoir,  or  whose  cellar  is  invaded  by  the  filth  of  his
neighbour's privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes
and  noisome  vapours  of  his  neighbour's  alkali  works,  is  damnified
without any fault….172
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In the light of the above it is clear that it is immaterial whether the escape of the thing which
has caused damage was as a result  of negligence  or not.  The point to  note in  the above
statement  of Blackburn J  is  that  ‘foreseeability  of the  risk’ is  a primary  element  for the
recovery of damages under the rule of strict liability, and that the doctrine of strict liability is
made manifest in the sense that the defendant will be held liable regardless of the fact that he
has exercised all ‘due care’ to prevent any escape or harm. Gerhart asserted that: ‘All of the
legitimate “work” of strict  liability  can be and is  being done better  under the negligence
regime  by  asking  whether  the  injurer  made  reasonable  decisions  about  activity-based
matters’.173 It  is  maintained that  Gerhart’s  opinion on absorbing the tort  of strict  liability
within  the  common  law  tort  of  negligence  is  fallacious.  This  is  because  of  the  unique
characteristics  of the strict  liability  tort  which actually  does not take into cognizance the
recklessness of the defendant. 
In the light of the above it is clear that liability under  Rylands v Fletcher is strict even in
cases of isolated escape of the ‘thing’ likely to do mischief. This implies that the fact that the
defendant has exercised reasonable care over the thing which has escaped does not exonerate
him from liability. Lord Goff has equally distinguished the concepts of ‘reasonable user’ and
‘reasonable  care  and skill’.  Whilst  the  former  is  an  element  in  cases  associated  to  strict
liability, the latter is a sine qua non in the common law tort of negligence. Lord Goff, while
making this distinction in the Cambridge Water case, said: 
… If  the  user  is  reasonable,  the  defendant  will  not  be  liable  for
consequent harm to his neighbour's enjoyment of his land; but if the user
is not reasonable, the defendant will be liable, even though he may have
exercised reasonable care and skill to avoid it.174
In the light of the above, it is shown that it is more logical and legal to associate the doctrine
of strict liability to the tort of nuisance than associating it to the tort of negligence.
1.7   A Critical Analysis of the Doctrine of Strict Liability as Established in Rylands v 
Fletcher: Its Applicability in Nigerian Oil and Gas Pollution Liability Regime
The facts and elements of the case of Rylands v Fletcher have been established in the early
part of this chapter. It is pertinent to point out that there are various statutory legal provisions
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in Nigeria relating to the liability of environmental pollution, and in reflecting on the doctrine
of  strict  liability  in  Nigeria,  such  statutory  provisions  form the  basis  and  guidelines  for
determining liability.
There is no doubt that the determination of the liability of transnational oil corporations in
Nigeria on issues of environmental pollution caused by oil and gas has been very uncertain
and  complex.  This  uncertainty  in  the  determination  of  such  legal  issues  relating  to
environmental pollution has led to many victims of oil and gas pollution in Nigeria seeking
for legal redress in foreign countries. A report on Reuters175 reveals that Nigerian Fishermen
and Farmers alongside Friends of the Earth Campaign Group brought a claim against Royal
Shell Dutch in The Hague, on the grounds of oil pollution to the Niger Delta region. The
report reveals that Shell denied responsibility to the pollution case on the ground that the
pollution was caused by sabotage (acts of a third party). The Report,176 has also shown that it
was the first time an oil pollution case was brought against Shell in a Dutch court for offences
alleged  to  have  been  carried  out  by  one  of  its  subsidiaries.  The  issues  and  challenges
emanating from the aforesaid report and others form some aspects of this research.
Findings have shown that there are two basic ways in which disputes relating to oil and gas
pollution are resolved between multinationals and the local communities (victims) in Nigeria.
The first and most peaceful method has been through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
which basically entails a negotiation (parties to the dispute are actively involved on the terms
of settlement) process.177 Interestingly, there are other remarkable methods under ADR with
almost similar traits.  Chatterjee178 has rightly drawn the differences between the methods.
Chatterjee maintained that  a conciliator  is  obliged to guide the parties to the disputes by
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pointing out their  strengths and weaknesses with a view to convincing them on the legal
consequences of instituting a lawsuit, without intervening, personally, in the dispute.179 An
arbitrator resolves disputes from a legal standpoint,180 whilst a mediator suggests what would
be best in the course of a dispute with exercise of authority on the possible outcome of the
terms of settlement.181 Whilst it is necessary for parties to consider the most suitable method
for out-of-court settlement, it is submitted that in cases of oil and gas pollution, it is advisable
that parties resort to conciliation and negotiation, this is because there is the need for both
parties  to be directly  involved in the settlement  process whilst  still  maintaining a cordial
relationship in the communities. In this vein, Chatterjee maintained that ‘the connotation of
the term “conciliation” necessarily implies that it is a method whereby differences between
parties may be settled by friendly means’.182
Secondly, disputes are resolved through litigation, but findings have shown that the option of
litigation is mostly utilised as a last resort where the victims of oil pollution have failed to
achieve any meaningful outcome from the ADR method.183 But whether disputes are resolved
via ADR or through court room litigation, there are embedded principles of liability attached
therein.
Findings have shown that where oil and gas pollution are caused by the wilful act of the
claimant or the act of a third party, which can best be described as ‘sabotage’, the defendants
will  not  be  held  liable  in  law.  In  the  Nigerian  case  of  Anthony  Atubin  &  Ors v Shell
Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd,184 the plaintiffs brought a claim against the
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owned by the defendant. The defendant stated that the escape was a malicious act of third
parties. In dismissing the claim, Ovie Whiskey J, stated that:
… The  hole  in  the  pipe  was  deliberately  drilled  by  an  unknown
mischievous person over whom the defendant company had no control.
Even if the oil spillage had caused damage to property or fishing right of
the plaintiff, in this case, the defendant could not be held liable for the
damage which was caused by mischievous third party in the absence of
any negligence on their part….185
In  the  course  of  this  chapter,  reference  has  been  made  to  the  English  case  of  Perry v
Kendricks Transport Ltd186 where the court held that the defendants were not liable under the
rule in Rylands v Fletcher since the conduct which resulted to a petrol tank explosion were
the acts of a stranger over whom the defendants had no control. Hence, the defence of ‘Act of
a stranger’ (which is basically connected to acts of pipeline or oil installation sabotage)187 is
very much applicable in Nigeria having regard to the  Anthony Atubin’s188 case mentioned
above. It is obvious that where the damage which resulted from the escape of the ‘dangerous
thing’189 is  caused  by  the  mischievous  act  of  a  third  party,  then  the  defendant  will  be
exonerated from liability without the need to establish ‘foreseeability of damage’ as required
in  strict  liability  claims.  Also,  by  virtue  of  the  provision  of  section  11(5)(c)  of  the  Oil
Pipelines Act 2004,190 the holder of a licence (oil companies) is exonerated from any kind of
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liability  caused by oil  and gas pollution as a result  of the default  of the claimant or ‘the
malicious Act of a third person.’191
In the Nigerian case of San Ikpede v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd,192
the claimants brought a claim for damages against the defendant as a result of the escape of
crude oil from the oil pipelines operated by the defendant which has caused damage to the
claimants. The claimants relied on the strict liability rule as established in the case of Rylands
v Fletcher. Ovie Whiskey J (as he then was) stated that ‘…to lay crude oil carrying pipes
through swamp forest land is a non-natural user of the land’. From that judgement, it was
crystal  clear  that  crude oil  is  a  dangerous thing if  allowed to escape from the pipelines.
Despite the above findings, the Court refused to apply the strict liability rule under Rylands v
Fletcher as requested by the plaintiff on the grounds that the activities of the defendants fell
under the exception of ‘statutory authority’ since they are operating under the licence issued
by the  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria.193 By virtue  of  the  Oil  Pipelines  Act,194 obtaining  a
licence  from  the  Nigerian  government  permits  the  holder  to  lay  oil  pipelines.
Notwithstanding the  above position  of  the  Court,  the defendants  were held  liable  to  pay
compensation in line with section 11(5)(c) of the Oil Pipelines Act.195 Section 11(5)(c) of the
Oil Pipelines Act imposes a direct liability on the holder of a license to pay compensation to
persons who have suffered damage as a consequence of any breakage or leakage from the
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pipeline. The only exception as provided in the aforementioned provision, is in circumstances
where the leakage is caused by the act of the claimant or the malicious act of third parties.196
In the light of the above Nigerian case of San Ikpede and the provisions of the Oil Pipelines
Act, it is maintained that the defences of ‘statutory authority’ and the ‘malicious act of a third
party’ are bona fide defences which are generally applicable in cases of strict liability both in
the English Jurisdiction and the Nigerian cases in environmental pollution brought under the
rule in Rylands v Fletcher. On the other hand, a close look at the case of San Ikpede197 and the
provisions of section 11(5)(c) of the Oil Pipelines Act,198 reveals that polluters will be strictly
liable for pollution caused by oil and gas in circumstances where the oil pipeline leakage
occurred independent of the act of the claimant or that of a third party. This is because from
the case of  San Ikpede and the provisions of section 11(5)(c) of the Oil Pipelines Act, the
defence of ‘statutory authority’ does not remove liability from the environmental polluters in
payment of compensation. Furthermore, the court in the case of  San Ikpede199 has equally
described  ‘crude  oil’  as  a  dangerous  thing  at  its  escape  from  the  oil  pipelines.  This
presupposes,  that  the  requirement  of  ‘foreseeability  of  harm’200 in  cases  of  oil  and  gas
pollution,  are  automatic  once  there  is  an  escape  of  crude  oil  from the  pipelines  to  the
claimant’s land. Victims of oil and gas pollution in Nigeria need not prove foreseeability of
harm in order to establish liability in oil and gas pollution; the larger part of the onus, in a
strict liability case will ordinarily fall on the defendants to prove that the leakage of crude oil
from the pipeline, which has caused damage, was as a result of the act of third parties. In
essence, a causal link must be established between the spill and the external forces.
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The principle of strict liability was made far clearer in the Nigerian case of Machine Umudje
& Anor v Shell-BP Petroleum Development  Company Nigeria Ltd,201 where the plaintiffs
instituted a claim for damages for the ‘escape’ of oil waste from the defendant’s pit which
caused  damage  to  the  plaintiff’s  ponds,  farmland  and  lakes.  The  court  of  first  instance
awarded damages to the plaintiffs, the defendants (Shell) not satisfied proceeded on appeal to
the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court held the defendant  (Shell)  liable  for the damage
caused to the plaintiffs in line with the rule under Rylands v Fletcher. While dismissing the
defendant’s appeal, the Supreme Court held (Idigbe JSC), that: 
Liability on the part of an owner or the person in control of an oil-waste
pit,  such as the one located at  location ‘E’ in the case in hand, exists
under  the  rule  in  Rylands  v  Fletcher  although  the  “escape”  has  not
occurred as a result of negligence on his part.202
From the outcome of the case of  Machine  Umudje,203 it  is  clear  that  once the  court  can
establish  a  case  of  ‘escape’  of  crude  oil  from a  place  in  control  of  the  polluter  to  the
claimant’s premises, then liability will arise insofar as damages can be proved. The Supreme
Court in Nigeria has made it explicit that proof of negligence is not necessary in cases under
Rylands v Fletcher. Frynas is of the view that Machine Umudje’s case has illustrated that the
legal rule of strict liability in  Rylands v Fletcher can increase the chances of victims of oil
pollution  to  succeed  in  oil  related  cases  in  Nigeria  since  the  proof  of  negligence  is  not
required, but that ‘proof of negligence’ might be required in other less-dangerous things.204
The position of the Supreme Court in Machine Umudje’s case may have been different if the
pollution was caused by an escape of crude oil from a damaged vessel in the Nigerian waters.
By virtue  of  section  4(2)(a)  of  the  Oil  in  Navigable  Waters  Act,205where  there  is  an  oil
pollution caused as a result of the damage of an oil vessel the polluter will be exonerated
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from liability if reasonable steps were taken to stop or reduce the escape of the crude oil. This
provision seems to be in line with the legal requirement in establishing cases of negligence or
nuisance, which is of ‘reasonable care’ and ‘reasonable user’ respectively.
A further  look at  Regulation 23 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production)  Regulation206
which  is  an  offshoot  of  the  Petroleum  Act,207 reveals,  inter  alia,  that  where  a  licensee
exercises his rights in a manner which is ‘unreasonably to interfere’ with any fishing rights,
he shall pay adequate compensation to any person who has suffered injury. The qualification:
‘unreasonably to interfere’ can be seen to be in line with the requirement of ‘reasonable user’
of land in the case of nuisance, and on the other hand, entails the requirement of  ‘escape’
under strict liability in Rylands v Fletcher. It has been established in the case of San Ikpede v
Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd208 that laying of crude oil pipes is a non-
natural user of land, and that the requirement of escape of the crude oil from the pipes is a
sine qua none in establishing cases under strict liability.
1.8   The Nature and Scope of the Doctrine of Absolute Liability
Having looked at the nature and scope of the principle of strict liability and its limitations in
judicial  interpretation,  it  is  necessary to consider the meaning of the concept  of absolute
liability. Rogers’s comment on strict liability flags up the key difference:
Liability under the rule (Rylands v Fletcher) is strict in the sense that it
relieves the claimant of the burden of showing fault; however, it is far
from absolute since there are a   number of wide-ranging defences.209
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A cursory look at the above comment on the doctrine of strict liability reveals that even if a
claimant needs not show any fault on the part of the defendant in establishing liability, there
are a series of defences at the disposal of the defendant which have been discussed earlier,
and that because such defences, if properly presented can vindicate the defendant, it therefore
follows that the absence of the availability of any defence in law will confer an absolute
liability on the defendant. Absolute liability can therefore, be literally defined as the kind of
liability that is imposed upon anyone without any defences. Waite pointed out in his article
entitled ‘the quest for environmental law equilibrium’ that in cases of absolute liability, it is
unnecessary to prove either causation or fault on the part of the defendant.210 In essence, in
absolute liability it is arguably unnecessary to say the pollution which has caused damage(s)
to the claimant was an act of a third person. To avoid clumsy repetition, a more adequate
analysis  of  the  concept  of  absolute  liability  within  the  context  of  fundamental  rights
violations  is  provided  in  chapter  6.211 On  the  other  hand,  in  strict  liability  cases  the
requirement of proof of both causation and fault is relevant because the defendant can be
exonerated in circumstances where the damage is caused by a third party as shown in the case
of Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd212 under the defence of ‘Act of a Stranger’. With regard
to the non-absolute nature of the strict liability rule, Rogers observed that, ‘Liability under the
rule is strict in the sense that it relieves the claimant of the burden of showing fault; however,
it is far from absolute since there are a number of wide-ranging defences.’213
Furthermore,  elements  of  the  doctrine  of  absolute  liability  can  be  traced  in  the  United
Kingdom by virtue of the provision of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.214 A combined
reading of section 78F (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the aforementioned Act, reveals that for the
210
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purpose of determining liability or establishing the appropriate person to bear responsibility
in  cases  of  contamination  of  land,  the  owner  or  occupier  for  the  time  being  of  the
contaminated  land will  be  held  responsible;  the owner  or  occupier  would be responsible
where no reasonable inquiry could reveal the appropriate person. In essence, the defence of
‘Act of a Stranger’ could be successful if the contamination is caused by a third party who is
identifiable  through ‘reasonable inquiry’. It would suffice to say therefore,  that where oil
pollutions are caused via sabotage, and the saboteurs could not be traced, multinationals will
definitely  be  the  ‘appropriate  persons’  to  bear  responsibility  in  the  context  of  the
Environmental  Protection  Act  1990.  In  applying  the  principle  of  absolute  liability  in
environmental pollution, the claimant needs only show that there is an escape of the polluting
substance,  regardless of the cause or fault  of such pollution.  This principle  is  adequately
analysed in chapter 6 of the research within the framework of fundamental rights relating to a
safe environment.
1.9   Strict and Absolute Liabilities in Criminal Offences
Principles of strict and absolute liability can equally be traced in criminal offences. There are
criminal  offences  relating  to  environmental  pollution.  For  instance,  there  is  the  Harmful
Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act,215 particularly section 6 of the Act which imposes
criminal  liability  on polluters  of  the environment  ranging from carrying and dumping of
harmful waste in the air, land or waters of Nigeria save with the consent of a lawful authority.
Strict liability offences have been defined by Lord Edmund while making reference to ‘Smith
and Hogan on Criminal law’ in the English case of Whitehouse v Gays News216when he said:
‘… an offence is regarded- and properly regarded- as one of strict liability if no  mens rea
need be proved as to a single element in the actus reus’. The displacement of the element of
‘mens rea’  in strict  criminal  liability  seems to contradict  the basic principles  of criminal
procedure law which emphasises the need to prove beyond reasonable doubt, which entails
showcasing the mental element or intention of the accused person. Reid217 submitted that it is
in areas relating to protection of the public and protection of the environment that is probably
215
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the  greatest  consensus  among  academic  commentators  and  Judges  in  support  of  strict
liability.
1.10 The Nature of Liability in International Environmental law: The Trail Smelter 
Arbitration
Over the years, most countries have embraced the old Roman law rule that no person has a
right to cause significant, foreseeable harm to others.218 One relevant case which has adopted
this same principle of establishing liability where harm is foreseeable is the  Trail Smelter
Arbitration219 which was between farmers in the United States and a Canadian smelter. The
Canadian smelter damaged the crops of the U.S. farmers through the emission of fumes. The
U.S farmers instituted a case in an international tribunal against the Canadian smelter through
international  arbitration.  The  Arbitral  tribunal  was  primarily  governed  by  the  Ottawa
Convention of 1935,220 entered into by the U.S. and the Dominion of Canada, which sets out
the aims and the procedural rules to follow by the members of the panel. One of the primary
aims of the Arbitral Panel as set out in the Convention was to decide whether damage caused
by the Trail smelter in the State of Washington has occurred since the first day of January,
1932, and, if so, what indemnity should be paid therefore?221 A close perusal of the entire
report (Trail Smelter), reveals that the Panel was not actually concerned with whether the
smelters were ‘negligent’ or whether there was a ‘foreseeability’ of harm from their smelting
activities, what seems to be the primary concern of the Tribunal was whether damage has
occurred,  and  the  cause  of  such  damage(s).  Whilst  concluding  on  the  issue  of  whether
damage was suffered by the complainant (U.S.) and the cause of such damage, it was stated
that:
218
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… Since  the  tribunal  has  concluded  that,  on  all  the  evidence,  the
existence of injury has been proved, it  becomes necessary to consider
next the cause of the injury. This question resolves itself in two parts-
first,  the  actual  causing  factor,  and  second,  the  manner  in  which  the
causing factor has operated.222
In the light of the above, it is clear that the Tribunal was solely focused by virtue of the
Convention to establish a nexus between the said injury suffered by the U.S. government and
the activities of the smelting company. The Arbitral Panel, while awarding damages to the
U.S. farmers, stated that: 
… Under the principles  of international  law, as well  as of the United
States, no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
or  the  properties  or  person  therein,  when  the  case  is  of  serious
consequence  and  the  injury  is  established  by  clear  and  convincing
evidence….223
In the light of the above dictum, it is obvious that liability is direct where the victim has
suffered injury and such injury has been linked to the acts or omission of the defendants. But
there appears to be a loaded qualification by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ as contained in
the above report of the Tribunal. In essence, what is the content or nature of evidence that
will amount to being ‘clear and convincing’ in order to warrant liability? The response to this
question could better be determined by the ‘Tribunal’, but having regard to the facts of the
case and the outcome of the arbitral award, what is ‘clear and convincing’ could be the ability
of  the ‘experts’  to  link the damage suffered to  the ultra-hazardous activities  of the Trail
Smelter. The most valuable message of the tribunal’s award in the Trail Smelter Arbitration
is that states have a duty to curtail trans-boundary environmental harm, and that there is an
obligation to pay compensation for the harm they cause.224 This aforesaid requirement in the
Trail Smelter case seems to be in line with principles of absolute liability, since none of the
defences associated with the strict liability rule was mentioned as exonerating factors in the
entire arbitration proceeding having regard to the fact that the tribunal was governed by law
222
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and practice followed in dealing with cognate questions in the United States as well as in
international  law and practice.225 But  this  is  not  to  draw a  conclusion  on the  acceptable
measure of liability for environmental pollution cases in international law. The principle of
state responsibility is further discussed in chapter 5 which has shown that liability principles
under international law, in later cases, hovers around principles of the tort of negligence and
the strict liability rule.226
1.11 Conclusions
This chapter has considered the concepts of strict and absolute liabilities. Whilst it is obvious
from  the  content  and  analysis  of  this  chapter  that  the  doctrine  of  strict  liability  was
established by the courts as a common law concept, it is shown that the doctrine of absolute
liability is mostly applicable where a statute or any written provisions makes the liability of
polluters  ‘absolute’  without  any of the exceptions  mentioned under strict  liability.227 This
chapter  has  maintained  a  legal  gap  which  serves  as  the  difference  between  the  two
aforementioned concepts. This is done with a view to avoid the misnomer of using the terms
of  strict  and  absolute  liability  interchangeably.  In  the  same  vein,  related  common  law
concepts  of  trespass  to  land,  nuisance  and  negligence  have  been  adequately  discussed
because these principles do manifestly possess certain similarities in law, and in most cases
arguments could emerge as to which legal scenario can best be suitable under any of these
concepts.
It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  research  is  geared  towards  ascertaining  whether  the
doctrine  of  absolute  liability  may  be  applied  to  the  principle  of  the  protection  of  the
environment in cases of fundamental rights violation proceedings involving oil operators in
Nigeria. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the doctrine of strict liability which
is more closely related to absolute liability and the standards of liability in other related torts
by expatiating the current position of these concepts in Nigeria, the UK, as well as in the
225
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international perspective with a view to testing their respective relevance or applicability to
fundamental rights enforcement proceedings relating to environmental pollution.  Once the
concept of strict liability is fully grasped, then, appreciating the concept of absolute liability
becomes  uncomplicated;  for  absolute  liability  simply  means  strict  liability  without  any
exceptions.  In  the  context  of  this  research,  both  strict  and  absolute  liabilities  are  only
interpreted in relation to the dangerous activities228 of the claimant, particularly, oil and gas
activities of TNCs.
There  has  been  a  heavy  reliance  on  judicial  cases  in  the  English  jurisdiction  whilst
expatiating on the common law concept of strict liability. The majority of these cases have
been correlatively shown to be persuasive in Nigerian courts. Basically, English law becomes
even more relevant to Nigeria where there are lacunae in the Nigerian legal system. It is
noteworthy to mention that one major source of Nigerian law is the ‘received English law’.
The ‘received English law’ includes; the common law, doctrines of equity and the statutes of
general application,  being laws made before 1900.229 This simply implies that the English
common law is automatically received in Nigeria but subject to Nigerian legislation230 and
necessary changes which might emerge due to variance in government policies, and this is
evidently shown in the mixture of English and Nigerian laws in determining liability in the
Bodo  Community231 case,  which  relates  to  claims  for  compensation  regarding  oil  spill
incidents from pipelines that occurred in Nigeria but determined in a London Court.
The  next  chapter  addresses  issues  of  fundamental  rights  as  a  tool  for  environmental
protection.  It  focuses  on  creating  awareness  on  the  correlation  between  environmental
pollution  and  fundamental  rights  violation.  Decisions  of  the  European  Court  of  Human
Rights as well as English Courts were given credence in this regard. Above all, it stretches
228
 See  figure  1.3.2.1  on  the  meaning  of  a  dangerous  thing.  Activities  relating  to  oil  and  gas  of
multinationals are generally classified within the scope of ‘dangerous things’.
229
 VI Mbu, ‘Problems of the Nigerian Legal System in the light  of the Analytical  Jurisprudence  of




 Bodo Community Case (n 146).
86
the  importance  of  fundamental  rights  as  contained  in  Chapter  IV  of  the  Nigerian
Constitution232 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.233 
232
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233
 African Charter  on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement)  Act Cap A9 LFN
2004.
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                                                        CHAPTER 2
AWARENESS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A TOOL FOR                                     
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
2.1   Introduction
In one of the four hypotheses through which this research is underpinned, it is asked whether
there  is  any legal  nexus between environmental  pollution  and breach of the fundamental
rights  of  people?  In  response,  this  chapter  explores  issues  bordering  on  awareness  of
fundamental rights as a vehicle for environmental protection.  Although little credence has
been  given  to  this  aspect  in  the  law,  and  this  dimension  should  have  been  directly
incorporated  into  it,  particularly  in  Nigeria,1 a  pertinent  question  is:  why  should
environmental protection be treated as an issue relating to fundamental rights? A series of
reasons  may  be  put  forward,  but  in  the  context  of  this  research  it  is  submitted  that
incorporating fundamental rights into principles of environmental protection would secure
higher standards of environmental quality (fundamental rights are known to be given higher
status over and above other rights) due to the requirement of states to provide a satisfactory
environment for citizens,2 thereby, securing the rights to health, life and peaceful enjoyment
of private and family life.3 This is more practical, as it is argued in chapter 6 of this research
that  enforcement  of  environmental  rights  would  be  based  on  the  principle  of  absolute
liability. For instance, on a scale of zero to ten (0-10), with 5 being ‘strict liability’ and 10
being ‘absolute liability’, environmental liability under fundamental rights enforcement, as
argued in chapter 6 of the current research should be pinned under 9, with limited space left
for illegal activities of ‘third parties’ where pollution is shown to be manifestly unavoidable
in events  relating  to illegal  oil  bunkering  and acts  of sabotage by vandals.4 It  is  argued,
nevertheless, that this liability ought to be absolute when such activities of ‘third parties’ are
1
 The recently decided case of  Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd
[2005]  AHRLR  151  (Federal  High  Court)  is  the  first  judicial  pronouncement  and  locus  classicus  on  the
enforcement of fundamental rights to a clean environment in Nigeria.
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foreseeable, and if transnational corporations (TNCs) are proactive and diligent enough in
curbing pollution, they would forestall such acts of third parties.5
All the aforementioned rights are embodied in the right to a safe or healthy environment
(directly implying the right to health). In this regard, The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, in its General Comment on Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic,  Social  and Cultural  Rights  (adopted on 16 December  1966),  characterises  the
Right to Health as:
An inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health
care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation,  an adequate supply of
safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental
conditions, and access to health-related education and information…6
In the light of the foregoing, Marks and Clapham have maintained that human rights law
cannot  purport  to  protect  a  right  not  to  fall  ill  or  have  disease.7 In  essence,  there  are
limitations to the right to health, but more importantly, emphasis must be placed on the cause
of the individual’s health challenges. For instance, within the context of the current research,
if the cause of the violation of the right to health is traceable to activities of oil transnational
corporations  or  government,  then  an  action  for  enforcement  of  the  aforementioned
fundamental rights can be sustained.
The current research retains a comparative methodology approach, and in view of limited
case law in Nigeria to support an argument for breach of fundamental rights in incidents of
environmental  pollution,  reference  is  made  to  similar  trends  in  foreign  jurisdictions,
particularly in England and Wales, and case law from the European Court of Human Rights
(hereinafter ‘ECtHR’). This move, is imperative owing to the mandate imposed on Nigerian
4
 The rationale for this proposition is justified in chapter 6, more particularly in figures 6.4, 6.4.1 and
6.5.
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courts by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 (Hereinafter ‘FREP
Rules’),  to  respect  regional  and  international  bills  of  rights  and  freedom  in  advancing
fundamental rights of individuals.8 In the same vein, the English law remains relevant to the
Nigerian legal system.9 Principles of law and judgments of foreign jurisdictions within the
ambit of environmental pollution and fundamental rights violations as deployed in the current
chapter are necessary. In this regard, Zweigert and Kotz have reasoned that:
When judges of a superior court are faced with a difficult  problem of
principle it is surely wrong for them to disregard solutions and arguments
which  have  been  proposed  or  adopted  elsewhere  just  because  they
happen to emanate from foreign courts and writers.10
The current chapter has exposed the legal jurisprudence and minor misconceptions in the use
of the terms: ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’, and their relevance to the principle of
the protection of the environment. Whilst the phrase ‘human rights’ could be utilised as a
generic concept to include both enforceable and moral rights, only fundamental rights (rights
encapsulated in legal instruments with legal backing) can be enforced by a court of law. It is
observed  that  whilst  the  international  community  is  busy  discussing  vexed  issues  of
environmental protection, no significant attempt had been made to link the environment with
fundamental  rights.11 It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  current  research  is  concerned  with
advancing environmental pollution incidents as a matter of fundamental rights.
This chapter demonstrates that the right to life,  dignity of human person and the right to
private and family life can be interpreted to include environmental rights, having regard to
striking decisions from the ECtHR, the English courts and the Nigerian courts. This chapter
also considers a salient doctrine known as the ‘margin of appreciation’ or the ‘balancing of
8
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interests’ as utilised by the ECtHR and the English courts in determining liability in human
rights  cases.  Whilst  it  has  been  shown that  the  ECtHR is  a  unique  and  focal  point  for
addressing violations of the Convention rights12 amongst contracting parties of the European
Union,13 its decisions are persuasive and subsidiary to English national courts.14
Most  land-mark  judicial  cases  decided  by  the  Nigerian  courts,  ECOWAS  (Economic
Community  of  West  African  States)  Court  of  Justice  and the  African  Commission  have
reflected on the principle of the protection of the environment through fundamental rights
enforcement by giving considerable importance to the right to life and dignity of the person
as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution  and the African Charter.15 Cumulatively,  courts
usually hold governments and oil TNCs culpable for violating fundamental rights relating to
a  safe  environment  where  they  overstep  the  ‘margin  of  appreciation’,16 act  without  due
diligence, or fail to show reasonableness in the handling of hazardous activities as equally
mentioned throughout the discussion in chapter 6 of this research.
2.2   What are Human Rights?
Various  writers  have  given  diverse  meanings  to  the  concept  of  human  rights,  albeit  the
concept as it is being used in the legal parlance may be a relatively recent concept,17 there are
12
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13
 The ECtHR was established as a full-time Court by virtue of Protocol 11 of the Convention (n 12).
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mentioned under figure 2.3.
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various ancient schools of thought who promulgated theories that underpin the modern use of
the phrase, ‘human rights’. Twining has conceptually distinguished between enforceable and
non-enforceable human rights respectively as human rights law and human rights morality.18
He posits that a coherent moral theory of human rights may include rights that may not be
immediately enforceable or claimable or which may not be suitable for being legalise for
other reasons.19 Darren, referred to Geoffrey Robertson’s opinion that one can read the ten-
commandments, in the Christian Holy Bible as implying certain basic rights. For instance,
‘Thou shalt not steal’ seems to suggest the right for individuals to own private properties.20
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was equally  of the view that  human dignity and value are
innate properties which are validated according to natural law.21 The aforementioned views
strengthen the concept of human rights which are more of faith or religious background.
Furthermore,  the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is often credited with
laying the ground work for modern understanding of human rights as ethical practice.22 He
laid  a  foundation  which  suggests  that  human rights  were  distinct  from those  civil  rights
accorded to citizens of a state by the government of that state.23 In essence, whilst human
rights could best be described as a moral obligation amongst citizens of any society, such
rights are not enforceable by the government of that state. This is against the concept of civil
liberties, which are rights recognised and enforced by the state. It is in line with the latter that
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) spoke derisively at the idea of natural law, and of human rights
18
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in general, as ‘nonsense on stilts’ on the grounds that such laws and rights are non-justiciable.
It is deducible from Bentham’s position that ‘human rights’ is not an abstract phenomenon
rooted  in  natural  laws  but  are  rights  invented  by  humans  out  of  necessity.  This
aforementioned  position  is  corroborated  by  Hannah  Arendt  (1906-1975),  that  the  only
fundamental right exists within the political community itself- that is, the right to maintain
the right to life, liberty and others.24 It is maintained that Jeremy Bentham’s articulated attack
on natural law as ‘nonsense on stilts’, and other theories against the non-binding nature of
natural  law must  have ignored the fact  that  at  the time when Thomas Aquinas25 and his
natural law apologists considered principles of natural law as constituting ‘law’, the legal
regime was remarkably dominantly centred on divine or religious norms, and such laws or
religious norms were equally enforced within the society where they apply. It could only be
accepted that the people’s awareness on the concept of ‘law’ during Bentham’s period must
have outgrown the stage of enforcing natural laws, thereby necessitating the embodiment of
principles of right and wrong into codes. But that is not to rule out the validity of ‘natural
law’.  It is against this background that Bix entered a caveat to the effect that: 
…The context of Aquinas’ approach to law-that the theory of law appears
as  a  small  piece  or  application  of  a  larger  theological-moral  system-
should  be  kept  in  mind  when  comparing  his  work  with  more  recent
theorists.26
Bix’s warning is  understandable  and imperative in  that the religious  and/or  philosophical
backgrounds of various jurists have a considerable impact in their various theories. Thomas
Aquinas was a known Catholic Priest (a theologian) and this undoubtedly shaped his position
on natural  law.  Conversely,  considering  Bentham’s postulations  on Legal  Positivism and
Utilitarianism,  it  is  obvious  that  he  is  more  inclined  into  practical  methods  of  resolving
issues, in essence, he is more of a pragmatist.
24
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From a practical standpoint and in contemporary legal regime, it is not enough to ascribe all
rights as ‘human rights’; if such rights must be sacrosanct, legally binding and enforced, then,
they have to be ‘fundamental’. Hence, as society advances, it becomes more necessary that
certain rights with higher priorities be encoded and designated as such, with binding rule of
action.27
The question which begs for answer is: what do lawyers mean when they speak of ‘human
rights’? The two basic aspects of ‘rights’ have been amply captured in the above submissions.
That is, Justiciable and non-justiciable rights, and it is only the former that a lawyer considers
as fundamental rights when presenting a case for violation of rights before a court of law.
This is because non-justiciable  rights cannot be enforced, though they can be persuasive.
Notwithstanding, it must be admitted that the definition of human rights remains a matter of
controversy.28
Phil was of the view that when we speak of ‘human rights,’ we are making statements about a
social  group’s adherence or non-adherence to a particular  moral and political  code which
contains certain principles.29 Phil’s definition appears vague, but it represents the practical
and  contemporary  usage  of  the  concept  of  human  rights  as  both  enforceable  and  non-
enforceable rights.  Rubin had drawn a line of difference between human rights and legal
rights. Rubin observed that both concepts are similar in the sense that they ‘represent some
claim or entitlement that can be asserted by the human beings in question,’ they are distinct to
the extent that:
Legal rights are created by government enactment, and thus constitute the
law that citizens are expected to obey, while human rights arise from the
essential  or  non-governmental  nature  of  human  beings,  and  thus
constitute  the  law  that  is  supposed  to  be  obeyed  by  government
officials.30
27
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Rubin’s remark above on the difference between legal rights and human rights can be related
to the sharp distinction  between fundamental  rights  and human rights  respectively  in  the
current  analysis,  to  the  effect  that  the  former  are  legal  rights  created  by  government
enactments and consequently enforceable, whilst the latter are merely norms ‘supposed to be
obeyed’, and although captured in documents, lack enforceability. For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and other international instruments yet to be incorporated
into national law can be considered as Human Rights Documents with persuasive effects but
do not project fundamental rights.31
The Court of Appeal in the Nigerian case of  Uzoukwu & Ors v Ezeonu II & Ors, whilst
drawing a clear distinction between Human Rights and Fundamental rights, maintained that:
Due  to  the  development  of  Constitutional  Law  in  this  field,  distinct
difference  has  emerged  between  “Fundamental  Rights”  and  “Human
Rights.” It may be recalled that human rights were derived from and out
of  the  wider  concept  of  natural  rights.  They  are  rights,  which  every
civilised society must accept  as belonging to each person as a human
being. These were termed human rights. When the United Nations made
its declaration it was in respect of “Human Rights” as it was envisaged
that certain rights belong to all human beings irrespective of citizenship,
race, and religion and so on. This has now formed part of International
Law. Fundamental Rights remain in the realm of domestic law. They are
fundamental because they have been guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the country; that is by the Constitution.32
In  line  with  the  above,  the  conundrum with  regard  using  the  terms  ‘human  rights’  and
‘fundamental rights’ interchangeably, at least, on technical grounds, has been demystified. In
corroborating the above stance of the Court of Appeal that ‘fundamental rights remain in the
realm  of  domestic  law’  and  they  are  rights  ‘guaranteed  by  the  fundamental  law  of  the
country’, ‘fundamental right’ is defined in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure)
Rules 2009 (FREP Rules) as ‘any of the rights provided for in Chapter IV of the Constitution,
and includes  any of  the rights  stipulated  in the African Charter  on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act’.33 In this vein, Ruth and Chinewubeze added that
the mode and level of enforcement of rights may depend on whether a provision is contained
31
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in an international or a national instrument.34 It is submitted that national legal instruments
encapsulating  provisions  of  ‘human rights’  are  usually  followed with adequate  means  of
enforcement, meanwhile most international instruments on human rights are precatory and
persuasive in nature.
The European Convention on Human Rights, which came into force in 1950, sets out certain
principles on human rights which were ratified by the European States. Such principles as
contained  in  the  Convention  could  only  be  legally  protected  by  individual  states  when
incorporated into their  national  laws. Such human rights,  when incorporated into national
laws metamorphose into ‘fundamental rights’. For instance, in the UK, the principles set out
in the European Convention on Human Rights were incorporated into the Human Rights Act
1998, thereby making such rights ‘fundamental’ at the state level. This is not to rule out the
fundamental nature of the Convention rights at the regional level (Europe), since there are
existing mechanisms to enforce such rights at the ECtHR. The point to note is that ‘rights’
that lack necessary enforcement mechanisms cannot be adjudged to be fundamental rights. In
Nigeria, the aspect of the Constitution which deals with enforceable rights is designated as
‘Fundamental Rights’.35 This simply implies that the aforesaid ‘rights’ retain higher status
over other rights. In this vein, William had observed that:
A right is inconceivable without some rule or norm by which that right is
determined.  To  say  that  I  have  a  right  means  that  there  is  a  certain
binding rule of action, a law, which prescribes a certain course of conduct
on the part of another person for my benefit.36
Even if the phrase ‘human rights’ can be used as a generic concept to include ‘fundamental
rights’, it is necessary to point it out from the onset that ‘fundamental rights’, in the context
of  the  current  research  means  only  rights  which  can  be  legally  protected.  In  essence,
 FREP Rules, Ord 1, r 2. The awareness of fundamental rights as it relates to a healthy environment in
Nigeria is further discussed in figure 2.5 below.
34
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fundamental rights exist only where the holder of the right can enforce it by bringing an
action in law.37 This aforesaid stance is embodied in the legal principle that where there is a
law or right, there is equally a corresponding remedy or duty, where such law or right is
breached.38
2.3   A Critical Analysis of the Use of Human Rights Actions as a Tool for Environmental 
Protection from Decisions of European Court of Human Rights and in England and Wales
More recently, human rights scholars and activists have indicated a tremendous interest in
utilising human rights based arguments to promote environmental values,39 and this could be,
perhaps, due to the fact that most human rights are infringed through harmful environmental
activities. Just like in every other aspect of the law, there are legal challenges encountered by
legal practitioners in establishing the liability of an alleged violator of fundamental rights.
However, these challenges vary, based on the jurisdiction in question.
It is worth mentioning that the principle of the protection of the environment encompasses
various aspects of the law which gives support to individual rights and values as it relates to
the  environment.  Just  like  it  is  mentioned above,40 the  idea  of  vesting certain  rights  and
freedoms  to  the  individual  has  a  long  and  complex  background with  various  schools  of
thought,  but only relatively recently have these rights been laid down in a binding code,
thereby enabling  members  of  the  society  to  pursue their  perceived  breach of  rights  with
certainty. In a European context, one significant text embedded with a series of rights and
values  is  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  1950
(hereinafter ‘the Convention or ECHR’).41 The ECHR is basically a fundamental guideline
for  European  countries  on  the  rights  and  freedoms  which  it  entails,  and  its  mode  of
37
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application is limited in member states in a way that the courts will have to strike a balance
between individual rights on one hand and the economic interests and other issues of national
interests of the state on the other.42 This implies that certain rights can be outweighed if they
contradict or are seen to undermine the economic and other national interests of the member
states.
Whilst the European Court of Human Rights is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain basic
rights and freedoms as contained in the ECHR, the English national courts are vested with
Jurisdiction  to  entertain  human rights  proceeding  as  contained  in  the  Human Rights  Act
(HRA) 1998. Both the ECHR and the Human Rights Act of 1998 contain certain rights which
could serve, substantially, as a tool for the protection and preservation of the environment.
Whilst it is necessary to note that the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR are merely
persuasive  on  the  courts,43 there  are  some  provisions  of  the  ECHR  which  are  directly
incorporated in the Human Rights Act of 1998, thereby, making such provisions binding on
the courts.44 The more relevant  (on environmental  protection)  Articles  of  the Convention
brought into the UK law as contained in the Human Rights Act are Articles 2 and 8, dealing
with  the  right  to  life  and  the  right  to  respect  for  private  and  family  life,  home  and
correspondence respectively. 
It  is submitted that Articles  2 and 8 of the Convention rights alongside other Articles as
provided for in the Human Rights Act 1998, are not absolute rights. This is pursuant to the
provision of section 1(2) of the Act which provides, inter alia, that those rights (Convention
rights),45 are  to  have  effect  for  the  purposes  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  subject  to  any
designated derogation or reservation.46 The aforesaid provision is corroborated by Article 57
42
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of the ECHR, permitting  member states  to  make reservations  in  parts  of the Convention
rights  which  are  not  in  conformity  with  existing  state  laws,  but  the  ECHR  prohibits
reservations of a general character.47 The ‘reservations’ and ‘derogations’ have made human
rights enforcement actions very uncertain for applicants, as the State seem to give a higher
priority to national interest, thereby undermining individual rights as contained in the ECHR
and the Human Rights Act. This position is shown in the English case of Marcic v Thames
Water Utilities Ltd.48
Having regard to the above, it should be clear that the courts are vested with the ultimate
authority of determining the circumstances that can entrust  the loaded rights as contained
respectively in the ECHR and the Human Rights Act, to victims of environmental pollution.
This, therefore, presupposes the significant role of case-law in determining individual rights
as it relates to the principle of the protection of the environment.
The Convention does not directly make provisions relating to fundamental rights to a clean
environment.  Nevertheless,  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  and  its
subsequent protocols have been utilised by a significant number of victims of environmental
pollution  in  a  series  of  judicial  claims  as  a  means  to  secure  an  acceptable  or  standard
environment.49 It is necessary to consider the potential impact of the ECHR and HRA1998 in
order to determine the extent to which they guarantee substantive environmental rights.
In the striking case of Guerra v Italy,50 the applicants all lived in Malfredonia, a town situated
one kilometre away from a chemical factory. The factory’s activities produce large quantities
of  inflammable  gas,  which  was  said  to  have  the  potential  to  cause  explosive  chemical
reactions polluting the air with highly toxic substances. In 1976, following an explosion in
 Human rights Act 1998, s 1(2).
47
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the factory, about 150 persons were hospitalised with acute arsenic poisoning and in 1998 the
factory was classified as ‘high risk’ pursuant to the criteria laid down in a Presidential Decree
178/88 (implementing  Council  Directive  (EEC)  82/501 on the  major-accident  hazards  of
industrial activities dangerous to the environment and the well-being of the local population)
and a committee  of  technical  experts  found that  the geographical  location  of  the  factory
rendered Malfredonia susceptible to its emissions. Under the aforesaid Decree, the relevant
Mayor and Prefect were obligated to inform local inhabitants of industrial hazards, safety
measures taken, emergency strategies and the procedure to be followed in the event of an
accident. The applicants complained to the European Commission of Human Rights that the
Italian authorities had failed, inter alia, to provide information on risks and the emergency
procedures violating the right to freedom of information as guaranteed to them by Article 10
of the ECHR (Article 10 borders on Freedom of Expression which include the freedom to
receive  and  impart  information  and  ideas  without  interference  by  public  authority).  The
Commission  expressed  the  opinion  that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  Article  10  of  the
Convention and subsequently referred the complaint to the European Court of Human Rights.
The applicants, in the Guerra case equally relied on Articles 8 and 2 of the Convention, with
the contention that the failure to provide information had infringed their right to respect for
their private and family life and their right to life respectively. The European Court of Human
Rights held that the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention was established by the direct
effect of toxic emissions on the applicants’ right to private and family life. It was stated that
the primary aim of Article 2 of the Convention was to protect the individual against arbitrary
interference by public authorities, which mostly entails negative undertakings by the state.
The Court further stated that the duty of the state under Article 8 also includes a positive
obligation to ensure effective respect for private and family life.51 
The facts of the Guerra case also suggest that the production of harmful substances ceased in
1994 before the applicants were given essential information that would have enabled them to
assess the risks related to the factory’s emissions. It therefore followed that the state had not
complied with its obligation to secure the applicants’ right to respect for their private and
family life, thereby violating Article 8. The European Court of Human right disregarded the
51
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contention  on  Article  2  since  the  state  had  complied  with  its  obligation  of  rendering
information on the risk of the emission, although belated.52
Having regard to the Guerra case, it is no longer in doubt that the right to life and respect for
private and family life could be interpreted to include environmental rights. This raises the
issue whether these rights could be enforceable in the UK. In the English case of R (Secretary
of state for the home department) v BC and BB,53 the court stated that Convention rights
become civil rights at the moment such rights are incorporated into the Human Rights Act of
1998. It is submitted in the light of the case of R v BC and BB, and having regard to the fact
that Article 2 and 8 of the ECHR have been incorporated into the Human Rights Act, that the
right to life and the right to private and family life respectively are civil rights guaranteed in
the UK.
Another  important  issue  for  determination  is  the  significance  of  the  Judgments  of  the
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  the  UK courts.  In  essence,  how effective  are  the
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights to the UK national courts? A combined
reading  of  section  2(1)  of  the  HRA 199854 provides,  inter  alia,  that  a  court  or  tribunal
determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into
account:  judgment,  decision,  declaration  or  advisory  opinions  of  the  European  Court  of
Human Rights, opinions or decisions of the commission, or decision of the Committee of
Ministers, whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is
relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen. It is deducible from the above
provision that the qualification,  ‘in the opinion of the court  or tribunal’  suggests that the
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights can only be persuasive but not binding. It
is persuasive because the UK national courts or tribunal are only meant to ‘take into account’
such decisions from the European Court.  It  could be argued that  despite the non-binding
effects of decisions of the European Courts on Human Rights, it would attract more weight in
terms of  judicial precedence, since principles of justice requires that ‘like cases are treated
52
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alike’ in order to establish consistency.55 In another perspective, it is arguable that once any
court or tribunal in the UK is able to ascertain the relevance of a judgment of the European
court of Human Rights to a pending case,  it  automatically  becomes an obligation on the
former to follow suit. This is because section 2(1) above of the Human Rights Act made use
of  the  verb  ‘must’,  suggesting  a  procedural  obligation  in  the  circumstance,  provided the
decision of the ECtHR to be taken into account is relevant to the pending case before the
court or tribunal in the UK. Conversely, it is obvious from the aforesaid provision that the
courts and tribunals in the UK are allowed a degree of discretion on the credence to be given
to judicial cases from the ECtHR, and according to Hoffman and Rowe, this is important
owing to the fact that the ‘European Court cases are decided in relation to a wide variety of
situations arising in many different countries.’56 This is equally understandable having regard
to  the  fact  that  judges  of  the  European  Court  are  from  different  legal  cultures  and
backgrounds,57 and this is likely to influence their decisions on legal issues before them.
Having considered the relevance and significance of judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights, it would be necessary to consider a couple of additional cases of importance
to  Convention  rights.  A landmark case  is  that  of  Powell  and Rayner  v  UK,58 where  the
applicants  who lived  close  to  Heathrow airport  based  their  action  on  Article  8  (right  to
respect of one’s private life and home) of the Convention rights. The applicants brought their
claim on the grounds that the noise pollution from the airport constituted a grievous effect on
the quality  of their  private  lives and adversely affected the peace and enjoyment  of their
home,  thereby  infringing  on  their  Article  8  rights.  For  the  purposes  of  appreciating  the
position of the European Court of Human Rights in this case, it will be pertinent to look at the
complete provision of Article 8 of the Convention rights which provides that:
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Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with
the  law  and  is  necessary  in  a  democratic  society  in  the  interests  of
national  security,  public  safety  or  the  economic  well-being  of  the
country,  for the prevention  of disorder or crime,  for  the protection  of
health  or  morals,  or  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  of
others.59
The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in  a  unanimous  judgment  held,  having  a  full
contemplation of the aforesaid provision of Article 8 that there had been no violation of the
right to an effective domestic remedy in respect of alleged violations of Article 8. It was
equally made clear that the applicants had conceded to the fact that the operation of a major
international  airport  such  as  Heathrow  pursued  a  legitimate  aim  (in  the  interest  of  the
economic  well-being  of  the  country)  and that  the  consequential  negative  impacts  on  the
environment could not be entirely eliminated. 
It is submitted from the foregoing that the courts have a more sensitive and significant role to
play by striking a balance between the rights of individuals as enshrined in Article 8(1) and
the  exceptions  which can  be considered  as  ‘public  interest’  as  contained in  Article  8(2),
because it is clear from that provision that as long as the individual possesses the right to
respect for his private and family life, the state could interfere with such rights in the interest
of the community.60 Fitzmaurice maintained that the fundamental principle of ‘balancing of
interests’  between an individual and the community is at the core of the adjudication of cases
based on Article 8 of the Convention rights, which was first utilised in the case of Powell v
Rayner.61 In fulfilling this obligation of striking a balance between the interests of individuals
and states, the courts will have to take into consideration whether the state has complied with
its  own  positive  duty  of  taking  ‘reasonable  and  appropriate’  measures  in  securing  the
59
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applicants  rights.  What  could  be  reasonable  and appropriate  will  be  another  issue  to  be
determined by the courts having regard to the efforts made by the state. 
In the Guerra case,62 the Italian government failed to provide information which could have
served as  a  precautionary  measure  for  the  applicants  to  avoid  the  harmful  effects  of  the
factory’s activities, hence the government was said to have violated the Article 8 rights of the
applicants.  In  Powell  and Rayner’s case, it  was evident from the facts of the case that a
number of measures were introduced by the UK authorities to control, abate and compensate
for  aircraft  noise at  and around the Heathrow Airport.  Albeit  the state  is  responsible  for
setting  out  the  procedures  which  will  justify  whether  there  is  a  compliance  with  the
Convention rights in Article 8, such procedures will have to be complied with in order to
fulfil the requirement of ‘reasonability’ and ‘appropriateness’ of the state’s action needed to
be vindicated in human rights cases.
In the case of Lopez Ostra v Spain,63 the applicant and her family lived in a town in Spain.
The applicant alleged that the smells, noise and polluting fumes caused by a plant for the
treatment of liquid and solid waste situated only a few metres away from her family had
breached her article 8 rights of the Convention. The government contended that the special
application for the protection of fundamental rights brought by the applicant was an improper
means of raising questions of compliance with the ordinary law or the current dispute which
is  of  a  scientific  nature.  The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  held  that  the  special
application for the protection  of fundamental  rights  was an effective  and rapid means of
obtaining redress, since such procedure could curtail  further waste and activities from the
plant,  and  that  the  applicant  is  not  under  any  obligation  to  bring  a  different  kind  of
proceedings.
In determining Lopez Ostra’s rights under the Convention, the Court considered the basic
issue whether the state has complied with its positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate
measures to secure the applicant’s rights under Article 8(1) of the Convention rights, or in
terms with an ‘interference by a public authority’, whether the state has acted in line with the
aims of Article 8(2). In determining the issue, attention was paid to the issue of striking a fair
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balance between the competing interests of an individual (the applicant’s effective enjoyment
of her right to respect for her home and her private and family life) on the one hand, and of
the community on the other. It was emphasised by the Court that the public aims mentioned
in Article 8(2)64 are relevant, but that in the instant case, the municipality had not only failed
to take steps necessary for the protection of the applicant’s right as contained in Article 8(1)
but had also resisted judicial decision to that effect. As a result, the Court held that the state
had failed in striking a fair balance required, and accordingly, there had been a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention. 
In the light of the case of  Guerra65 and the latter  case of  Lopez Ostra,  it  has become an
established case law principle that in striking a balance in human rights-based arguments, the
European Court on Human Rights would take into consideration the positive steps which the
State has taken to subvert any act that will infringe the Convention rights amply captured in
section  8(1).  Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that  the  Convention  rights  can  be  enforced  against
incidents of environmental pollution, even if the right to a clean environment is not explicitly
provided  for  under  the  Convention  rights.  In  corroborating  this  stance,  Murdoch  had
observed, while commenting on the Lopez Ostra case that ‘Strasbourg case-law now clearly
establishes  that  environmental  protection  may  indeed  indirectly  fall  within  the  scope  of
Convention  guarantees.’66 Murdoch  further  admitted  that  the  provision  in  Article  8
(Enjoyment of Private and Family Life) of the Convention rights is wide enough to include
threats to physical well-being.67 The current analysis of the ECtHR  cases is to establish the
link between environmental pollution and fundamental rights violation at the international
level, and how this principles have gained their way into the English jurisdiction (through the
64
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Human Rights  Act);  and being a  comparative  research work,  the Nigerian  perspective  is
considered with very limited case law available in this regard.68
In another landmark case of Hatton and others v United Kingdom,69 with almost similar facts
to the Powell and Rayner70 case discussed above, the applicants lived in the vicinity of the
Heathrow airport and alleged that their sleep had been regularly disturbed by aircraft noise at
night. The alleged disturbance was pursuant to the increment of night flights by the 1993
night quota scheme. The introduction of the scheme, in effect, increased the number of night
flights due to its ‘economic benefits’. The applicants averred before the European Court of
Human Rights, inter alia, that the level of aircraft noise at night amounted to an unjustifiable
interference in their private lives as contained in Article 8(1). In a Chamber judgment, the
Court held that the government had not taken sufficient steps to protect the applicants Article
8 rights in devising the 1993 scheme. 
On appeal, the Grand Chamber reversed the initial judgment and ruled that the role of the
Convention  was  essentially  a  subsidiary  one,  and  that,  national  authorities  had  direct
democratic legitimation, and were, in principle, better placed than an international court to
evaluate local needs and conditions. The Grand Chamber equally emphasised that Article 8
could apply in environmental cases in circumstance where the pollution is caused directly by
the state or where the state had failed to regulate private industry. In either case, it was stated
by the Grand Chamber that fair balance had to be maintained between the competing interests
of the individual and the community. Having regard to the terms of the 1993 scheme, and
having considered the substantive merits of the state’s decisions to ensure compatibility with
Article 8 rights of the individual, the Court held that the government had not overstepped its
margin of appreciation,  which indicates the striking of a balance between individuals and
states with regard to the discretion enjoyed by the state.
68
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It is worth mentioning that the modus utilised by the European Court of Human Rights in
Powell  and Rayner71 and that of  Hatton72 are in line with one of the grounds justified by
Article 8(2) under which a state could interfere with the rights under Article 8(1), and such
grounds is where the alleged infringement is caused as a result of the ‘economic well-being
of the country’.73
A striking  case  on  the  position  of  the  English  Courts  on  issues  of  human  rights  based
argument for environmental  protection,  was the case of  Marcic v Thames Water Utilities
Ltd.74 In that case, the defendant was a statutory sewerage undertaker, responsible under the
Water Industry Act 1991 (as amended) for providing sewers for the removal of sewage and
surface water in which the claimant’s house was situated. From the facts of the case, there
were sufficient sewers to meet the needs of residents, but because of subsequent structures in
the area,  the claimant’s  property has  been flooded as  a  result  of  inadequate  sewers.  The
aforementioned  Water  Industry  Act  makes  provision  for  the  Water  Services  Regulation
Authority,75 and The Secretary of State exercises similar powers alongside the Authority,76
who has  legal  powers  to  enforce  the  obligations  of  a  sewerage  undertaker  by  means  of
enforcement orders.77 In essence, where there are inconveniences or foreseeable damage to be
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suffered by a resident, such complaints are made to the Regulator, who in effect makes an
enforcement order against the sewerage undertaker(s).78 A claimant could only bring up an
action against the sewerage undertaker who failed to execute the enforcement order. Hence,
the  enforcement  procedure  is  the  only  remedy  available  to  a  person  who  alleges  a
contravention of the sewerage undertaker’s drainage obligation,79 except in the circumstances
where the sewerage undertaker fails to comply with the enforcement order.
In the court of first instance, Mr Marcic (claimant) launched a claim on nuisance and breach
of  his  Conventions  Rights  under  Article  8.  The  Judge  found  that  under  the  system  of
priorities then prevailing in the company’s area, there was no prospect of any work being
carried out in the foreseeable future to prevent flooding of the claimant’s property. The Judge
concluded  that  the  company  (Thames  Water)  had  infringed  the  claimant’s  Convention
rights.80 The decision was affirmed by the  Court  of  Appeal.  On a further  Appeal  by the
Company  to  the  House  of  Lords  (now  Supreme  Court);  one  of  the  primary  issues  for
determination before the House of Lords was whether the statutory scheme of the Water
Industry Act 1991 as a whole complied with the European Convention.81 Whilst allowing the
Appeal, Lord Nicholls asked:
 …More specifically and at the risk of over-simplification, is the statutory
scheme unreasonable in its impact on Mr Marcic and other householders
whose properties are periodically subjected to sewer flooding?82
The House of Lords made reference to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights
in  the  case  of  Hatton  v  UK,83 where  the  ‘subsidiary’  nature  of  the  Convention  was
78
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emphasised.  It  was  stated  that  in  matters  of  general  policy,  on  which  opinions  within  a
democratic  society  may  reasonably  differ  widely,  the  role  of  the  domestic  policy  maker
should be given special weight, and that a fair balance must be struck between the interests of
the individual and of the community as a whole.84 As regards the sort of balance struck by the
Act, the Lord Nicholls stated:
…The balance struck by the statutory is to impose a general drainage
obligation on a sewerage undertaker but to entrust enforcement of this
obligation to an independent regulator who has regard to all the interests
involved.  Decisions  of  the  Director  are  of  course  subject  to  an
appropriately penetrating degree of judicial review by the courts.85
The House of Lords was of the view that,  in principle,  the scheme (Water  Industry Act)
seems to strike a reasonable balance,  and that parliament acted well  within its bounds as
policy makers.86 The alleged claim for infringement of Mr Marcic’s Convention rights was
therefore held to be ‘ill-founded,’ since the scheme provides a remedy for persons in Mr
Marcic’s unhappy position, but Mr Marcic chose not to avail himself of this remedy.87 In
essence,  Mr Marcic  ignored the scheme (which was held to be convention-compliant)  by
bringing an action directly on Thames Water without any formal complaint to the Director of
Water Resources. 
Mr Marcic’s case can be contrasted to Guerra’s case.88 In the latter case of Guerra v Italy, the
Italian government failed to comply with its obligation under the presidential Decree 178/88
to inform local inhabitants of emergency procedures and the risk of hazards emanating from
factories. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the failure to provide such
 Hatton (n 69).
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information has led to the damages suffered by the applicants, thereby infringing on their
Convention  rights  as  enshrined in  Articles  2  and 8.  Whilst  applying  the  doctrine  of  the
‘margin  of  appreciation’,  it  can  be  submitted  that  the  State  (Italian  government)  has
overstepped the margin of appreciation by ignoring the tenets of the Decree. But looking at
the content of the Presidential Decree, it is obvious that the scheme has created a reasonable
balance between the operations of factories and local inhabitants. The only shortcoming in
the  Guerra case was the delay or failure of the government to implement the Directive. In
both  the  Marcic and  Guerra case,  parliament  had  good  intentions.  The  only  point  of
derogation was that in the Marcic case, Marcic failed to follow due process as laid down by
the Water Industry Act 1991 (as amended), thereby failing to establish his Convention rights.
In the Guerra case, it was ‘public authority’ who derailed from the laid down directive. The
takeaway point in both cases is that public authority (which includes parliament) must act
‘reasonably and appropriately’ in striking a balance which is expected to be compliant with
the Convention rights, and most importantly it is shown via case law that a significant nexus
does  exists  between environmental  pollution  and violation  of  Conventions  rights,  so that
where the environment is polluted via activities of oil and gas there would be a cause of
action in enforcement of Convention rights. To corroborate this stance, Francioni maintained
that ‘extensive case law developed by human rights courts and supervisory bodies at regional
and universal  levels  tends  to  indicate  that  indeed  an  environmental  dimension of  human
rights has been recognised’.89
2.4 Environmental Challenges in Nigeria
At the heart of this research, is an attempt to unravel the numerous environmental challenges
faced by Nigerians, particularly in the oil producing communities in the Niger Delta area, and
the need to address such challenges through the instrumentality of fundamental rights actions.
In  view of  this,  a  brief  background showcasing  the  nature  and  degree  of  environmental
challenges faced by Nigerians, particularly inhabitants of the oil-rich Niger Delta, is captured
in every chapter of the research as a reminder of the need for an argument for a stricter
liability90 in environmental pollution claims.
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Crude oil in Nigeria was first discovered in commercial quantities in Oloibiri in 1956,91 a
community in the present Bayelsa State. A native of that community, Chief Sunday Inegite,
whilst narrating his experience of welcoming the British, German and Dutch engineers in the
course of their exploration visits in the community in 1953 said ‘They made us be happy and
clap like fools, dance as if we were trained monkeys,’92 and Nigeria being one of Africa’s
biggest  oil  producer,  it  is  reported  the  people  of  the  Niger  Delta  witness  any  major
development, rather, there are growing reports of environmental degradation as a result of oil
and gas activities which has affected wildlife and farming in the area. Chief Sunday Inegite
apportioned  blame  on  both  the  oil  transnational  corporations  and  the  government.  He
observed further: ‘I don’t only blame the whites that came here, what about the government?
People in government get nearly all the money from the economy’.93
The  environmental  problems  witnessed  in  the  Niger  Delta  area  are  well-known,  as  the
Nigerian government in several occasions has corroborated on the plight of the people. In a
report  furnished  by  the  Nigerian  government  to  the  UN  Commission  on  Sustainable
Development, it was admitted that:
The environment provides all life support with air, water and land as well
as the materials for fulfilling all developmental aspirations of man. As in
most  other  countries  of  the  world,  the  Nigerian  environment  today
presents a grim litany of woes.94
The  Nigerian  government  specifically  pointed  out  that  petroleum  prospecting  with  its
attendant  oil  pollution  problems  has  led  to  environmental  degradation  such  as:  loss  of
sabotage by vandals.
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aesthetic values of natural beaches due to oil slicks, damage to marine wildlife, modification
of  the ecosystem through species  elimination,  and decrease in  fishery resources.95 It  was
admitted that gas flaring has led to problems of ecosystem heat stress, acid rain, destruction
of fresh water and forests resources in the coastal areas of the country.96
In view of the environmental challenges encountered by the people of the Niger Delta, there
had been serious cases of protests and lawsuits with a view to getting government attention
and deriving compensations from government and oil transnational corporations. But these
moves,  in most cases have been witnessed with tremendous resistance from government.
Amnesty International, a non-governmental environmental organisation, has equally accused
major oil companies, including Shell, of refusing to render a proper disclosure of oil spills in
Nigeria.97 This trend has been seen to undermine the serious cases of environmental pollution
in the Niger Delta area. Ross observed that ‘oil spills are having an appalling environmental
impact on the Niger Delta and they are happening at an alarming rate’.98 Amnesty is said to
have  identified  about  474  spills  in  2012  in  an  area  operated  by  the  Nigerian  Agip  Oil
Company- a subsidiary of ENI.99 Although it is reported that all the spills from ENI were
recorded to avoid disputes, and the management of the company had alleged to have paid all
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Environmental campaigners have observed that there are approximately 300 oil spills every
year in the Niger Delta.101 These figures are fluctuating, year by year, but the point to note is
that records of oil spills are staggering. It is against this background that environmentalists
call the Niger Delta the ‘global capital of oil pollution’.102 On 12 May 2009, Shell’s Bomo
Manifold in Nigeria blew up, causing leakage of crude. In May, an Exxon Mobil pipeline in
Akwa Ibom State leaked about 300 barrels of crude oil, and this has been described as ‘one of
several spills involving the company’.103
The Nigerian government is said to have admitted that there were more than 7,000 spills
between 1970 and 2000.104 A native of the Nigerian village of Kpor, Saturday Pirri, a local
palm wine tapper in Rivers  State of the Niger Delta, whilst narrating personal experience of
the effects of oil pollution on the environment observed: ‘It kills our our fish, destroys our
skin, spoils our streams, we cannot drink’.105 In fact, reports of environmental degradation in
the Niger Delta caused by oil and gas pollution are unprecedented and inexhaustible to be
contained in this brief record. The rationale behind this brief narrative is to awaken minds on
the basis behind a series of court actions for environmental justice, which fundamental rights
enforcement  takes  the  limelight  in  this  research.  As  earlier  mentioned,  the  series  of
environmental abuses have generated protests in the Niger Delta, and in response, protesters
are being attacked by government security forces, which Human Rights Watch has recorded a
series of human rights violations in that regard.106 Of greater concern of such human rights
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violations,  is the environmental aspect, because it has been shown that the environmental
injustice, and claims of being marginalised in the area had sparked every kind of agitation.
Environmental injustice could be considered both a remote and direct cause of key problems
faced by the Niger Deltans. The Government of Bayelsa State, a major oil producing State in
the Niger Delta, through its governor, Mr. Seriake Dickson observed that: 
…Over 260 environmental pollutions are recorded in the state yearly…
oil companies have to conform to best practices as done everywhere in
the world. They have taken advantage of the weak institutions and laws
in the country.107
In line with the above remark, it is generally believed that the regulatory regime as well as
procedural laws on environmental safety is relatively weak. This is a strong assertion which
is not taken on face value. Hence, a proper analysis is made with a view to mirroring the
environmental legal framework in Nigeria, particularly on environmental rights enforcement
throughout the research. 
In the light of the above, it is maintained that in view of the principle of ‘state responsibility’,
as discussed in chapter 5 of this research, which requires governments to tackle pollution
issues within their jurisdictions, and not to cause harm to other states,108 government must
promote  issues  of  public  awareness  on  environmental  matters  (which  entails  access  to
information,  public  participation  in  environmental  decision-making  as  well  as  access  to
justice)  as  discussed  in  chapter  4  of  this  research.109 Furthermore,  Mr  Akenhead  of  the
Technological  and  Construction  Court  in  London,  reasoned  in  the  Bodo case  that  the
‘reasonable  steps’  to  be  taken  by  oil  operators  (including  the  Nigerian  government)  in
protection of pipelines, can, in some cases, be interpreted as including curtailing intentional
2015.
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acts of sabotage.110 Owing to this, oil operators would be deemed, in some cases not to have
taken  ‘reasonable  steps’  to  secure  oil  facilities  if  they  fail  to  comply  with  modern
technologies  that  could  safeguard  the  pipelines  and  other  installations.111 It  follows  that,
installation  of  anti-tampering  equipment  or  other  sort  of  technology  to  maintain  rapid
surveillance would amount to reasonable or preventable steps to secure oil facilities and curb
oil  spills.  Most importantly,  it  is suggested that government should constantly engage oil
producing communities in dialogue with a view to addressing grievances relating to issues of
marginalisation and underdevelopment as mentioned in figure 3.3.1 of this research.
2.5 Awareness of Fundamental Rights as a Tool for Environmental Protection in Nigeria
Looking at case law and statutory provisions within the field of human rights as it relates to
environmental  protection,  it  could  be  said  that  this  area  of  study is  novel  with  minimal
attention  given  by  government.  This  is  because  there  had  been  no  clear  enforcement
provision relating to the right to a clean environment until the incorporation of the African
Charter on Human and People’s Right112 into the municipal laws of Nigeria in 1983. It is
against this background that Anaebo and Ekhator observed that:
There  has  been never-ending debate concerning the right  to  a  healthy
environment  and  the  extent  to  which  the  law  has  provided  for  or
guaranteed the right in national and international contexts. Whilst some
countries have expressly recognised the right to a healthy environment in
their  constitutions  and subsidiary laws,  others  have  relied  on regional
instruments  and  treaties  to  guarantee  such  rights,  especially  where
domestic legislation is either lacking, inadequate or ineffective.113
Although section 20 of the Nigerian Constitution emphasises on the need for the Federal
government to protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land,
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forest and wild life of Nigeria,114 this provision is non-justiciable by virtue of section 6(6)(c)
of the Constitution, as the former provision on the duty of government to maintain a safe
environment falls within the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy,
which is precatory in nature. However, considering the growing body of legal knowledge and
awareness that the rights to life,  dignity of the human person and private and family life
would inevitably be interpreted to include environmental  rights,  victims of environmental
pollution  and  academics  effectively  contributed  to  project  a  cause  of  action  under
fundamental rights enforcement proceeding in Nigeria where the environment is polluted by
oil and gas activities of transnational corporations and local industries as well. In view of this,
Jonathan had observed that:
…Indeed,  an  environment  degraded  by  pollution  and  defaced  by  the
destruction  of  all  beauty…is  as  contrary  to  the  satisfactory  living
conditions and the development of personality, as the breakdown of the
fundamental  ecological  equilibrium  is  harmful  to  physical  and  moral
health. There is, of course, an integral link between the right to a healthy
environment and other human rights in general. The deterioration of the
environment  affects  the  rights  to  life,  health,  work,  dignity  of  human
person, privacy of the home, education among other rights.115 
The  above  remark  lends  support  to  the  foundation  and  justification  for  the  pursuit  of
environmental justice under fundamental rights proceedings in Nigeria, particularly where the
right  to  a  clean  environment  is  not  explicit  within  legal  instruments  guaranteeing  the
aforementioned  fundamental  rights.  It  is  logically  and inductively  reasoned that  a  man’s
survival solely depends on a harmless and productive biological ecosystem, and every other
human right would go into oblivion if man ceases to exist; in view of this, it should be the
case that once the concept of fundamental rights is mentioned or conceived (particularly the
rights to life, dignity of the person and private and family life), it should legally be interpreted
to  including  the  right  to  a  safe  environment  as  it  is  shown  from  the  series  of  judicial
pronouncements considered above on the European Convention of Human Rights and the
various  conventions  and  world  treaties  mentioned  in  this  research.  This  position  is  not
114
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unchallengeable, as it could be maintained that Parliament never envisaged a right to a clean
environment  to  be  absorbed  within  the  aforementioned  rights.  But  such  an  argument  or
standpoint  may  not  be  persuasive  enough  to  deny  environmental  rights  within  the  legal
connotations and circumstances of the rights to life, dignity of human person and private and
family life.
With regard to judicial pronouncement, a Federal High Court in Nigeria in the case of Jonah
Gbemre (for himself and as representing Iwherekan Community in Delta State, Nigeria)  v
Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and others,116 has affirmed the position
of the applicants that the pollution of the environment via gas flaring by the first respondent
(SPDC) was a violation of their fundamental rights to life and dignity of the human person as
guaranteed by sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria (as amended) and related provisions of the African Charter117. This judgment should
be  regarded  as  a  landmark  decision  and  a  far-reaching  judicial  pronouncement  linking
incidents  of  oil  and  gas  pollution  to  violation  of  the  aforementioned  guaranteed  rights
provided for in Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution. To avoid repetitions, the full detail
of the verdict is reserved for the discussion in Chapter 6 to aid the argument for an absolute
liability for environmental rights enforcement. 
Ruth and Chinewubeze have expressed worries and shortcomings relating  to  the  Gbemre
case, pointing out that the judgment is only persuasive on the ground that the Federal High
Court is a Court of coordinate jurisdiction with other high courts of the states on the subject
matter.118 They maintained that the ‘jurisprudential value’ of the decision would have had
more  credence  or  weight  if  it  were a  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  or  the  Supreme
Court.119 This position is quite correct, but it is necessary to add that there is a presumption of
correctness,  validity  and bindingness  on the parties  to  the  Jonah Gbemre case until  it  is
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upturned on appeal. It would be pertinent to state that as at the 4 th of April, 2016, when an
application to search the case file of the aforementioned case (Jonah Gbemre v SPDC) was
put  forward  before  the  Assistant  Director  Litigation  at  the  Federal  High  Court  (Benin
Division), it was confirmed that there is no pending appeal on the courts’ verdict, meanwhile
the judgment was delivered in 2005.
It  is  noteworthy  that  before  the  pronouncement  of  the  ground-breaking  judgment  in  the
Jonah Gbemre case in 2005, environmental law experts have had mixed opinions on whether
there is any cause of action in enforcement of fundamental rights to a clean environment in
Nigeria. Atsegbua had made reference to Okukpon and Adewale on their respective stance
that even if it is assumed that the provision in section of 20 of the Nigerian Constitution
making provision for the need for States to maintain a healthy environment is not justiciable,
section  33(1)  which  borders  on  the  right  to  life  appears  to  protect  the  citizens  against
environmental  degradation;  affirming  that  the  right  to  life  means  the  right  to  a  clean
environment.120 Conversely,  Okon  observed  that  ‘neither  the  1999  Constitution  nor  any
enactment on environment is capable of creating fundamental right to a clean and healthy
environment  in  favour  of  any  person whether  natural  or  artificial.’121 Nonetheless,  Okon
seems to theoretically admit an existing nexus between the constitutional right to life and the
right to safe environment when he said ‘definitely, the inter-relationship between a balanced,
clean  and  healthy  environment  and  the  right  to  life  will  see  the  enforcement  of  the
environmental objectives through the right to life'.122
Following notions that the Nigerian Constitution does not contain an enforceable provision
on the right to a safe environment, some legal experts have recommended that section 20 of
the Nigerian Constitution be amended to project the right to a clean environment which is to
be  captured  under  Chapter  IV  of  the  Constitution  (containing  fundamental  rights),  and
according to Atsegbua (in an article published in 2001), if this is done, the right to a clean
120
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environment would be justiciable.123 This literally suggests that before the judgment of the
Jonah  Gbemre case124 (in  2005)  a  vast  majority  of  environmental  law experts  were  not
satisfied or confident with the willingness of the Nigerian courts to expansively interpret the
existing constitutional provisions of the rights to life, dignity of human person and private
and family life to reflect environmental rights. But even if there are still prevailing fears on
the  readiness  of  the  courts  to  give  more  expansive  interpretation  to  the  constitutionally
guaranteed rights in Chapter IV to include environmental rights, particularly due to the fact
that the judgment of the Jonah Gbemre case is still subject to further appeals in the Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court as expressed by Ruth and Chinewubeze above,125 it is observed
from recent legal literature,  after  the aforesaid judgment that the arguments in support of
enforcement of environmental rights derived from the above mentioned constitutional rights
have incredibly improved amongst writers from 2005 till date.
At the international level, the United Nations Human Rights Committee rightly cautioned that
the right  to life  as contained in the International  Covenant  on Civil  and Political  Rights,
should not be interpreted narrowly,126 noting further that ‘the expression “inherent right to
life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner’.127
With regard to the position of the Court in the Jonah Gbemre case, and without being in haste
to pre-empt the outcome of an appeal (in the aforesaid case or similar ones that would likely
emerge  in  future),  it  would  be  difficult  to  reason  or  hold  that  a  decision  embedding  or
subsuming the rights to life, dignity of the human person and private and family life into the
right  to  a  healthy  or  safe  environment  amounts  to  a  decision  reached  per  incuriam or
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ignorantium, bearing in mind the contemporary conventional trends in this aspect of the law.
This is because the existing links between the aforesaid rights and incidents of environmental
pollution are genuine and practically interwoven to be turned down. This is not to rule out the
possibility of turning down such judgments on technical grounds. For example, in Okpara v
Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and Ors,128 an action on fundamental
rights enforcement in another Federal High Court which is similar to that of Jonah Gbemre
above  was  struck  out  on  the  grounds  that  the  applicant  cannot  institute  the  action  in  a
representative capacity, and secondly on the grounds of wrong joinder of cause of action.
With regard to the latter case, the technical issue of applicant(s) not being able to institute in a
representative capacity in fundamental rights enforcement has been adjusted by the recent
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules,129 recognising an ‘Applicant’ as a party
who files an application or on whose behalf an application is filed under the rules.130 This is
without any need for applying for a leave of court as against the former rules of 1979 which
abhors the receipt of an application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement of any
fundamental rights contained in the Constitution without being granted leave by the court.131
Again  the  new Fundamental  Rights  (Enforcement  Procedure)  Rules  of  2009 have  totally
expunged any form of limitation of action imposed by any limitation statute whatsoever.132 It
is pertinent to mention that in the former rules of 1979, no leave is granted for an application
except such application is brought within twelve months from the date of the happening of
128
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the event, matter or act complained, except where such delay is satisfactorily justified.133 It is
submitted that the current rules have immensely reduced the level of exercise of jurisdictional
discretion by judges on the fate of applicants in environmental rights enforcement, bearing in
mind that judges are most likely to be influenced by their orientations and beliefs in granting
leaves and other related matters, particularly in controversial areas of law as human rights
and environmental justice.
The  Nigerian  courts  seemed  to  have  shown  remarkable  interest  in  fundamental  rights
enforcement in such a manner that stood beyond the limitations imposed by the old rules of
enforcement.134 Justice Fatayi-Williams, a former chief justice of Nigeria whilst affirming on
the imperativeness of fundamental rights as contained in the Nigerian Constitution of 1979
maintained that:
…I take the view that because it is so fundamental to the life, liberty and
well-being of the individual, any person who complains about an alleged
infringement  of  any  of  his  Fundamental  Rights  as  entrenched  in  our
Constitution, to convey the issue of such infringement at any stage of any
court proceedings whether in the trial or Court of Appeal.135
Justice Aderemi,  in a public lecture,  whilst making reference and throwing support to the
above  dictum  of  Fatayi-Williams,  on  the  importance  of  fundamental  rights  observed  as
follows:
… I beg to submit that by their  nature,  they are not a creation of the
constitution.  It  therefore  seems to  me that  they  are  entrenched  in  the
constitution because they are fundamental and they can never be said to
be fundamental because of the reason of their  being entrenched in the
constitution. They are the basic natural rights of all mankind- they may
even be described as the fundamental  divine rights,  given to mankind
from time immemorial.136
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Justice  Aderemi  clearly  pointed  out  that  his  position  is  not  without  exception.137 It  is
interesting to note that the above standpoint has been given adequate attention fit for this
research,  and no doubt,  it  has raised a series of arguments  amongst ancient  scholars and
academics. Whilst recognising the need to avoid clumsy repetition, it is necessary to point out
that  these  rights  (fundamental  rights)  gain  enforceability  by  virtue  of  being  encoded  in
municipal Constitutions as affirmed by Nasir JCA in Uzoukwu & Ors v Ezeonu II & Ors.138 It
would be plausible to submit that Fundamental Rights are equally captured in other statutory
provisions or legal instruments, for the weight they gain, depends largely on the recognition
conferred  by  the  judicial  system.  This  position  is  justified,  first,  in  the  Preamble  to  the
Fundamental  Rights  Enforcement  Procedure  Rules  2009.  It  provides  that  the  overriding
objective  of  the  Rules  includes  ‘the  Constitution,  especially  Chapter  IV,  as  well  as  the
African Charter’ and that the provisions therein be ‘expansively and purposely interpreted
and  applied’.139 Furthermore,  if  the  Rules  must  be  read  and  applied  from  its  explicit
provisions, then, a cause of action, under Fundamental Rights Enforcement within the ambit
of the Rules, arise where provisions of the Constitution in Chapter IV or the African Charter
has been, is being, is likely to be infringed.140
In the light of the above, there is little doubt that the provisions of the African Charter can
best  be  considered  as  ‘fundamental  rights’,  since  the  Fundamental  Rights  Enforcement
Procedure  Rules  are  a  direct  creation  of  section  46(3)  of  Chapter  IV  of  the  Nigerian
Constitution. In fact, the term ‘fundamental right’ is defined under the Rules as follows:
Fundamental Right means any of the rights provided for in chapter IV of
the Constitution, and includes any of the rights stipulated in the African
<http://nigerianlawguru.com/articles/human%20rights%20law/NIGERIAN%20COURTS%20AND%20THE
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Charter  on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification  and Enforcement
Act). Human Rights includes fundamental rights.141
From the aforesaid provision,  it  could be observed that  the conundrum in the use of the
phrases, ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘human rights’ is arguably resolved. Contrary to Order 1
Rule 2 above (text to n 136) ascribing the provisions of the African Charter as fundamental
rights, Okon had submitted that the decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in  Attorney
General  of  Ondo  State  v  Attorney  General  of  the  Federation  and  Ors,142 and  Attorney
General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation and 35 Ors,143affirming the non-
justiciability  of  the  Fundamental  Objectives  and  Directive  Principles  of  State  Policy
contained in Chapter II, which contain the only direct provisions on the protection of the
environment,  clearly  implies  that  ‘any  new  enactment  on  environment  by  the  National
Assembly or existing Federal Government legislation on environment has the status of an
ordinary law and can only create ordinary rights’.144 Okon’s latter stance is suggestive that the
African Charter, which is now adopted by the National Assembly as a domestic law can only
create  ordinary  rights  but  not  fundamental  rights.  This  reasoning  may  be  considered
fallacious owing to Order 1 Rule 2 of the FREP Rules 2009 above (see text to n 136) and the
judgment of the Jonah Gbemre case upholding the fundamental nature of the provisions of
the African Charter vis-à-vis environmental protection and preservation.
Whilst it is clear that Fundamental Rights are enforceable rights, not all Human Rights are
enforceable,  only  that  the  term  is  used  generally  to  refer  to  both  enforceable  and
unenforceable rights. Hence it is maintained that ‘human rights include fundamental rights’.
In  the  course  of  this  research,  references  have  been  made  to  regional  and  international
instruments  bordering on environmental  rights.  These instruments,  despite  their  precatory
nature  are  relevant  and  persuasive  in  proceedings  relating  to  environmental  rights
141
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enforcement in Nigeria. It is stated in the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules
that:
… For  the  purpose  of  advancing  but  not  never  for  the  purpose  of
restricting  the applicant’s  rights  and freedoms,  the Court  shall  respect
municipal, regional and international bills of rights cited to it or brought
to  its  attention  or  of  which  the  Court  is  aware,  whether  these  bills
constitute instruments in themselves or form parts of larger documents
like constitutions.145
It  is  shown  that  international  treaties  and  conventions,  as  well  as  regional  instruments,
particularly in Africa, promoting the rights to a safe environment would promote the need for
Nigerian Courts to give and maintain an expansive interpretation of the Constitutional rights
to life and dignity of the human person rather than restricting or limiting such provisions.
This is necessary, owing to the increasing reports of environmental pollution caused by oil
and gas activities, which are seen to infringe on basic rights.
A  cumulative  understanding  of  Fatayi-Williams  in  Sofekun146 and  justice  Aderemi’s
observations above, suggests that claimants in cases commenced under the torts of nuisance,
negligence and under the strict liability rule as discussed in chapter 1 would be at liberty to
invoke  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions  bordering  on  fundamental  rights  in  such
traditional claims for compensations without necessarily utilising the procedures laid under
the  Fundamental  Rights  Enforcement  Procedure  Rules,  and  such  issues  bordering  on
fundamental rights will be given preferential treatment and accelerated hearing above others.
In addition, it is submitted that the enforcement of fundamental rights under the Constitution
is not necessarily hinged upon the making of Rules by the Chief Justice of Nigeria. It is
encouraging  that  a  cause  of  action  arising  in  areas  of  environmental  rights  violation  as
adequately  discussed  in  chapter  6  be  pursued  via  Fundamental  Rights  Enforcement
Proceedings by virtue of the numerous benefits attached to it, which includes the expediency
in obtaining judgment and the need for the court to adequately address prevailing issues.
2.6 Conclusions
This  chapter  has  analysed  the  use  of  fundamental  rights  as  a  vehicle  for  environmental
protection. This is done in line with one of the aims of this research; which is to determine
145
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whether the doctrine of absolute liability can be applied to constitutional rights relating to a
safe environment. This chapter established a nexus between ‘human rights’ and ‘natural law’
principles, with the premise that neither of the concepts is enforceable in legal jurisprudence.
It is observed that natural law principles were given much importance (and in most cases,
enforceable) in ancient times, hence, the reason for most ancient philosophers to anchor their
theories on the principle. Contemporary legal systems could no longer leave serious issues as
fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person to natural law principles or as mere
human  rights  pursuits.  This  engendered  governments  to  develop  special  codes  for  such
enhanced rights.  At the European level,  the European Convention on Human Rights  and
Fundamental Freedoms and its subsequent protocols are evident. At a municipal level in the
English Jurisdiction, the Human Rights Act had captured these rights. The same is applicable
in Nigeria, as shown in the Nigerian Constitution and the absorption of the African Charter
into municipal law; although this is given greater consideration in chapter 6.
Thus, in English practice, issues of fundamental rights relating to right to life and respect of
private life and home, are approached with the doctrine of the ‘margin of appreciation’ which
requires that public authority could interfere with these rights only when acting in needs of a
democratic  society,  which  entails  ‘economic  well-being  of  the  country’  and a  few other
circumstances as mentioned in Article 8 of the ECHR.147 In addition to striking a balance
between the individual and national interest, the English House of Lords in Marcic v Thames
Water Utilities Ltd148 has mentioned that the courts will consider whether the action(s) of the
State said to have infringed on the fundamental rights of the individual is ‘reasonable and
appropriate’. In view of this, it is maintained that the measure of liability as regards issues of
fundamental rights violations on the rights to a safe environment could best fit with common
law doctrines of strict liability, nuisance or negligence as the case may be, rather than a case
for absolute  liability,  due to the numerous defences  public  authorities  are likely to raise.
Notwithstanding, human rights actions can be seen as a tool for environmental protection.
147
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In Nigeria,  environmental  challenges  relating  to  oil  and gas  pollution,  particularly  in  the
Niger Delta, are briefly considered. It is shown that a pollution-free environment is inevitable
and  necessary  for  healthy  living;  and  where  the  ecosystem  is  fraught  with  incidents  of
environmental pollution as the case in the Niger Delta, it is certain that lives of inhabitants
are threatened. In view of this, it is argued that there is a cause of action for violations of
fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person as well as the right to private and
family life. Although, these rights are not clearly explained to include environmental rights in
the  Nigerian  Constitution,  they  can  be  expansively  interpreted  to  include  environmental
rights. Furthermore, the African Charter has captured the right to a safe environment, and by
virtue of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009, the provisions of the
African Charter are considered as fundamental. 
In  the  next  two  chapters,  the  key  issues  and  challenges  encountered  in  the  course  of
environmental  rights  enforcement  are  critically  analysed.  The  next  chapter,  in  particular,
utilised a legal theory (economic theory) in explaining government (executive, legislative and
judicial) actions and responses in relation to liability of oil TNCs, and the reasons behind
such actions or demeanour, particularly on the reluctance of government to directly uphold
fundamental rights to a pollution-free environment in the Nigerian Constitution. This is done
with a view to aiding a practical understanding of the benefits of fundamental rights approach
to environmental protection and preservation, and some of its shortcomings on the part of
TNCs.
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                                            CHAPTER 3
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN 
EVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN NIGERIA
3.1 Introduction
This  chapter  focuses  on  some  of  the  numerous  challenges  encountered  by  victims  of
environmental pollution (particularly caused by oil and gas) in enforcing their fundamental
rights to a safe environment; justifying some of the significant barriers to effective justice
through legal theories and jurisprudence. It is shown that whilst principles of tortious liability
in nuisance,  negligence  and strict  liability  (as  in  Rylands v Fletcher)  easily  form subject
matters  and  issues  for  determination  in  environmental  pollution  litigation,  commencing
judicial actions through fundamental rights enforcement is rare, and most States, including
Nigeria, and even in developed countries are reluctant in pushing for such fundamental rights
enforcement in environmental pollution cases (these rights are deemed to be absolute). At the
forefront of these barriers is the economic factor which seems to influence the behaviour or
disposition  of  judges  in  being  lenient  or  more  likely  to  favour  states  and  Transnational
Corporations (TNCs).  The economic reason is  predicated and explained on the basis  that
TNCs are engaged in activities that are presumably profitable to the state, thereby boosting
the economic well-being of the State, and applying strict principles of liability in incidents of
environmental  pollution would expose TNCs to a series of litigations  and compensations
claims which would adversely affect the profits of the state. Maintaining almost a similar
stance, Atsegbua had observed that if the fundamental right to a clean environment is directly
inculcated in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, and becomes enforceable: 
The neglected oil communities  of the Niger Delta will begin to assert
their  constitutional  rights.  It  is  however  doubtful  that  government  or
legislature will be willing to undertake such a bold step. The government
may feel that such a step will expose it to litigation by the oil-producing
communities of the Niger Delta.1
Hence, it can be argued that dispensing justice in a manner that will permit smooth running of
activities of Oil TNCs may not necessarily reflect a compromised judiciary but can be seen as
a judicial backing to government interests on economic grounds, this is because oil and gas
1
 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘Environmental rights, pipeline vandalisation and conflict resolution in Nigeria’ 
(2001) 5 IELTR 89, 90.
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activities  of  TNCs  are  seen  as  the  economic  mainstay  of  the  nation.  Conversely,  it  is
submitted that creating a balance between individual rights infringements and the interest of
the state’s economy would be a clear attempt to undermine fundamental rights of individuals
due to profit-making or national economy. However, it is shown that judges retain substantial
discretion, via case law to make decisions that would affect government policies as well as
expand the frontiers of the law.
Albeit there may not be a generally known or acceptable doctrine to explain the reasons for
judicial reluctance in holding oil TNCs absolutely liable in oil and gas pollution, particularly
in  the  area  of  fundamental  rights  enforcement  to  a  healthy  environment  in  Nigeria,  the
doctrine of the  Margin of Appreciation or  balancing of interests as first expounded by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)2 and later emphasised in the case of  Marcic v
Thames Water Utilities Ltd3 in the UK, which takes cognisance in balancing the economic
interest of the state and that of individuals in claims for environmental pollution relating to
Convention rights, is a clear demonstration of an aspect of the Economic theory as discussed
in  this  chapter.  It  is  submitted  that  although the  nomenclature  may  vary,  the  margin  of
appreciation is a universal concept which appears to undermine and stand as a barrier to
fundamental  rights  enforcement  vis-à-vis  the  right  to  a  clean  environment  which  is
considered an absolute right. Conversely, it could be argued that since oil and gas sales are
Nigeria’s largest revenue stream, environmental pollution from activities of oil TNCs, which
is an inevitable consequence of oil and gas exploration and production ought to attract little
or no penalty since their (TNCs) engagements are for the interest of the community. 
In the context of this research, judicial technicalities and the lack of enforcement of extant
laws on environmental  pollution  are identified  as  hurdles  to  attainment  of  environmental
justice within the parameters of fundamental rights enforcement, bearing in mind allegations
of irresponsible behaviours from transnational corporations engaged in oil and gas extraction
2
 See Powell and Rayner v UK (1990) 12 EHRR 355, [1990] ECHR 931/81.
3
 [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42.
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which  has  attracted  civil  agitations  in  recent  past,4 and  has  added  to  the  numerous
environmental challenges in oil producing regions in Nigeria.
Furthermore, consideration is given to issues of public awareness in environmental matters. It
is observed that the lack of public awareness in environmental matters is seriously hindering
the enforcement of fundamental rights relating to the environment. Due to the intricate nature
of this latter challenge,  a complete chapter is dedicated to it; analysing the importance of
access to environmental information, public participation in environmental decision-making
as well as access to environmental justice.
3.2 Jonah Gbemre v SPDC  5 : A Reflection of Judicial Legislation  
Whilst  the current  chapter  is  not  disposed to  discussing the practicability  of  case-law or
judicial precedence in detail, the primary target is to showcase that judges can competently
reform the law when faced with issues involving questions of policy, whether political or
social  in  nature;  and  such reforms  are  basically  anchored  on  issues  of  national  interest,
personal disposition of the judge and other related factors. Consequently, case law (being a
primary source of the law) remains useful in the Nigerian and English legal systems, and case
law  analysis  becomes  imperative  due  to  the  need  for  the  judiciary  to  creatively  and
expansively interpret certain provisions of the law to meet with prevailing global trends or
peculiar  challenges  in  domestic  jurisdictions  which  are  yet  to  be  given  comprehensive
legislative backings; and in this context, focus is on the interpretation of existing laws to give
effect to  fundamental right to a clean environment.
With regard to the role of the court to make significant contributions to the body of the law
via case law (otherwise known as judicial legislation), Denning LJ observed in the case of
Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation,6 that:
4
 Evaristus Oshionebo, ‘Transnational Corporations, civil society organisations and social accountability
in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry’ (2007) 15 AJICL 107.
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We sit here to find out the intention of parliament and ministers and carry
it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the
enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis.7
Whilst  the expression was partially admitted,  Lord Simonds had expressed misgivings on
Denning’s position when the same case (the Magor case) came on Appeal to the House of
Lords (now Supreme Court). Lord Simonds had maintained that:
It is sufficient to say that the general proposition that it is the duty of the
court to find out the intention of Parliament- and not only of Parliament
but of Ministers also- cannot by any means be supported. The duty of the
court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used; those words
may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the court
to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.8
The above expression suggests that even if statutory provisions are ambiguous, there is a
limit  to  which  judges  will  not  go.  Lord  Simonds’s  view  seems  pretty  clear  but  a  bit
perplexing regarding the role judges should play where provisions of the law are not clear or
comprehensive, since the limit at which judges should go in the course of interpretation is not
clearly stated or may not be gauged. He criticised the proposition that ‘what the legislature
has not written, the court must write’.9 Nonetheless, Lord Simonds had advanced a traditional
view to resolving ambiguous provisions of legal instruments when he said that the above
view by Denning LJ ‘…appears to…be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under
the thin disguise of interpretation…if a gap is disclosed,  the remedy lies in an amending
Act’.10
It is submitted that Lord Simonds’s remedy of filling gaps of ambiguous legal instruments by
waiting for the legislature to make amendments may not be too practical when judges are
faced with pressing issues for determination in the face of ambiguity. Whilst the suggestion is
tenable  and  constructive,  and  equally  in  line  with  principles  of  separation  of  powers,  a
7
 Magor (n 6) 1236.
8
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suggestion for interim measures which the court must take to interpret ambiguous provisions
would be useful.  Albeit  Lord Simonds had highlighted that his area of concern is on the
approach of what amounts to construction of modern statutes, he had admitted that ‘it is after
all  a trite  saying that on questions of construction different minds may come to different
conclusions.’11 In  essence,  Denning’s  position  is  worthy  of  support  and  Lord  Simonds’s
caution is instructive. In cases where construction of legal instrument is needed or in cases
where there is higher need or susceptibility for judicial discretion, particularly where there are
gaps in statutes, Raz has recommended that judges should rely on their moral judgment.12
This  latter  position  appears  to  be  in  tandem with  current  trends  with  regards  to  judicial
legislation. In the same vein, a foremost legal positivist, inclined to the concept of judicial
law-making, HLA Hart observed that:
In every  legal  system a large  and important  field  is  left  open for  the
exercise of discretion by courts and other officials in rendering initially
vague standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or
in  developing  and  qualifying  rules  only  broadly  communicated  by
authoritative precedents.13
The above remark  (text  to  n 13),  and the foregoing discussion  on the role  of  judges  on
questions of construction form the basis or justification for the judgment of the Federal High
Court in Nigeria in the case of  Jonah Gbemre (for himself and as representing Iwherekan
Community in Delta State, Nigeria) v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd
and others.14  
Despite  the  absence  of  a  clear  provision  on  the  right  to  a  clean  and  pollution-free
environment in the Nigerian Constitution embodying fundamental rights, there has been a
global  call,  and  some  isolated  judicial  interpretations  recognising  the  right  to  a  safe
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claims are considered as ‘fundamental’ because of the enhanced status they are given over
and  above other  claims.15 Amnesty  International  observed that  ‘human  rights  monitoring
bodies, and international courts, are increasingly recognizing poor environmental quality as a
causal factor in violations of human rights.’16 In chapter 2 of this research, the concept of
fundamental  rights  (or  human  rights,  as  the  case  may  be)  as  a  tool  for  environmental
protection was aptly discussed, it has been showcased that many jurisdictions have arbitrarily
interpreted human rights claims to the environment with cognisance to social and political
realities, thereby rendering it as an amorphous concept or creating doubts as to the nature of
liability obtainable in human rights claims to environmental pollution incidents. Nonetheless,
at the international level there are a series of Conventions and Treaties upholding the fact that
environmental  pollution  could  unavoidably  infringe  on  basic  rights  of  citizens.  Justice
Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice has pointed out that: 
The  protection  of  the  environment  is…a  vital  part  of  contemporary
human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights
such  as  the  right  to  health  and  the  right  to  life  itself.  It  is  scarcely
necessary to evaluate this, as damage to the environment can impair all
the human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human
rights instruments.17
Justice Weeramantry’s  view,  in  practical  terms  is  incontrovertible.  But  nevertheless,  it  is
imperative to bear in mind the gap that exists between what the law of a country ‘is’ and what
the law ‘ought’ to be. Whilst it is observed that environmental pollution would indisputably
instigate clear violation of fundamental rights of citizens, this has not been trite and absolute
in  most  jurisdictions.  In  essence,  there  has  been  a  remarkable  burden  on  victims  of
environmental  pollution  to  establish  the  necessary  link  between  fundamental  rights  and
environmental  pollution  in  courts,  and  where  such  link  is  established,  the  probability  of
establishing liability against government authorities is remarkably thin owing to prevailing
circumstances that would have led to such pollution incidents, particularly, economic factors.
15
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In Nigeria, the  Jonah Gbemre case is currently the only known ‘reported’ case where the
court  (The  Federal  High  Court)  took  the  step  to  affirm  that  constitutionally  guaranteed
fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person provided in sections 33(1) and 34(1)
of the Nigerian Constitution respectively, and reinforced under Articles 4, 16 and 24 of the
African  Charter,18 inevitably  includes  the  right  to  a  clean  poison-free,  pollution-free  and
healthy environment. From the provisions of international treaties and conventions mentioned
in this research (particularly the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950) echoing the nexus between environmental pollution and fundamental rights
infringement,  the  rationale  for  affirming  violation  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  Nigerian
Constitution,  in cases of environmental pollution is not far-fetched. The rights to life and
dignity of human person are conventionally hinged on a safe environment. What the Federal
High Court has done in the Jonah Gbemre case is a clear attestation to the concept of judicial
legislation by giving a wider interpretation to the rights to life and dignity of the human
person; and in practical terms, this is a major role of the judiciary as a law reformer.
It is widely held that obtaining ecological justice in civil court proceedings against oil TNCs
appears to be difficult for victims of environmental pollution in Nigeria.19 It is true that on
questions  of  construction  of  legal  instruments  different  minds  may  come  to  different
conclusions,20 but it should be borne in mind that every government would be inclined to
create  an  enabling  environment  for  its  investors  and  it  is  a  hard  fact  that  a  strict
environmental legal framework or judicial stance on liability could be distractive to oil and
gas investors owing to the fact that environmental pollution is somewhat inevitable in the
course of exploration and production of oil and gas. In this vein, it would not be difficult to
pinpoint a few theories underpinning governments’ reluctance in promoting environmental
rights.
18
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3.3 A Critical Analysis of the Hurdles in the Enforcement of Environmental Rights 
Carstensen maintained that there are several reasons why expressly stating economic or other
theories of a legal rule, a doctrine, or a case is a worthy project.21 He confirmed that though
some legal scholars seem not to appreciate the importance of theory in explaining legal rules,
therefore they deny or ignore the theory or theories they employ, and that this is bound to
frustrate  scholarly  and  practical  understanding  of  law.22 Carstensen’s  position  forms  the
rationale for the discussion under the current section owing to the fact that most government
policies and judicial decisions are leveraged by existing legal theories, consciously or not,
and linking such theories to judicial verdicts or government policies will further expatiate and
advance  a  better  understanding  of  the  current  position  of  the  law  and  the  challenges
bedevilling it, particularly in the area of fundamental rights and environmental law.
Furthermore, Carstensen had specifically identified some importance of utilising legal theory
or  theories  in  explaining  legal  doctrines  or  rules.  First,  it  can facilitate  the  prediction  of
outcomes.  Second,  theory  can  aid  to  the  identification  of  the  results,  processes,  and
implications of the pursuit of certain legal goals, by identifying and articulating directly on
the  goals.  Third,  theory  can  identify  goals,  and define  ways  to  achieve  them or  at  least
explain how law aids or hinders their achievement. Fourth, theory can help evaluate the cost
to goals ignored in single-minded pursuit of other goals. Fifth, specific theory is amenable to
testing, validation, and critique in a way that loose generalisations and ad hoc conclusions are
not. Finally, theory can instruct lawyers at a very practical level in the sorts of arguments and
evidence that will make particular claims more or less persuasive.23  This theory is deployed
in the current research to examine the disposition of the Nigerian government; including the
courts on the economic factors acting as barriers to environmental justice.
What this current research seeks to resolve is whether an action under fundamental rights
violations in event of environmental pollution can generate an absolute liability (as compared
to that of the strict liability rule and other common law torts such as nuisance and negligence
21
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as discussed in chapter 1) on the polluter without any extraneous consideration of ‘economic
well-being of the State’. Notwithstanding, it could be said that principles of compensation
with regards damages for injuries suffered by claimants are mostly guided by legislation, and
where there is a gap in the law, judges would exercise their discretionary jurisdictions as to
remedying damages.
3.3.1 Economic Well-Being of the State: An Obstacle to Enforcement of Fundamental Rights
to a Safe Environment?
The economic theory of law is multi-faceted and complex. It is submitted that the key reason
for  the  reluctance  of  some  governments,  particularly  in  developing  states  to  inculcate
fundamental rights to a pollution-free environment in the Constitution (the grundnorm), vis-à-
vis activities of oil and gas is the fact that oil transnational corporations have been a major
source of the economic live stream of these nations and to open the door for fundamental
rights enforcement in environmental matters is to open a flood gate of arbitrary and a plethora
of  judicial  cases  against  TNCs,  and  if  this  is  allowed,  there  is  the  tendency  of  victims
obtaining  a  series  of  injunctions  and  compensations,  thereby  obstructing  the  profits  and
activities of these companies. Ejims observed in this regard that petroleum contracts are being
entered  into  in  Nigeria  without  providing for  stringent  measures  within  the contracts  for
protecting the environment of the host communities, particularly in the Niger Delta region.24 
In  fact,  if  such rights  are  overtly  enshrined and recognised  in  the  Nigerian Constitution,
fundamental rights enforcement cases would be unprecedented owing to the growing number
of oil spills in the country, particularly in the Niger Delta area where oil pollution incidents
are predominant. 
In the Nigerian case of Allar Irou v Shell BP,25 where the claimant sought for an injunction to
restrain  the defendant  (Shell  BP) from continuous pollution of  his  land,  the High Court,
refusing the request maintained that:
…Negligence  or carelessness by the defendants’  employees  cannot  be
controlled  by  the  defendants.  To  grant  the  order…would  amount  to
asking the defendant to stop operating in the area …The interest of third
24
 Okechukwu Ejims, ‘The impact of Nigerian international petroleum contracts on environmental and
human rights of indigenous communities’ (2013) AJICL 21 (3) 346.
25
 Suit No. W/89/71, Warri High Court, November 26, 1973.
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persons  must  be  in  some  cases  considered  e.g.  where  the  injunction
would  cause  stoppage  of  trade  or  throwing  out  a  large  number  of
people…mineral oil is the main source of this country’s revenue…The
defendant having being granted an oil exploration licence, an order for
injunction may render …nugatory…such licence.26
In the light of the above case, there is no doubt that both the legislature and judiciary are fully
conscious of the fact that substantial judicial proceedings with regard to oil and gas pollution
would truncate or weaken exploration and production activities of TNCs. This standpoint
may not be generalised in all jurisdictions in the world, but there is no doubt that the scenario
is playing out in the Nigerian legal system. In fact, it is a traditional belief amongst victims of
environmental pollution in the Niger Delta that pursuing a law suit for compensation against
oil TNCs is an adventure in futility, because of the tendency of not getting justice due to
Government’s sympathy on oil operators.27 In the Jonah Gbemre case, the ground-breaking
case affirming the right to life and dignity of the human person to include environmental
rights, the plaintiff’s legal counsel was alleged to have reported that on May 31, 2006, the
judge in the case had been removed from the Court in Benin and the file of the case could not
be located.28 The removal of the Judge was confirmed but the allegation of the missing file in
2006 may not be absolutely true as this researcher personally made an application to verify
the case file on 4th April 2016 via the office of the Assistant Director Litigation, and although
the file could not be located by members of staff in the court’s ‘strong room’ and related
offices, it was confirmed on the court’s records that the case file was last sent to the office of
the Assistant Director Litigation in January, 2016.
Wick submitted that the failure to enforce environmental standards against Shell (other oil
companies as well) has attracted a series of allegations against the Nigerian government of
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practices that would not be welcomed in Europe or US.29 It follows that such environmental
practices have led to a series of violence and judicial  cases. In corroboration,  the Human
Rights Watch observed that the continued violence in the Niger Delta, particularly around oil
facilities, is as a result of failed responsibilities on both the government and oil TNCs, and
that with the synergy between government and oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, oil
production  is  being  supported  at  all  cost.30 Again,  it  is  maintained  that  such  support  is
anchored on economic grounds owing to its importance in the economic well-being of the
State.
The Nigerian Senate disclosed that Nigeria has the highest number of oil  spill incidences
among oil  producing countries  with no penalty  regime  attached to  such oil  spills.31 This
assertion may not be given much support in view of the numerous laws on environmental
pollution and compensation in Nigeria, and which some have been discussed in Chapter 5 of
this research.32 To allege that there is no penalty regime would amount to exaggeration; the
truth lies in the many challenges (mostly on the economic grounds which contributes to the
lack  of  enforcement  of  court  orders  and  government  policies  relating  to  environmental
pollution, the lack of public awareness on environmental issues raised in chapter 4, as well as
the difficulties encountered in establishing negligence or the strict liability rule on the part of
TNCs) bordering on the lack of will-power on the part of the executive and unwillingness of
the judiciary to apply existing laws in strict sense.33 It is submitted that the lack of will-power
on  the  part  of  government  in  promoting  environmental  justice,  could  be  linked  with
29
 Laris Wick ‘Human Rights Violations in Nigeria: Corporate Malpractices And State Acquiescence In
The Oil Producing Deltas of Nigeria’ (2003-2004) 12 Mich St UJ Intl L 63, 73.
30
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corruption allegations within government agencies. Some of these allegations on corruption
between  government  agencies  and the  TNCs are  contained  in  a  draft  report  issued by a
Special  Task Force set up by the Nigerian government (under former president Goodluck
Jonathan) to look into the rot in the Nigerian oil industry which was headed by Nuhu Ribadu
in  2012.  The  report  was  said  to  have  implicated  the  Nigerian  National  Petroleum
Corporation, which is the state oil firm, ministers, government agencies and oil majors in
dodgy deals and mismanagement which is estimated to have cost Nigeria $35 billion over the
last  10  years.34 Although,  this  report  has  received  criticism  in  some  quarters  as
unsubstantiated facts, it is widely believed by most Nigerians that the report should be given
necessary attention.35 It is maintained that if the aforesaid allegation and others are to be
legally  established,  it  will  suffice  to  conclude  that  the  corruption  issues  are  contributing
immensely against the attainment of environmental justice.
Kenneth  Roth  had  pointed  out  that  cases  of  security  crackdown  on  local  oil  producing
communities in the Niger Delta is an indication that the Nigerian government is continuing to
use violence to protect the interests of international oil companies.36 There are unsustainable
reports from Human Rights Watch regarding incidents in which the Nigerian security forces
have beaten, detained, or even killed inhabitants of the oil producing Niger Delta who were
involved in protests over activities of oil companies concerning environmental pollution and
compensation for resulting damage.37 Philip Hammond (the then British Foreign Secretary),
advised the Nigerian government in the face of recent oil pipelines bombings in 2016, to deal
with the root causes or grievances of the Niger Delta people rather than resorting to military
confrontations.38 
34
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Conversely, the government in recent years has put a couple of programmes to ameliorate the
plight of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. Of key importance, are the establishment of the
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC),39 the Niger Delta Ministry40 and the Niger
Delta Amnesty Programme.41 It is maintained that judges would take every step which the
executive  has  taken  to  ameliorate  the  plight  of  inhabitants  of  the  Niger  Delta  area  into
consideration whilst adjudicating on disputes relating to environmental pollution activities of
TNCs. In essence, in a case of environmental pollution,  it  is possible that the Court may
consider whether government through the aforementioned programmes and others has done
anything  reasonable  to  address  the  claims  of  the  applicants  or  plaintiff.  Although,  in  an
argument for breach of fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person there are no
such  exceptions  or  qualified  considerations  as  spelt  out  in  the  Nigerian  Constitution  if
circumstances requires it to do so. In the English legal system, section 1(2) of the Human
Rights Act provides, inter alia, that those rights (Convention rights)42 are to have effect for
the purposes of the Act subject to any designated derogation or reservation,43 and in Marcic v
Thames Water Utilities Ltd,44 Marcic’s claim on violation of rights to private and family life
 Vanguard News, ‘UK warns Buhari: Using military confrontation in the Niger Delta could end in 
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was rejected by the courts on the ground that Marcic had failed to comply with provisions of
the Water Resources Act set by Parliament (government) to address individual complaints
regarding to alleged violations. Mr Marcic was held to have ignored the scheme, which was
considered  to  be  convention-compliant  by  bringing  an  action  directly  on  Thames  Water
without  any  formal  complaint  to  the  Director  of  Water  Resources  (this  office  is  now
abolished by virtue of section 34 of the Water Act 2003). In view of this, it is mentioned that
in satisfying this  obligation of striking a balance between the interests  of individuals and
States, the court will give credence as to whether the State has complied with its own positive
duty of taking ‘reasonable and appropriate’ measures in securing the victim or claimant’s
rights. Under the Nigerian Constitution, such expanded discretion by the courts can only be
exercised under sections 37-41, of which only section 37 which borders on the right to private
and family life appears to be relevant to environmental issues as discussed in this research.
Section 45 of the Nigerian Constitution provides that:
Nothing  in  sections  37,  38,  39,  40  and  41  of  this  Constitution  shall
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society-in
the  interest  of  defence,  public  safety,  public  order,  public  morality  or
public health; or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of
other persons.45
One defence or exception that is overtly missing from the above section 45 of the Nigerian
Constitution is that of ‘economic well-being’; as this has been shown to be a ground under
which the right to private and family life incorporated in the European Convention on Human
Rights  and  automatically  in  the  English  legal  system  by  virtue  of  the  transplant  of  the
Convention Rights can be infringed.46 It could be suggested that the drafters of the Nigerian
Constitution had never envisaged circumstances where the fundamental right to private and
family  life  would  be  violated  for  economic  reasons.  Notwithstanding,  this  and  other
provisions of the Constitution mentioned earlier relating to fundamental rights to a pollution-
free environment are given fuller consideration with regards the absoluteness of liability in
chapter 6.
 [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42.
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It is not overtly established whether judges would consider economic factors in fundamental
rights enforcement proceedings, since it has been shown that the Nigerian Constitution does
not capture ‘economic well-being’ as an exception in any of the provisions for fundamental
rights infringement under Chapter IV (particularly the rights to life, dignity of the person and
private and family life). But insight on the likely position of the Nigerian Courts in giving
consideration  to  economic  well-being  of  the  State  in  deciding  cases  bordering  on
environmental rights enforcement can be extrapolated from the case of Allar Irou v Shell BP
as  mentioned  above.47 Albeit  the  judge  had  refused  injunction  to  jettisoning  oil  mining
activities of Shell BP, noting that the injunction if granted would truncate trade activities of
the company, and bearing in mind that oil is the main source of the country’s revenue, the
aforesaid case was based on common law principle of nuisance and negligence and not under
fundamental rights enforcement as captured in the Constitution. It is believed that the Courts’
reasoning would be narrower and strict if such an injunction was sought under a proceeding
for fundamental rights enforcement as clearly shown in the Jonah Gbemre case.48
3.3.2 Judicial Technicalities and the Lack of Enforcement of Extant Environmental Laws
It is pertinent to point out that some other major challenges in the Niger Delta area with
regard to environmental  pollution and complaints of injustice seems to be surrounded by
shortcomings  from  judicial  interpretations  and  enforcement  of  environmental  laws.49
Investigations carried out by the Human Rights Watch in the Niger Delta concerning security
force abuses on local inhabitants reveals that oil companies have not abided by environmental
standards  or  provided  adequate  compensation  in  line  with  the  damage  caused  through
environmental  pollution.50 It  is  observed  that  the  traditional  principles  of  liability  in
47
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environmental pollution cases, such as the strict liability rule, liability principles surrounding
the torts of nuisance and negligence are vague, or overtly unsatisfactory and undermines the
legal  rights  of  the  inhabitants  of  such pollution  prone areas  to  enjoy a  safe  (or  healthy)
environment.  Owing to this,  it  is  recommended in the current  research that  the judiciary
should give adequate attention toward promoting fundamental rights relating to the protection
and preservation of the environment, as these rights are seen to be given higher status over
other rights regarding environmental liability and compensation claims.51  On the challenge
raised by judicial technicalities, Kalu and Stewart have maintained that:
Litigation in regular courts has not helped the situation. This is primarily
because the highly scientific,  technical  and sophisticated nature of the
operations of oil companies makes it imperative for a plaintiff to be well
versed in this area to be able to recover damages for his losses in suits for
compensation or negligence.52
Kalu and Stewart’s position above deserves support owing to the legal burden encountered in
establishing  torts  of  negligence  and  other  related  torts  in  environmental  pollution  cases,
particularly where most victims do not fully understand the operational rules and activities of
the oil operators. In addition, it has been shown in a plethora of decided cases that TNCs
mostly furnish the defence of ‘malicious act of third parties’ to escape liability, stating that
the  cause  of  oil  spills  is  an  effect  of  illegal  oil  bunkering  and/or  intentional  pipeline
vandalism by saboteurs, and this defence is valid in both common law and extant statutory
schemes on environmental liability in Nigeria,53 particularly the Oil Pipelines Act.54 
It was mentioned in the  Bodo Community55 case that the ‘reasonable steps’ to be taken by
TNCs in protection of oil pipelines, can, in some cases, be interpreted as including curtailing
51
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intentional acts of sabotage.56 Owing to this, TNCs would be deemed, in some exceptional
cases not to have taken ‘reasonable steps’ if they fail to comply with modern technologies
that could safeguard the pipelines and other installations.57 For instance, installation of anti-
tampering equipment or other sort of technology to maintain rapid surveillance would amount
to reasonable or preventable steps to avoid oil spills. Technically, it would be difficult for a
claimant  to  prove through direct  evidence  that  TNCs have not  taken reasonable  steps  to
protect oil pipelines.58 It is against this background that an argument for the enforcement of
fundamental rights relating to the environment is raised in chapter 6 of the research. It is
argued  that  enforcement  of  these  rights  would  generate  a  higher  level  of  environmental
responsibility by TNCs.
Again, despite government’s programmes put in place to address the plight of the people,
there seem not to be much achieved to improve the welfare of the people. This might be
linked to cases of corrupt officials  appointed to oversee the affairs  of the various organs
established by the government. 
Looking at the existing legislation in Nigeria, particularly the statutes mentioned in chapter 5
of this research,59 including environmental provisions in the African Charter on Human and
People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act,60 and the Nigerian Constitution, there is
no gainsaying that the Nigerian environmental legal regime is adequately equipped to address
55
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cases of pollution caused by oil and gas. Although, Bukola Saraki (in the Nigerian Senate)
had maintained that due to lack of penalties and cost framework much of the spills in Nigeria
have been ‘ignored, neglected and in most cases never cleaned up or the sites remediated’.61
This latter position could be supported, but it is worth mentioning that a substantial part of
environmental challenges faced in Nigeria is anchored on the reluctance of the courts to give
strict interpretations to extant laws on environmental protection and preservation as shown
throughout this research.
3.3.3 The Lack of Public Awareness on Environmental and Procedural Issues
A major factor dimming the lights of environmental rights enforcement in Nigeria is the issue
of inadequate public awareness on environmental matters. The concept of public awareness
generically entails: access to information on environmental matters, public participation in
environmental decision-making as well as access to justice. Due to the significance of public
awareness  on  the  environmental  problems  in  Nigeria,  a  separate  chapter  (chapter  4)  is
reserved for it. Significant laws in that regard, such as; the Environmental Impact Assessment
Act Cap E12 LFN 2014, Freedom of Information Act 2011 No. 4 and the African Charter, 62
were given consideration.  It  is imperative to point out that government must take up full
responsibility to create the sort of environment where the negative impacts of the activities of
Transnational Corporations would be collectively known by the inhabitants (this duty would
be fused with parental and school responsibilities in educating the grassroots), this is because
one  of  the  major  challenges  with  regards  environmental  harm  and  failure  to  enforce
environmental rights is due to the ignorance of the level of industrial pollution on the part of
the locals. In fact, protection of the environment should be a matter of fundamental right, and
that  is  the rationale  for the current thesis.  It  is maintained that Access to information on
environmental issues, which entails creating education in environmental matters and public
participation in decision making be given priority by government.63 This applies to the need
for access to environmental justice as discussed in figure 4.5.
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3.4 Conclusions
The current chapter has expatiated on the concept of ‘judicial legislation’ and some aspects of
the theory of economics and law. It is stated that one of the primary sources of law is case-
law  or  judicial  precedence,  and  this  is  predicated  on  the  use  of  judicial  discretion  in  a
judicious manner to promote consistency in the body of the law. This awareness is deployed
due to the numerous challenges encountered in attaining environmental justice in Nigeria;
and due to lack of explicit legal provisions upholding environmental rights, there is need for
the courts to give wider interpretations to existing relevant fundamental rights to secure a
healthy environment. In this regard, legal provisions are found in the Nigerian Constitution as
well  as the African Charter  relating  to  environmental  protection as discussed; and in  the
Nigerian  Constitution,  the  most  direct  one  is  precatory  (section  20  of  the  Nigerian
Constitution), while the enforceable provisions perceived to guarantee environmental rights
are  ambiguous.  But  in  all,  the  intentions  of  the  drafters  of  the  Constitution  are  easily
deciphered with the aid of judicial pronouncements as seen in the Jonah Gbemre case.
It is observed that government (including the judiciary) is committed to protecting the interest
of oil TNCs owing to the economic benefits derived from oil and gas activities, and this trend
is seen as a major challenge towards enforcement of environmental rights in the sense that
government may not be inclined to push for draconian laws, like explicit fundamental rights
to a clean environment, which would likely affect activities of oil operators. In recent years,
there are reported cases of victims of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta seeking for
justice  in  foreign  courts.  Many  have  expressed  fear  that  if  they  seek  for  redress  in  the
Nigerian  courts  the  oil  TNCs  will  always  win  due  to  government  interest.64 This  has
inevitably led to victims of environmental pollution in Nigeria looking for justice in foreign
courts, and those who could not afford the rigors of litigation have resorted protests which
has consequently led to major confrontations between government security forces and the
protesters.  In  this  vein,  it  is  highlighted  that  Nigeria  is  rich  with  a  series  of  statutes  on
environmental  liability  but  there  are  major  shortcomings  in  the  aspect  of  judicial
technicalities, lack of enforcement and inadequate public awareness on environmental issues.
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The next chapter addresses issues of public awareness in addressing environmental problems.
The  complementary  aspects  of  public  awareness  such  as:  access  to  information  on
environmental matters, public participation in environmental decision-making, and access to
justice in environmental disputes would be discussed with a view to establishing their nexus
and significance to environmental rights enforcement.
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                                                          CHAPTER 4
ISSUES OF PUBLIC AWARENESS IN DEALING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHALLENGES
4.1 Introduction
This  chapter  considers  the  significance  of  public  awareness  in  addressing  environmental
challenges. A global claim to the environment as a form of right was proclaimed in the first
United Nations Conference on the Environment in 1972 (otherwise known as the Stockholm
declaration) where it was upheld that ‘man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and
wellbeing.’1The Stockholm declaration holds further that human beings are entrusted with the
goal of protecting and improving the environment for ‘present and future generations.’2 It
becomes  incumbent,  therefore  on  responsible  governments  and  organizations  to  promote
public awareness of environmental matters with a view to protecting the environment. This is
because public  awareness on environmental  issues could be considered as the procedural
aspect of the right to a safe environment.
The  crux  of  this  chapter  is  to  create  nexus  between  public  awareness,  principles  of
environmental liability and fundamental rights to a clean environment, and this is aimed at
addressing one of the key hypotheses of this research, which is to examine ‘whether public
awareness may contribute to reduce the risk of environmental pollution’.  It is surmised that
fundamental rights issues as it relates to environmental protection will be undermined if there
are inadequate efforts put towards fashioning public awareness in environmental matters. The
more  focus  is  being  given  to  creating  awareness  of  environmental  matters,  the  more
consciousness  there  will  be  of  the  need  to  utilise  judicial  measures  to  obtain  redress,
particularly through fundamental rights enforcement procedures, which forms the focal point
of  the  current  research.  The  rationale  behind the  Aarhus  Convention,3 which  borders  on
1






public awareness, is equally hinged on the need to protect environmental rights. It provides
that:
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of
present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his
or her wealth and well-being,  each party shall  guarantee the rights of
access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access
to justice in environmental matters, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention.4
Addressing environmental challenges through public awareness or public participation has
widely become a norm at both international and national jurisdictions. This is encapsulated in
principle 10 of the well-known Rio Declaration, which provides:
Environmental  issues  are  best  handled  with  the  participation  of  all
concerned  citizens,  at  the  relevant  level.  At  the  national  level,  each
individual shall have access to information concerning the environment
that  is  held  by  public  authorities,  including  information  on hazardous
materials  and  activities  in  their  communities,  and  the  opportunity  to
participate  in  decision-making  processes.  States  shall  facilitate  and
encourage  public  awareness  and  participation  by  making  information
widely  available.  Effective  access  to  judicial  and  administrative
proceedings, including redress and remedy shall be provided.5
It  is  clear  from the  above  that  individuals  must  first  be  given  adequate  information  on
environmental  matters  which  would  enable  them  to  make  adequate  contributions  in  the
decision-making processes.  This  is  because members  of the public  would be placed in  a
position to  make informed decisions.  It  follows that  the need to  gain effective  access  to
justice in events of environmental abuse cannot be overemphasised.
Reference  is  made to  English  law,  international  law and European Union case  law with
regard  to  issues  bordering  on  the  promotion  of  environmental  rights  in  Nigeria.  This  is
because  of  limited  case  law  and  legal  instruments  supporting  fundamental  rights  to  the
environment in Nigeria despite the proliferation of environmental abuse as a result of oil and
gas activities of oil transnational corporations. There is also the need to compare and contrast
 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters (adopted 25 June 1998).
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applicable  practices  within  the  sphere  of  environmental  rights  in  other  jurisdictions  to
practices in Nigeria with a view to aligning with global best practices.
4.2 Meaning of the Environment and Environmental Information
Both the Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary6 and the Dictionary of Law by Curzon7 retain the
same  definition  of  environment  as  provided  by  the  Environmental  Protection  Act.8 The
Environmental Protection Act as applied in the UK succinctly puts:
The  “environment”  consists  of  all,  or  any,  of  the  following  media,
namely, the air, water and land; and the medium of air includes the air
within buildings and the air within other natural or man-made structures
above or below ground.9
In the light of the foregoing definition, it is established that the environment encompasses the
elements of air, water and land. In essence, the environment entails the existing relationship
between man, animals and plants to land, water and air. It follows that when the concept of
environmental  awareness  is  mentioned,  it  addresses  the  correlation  or  interrelationship
between the latter elements having man at the centre.
On the other hand, environmental information has been considered as ‘any information in
written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on the state of the elements of the
environment’.10 This meaning is explicit enough to be applied in any jurisdiction, but it is
worth  mentioning  that  such  information  within  the  context  of  public  awareness,  is  that
relating to the state of human health and safety, and that a failure to provide such information
would violate existing fundamental rights of the individual in its community.
6
 Mick Woodley (ed), Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (10th edn Sweet and Maxwell, 2005) 159.
7
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9
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4.3 Access to Information on Environmental Issues
Access  to  environmental  information  is  a  sine  qua  non in  achieving  the  goal  of  public
awareness or public participation as mentioned above. Stookes has maintained that “without
proper access to information, the other procedural rights of public participation and access to
justice are likely to be far less effective”.11 In the same vein David Hughes and others were of
the view that, ‘without rights of access to information, environmental justice collapses and
environmental  law  becomes  unenforceable  and  produces  discontent  from  a  suspicious
public’.12 The aforesaid submissions are suggestive that access to environmental information
is  the  bedrock  or  most  critical  aspect  amongst  the  three  pillars  of  environmental  public
awareness. This latter position is over-stated owing to the fact that without obtaining legal
redress, justice may be unavailable. The crux is that all three pillars of public awareness must
be complemented in order to produce a significant result. The provision of information has
been  classified  in  two  categories;  passive  information  provision  and  active  information
provision. In the former, environmental information is only made available by government
authorities on the request by an individual or organization.13 In essence, it is less likely that
information would be made available to the public domain if no request is made. In the latter,
public authorities are obliged, either under legislation or policy to make information available
for public use without any formal request. In an earlier mentioned case of  Guerra v Italy14
before the ECtHR, the Italian authorities were liable for violating the rights to Freedom of
Information  of  the  Applicants  under  Article  10  of  the  ECHR for  failing  to  inform local
inhabitants  of  industrial  hazards,  safety  measures  to  be  taken,  emergency  strategies  and
procedure to be followed in the event  of an accident  emanating  from a chemical  factory
classified as ‘high risk’. The necessity of such information obligated by law falls within the
ambit of the ‘active information provision’.
11
 Paul Stookes, A Practical Approach to Environmental Law (OUP 2005) 33-34.
12




 [1998] 26 EHRR 357, [1998] 4 BHRC 63. See figure 2.3 for the full facts of the case.
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The  right  to  access  public  information  is  a  global  quest  and  international  regimes  have
confirmed  this  through  a  wide  range  of  Conventions.  By  virtue  of  Article  27  of  the
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,15 State
Parties to the Convention are obligated to educate or inform citizens of their cultural and
natural heritage, and shall keep the public broadly informed of the dangers threatening such
heritage. In line with Article 5(d) of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Those
Countries  Experiencing  Serious  Drought  and/or  Desertification  Particularly  in  Africa
(UNCCD),16 Member  States  are  expected  to  promote  awareness  and  facilitate  the
participation of local populations in efforts to combat desertification and mitigate the effects
of drought. In the same vein, Article 6 of the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on
Climate  Change,17 provides  inter  alia,  that  in  carrying  out  commitments  under  the
Convention, Member States shall promote and facilitate at national, sub-regional and regional
levels;  the  development  and  implementation  of  educational  and  public  awareness
programmes  on climate  change and its  effects;18 public  access  to  information  on climate
change and its effects19 and public participation in addressing climate change and its effects
and developing adequate responses.20 It is pertinent to note that the requirement of ‘public
participation’ in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change retains a wider meaning
than ‘public participation in environmental decision-making’ as discussed in figure 4.4. This
is  because,  Article  4(1)(i)  of  the  aforesaid  Convention  mandates  parties  to  ‘promote  and
cooperate  in  education,  training  and  public  awareness  related  to  climate  change  and
15
 Adopted 16 November 1972.
16
 (Adopted 14 October 1994). Entry into force 26th December 1996.
17
 (Adopted 9 May 1992). Entry into force 21 March 1994.
18






encourage  widest  participation in  this  process,  including  that  of  non-governmental
organizations’. In essence, ‘public participation’ under the Convention on Climate Change
connotes participation by members of the public, including non-governmental organisations
in the process of training, educating and creating public awareness in issues bordering on
climate change. Conversely,  the concept of public participation in environmental decision
making as discussed in figure 4.4 is concerned with attempts to influence law, policies, and
decisions made by government or regulatory bodies.21
In line with the widespread acceptance of the need for regional, sub-regional and national
bodies to maintain the practice of disseminating information or allowing access to public
data, there is an increasing support for the notion that principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 22
has or may have acquired the status of ‘customary international law’.23 The validity of the
aforesaid assertion can be verified through international case law. Although the Guerra case
is  regional,24 in  the  Pulp  Mills  Case,25 Argentina  on  her  part  maintained  that  the
environmental impact assessment transmitted to it by Uruguay were incomplete, in that they
failed to include any consultation with the affected populations.26 The International Court of
Justice considered that  the  procedural  obligations  of  informing,  notifying  and negotiating
with regards to any activity in the River Uruguay as set out in the 1975 Statute is agreed on
21
 Stuart Bell and others, Environmental Law (8th edn OUP 2013) 315
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by  the  parties.27 In  upholding  the  universality  of  the  need  for  access  to  environmental
information, through EIA, the ICJ maintained that: 
...The  obligation  to  protect  and  preserve…has  to  be  interpreted  in
accordance with a practice,  which in recent years has gained so much
acceptance among States that it  may now be considered a requirement
under  general  international  law to  undertake  an environmental  impact
assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may
have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context…28
The position of the Court seems to be favourably disposed to the fact that public consultation
in matters  of environmental  safety is  a  prerequisite  and an integral  part  of EIA. In what
appears  to  be  a  deviation,  the  Court  was of  the  view that  there  was no subsisting  legal
obligation to consult the affected populations from the instruments showcased by Argentina.29
Whilst it is clear that the reliance of the Court on an agreement or treaty in order to consider
public  consultation  an  integral  part  of  EIA  is  a  substantial  limitation  on  environmental
litigation, Boyle has submitted that ‘there should have been no difficulty in persuading the
Court of the general principle  that  public consultation is  a necessary element  of the EIA
process’.30
Again, Harrison pointed out that the International legal system is decentralised,  connoting
that jurisdiction emanates from the consent of the parties.31 This, according to Harrison, is
anchored on ‘Compromissory Clauses in Treaties’ where parties consent in advance to submit
to certain jurisdiction and thereby limit the scope of such jurisdiction to the treaty. This trend
has been considered a setback in international environmental rights claims owing to the fact
27
 Pulp Mills (n 25) [81].
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 Pulp Mills (n 25) [204].
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that ‘courts or tribunals may not be able to decide all aspects of environmental harm that may
have been caused in a particular case’. In the Pulp Mills Case, the ICJ relied on the Statute of
Uruguay 1975 and other related documents to justify its position that ‘no legal obligation to
consult the affected populations arises for the parties…’32 
It is maintained that even if the ICJ noted in the Pulp Mills Case that Uruguay did undertake
activities aimed at consulting the affected populations, both on the Argentine and Uruguayan
sides of the river,33 its remark on the fact that there was no legal obligation in consulting the
population  in  any  of  the  tendered  instruments  is  a  point  which  must  be  noted  as  a
shortcoming in the global right for access to environmental information by the public. This,
admittedly,  is  a  shortcoming  because  environmental  information  under  international
Conventions  as  mentioned  earlier  should  be  rendered  freely  and  not  anchored  on  the
exigencies  of  certain  legislation  or  agreements,  particularly  where  it  is  clear  that
environmental activities would pose a threat to inhabitants. Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen
have  opined  that  the  aim  of  ‘access  to  environmental  information’  is  ‘to  ensure  that
information about the environment is freely available, so as to enhance the public’s role in
decision-making in relation to environmental matters on an informed basis’.34
The right  to  access  environmental  information  under  the Freedom of  Information  Act  in
Nigeria is seemingly ‘passive’, connoting that environmental information is made available
by  government  authorities  at  the  request  of  the  applicant.  This  method  of  obtaining
environmental information does not adequately conform with the key objective of the right to
access  environmental  information,  rather,  citizens  or  inhabitants  at  all  times  should  be
actively  involved,  i.e.  by  virtue  of  policies  or  laws  gain  automatic  information  on  their
immediate  environment.  This  would  provide  a  reasonable  foresight  on  imminent  risks
associated  with the environment.  It  follows that  legal  backings  on the need to  carry out
Environmental Impact Assessment on certain projects would be more beneficial. 
32
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a formal process by which a proposed activity
with potentially significant environmental, social and economic costs is carefully studied with
a view to evaluating its impacts, examining alternative approaches and developing measures
to prevent or mitigate the negative impacts.35 It  is obvious that the EIA process or study
would require engaging the inhabitants of the location where such projects will be situated
and  in  the  course  of  such  engagements,  inhabitants  will  access  necessary  environmental
information.  Ingelson  and  Nwapi  had  maintained  that  one  of  the  primary  reasons  for
conducting  EIAs  is  to  inform the  public  of  the  proposed  projects  thereby  establishing  a
meaningful dialogue with a view to identifying and deploying safeguards to mitigate adverse
environmental  impacts  from  the  proposed  activity.36 In  Nigeria,  one  of  the  goals  of
environmental  impact  assessment  as  contained  in  the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment
Act37 is:
…To  encourage  the  development  of  procedures  for  information
exchange,  notification  and  consultation  between  organs  and  persons
when  proposed  activities  are  likely  to  have  significant  environmental
effects  on boundary or trans-State or on the environment  of bordering
town and villages.38
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the EIA process includes consultation and exchange
of information between organs and persons with regard to projects which will significantly
affect the environment.39 It has been submitted that although the EIA Act in Nigeria requires
the EIAs before a variety of projects can proceed, there is a general perception that EIAs are
seldom carried out in Nigeria.40 The failure to carry out EIAs by major firms and government
35
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agencies would not be unconnected with the allegations of corruption and impunity within
the system, this is probable because there are staggering reports that government officials in
most agencies that are mandated to enforce these statutory requirements (EIAs and others),
are alleged to be collaborating with TNCs for personal gains,41 and this development could
lead to compromise in discharge of official  duties.  This raises the issue and the need for
access to justice as a key factor because inhabitants who are at the receiving end of the effects
of  dangerous activities  on  the  environment  are  in  a  position  to  see  to  it  that  the  law is
enforced through litigation and other means of enforcement.
It is submitted that in incidents of environmental degradation, it is certain that there would be
a cause of action for fundamental rights violation relating to non-provision of information on
the activities leading to the pollution, although this will not be the case in every pollution
incidents,  it  would  apply  in  cases  where  necessary  information  is  denied  of  inhabitants.
Whilst  expatiating  on  the  nexus  between  environmental  information  provision  and
fundamental rights actions, Jonathan stated that:
In  addition  to  the  obligation  of  States  to  urgently  inform individuals
likely  to  be  affected  by  any situation  or  event  which  could  suddenly
produce effects that are deleterious to their environment, States should
also give due notice of an intention to undertake or authorize activities
which might make a considerable impact on their environment. Failure
and  or  refusal  of  government  or  relevant  agencies  to  provide  such
information amounts to deprivation of fundamental right to environment,
which affects the exercise of all other rights.42
By virtue of Article 9(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification
and  Enforcement)  Act,43 ‘every  individual  shall  have  the  right  to  receive  information’.
Although  the  provision  is  silent  on  the  nature  of  information  or  the  sort  of  institutions
 Ingelson and Nwapi (n 37).
41
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obligated to tender information,  it  is submitted that such a right is all-encompassing,  and
would be effective provided the non-compliance of the provision would violate the right(s) of
the individual within the context of environmental rights.
In the Nigerian environmental landscape, Etemire pointed out that until the introduction of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act) 2010 Nigeria had maintained a culture of secrecy
in environmental governance with its attendant harm to the environment and public well-
being.44 This assertion is to a reasonable extent, correct, owing to the fact that the Nigerian
FOI Act is one legal instrument  that was long awaited,  and the desire of individuals and
organisations to gain access to public information has been intense; bearing in mind that the
EIA process under the EIA Act is rarely complied with. It is averred that complementary
provisions relating to access to environmental information under the EIA Act and the FOI
Act will produce a cumulative effect on the legal rights to access environmental information.
This is logical bearing in mind that EIAs are carried out at preliminary stages before projects
are embarked upon, there would be need for inhabitants to get additional information even
after the project is completed. For instance, in oil wells drilling and laying of pipelines, there
is the likelihood that communities around such areas would need to be updated periodically
on the impacts of the existing installations, and in this regard, the FoI Act may be utilised.
4.3.1 Are Private Companies under any Obligation to Provide Environmental Information?
There  is  no  gainsaying  that  oil  TNCs  are  directly  involved  in  the  majority  of  activities
devastating the environment in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta region.45 The Aarhus
Convention46 as earlier mentioned is relevant with regard to public awareness and it is overtly
supportive of the need for contracting parties to contribute to the protection of the right of
every person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or
her  wealth  and  well-being,  and  for  each  party  to  guarantee  the  rights  of  access  to
information.47 A question  for  consideration  is  who is  obligated  to  render  stewardship  or
44
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provide environmental information under the convention? From provisions of Article 2(1) of
the Aarhus Convention, ‘Public Authority’ means:
(a) Government at national, regional and other level;
(b) Natural  or legal  persons performing public administrative functions under national
law, including specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment ;
(c) Any other  natural  or  legal  persons  having  public  responsibilities  or  functions,  or
providing public services, in relation to the environment, under the control of a body
or person falling within subparagraphs (a) or (b) above.48
The  key  provisions  and  objectives  of  the  Aarhus  Convention  are  being  implemented  in
England  and  Wales  by  virtue  of  the  Environmental  Information  Regulation  (hereinafter
EIR).49 The EIR defines public authority to mean:
(a) Government departments;
(c) Any other body or other person, that carries out functions of public administration; or
(d) Any other body or other person, that is under the control of a person falling within sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) and-
(i) has public responsibilities relating to the environment;
(ii) exercises functions of a public nature relating to the environment; or
(iii) provides public services relating to the environment.50
It appears that the determination of whether a body is a public authority is complex, and in
most cases, determined through mixture of fact and law. The provisions of what constitutes
47
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48
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‘public authorities’ under the Freedom of Information Act in the UK51 appear vague but it can
be pointed out from the provisions of sections 3 and 6 of the Act that  public  authorities
include a person holding a public office, and a publicly owned company which is wholly
owned by the crown or any public authority listed in the Act with certain exceptions as listed
in the Act.52 However, private companies are not inclusive. 
It is necessary to recall that the Human Rights Act guarantees the freedom of information (a
Convention right), which through case law is shown to include environmental information. In
this regard, it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with
Convention rights.53 The Human Rights Act has defined ‘Public Authority’ to include ‘any
person certain of whose functions are of a public nature…’  54 In resolving the question of
what amounts to a Public Authority, the case of Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Ltd
v Information  Commissioner55 would  serve  as  a  guide.  In  that  case,  the  Appellant
(Smartsource),  a  specialist  business  that  provides  information  relating  to  pipe  locations,
water, waste water billing and related data in England and Wales requested a different sort of
information from both Water and sewerage companies (WASCs) and Water only companies
(WOCs),  ranging  from (1)  their  asset  mapping  database;  (2)  water  and sewerage  billing
records; (3) a list of all properties subject to “building over agreements”; (4) sewer flooding
register; (5) water pressure register; (6) water quality reports; and (7) trade effluent register.
Both WASCs and WOCs agreed to provide the information requested under figures (6) and
(7) mentioned above, where there are concrete legal provisions authorising rights of access
outside  the Environmental  Information  Regulation  (EIR)  2004.  However,  they refused to
provide information on the other categories, mainly on the ground that they were not public
51
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authorities within the EIR 2004. Consequently, the Appellant complained to the Information
Commissioner, who equally concurred via a letter on the 12th of March 2010 that he does not
retain jurisdiction to entertain the complaint on the basis that the water companies were not
public authorities. Conversely, in the other jurisdictions in the UK, both Northern Ireland and
Scotland, there is a single water company solely owned by the government. For instance, the
Scottish Water is listed under Schedule 1 (paragraph 102) of the Freedom of Information Act
200256 as a public authority.
The Appellant thereafter approached the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber),
where the appeal  was dismissed. The primary issue for determination in the Smartsource
case,  therefore,  was  whether  a  privatised  water  company  is  a  public  Authority  for  the
purposes of the Environmental Information Regulations? This was answered in the negative.
In  coming  to  its  conclusion,  the  Tribunal  had  taken  a  plethora  of  judicial  cases  into
consideration. The Tribunal had given credence and made reference to the case of Cameron v
Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd,57 where a High Court held that Network Rail Infrastructure
Ltd,  a  private  company rendering public services was neither  a core nor a hybrid public
authority  for  the  purposes  of  section  6(3)  of  the  Human  Rights  Act1998.  The  Tribunal
equally submitted to the argument that in determining a ‘Public Authority’ under Regulation
2(2)(c), the focus of the Court is not necessarily whether the body is public or private, but
whether the body is carrying out functions of a public nature.58 However, the Tribunal admits
that the ambit of Regulation 2(2)(c) as mentioned earlier is narrower than the scope of the
Human Rights Act which referred to public authorities as ‘persons certain of whose functions
are functions of a public nature…’ This, according to the Tribunal is suggestive that a body
may be a public authority for the purpose of the Human Rights Act and yet still fall outside
Regulation 2(2)(c) of the EIR.59 Due regard was given to the fact that the mere existence of
56
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an intensive regulatory regime does not translate that the provision of the service is a function
of public nature. The Tribunal noted that several of the water companies can buy each other,
or buy parts of each other subject to competition legislation, and this is a pointer to the fact
that the water companies are not public authorities.60
Looking at the key principles in the Smartsource case, it may be submitted that oil TNCs are
not  likely  to  be  considered  as  public  authorities  for  the  purposes  of  the  Environmental
Information Regulation and the Human Rights Act 1998. This position would be justified on
the grounds that oil companies are basically carrying out functions of a private nature and
they do retain the discretion of selling off major share or stakes, and their activities are only
governed  by  government  regulations  or  laws.  Conversely,  it  has  been  shown  from  the
Smartsource case that the determination of whether a company is a public authority or not is
complex,  particularly  in  circumstances  where  Oil  Companies  are  jointly  owned  by
government and private entities. Furthermore, TNCs, although are basically private entities,
they do play public roles. By virtue of the Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria, Public
Institution has been defined as:
…Any legislative, executive, judicial, administrative or advisory body of
the government, including boards, bureau, committees or commissions of
the  State,  and  any  subsidiary  body  of  those  body  including  but  not
limited to committees and sub-committees which are supported in whole
or in part by public fund or which expends public fund and private bodies
providing public services, performing public functions or utilizing public
funds.61
A combined reading of the Environmental Information Act in England and Wales, the Human
Rights Act 1998 in UK, and the Freedom of Information Act 2011 in Nigeria, points to the
fact  that  apart  from government  departments,  institutions  performing public  functions  are
legally bound to provide information on request by applicants. Madichie, a legal adviser to
the  Nigerian  National  Petroleum Corporation  (NNPC)  observed  that  the  NNPC,  being  a
statutory corporation, does not fall within the ambit of a Public Institution as defined by the
FoI Act.62 This stance was described by the Vanguard as a ‘strange response’. However, the
60
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then group managing director  of  the Corporation had debunked the position of  the legal
adviser, maintaining that the NNPC abides by the provisions of the FoI Act.63 Ordinarily,
there ought not to be any ambiguity on whether a government corporation such as NNPC
(including  its  subsidiary  companies)  falls  within  a  ‘public  institution’  as  defined  by  the
Freedom of Information Act, this is primarily anchored on the grounds that the Corporation is
supported by public fund and it expends public fund, and it is the main representative of
government  in  the  petroleum  sector.  Also,  the  Department  of  Petroleum  Resources,  a
department  within  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Petroleum,  which  is  saddled  with  the  duty  to
establish  and  enforce  environmental  regulations,  is  a  key  government  department  where
tangible environmental information would be obtained.64 Or better still, the National Oil Spill
Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA),65 which is actively involved in incidents of oil
spills  in  Nigeria  would  practically  be  a  warehouse  for  environmental  information  to  be
retrieved through the instrumentality of the FoI Act. 
It  is  submitted  that  even if  the Nigerian subsidiaries  of oil  TNCs can be seen as private
companies excluded from the FoI Act, it is clear that the Nigerian government through its
representative agencies and corporations in the oil industry will be legally obliged to provide
environmental information to the public, since it is clear that government has major stakes in
all private oil companies. Furthermore, legislators may want to demystify the conundrum of
specific organisations that constitute ‘public authorities’ by listing such bodies, as it is the
case in Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act mentioned above.66
 Vanguard News, ‘NNPC and the FoI Act’ (Nigeria, 22 August 2012) 




 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, ‘About NNPC’ Available at 
<http://nnpcgroup.com/AboutNNPC/CorporateInfo.aspx> accessed 4 August 2015.
65
 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency <http://nosdra.org.ng/> accessed 4 August 2015. 
66
 See FOI (Scotland) Act (n 56).
162
It appears that a vast majority of inhabitants of oil producing areas are not inclined to request
environmental  information  from  TNCs,  and  this  neglect  in  accessing  environmental
information is a general shortcoming even amongst the media. Ajibola observed that for a
country whose budget is funded by the proceeds of sale of oil and gas, it is expected that the
media would constantly demand transparency and accountability in the oil and gas sector, but
this is not the case, rather, the petroleum industry in Nigeria is seen as the most secretive
business environment in Nigeria.67 This latter position could be associated with the lack of
enforcement or inadequate awareness on extant laws and procedures to access information.
It  is  noted  that  existing  legislation  on  access  to  environmental  information  are  basically
passive in nature, that is, information is not likely to be given freely to inhabitants except on
request. With regards to the sort of dangerous environmental activities in the Niger Delta, it
would be imperative for public authorities to be obliged, either under legislation or policy to
make information available for the public use without any formal request by citizens.
Looking at Article 9(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification
and Enforcement) Act,68 which states that ‘every individual shall have the right to receive
information’, it would seem that the provision can be interpreted as generating both passive
and active rights to access environmental information. Again, this provision, bordering on
fundamental rights, could not be seen to exonerate private oil multinationals on the obligation
to provide information. In view of this, it will be correct to submit that Article 9 above can be
invoked against oil TNCs where they fail to provide environmental information, provided the
applicant can show that such information is one that would affect his person, in essence there
must be a reasonable cause of action. This is because, both fundamental rights provisions in
the Constitution and the African Charter are to be expansively and purposely interpreted by
the  Courts  with  a  view to  advancing  and realising  the  rights  and freedoms contained  in
them.69
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Despite  the  legal  mandates  with  regards  to  the  provision  of  environmental  information,
government has a positive duty to provide information for the well-being of the citizenry, this
is pertinent, owing to the Public Trust Doctrine in environmental matters where the State is
considered as a trustee of all natural resources,70 and this duty, no doubt entails a preservation
of the environment  which man is at  the centre.  The National  Policy on the Environment
which defines a framework for environmental governance in Nigeria recognises in its Action
Plan the need for environmental reporting in the management of natural resources as well as
embarking  on  environmental  impact  assessment  for  major  development  project.71 It  is
maintained that these plans, if fully implemented as equally incorporated in various statutes
mentioned,  would  sufficiently  provide  environmental  information  at  the  threshold  of
inhabitants. Despite the sufficient presence of legal and institutional framework, there is a
disappointing reluctance to implement on the parts of the government and oil TNCs. 
At the 9th National Council on Environment 2013, the Bayelsa State government had alleged
the  failure  of  Chevron Nigeria  Limited  to  comply  with  provisions  of  the  Environmental
Impact  Assessment  Act  1992,  by  embarking  on  a  drilling  project  without  EIA  and  the
eventual  damage  to  the  environment  by  gas  explosion  in  the  course  of  the  drilling.72 In
response, the Council had agreed to urge the Federal Ministry of Environment to take urgent
action.73 It  would be surprising to  witness a TNC embarking on such a  sensitive  project
without carrying out due consultations under the EIA Act. This is a reflection of some of the
challenges or level of impunity witnessed in the relationship between oil operators and the
host communities. Such impunity undermines the right to access environmental information
and others.
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4.3.2 Education in Environmental Matters
Looking  at  the  challenges  encountered  in  accessing  environmental  information  from oil
operators and government agencies, it is expedient to explore other feasible means to ensure
that environmental information gets to the hinterland, particularly host communities to oil
and gas activities. It is observed that inculcating and strengthening significant information
relating to issues of oil and gas pollution in both primary, secondary and tertiary institutions,
would produce better results than some of the statutory means mentioned earlier. It is in this
regard  that  principle  19  of  the  Stockholm  Declaration  (1972)  affirms  the  pertinence  of
education in environmental matters. It provides that:
Education in environmental matters, for the younger generation as well as
adults,  giving  due consideration  to  the  underprivileged,  is  essential  in
order  to broaden the basis  for an enlightened opinion and responsible
conduct  by individuals,  enterprises  and communities  in  protecting  and
improving  the  environment  in  its  full  human  dimension.  It  is  also
essential that mass media of communications avoid contributing to the
deterioration  of  the  environment,  but,  on  the  contrary,  disseminates
information of an educational nature on the need to project and improve
the environment in order to enable man develop in every respect.74
The above Declaration is divided into providing education to the masses, particularly the
underprivileged on one hand, and an explicit role of the media to disseminate environmental
information  on  the  other.  Whilst  the  latter  is  silent  on  whose  duty  it  is  to  provide
environmental education, it could be assumed that such burden will be shared by government
and major industries.
4.4 Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making
Bell and others have pointed out that public participation consists of attempts to influence
law, policies, and individual decisions made by governmental or regulatory bodies.75 Public
participation  in  environmental  decision  making  could  take  different  forms  and  it  entails
having  access  to  understand,  evaluate,  formulate,  comment  on  proposals,  plans,  and
programmes.76 Logically, an active provision of environmental information by government or
74
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regulatory  authorities  would  create  conducive  atmosphere  for  public  participation  in
environmental decision-making. For instance,  the consultation process during EIAs would
entail  deliberative  participation  and  exchange  of  information  which  will  influence  the
outcomes of laws and policies.
It is maintained that public participation in decision making could be direct or indirect. It is
direct where a platform is established for deliberation with members of the public, and as a
result,  governments  sought  for  direct  opinions  or  inputs  from  the  public  regarding
environmental issues. On the other hand, public participation is indirect where members of
the public utilise their constitutional or statutory rights to express opinions on environmental
matters through the platform of the media or press. Section 22 of the Nigerian Constitution,
under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, provides that:
The press, radio, television and other agencies of the mass media shall at
all times be free to uphold the fundamental objectives contained in this
chapter  and  uphold  the  responsibility  and  accountability  of  the
government to the people.77
The  aforesaid  provision  falls  within  Part  II  of  the  Nigerian  Constitution  which  is  non-
justiciable  by  virtue  of  section  6(6)(c).  Notwithstanding,  being  a  ‘directive’  from  the
Constitution, which is the grundnorm, the above section 22 would hold sway in a democratic
society. Furthermore, section 39 of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees a fundamental right
to freedom of expression and the press; stating that every person shall be entitled to freedom
of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and
information  without  interference.  This  clearly  indicates  that  inhabitants  of  a  particularly
harmed environment are legally empowered to make, receive and impart ideas which would
form the basis of any government decision. However, Wolf and Stanley have highlighted a
challenge encountered in public decision making; noting that where there are consultations in
events of environmental risks, it is more likely that only major landholders and businesses
make inputs into developmental plans with a view to protect their personal interests. Whereas
only  a  minority  of  the  population  bothers  to  master  the  background  detail  of  any  such
environmental risk before making inputs.78 The aforesaid scenario could be playing out in
many jurisdictions where there are public consultations.
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Public  participation  in  environmental  decision  making  becomes  imperative  not  only  for
successful policies by the government but ensuring that such policies are backed with the
people’s mandate; thereby ensuring, that policies are generally acceptable by the masses. In
this vein, Stanley and Wolf posited that government’s failure to consult properly can wrong-
foot the government and lead to a public outcry which may lead the government to have a
rethink on its policies.79
The  National  Policy  on  Environment  in  Nigeria  recognises  the  principle  of  participation
which requires that decisions should, as much as possible, be made by the people or on their
behalf by representatives chosen by them.80 This principle would be useful and constructive
in addressing the many challenges of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region in
Nigeria. This is because many cases of environmental rights violations would be curbed if the
victims are given open doors to directly participate in environmental decision making by both
government and oil transnational corporations. Whilst it is clear that the National Policy on
the Environment is critical in defining a framework for environmental governance in Nigeria,
it is a document without legal force. It is stated that the right to a healthy environment would
inevitably  include  a  right  to  gain  public  awareness,  which  public  participation  is  a  vital
element. There is no direct enforceable right under the Nigerian Constitution in this regard,
but the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights which is now a municipal law in
Nigeria is potentially instructive and useful. Article 13 of the Charter provides that:
Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government
of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in
accordance with the provisions of the law. Every citizen shall have the
right of equal access to the public service of his country.81
The above provision of the Charter, being an enforceable provision, can be invoked alongside
the  right  to  access  environmental  information  as  mentioned  above  against  government
agencies entrusted with the duty to safeguard the environment. In fact, it is clear that Article
79
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13 of the African Charter acts in line with the guiding principle on Participation as captured
in the National Policy on the Environment. Both, are in support of members of the public,
either individually or through chosen representatives to take part in public decision making. It
is therefore necessary that government and TNCs, particularly in oil producing areas initiate
environmental  sensitization  programmes  with  a  view  to  engaging  local  inhabitants  and
getting  comments  on  areas  of  concern.  These  challenges  or  areas  of  concern  could  be
inculcated into environmental policies across major institutions including the environmental
policies of oil operators.
The Shell Petroleum Developing Company of Nigeria (SPDC) indicated its deployment of
the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) on its website. This is an agreement
between SPDC and a cluster of several oil producing communities with representatives of
State,  local  governments  and  non-profit  organisations.  The  aforesaid  bodies,  through
representatives, meet as a decision making-committee called the Cluster Development Board
(CDB) where communities are given the chance to air their views and the development they
want.82 Whilst  this  initiative  would  be  considered  as  an  aspect  of  corporate  social
responsibility, it is clearly in conformity with the Principle of Participation enshrined in the
National Policy on Environment and Article 13 of the African Charter as mentioned (right of
equal access to public service). The Principle of Participation requires that ‘decisions should,
as much as possible, be made by the people or on their behalf by representatives chosen by
them’.83
Almost all major oil companies in Nigeria maintain policies connected to the GMoU, but
whether  such  community  based  meetings  and  consultations  are  regular  and  effective  is
another matter, since there are frequent complaints of environmental degradation via oil spills
with little or no sign of responsibility on the part of the companies.84
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Furthermore, it is shown that during oil spill incidents, a team, including relevant government
agencies  and  the  Company  owning  the  flowlines,  alongside  representatives  of  impacted
communities visit the affected site. This is otherwise known as the Joint Inspection Visit.85
Again this initiative is in conformity with principles of Public Participation, since the affected
communities  are  directly  given the opportunity  via  its  representatives  to  take  part  in  the
inspection, thereby creating the avenue to receive opinions and make decisions in addressing
spills. 
Notwithstanding the existing policy measures and other steps taken by the oil TNCs, it has
been observed that discriminatory policies that exclude the affected local communities from
participating in making rules that govern key aspects of the lives of local inhabitants is one of
many other factors instigating crisis in the Niger Delta region.86 This position is affirmed by
Kalu who posits that addressing the problems in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria requires a
multidimensional measures including ‘public or indigenous participation’ in mining energy
and other resources development.87 In essence, the major challenges within the oil regions
would not merely be resolved by public participation in decision making but also in public
participation in managing the resources. In light of what has been said, it is imperative to
point  out  that  the  demands  and  of  oil  producing  communities  in  the  Niger  Delta  for
consultations  and inclusion in policy making processes relating  to  matters  that  affect  the
environment and resources is not is not out of place88 due to both municipal and international
recognition of the need for public participation in environmental matters.
4.5 Access to Environmental Justice
 Access to environmental justice is a crucial aspect or pillar of public awareness as a tool for
dealing with environmental problems. This is pursuant to the fact that issues of fundamental
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rights  enforcement,  forming  the  centre-point  of  this  research  would  be  insignificant  and
meaningless if individuals are unable to access justice in the courts or related institutions
mandated with resolving environmental disputes by law. The imperative for adequate access
to environmental  justice has been a global call.  The Aarhus Convention,  despite  being a
Regional Convention for Europe, took into cognisance, as stated in its Preamble. Principle 1
of the Stockholm Declaration as well  as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration as discussed
above emphasised on the fundamental rights to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of
life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing as well as
Effective  access  to  judicial  and administrative  proceedings  respectively.  The  Convention
mandates Member States to ensure that individuals who are refused access to environmental
information  are  given  access  to  a  review  procedure  before  a  Court  of  law  or  other
independent and impartial bodies established by law.89 In the same manner, the Freedom of
Information  Act,  2011 in  Nigeria  is  explicit  on  the  appropriate  step  an applicant  should
follow where access to information is denied. It states that:
Where  the  government  or  public  institution  fails  to  give  access  to  a
record or information applied for under this Act, or a part thereof, the
institution shall state in the notice given to the applicant the grounds for
the refusal, the specific provision of this Act that it relates to and that the
applicant has a right to challenge the decision refusing access and have it
reviewed by a Court.90
Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention provides that:
…Each party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid
down  in  its  national  law,  members  of  the  public  have  access  to
administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by
private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its
national law relating to the environment.91 
The Convention equally supports the provision of adequate and effective injunctive reliefs as
well  as  creating  mechanisms  to  remove  or  reduce  financial  and  other  barriers  to  access
justice.92 The Aarhus Convention becomes a very relevant international reference document
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in this regard due to the fact that it solely addresses issues relating to the three key aspects of
public participation, which includes access to justice, in full.
It is submitted that access to justice in events of environmental rights violation is contingent
upon  the  intersection  of  the  breach  of  substantive  and  procedural  rights.  Amechi  had
maintained that the latter is very important as most people whose rights have been infringed
or threatened by environmental degradation in Nigeria have been denied access to justice
because of the burdensome procedural rules or injustices encountered in the legal system.93
He drew an instance, stating that failure to discharge the onerous burden of proof associated
with reliance on tort rules has led to the failure of many environmental cases.94 
In  the  same  vein,  the  substantive  application  of  traditional  principles  of  liability  in
environmental  pollution  cases,  such  as  the  strict  liability  rule,  torts  of  nuisance  and
negligence are vague and/or difficult to establish, and this, to a large is a barrier to accessing
environmental justice. In view of these shortcomings, Kalu and Stewart have stated that:
Litigation in regular courts has not helped the situation. This is primarily
because the highly scientific,  technical  and sophisticated nature of the
operations of oil companies makes it imperative for a plaintiff to be well
versed in this area to be able to recover damages for his losses in suits for
compensation or negligence.95
In Nigeria, the financial burden and time involved in running environmental litigation are
considered as some of the primary challenges facing the successful pursuit of environmental
cases; and in some cases, allegations of judicial compromise instigated by TNCs may be a
considerable factor hindering environmental justice. Although this latter position runs short
of  conclusive  evidence,  it  is  a  widely  held  belief  amongst  victims  and  litigants  of
environmental pollution in Nigeria.96
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In light of the above, there are different circumstances or categories under which members of
the public can institute judicial proceedings within the parameters of the right of access to
environmental justice. In line with Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, anyone who considers
that  his/her  right  to  information  access  is  ignored,  wrongfully  refused,  inadequately
answered, or otherwise not dealt with in accordance with stipulated laws or guidelines would
be entitled to access justice by way of judicial review.97 This provision is similar to section 7
of the Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria mandating applicants to challenge any decision
refusing access to information with a view to having it reviewed by a court. Second, judicial
actions  may  be  invoked  by ‘members  of  the  public  concerned’  where  decisions,  acts  or
omissions  relating  to  specific  permits  for  peculiar  sort  of activities  (mostly projects  with
tendencies to significantly impact on the environment) are found to or likely to contravene
existing laws or regulations.98 The Aarhus Convention defined the ‘Public Concerned’  to
include Non-Governmental Organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting
any requirements under national law. In this vein, it is maintained that NGOs are deemed to
have a specific interest in environmental matters and decision making,99 and could therefore
have access to justice in the same circumstances with natural persons.
In Nigeria, under the Freedom of Information Act 2011, ‘applicant’ refers to any person who
applies  for  information  (environmental  information  within  the  context  of  this  discussion)
under  the  Act,100 and  ‘person’  includes  a  corporation  sole  and  body  of  persons  whether
corporate or incorporate; acting individually or as a group.101 It follows that NGOs are at will
to  request  environmental  information,  even without  the need to  demonstrate  any specific
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interest in the information being applied for,102 as against the requirement for proof of interest
in the Aarhus Convention as mentioned.103 As a result, any person entitled to environmental
information shall have the right to institute legal proceedings to compel any public institution
to comply where it is shown that such right is infringed.104
It has been shown in the previous chapters that the fundamental rights to life and dignity of
the human person as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution have been creatively interpreted
to include environmental rights.105 Also, there are supplementary provisions relating to the
right  to  a  clean  environment  which  have  been  captured  in  the  African  Charter.106 A
cumulative  reading  from  both  the  Constitution  and  the  African  Charter  shows  that
environmental  rights  in  Nigeria  are  enforceable,  and  these  rights  are  enforced  via  the
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009107 (hereinafter ‘the rules’ or ‘FREP
rules’). Under the Rules, an ‘Applicant’ is defined as a party who files an application or on
whose behalf, an application is filed under the rules.108 This indicates that no leave of court is
required to institute a class action or action on behalf of another as against provisions of the
former Rules of 1979 which abhors the receipt of an application for an order enforcing or
securing  the  enforcement  of  any  fundamental  rights  without  being  granted  leave  by  the
court.109 
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Again,  the  new  Fundamental  Rights  (Enforcement  Procedure)  Rules  2009,  has  totally
expunged any form of limitation of action imposed by any limitation statute.110 It is pertinent
to mention that in the former Rules of 1979, no leave was granted for an enforcement of
fundamental rights except such application is brought within twelve months from the date of
the  happening  of  the  event,  matter  or  act  complained,  except  where  such  delay  is
satisfactorily justified.111 In the light of these changes and improvements in the current Rules
(2009), there is no doubt that the pursuit for environmental justice has gained momentum
since it could be seen that limitation of statutes and seeking leave of court before instituting
legal proceedings are major technical  hurdles in the realm of judicial  proceedings.  In the
Nigerian case of Okpara v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd & others,112
the  Federal  High  Court,  struck  out  a  matter  brought  under  the  Fundamental  Rights
(Enforcement Procedures) Rules of 1979 (the old Rules) for enforcement of environmental
rights, on the ground that the suit could not be maintained in a representative capacity. Some
of the key hurdles in the quest for environmental justice as highlighted by Ekhator includes
weak regulatory regime in the oil  and gas sector,  the lack of political  will  by regulatory
agencies  to  enforce  oil  and  gas  laws  and  regulations,  acute  corruption  and  judicial
obstacles.113 It has been shown from previous chapters that the Nigerian environmental legal
framework is rich in terms of holding environmental polluters liable, but it is submitted that
the aforementioned factors ranging from the lack of political will by regulatory agencies to
enforce oil  and gas laws to judicial  obstacles are understandable owing to the interest  or
economic benefits which the State derives from oil and gas production.114
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4.5.1 Access to Environmental Justice and Jurisdiction of Courts in Nigeria
Another critical factor in the pursuit for environmental justice is the proximity of the Nigerian
Courts to those prone to the negative impacts of environmental pollution caused by oil and
gas activities of multinationals.  Under section 251(1)(n) of the Nigerian Constitution it is
provided that the Federal High Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil
causes and matters relating to mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological
surveys and natural gas). This is an issue capable of raising eyebrows owing to the fact that
there are limited Federal High Court Divisions in the country compared to the existing State
High Courts115 which are almost located in every local government area in Nigeria. There is
no gainsaying that limited number of courts in Nigeria is a reason for congestion of cases
which inevitably leads to delay in justice as well as projecting challenges in the access to
justice.
In  Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd v Abel  Isaiah and others,116 the
Supreme Court of Nigeria reinforced the stance that a State High Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain  issues  on  petroleum  mining  operations  which  includes  environmental  pollution
caused by oil and gas activities. In that case, the plaintiffs (now respondents) brought a claim
under the common law principles of negligence and Rylands v Fletcher for compensation for
the  permanent  damage  to  its  plant,  marine  and  domestic  life  which  was  caused  by  the
defendants’ (now appellant) oil exploration activities in Rivers State, Nigeria. The State High
Court (trial court) delivered judgment in favour of the plaintiffs; which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeal. Dissatisfied with both judgments, the appellant approached the Supreme
Court. The primary issue for determination before the Supreme Court was whether the Court
of Appeal was right in holding that the State High Court had jurisdiction to try the case.
Whilst  allowing  the  appeal,  the  Supreme  Court  agreed  that  the  subject  matter  of  the
respondents’ claim (compensation for oil spillage) falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Federal  High Court as contained in section 251(1)(n) of the Nigerian Constitution as
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stated above.117 In linking mining operations to the laying of oil pipelines, the Supreme Court
stated:
In  establishing  whether  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  an  oil
pipeline is part of mining operations, it is relevant to refer to the practice
of  the oil  prospecting  licence  holders  during  mining operations.  They
have been described in the Petroleum Act 1960 and Oil Pipelines Act
1956. If petroleum is discovered through the approved mining operations,
arrangement is made by the oil prospecting licence holder, which struck
the oil, to evacuate the oil from the oil well to an oil terminal. This is
done either through a pipeline or a tanker. The pipeline is constructed and
maintained by the Oil Company which transports the oil from the oil-well
to the oil terminal.118
The  above  stance  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  the  exercise  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  on
proceedings relating to oil exploitation activities by the Federal High Court was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of  Shell Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria Ltd v Sirpi-Alusteel  Construction  Ltd..119Although,  before the emergence  of these
latter  cases it  has been the reasoning that incidents of environmental pollution caused by
leakages  from  oil  pipelines  do  not  fall  within  the  meaning  of  ‘mines  and  minerals’.120
Looking  at  the  provision  of  section  251  of  the  Nigerian  Constitution  on  the  exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal High Court on mines and minerals, it would be logical to conclude
that causes of action arising in environmental pollution, which basically are side effects of oil
mining and natural activities of oil TNCs are limited to resolution by the Federal High Court.
Conversely,  Section  46(1)  of  the  Constitution121 which  borders  on  the  enforcement  of
Fundamental Rights, captured in Chapter IV provides that:
Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this chapter has
been, is being or likely to be contravened in any state in relation to him
may apply to a High Court in that state for redress.122
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The above provision is furthermore buttressed by section 46(2) on the original jurisdiction of
State High Courts to entertain proceedings in the event of violations of Fundamental Rights
(which inevitably include the right to safe environment) enforcement. It states that:
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,  a High Court shall have
original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in
pursuance of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and
give such directions as it  may consider appropriate  for the purpose of
enforcement or securing the enforcing within that State of any right to
which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this
chapter.123
In the light of the above, it is observed that the provisions of sections 251(1) (n) and 46(1)
and (2)  of the Constitution  are contradictory  with regard to  the jurisdiction  of  Courts  in
entertaining issues relating to mining and mineral. This becomes more obvious owing to the
trend of the recognition and interpretation of the rights  to life  and dignity of the human
person to include environmental rights as maintained in the case of  Jonah Gbemre v Shell
Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd..124 Again, bearing in mind, the provisions of
environmental safeguards as contained in the African Charter, which can be enforced via the
Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, it is clear that State High Courts retain
jurisdiction  to  entertain  issues  of  environmental  pollution  raised  via  Fundamental  Rights
Enforcement Proceedings. This latter stance is backed by Order 1 Rule 2 of the Rules (2009)
which defines ‘Court’ to mean ‘the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or the
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja’.
In view of the foregoing, it is noteworthy that whilst the side-note of section 46(1) is couched
‘Special  Jurisdiction  of  High  Court’,  that  of  section  251(1)(n)  (bordering  on  exclusive
jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  High  Court)  is  marked  ‘Jurisdiction’,  implying  ‘general
jurisdiction’.  In  this  regard,  Uwaifo  JSC  in  Grace  Jack v University  of  Agriculture,
Markurdi,125 maintained that where there are ‘special’ and ‘general’ provisions in a statute
 ibid.
123
 Nigerian Constitution (n 77), s 46 (2).
124
 Jonah Gbemre’s case (n 105).
125
 [2004] 5 NWLR (Pt 865) 208 at 228-229.
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covering the same subject matter, the general provision is not to be interpreted as derogating
what has been specifically provided for. In view of this, Uwaifo affirmed the provision of
section 46(1) as ‘special and fundamental.’126 It is maintained that in invoking fundamental
rights incorporated in the Constitution, an applicant is at liberty to pursue such action either at
a State High Court, Federal High Court situated in the State where the alleged infringement
had occurred or the High Court of the Federal Capital territory. This is because, section 46(1)
had limited the institution of all actions emanating under Chapter IV to a High Court in the
State of the Applicant.
It could be argued, therefore, that the Nigerian Supreme Court Judgment in Abel Isaiah’s
case127 above did not in any way invalidate commencement of fundamental rights actions in
cases of oil and gas pollution in a State High Court since the subject matter in that case (Abel
Isaiah)  borders  on  common law tort  principles  of  negligence  and  strict  liability  and  not
fundamental  rights  enforcement.  In  the  case  of  Bodo Community v The Shell  Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd,128 which was a group litigation involving more than
15,000  claimants  seeking  damages  at  common  law  and  statutory  compensation  under
Nigerian law in a London High Court in relation to oil spills alleged to have been caused by
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), the court affirmed that…’the
Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to deal not only with any cases at common law
but  also  any claim  for  statutory  compensation  under  the  Oil  Pipelines  Act’.129 From the
foregoing argument, it is submitted that in the absence of fundamental rights enforcement, it
is plausible that the Federal High Court retains exclusive jurisdiction to entertain oil pollution




 Abel Isaiah (n 116).
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 [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC).
129
 The Bodo Case (n 128) [48].
130
 See Engobo Emeseh, ‘Mainstreaming enforcement for the victims of environmental pollution: towards
effective allocation of legislative competence under a federal constitution’ (2012) 14 ELR 185, 196-197 on a
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The Supreme Court in  Nwankwo v Yar’ adua131 reinforced the conditions precedent to the
important  issue  of  jurisdiction,  which  include  the  fact  that  a  court  is  only  competent  to
exercise jurisdiction in respect of any matter where the subject matter of the case is within its
jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which would prevent the court from exercising
jurisdiction. It follows, that an applicant carries a substantive burden of establishing the nexus
between environmental pollution and infringement of fundamental rights as encapsulated in
the Constitution and the African Charter which forms the heart of this research.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter briefly considered the concept of ‘public awareness’ in environmental matters
with a view to establishing its relevance to the principle of the protection of the environment
within the ambit of environmental rights (the right to a safe and pollution free environment).
It is practically a dialectic, owing to current environmental challenges posed by activities of
oil  TNCs  on  the  immediate  environment.  In  addressing  pollution  challenges,  public
participation becomes a tool which must be given higher priority and credence. In light of
this, it is maintained that in order to meaningfully contribute to the protection of the right of
every person; of both present and future generations to live in an environment suitable for the
well-being of humans, governments must guarantee the rights of access to information, public
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.
In the current Nigerian legal framework, the Freedom of Information and the Environmental
Impact  Assessment  Acts  have  been  identified  as  supporting  legal  instruments  in  the
promotion  of  principles  of  public  awareness.  In  the  same  vein,  the  National  Policy  on
Environment, though precatory in nature, has affirmed core principles of public awareness. It
is submitted that public awareness, in every aspect, if adequately promoted, will stimulate a
proper understanding of environmental challenges and aid in fundamental rights enforcement.
The next chapter considers the principles of environmental protection and the concept of state
responsibility; and critically examines the interconnectedness between principles of liability
at both state and international levels, and also considers the nature of such liability.
brief analysis on the jurisdiction of courts regarding oil mining.
131
 [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt 1209) 518 at 560.
179
180
                                            CHAPTER 5
PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
5.1   Introduction
There  are  intricacies  surrounding principles  of  causation  and responsibility  in  relation  to
environmental  pollution  incidents.  Owing  to  these  challenges,  many  international
conventions and treaties have put more effort towards setting a uniform standard for liability
in cases of environmental hazards resulting to loss or damage. This chapter briefly considers
the extent of environmental pollution in Nigeria, caused, particularly as a result of oil and gas
exploration  and  production  by  transnational  corporations  (TNCs)  and  focusses  on  the
principle of environmental protection and the standard of liability obtainable with regard to
the principle of state responsibility, within Nigeria and at the international level. This two-
fold approach of the concept of state responsibility is triggered on the basis that whilst a state
is  expected  to  tackle  pollution  issues  within  its  jurisdiction,  a  responsible  state  is  under
international obligation not to cause harm to other states. This principle was emphasised in
the Trail Smelter Arbitration1 in 1938. It is worth noting that the discussion in this chapter is
targeted  towards  ascertaining  the  prevailing  measure  of  liability  that  is  obtainable  for
transboundary  pollution,  with  a  view to  comparing  such liability  with  that  obtainable  in
breach of fundamental rights to a safe environment as discussed in chapter 6. Basically, this
chapter does not necessarily tackle in-depth issues on the concept of state responsibility.
The crux of this chapter is to critically examine the interplay of national and international
laws with a view to ascertaining  the measure of  liability  obtainable  in  legal  proceedings
relating  to  environmental  pollution.  This  is  done  in  line  with  pragmatic  cases  of
environmental  abuses  and  the  attitude  of  the  courts  in  resolving  such  disputes.  More
importantly, the current analysis is aimed at resolving one of the hypotheses, done in part, in
chapter 1 of this research which is to examine ‘whether the current technique of measuring
liability, particularly under tort law is clear in Nigeria’.
1
 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States/Canada),  (1938) Vol III (Reports of International  Arbitral
Awards) 1905-1982.
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Whilst considering principles of transnational responsibility, this research enumerates on the
mandate of the Stockholm Declaration2 and other related instruments on the need for states to
take  responsibility  by ensuring that  activities  within their  jurisdiction  and control  do not
cause damage outside of their jurisdiction.3 A similar obligation is reflected in principle 2 of
the  Rio  Declaration.4 In  addition,  where  damage  occurs  due  to  activities  of  states,  the
Stockholm Declaration requires that states do cooperate to develop further the international
law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond
their  jurisdictions.5 This  chapter  corroborates  the  fact  that  questions  of  liability  and
compensation for environmental harms have undergone dramatic doctrinal development in
municipal legal systems, while international law remained essentially static.6 It is observed
that  the  International  Court  of  Justice  anchored  the  standard  of  liability  relating  to
transboundary harm on ‘prevention and due diligence’ even where damage is foreseeable by
the defaulting state. This is more particularly displayed in the case of Argentina v Uruguay.7
Conversely,  it  is  argued  that  once  damage  is  foreseeable,  liability  ought  to  be  strict  or
absolute, provided there was no third party interference as shown in the case of  Rylands v
Fletcher.8 Owing  to  this,  the  ‘due  diligence’  requirement  in  the  case  of  Donoghue v
2
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (adopted 5-6 June 1972)
(hereinafter ‘Stockholm Declaration’).
3
 See principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration (n 2).
4
 United  Nations  Conference  on  Environment  and  Development  (Rio  de  Janeiro,  3-14  June  1992)
A/CONF. 151/26 Vol.1, Principle 2.
5
 Stockholm Declaration (n 2), principle 22.
6
 Sanford  E  Gaines,  ‘International  Principles  for  Transnational  Environmental  Liability:  Can
Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?’ (1989) 30 HILJ 311, 315.
7
 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) [2010] ICJ Rep14, para 101.
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Stevenson9 is argued to no longer sustain current liability principles under state responsibility,
particularly where it is shown that the damage caused by a state to another is foreseeable.
Principle  13  of  the  Rio  Declaration10 and  Principle  22  of  the  Stockholm  Declaration,
mandates  states  to  develop  national  and  international  law  regarding  liability  and
compensation of victims of pollution. Hence, this chapter concentrates on the examination of
liability  principles  with regards to  extant  environmental  laws in  Nigeria  and case law in
drawing  a  logical  legal  stance  on  the  position  of  both  international  and  domestic  law
regarding the standard of liability in environmental pollution incidents.  Nevertheless, it  is
maintained that failure of a state to provide reasonable redress to victims of environmental
pollution may, in most serious cases lead to the violation of fundamental rights to life, private
life, health and property under international human rights agreements.11 It follows that the
analysis of traditional liability principles (such as statutory provisions and common law rules
of negligence, nuisance and strict liability) as discussed in the current chapter would serve the
purpose of a further comparative analysis of such measures of liability with that obtainable in
in cases relating to breach of fundamental rights to a healthy environment as discussed in
chapter 6.
5.2 A Brief Analysis on Environmental Pollution incidents in Nigeria.
There  is  no gainsaying that  what  has  created for  Nigeria  the strength and popularity  for
enormous prosperity and regional leadership in the world and Africa in particular is its oil
reserves.  Disturbingly,  the continuous exploration and production of crude oil  in Nigeria,
particularly  in  the  Niger  Delta  area  has  resulted  in  serious  environmental  hazards.  In
affirming this latter position, Olanrewaju maintained that:
Almost every ecosystem and primal culture that has had the misfortune of
being exposed to oil exploration and production has been disrupted and in
some  cases  suffer  irreversible  ruin.  Mention  can  be  made  of  the
 [1861-73] All ER Rep 1 (HL). See also figure 1.3 on the nature and scope of the strict liability rule.
9
 [1932] AC 562 (HL) 580.
10
 Rio Declaration (n 4).
11
 See the cases of Lopez Ostra v Spain [1994] 20 EHRR 277 and Guerra v Italy [1998] 26 EHRR 357 as
discussed in figure 2.3 of this research.
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destruction of several mangrove forests, associated species extinction, the
destruction  of  complex  animal  communities,  the  poisoning  of  water
supplies,  the  displacement  of  many  indigenous  populations  and  the
killing of protesters from both non-oil and host oil communities who are
averse to the continued pollution and degradation.12
The above consequences associated with oil and gas exploration and production evinced by
Olanrewaju  is  a  reflection  of  what  is  being  experienced  by  inhabitants  of  oil  producing
communities in most developing countries. This is equally the case in developed countries,
but could be seen to be in its miniature due to urgent and commensurate response to cases of
oil spillage and other associated activities that could lead to more severe environmental harm.
Most cases of environmental pollution in Nigeria resulting from oil and gas exploration and
production are traced to the Niger Delta area. The Niger Delta is located in the South-South
region of Nigeria and made up of States such as Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River,
Delta, Ondo and Rivers. Oil exploration in the Niger Delta could be traced to 1905 when oil
was discovered  in  Araromi;  now in Ondo state.13 This  discovery  is  said to  attract  many
companies to Nigeria. The major discovery of oil in commercial quantity in Nigeria was after
the Second World War in 1956, which is traceable to Shell Bp in Oloibiri Community in
Ogbia Local Government Area of Bayelsa State.
As mentioned earlier,  there are  increasing cases of environmental  degradation14 owing to
pollution caused by oil activities. The major source of pollution in Nigeria is oil spillage and
gas flaring.15 Oil spillages in Nigeria are basically traceable to sabotage on oil pipelines and
illegal oil refining. Gas flaring, in some cases, occurs as a result of sabotage or unintentional
damage on gas pipelines, and the gas flaring technique used in oil production to separate
12
 Olanrewaju  Fagbohun,  The Law of  Oil  Pollution  and Environmental  Restoration A Comparative
Review (Odade, Lagos 2010) 3.
13
 The State of Human Rights in Nigeria, Being a Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria, 2008
(Nigerian National Human Rights Commission, Abuja 2008) 199-200.
14
 Olanrewaju has highlighted some of the negative traits associated with oil and gas exploration and
production in his book (n 12).
15
 A Report on the state of Human Rights in Nigeria (n 13).
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crude from associated gases. The aforesaid gas extraction method is considered outdated and
it has caused extensive damage to surface vegetation, agriculture, human health and aquatic
life.16
The  report  on  the  environment  and  the  Niger  Delta  by  the  National  Human  Rights
Commission has it to the effect that in 1979, the Nigerian government passed a law banning
gas  flaring  but  the  ministry  of  petroleum  was  allowed  by  virtue  of  the  law  to  grant
exceptions,  and that up till  date,  most operators are still  relying on the exceptions.17 The
Nigerian government had previously given 2003 and 2004 as deadlines to end gas flaring but
there was no consistent compliance due to the fact that there is no legislation to that effect,18
hence, it became a mere directive without sanctions.
There are series of incidents on hazardous oil spillage and gas flaring in the Niger Delta
Area.19 Of  recent,  with  environmental  and  legal  significance,  is  the  oil  spill  from Shell
pipelines  in  Bodo community  which is  reported to  have adversely affected  about  15,600
farmers and fishermen in 2008 and 2009.20 But it seems that pollution emanating from the
crude oil exploration and production is inevitable, and this is widely associated to the multi-
dimensional  causes  of  oil  pollution  which  ranges  from oil  well  blow-outs,  corrosion  of
pipelines and tanks, burst and leaking pipelines, over pressure failures, over-flow of process
equipment components, failures along pump discharge manifolds, sabotage to well heads and





 A Report on the state of Human Rights in Nigeria (n 13).
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 A Report on the state of Human Rights in Nigeria (n 13) 201.
19
 For a breakdown of oil spills incidents in Nigeria from 1976-1997, see Olanrewaju Fagbohun,  The
Law of Oil Pollution and Environmental Restoration, A comparative Review’ (n 12) on page 164.
20
John Vidal, ‘Shell announces £55m payout for Nigeria Oil spills’  The guardian (London 7 January
2015)  <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/07/shell-announces-55m-payout-for-nigeria-oil-
spills> accessed 14 August 2015.
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Corrosion  of  pipes  and  the  rupturing  or  leaking  of  production
infrastructure accounts for about 50 per cent of oil spills. The reason for
this is that many of these facilities are old and lack regular inspection and
maintenance.21
Despite the above stance linking the major cause of oil spillage to ‘corrosion of pipes’, there
seems  to  be  a  major  disagreement  amongst  environmental  activists,  stakeholders  and
operators on the most likely cause of oil spillage. Whilst most victims and environmental
activists  are  more  inclined  to  retain  the view that  oil  and gas  pipelines  are  inadequately
inspected and maintained thereby resulting in spillages, oil TNCs are mostly of the view that
spillages are caused via sabotage. The Director of Global Issue at  Amnesty International,
Audrey Gaughram, whilst responding to the recent acceptance by Shell BP to compensate the
indigenes of Bodo community with £55m due to a manifest devastation caused to the people,
said: ‘Oil pollution in the Niger Delta is one of the biggest corporate scandals of our time.
Shell  needs  to  provide  proper  compensation,  clear  up  the  mess  and  make  the  pipelines
safer’.22 Conversely, Mutiu Sunmonu, Managing Director of Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria (SPDC), whilst responding to the same Bodo incidence, maintained that:
…Unless real action is taken to end the scourge of oil theft and illegal
refining, which remains the main cause of environmental pollution and is
the real tragedy of the Niger Delta, areas that are cleaned up will simply
become re-impacted through these illegal activities.23
In  the  light  of  the  above  elucidations,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  the  latter  view of
Sunmonu, linking the basic causes of environmental pollution to cases of oil theft and illegal
refining must not be taken on face value as there are constant cases of oil theft resulting to oil
spillages. Having said so, TNCs would have to show more vigilance and diligence in tackling
cases  of  oil  spillages,  since  it  has  become  obvious  that  oil  pollution  is  an  inevitable
consequence of oil and gas exploration and production.
21
 Fagbohun (n 12).
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 Vidal (n 20).
23
 Vidal (n 20).
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5.3   The Nigerian Legal Framework and Issues of Environmental Responsibility
The principles relating to environmental liability in the Nigerian Constitution and the African
Charter have been discussed in the early part of this research.24 It is mentioned that the only
aspect of the Nigerian Constitution which contains an obligation on the part of the state to
ensure  a  pollution  free  environment  is  rendered  non-justiciable  by  virtue  of  the  same
Constitution.25 However,  the  courts  have  given  judicial  consideration  to  the  fundamental
rights to life and dignity of the person as contained in the Nigerian Constitution and the
African Charter respectively by interpreting these guaranteed rights to inevitably include the
right to clean poison-free environment, pollution free and healthy environment. Albeit there
are few judicial decisions in this regard, the courts have put hope on victims of environmental
pollution to seek redress via fundamental rights enforcements.26 In the same vein, there is a
plethora of legislation relating to environmental liability in cases of oil and gas pollution, and
a brief consideration of such laws will aid the understanding of what parties in environmental
pollution cases in Nigeria could expect in adjudication.
5.3.1 Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act 2004  27  
The enactment of the Harmful Waste Act 2004 by the Nigerian National Assembly was in
response to the dumping of toxic waste in Koko town, Nigeria.28 The Act prohibits all kinds
24
 See figure 2.5 of chapter two entitled ‘Awareness of Human Rights as a Tool for Environmental 
Protection in Nigeria’.
25
 Section 20 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) implores states to
protect and improve the environment. This provision has been rendered unenforceable by virtue of section 6 of 
the same Constitution.
26
 See the case of Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and others 
[2005] AHRLR 151 (Federal High Court of Nigeria, Benin Judicial Division).
27
 Cap H1 LFN 2004.
28
 Nelson E Ojukwu-Ogba, ‘Legal and Regulatory Instruments on Environmental Pollution in Nigeria: 
much talk, less teeth’ (2006) 8/9 IELTR 201, 204.
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of dealings relating to the carrying, dumping or depositing of harmful waste in the air, land or
waters of Nigeria except with the consent of a lawful authority.29 The Act creates a direct
criminal liability on polluters of the environment, particularly as provided in section 6 of the
Act which imposes a criminal penalty requiring ‘life imprisonment’ and the seizure of any
‘carrier,  including aircraft,  vehicle,  container and any other thing whatsoever’ used in the
transportation of the harmful waste.30
It is clear that section 6 of the Act imposes liability on the polluter but the nature of the
liability does not involve any kind of compensation from the polluter, rather, after conviction,
polluters are to face a ‘punishment of life imprisonment’ and forfeiture of land or anything
which was used to commit the offence. What seems to be relevant from the aforementioned
provision is the imposition of liability on the polluters of the environment. In furtherance,
section  12  of  the  Act31 has  equally  defined  the  civil  liability  of  polluters  (offenders)  by
stating, inter alia, that the offender will be liable to persons who have suffered injury from his
conduct.32 A close consideration of the section will be necessary to appreciate and interpret
the nature of liability involved. It provides that:
Where any damage has been caused by any harmful  waste  which has
been deposited or dumped on any land or territorial waters or contagious
zone or exclusive economic zone of Nigeria or its inland waterways, any
person who deposited, dumped or imported the harmful waste or caused
the harmful waste to be so deposited, dumped or imported shall be liable
for the damage-except where the damage was due wholly to the fault of
the person who suffered it; or was suffered by a person who voluntarily
accepted the risk thereof.33
29
 Environmental Resource Institute, ‘A Synopsis of Laws and Regulations on the Environment in 
Nigeria’. <http://www.elri-ng.org/newsandrelease2.html  >   accessed 14 July 2014. See also the introductory 
section of the Act.
30
 Harmful Waste Act (n 27), s 6.
31
 ibid, s 12.
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 Environmental Resource Institute (n 29).
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 Harmful Waste Act (n 27), s 12(1)(a) and (b).
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This  latter  provision  has  equally  established  the  kind  of  liability  that  will  attract
compensation for damages in favour of anyone who has suffered injury. It is clear that the
Act  entails  both  criminal  and  civil  liabilities  for  the  unlawful  acts  or  omissions  of  the
defendant which would inevitably cause injury to others. 
The three basic grounds on which the defendant can be exonerated from liability are in events
where it is shown that the dumping of the waste is carried out under lawful authority34 or
where the damage was as a result of the person who suffered it (claimant), and or where the
claimant voluntarily accepted the risk. If the preceding provisions are to be given a literal
interpretation, then it presupposes that acts or omissions of a third party, independent of the
claimant and defendant (polluter) could also attract the liability of the polluter itself.  One
major issue for scrutiny is whether liability under the Harmful Waste Act 2004 can be termed
as ‘strict liability’ offences having regard to the basic elements needed to establish a case of
strict liability as in Rylands v Fletcher.35 It is submitted that liability under the Harmful Waste
Act regime is stricter than the liability in Rylands. This is because there are few identifiable
exceptions under the Act than could be seen in the  Rylands case.36 Furthermore, the Act is
silent as to whether the requirement  of ‘reasonable foreseeability of harm’ as required in
establishing strict liability cases would be required as an element for prosecution under the
Act. Section 2 of the Act provides that:
A person shall be deemed to commit a crime under this Act if-he actually
does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the crime; or he
does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another
person to commit the crime.37
The above provision is silent on the measure of liability required to hold polluters culpable
under this Act. Rather it is maintained that a person shall be deemed to commit a crime under
34
 Harmful Waste Act (n 27), s 1(2).
35
 [1861-73] All ER 1 (HL).
36
 The exceptions in  Rylands v Fletcher includes,  amongst  others;  consent of the claimant,  act  of  a
stranger, default of the claimant and Act of God.
37
 Harmful Waste Act (n 27), s 2(1) (a)(b).
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the Act if he ‘actually does the act or makes the omission’ which leads to the offence. In
establishing  that  the  accused  actually  committed  a  crime,  under  criminal  cases,  the
prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, it is argued that
liable could not be absolute since there are hurdles in the task of proving beyond reasonable
doubt.
The term, ‘Harmful waste’, under the Harmful Waste Act 2004  includes ‘liquid,’38 and the
Act, without any doubt is very much applicable in the oil and gas industry considering the
fact  that  there  are  tremendous  wastes  which  are  produced  in  the  course  of  oil  and  gas
exploration and production, and such wastes can be harmful to the environment.39
5.3.2 Oil in Navigable Waters Act 2004  40  
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act is enacted to eradicate acts of pollution to the Nigerian
waters, thereby creating liability on individuals and companies who are found wanting in the
contamination of the Nigerian water through the discharge of oil (including fuel, lubricating
oil  and  diesel).  The  Act  was  enacted  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  the  International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by oil1954 to 1962.41 A combined
reading of sections 1, 3, and 5 of the Act42 reveals that the Act imposes liability on polluters
who discharges oil, either from a vessel, land or from an apparatus used for transferring oil
into prohibited sea areas in Nigeria.
38
 Harmful Waste Act (n 27), s 1(3).
39
 Ojukwu-Ogba (n 28).
40
 Cap O6 LFN 2004.
41
 This is clearly stated in the Preamble to the Oil in Navigable Waters Act Cap O6 LFN 2004.
42
 Oil in Navigable Waters Act (n 40), sections 1, 3 and 5.
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Section 6 of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act43 provides punishment for such polluters of the
Nigerian sea, while section 4 of the Act44 provides general defences which the defendant
(polluter)  can  raise  in  matters  brought  under  the  Act.  One  such  defence  is  that  of
‘reasonableness’, that is, the Act provides, inter alia, that the polluter must show that the oil
escaped in consequence of damage to the vessel, and that as soon as practicable after the
occurrence of the damage all reasonable steps were taken for preventing, or if the escape
could not be prevented, then reasonable steps should have been taken to stop or reduce the
escape of oil.45 This defence appears to be equated to the general common law defence in the
torts  of  strict  liability  (Rylands  v Fletcher),  nuisance,  trespass  to land and negligence.  A
further defence which is made available for a defendant under the Act is that the defendant
will have to show that ‘the leakage was not due to any want of reasonable care.’46 This latter
defence relating to the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the polluter is tantamount to
a key defence in the tort of negligence as elaborated by Lord Atkin in the well-known case of
Donoghue v Stevenson.47 In this vein, Lord Atkin observed that: ‘…in order to support an
action for damages for negligence the complainant has to show that he has been injured by
the breach of a duty owed to him in the circumstances by the defendant to take reasonable
care to avoid such injury’.48
It is maintained by Ojukwu-Ogba that the defences as provided under section 4 of the Act are
couched to favour violators since the defences provide a ‘leeway’ for the refining companies
43
 Oil in Navigable Waters Act (n 40), s 6.
44




 Oil in Navigable Waters Act (n 40), s 4(2) (b).
47
 [1932] AC 562 (HL).
48
 ibid 579 (Lord Atkin).
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to  enjoy  some  measure  of  immunity  from liability.49 This  has  brought  the  work  to  the
forefront of one major issue in this research; whether the requirement of ‘reasonableness’ and
‘reasonable  care’  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  establish  liability  will  still  create  any
impression that the defendant is strictly liable for his conduct which has caused damage to the
environment.  It is submitted that liability under the Oil in Navigable Waters Act is more
connected to liability under nuisance and negligence than it could be under strict liability, this
is because the carefulness of the defendant in strict liability tort is immaterial provided it is
obvious that there is foreseeability  of the likelihood of the activities carried out to cause
injury to the public.
5.3.3 Oil Pipelines Act 2004  50  
One major Nigerian statute that guides the issuance of licenses and the maintenance of oil
pipelines  is  the  Oil  Pipelines  Act  2004. The Act  also recognises  the individual  rights  of
landowners51 and determines  the liability  of transnational  corporations as it  relates  to the
pollution  of  the  environment  via  oil  and gas.  The  holders  of  licences  on  the  use  of  oil
pipelines are required to take all ‘reasonable steps’ to avoid unnecessary damage which can
be caused as a result of the use of any land entered upon, and such reasonable steps should
extend to buildings, crops or economic trees on the land.52 Section 11(5) of the Oil Pipelines
Act53 creates  a  civil  liability  on  oil  companies  or  licensees  who  own  pipelines  to  pay
compensation to anyone who has suffered injury as a result of any leakage of oil from the oil
pipelines,54 section  11  of  the  Oil  Pipelines  Act  deals  generally  with  the  ‘Rights  and
49
 Ojukwu-Ogba (n 28) 205.
50
 Cap O7 LFN 2004.
51
 Ojukwu-Ogba (n 28) 205.
52
 Ojukwu-Ogba (n 28) 205.
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 Oil Pipelines Act (n 50), s 11(5).
54
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obligations of the holder of a license.’ While obtaining a licence under the Act permits the
holder to lay oil pipelines55 (pipelines for the conveyance of mineral oils, natural gas or any
of their derivatives), the Act equally creates the grounds under which direct compensation
must be made to any person who has suffered injury as a result of escape of oil and gas.56 In
order  to  decipher  the  extent  of  liability  of  polluters  (licensee)  under  the  Act,  it  will  be
necessary to look closely at each of the provisions and enumerate briefly on them.
Section 11(5)(a) of the Oil Pipelines Act provides that:
The holder of a licence shall pay compensation to any person whose land
or interest in land (whether or not it is land in respect of which the licence
has  been  granted)  is  injuriously  affected  by  the  exercise  of  the  right
conferred by the licence, for any such injurious affection not other-wise
made good.57 
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that compensation shall be awarded to any person
who has suffered injury as a result of escape of crude oil or gas from the pipelines owned by
the polluter. Within the above section, it is stated that persons who have interest in any land
‘whether or not it is land in respect of which the license has been granted’, would be entitled
to such compensation. In the case of  Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd,58 Viscount Simon defined
escape as: ‘Escape… means escape from a place which the defendant has occupation of, or
control  over,  to  a  place  which  is  outside  his  occupation  or  control.’59 In  line  with  this
definition of escape, and ‘escape’ being a primary requirement to establish ‘Strict liability’ in
the case of Rylands v Fletcher,60 it is clear that whoever has suffered injury from the escape
55
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of crude oil or gas on his land, irrespective of whether the land is under the control of the
polluter or not can be compensated.
Furthermore, section 11(5)(b) of the Oil Pipelines Act in relation to compensation provides
that: 
The holder of a licence shall pay compensation to any person suffering
damage by reason of any neglect on the part of the holder or his agents,
servants or workmen to protect, maintain or repair any work, structure or
thing  executed  under  the  licence,  for  any such damage  not  otherwise
made good.61
Again, it is deducible from the above that the compensation which can be derived by the
person who has suffered injury will be based on the ground that the polluter or any of its
servants is  negligent in the conduct which has caused damage or injury. It therefore entails
that the proof of lack of ‘reasonable care’ is a prerequisite to obtain damages under the Act.
Finally, section 11(5)(c) of the Oil Pipelines Act provides that:
The holder of a licence shall pay to any person suffering damage (other
than on account of his own default or on account of the malicious act of a
third person) as a consequence of any break-age of or leakage from the
pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any such damage not otherwise
made good.62 
On this last provision relating to the compensation for damage suffered by the persons who
own a legal interest in the land, the qualifications are explicit. In essence, the polluter can
raise a defence against the claim for compensation by the claimants that the Act which has
occasioned harm to the claimants was caused by the claimants themselves or by the act of a
third  party.  These  defences  are  available  to  a  defendant  in  cases  of  strict  liability  as
enumerated in chapter 1 of this research, particularly in figures 1.5.3 (Act of a stranger) and
1.5.4 (Default of the claimant). Despite these defences which have been made available to the
owners of oil pipelines with regards to liability of escape of oil and gas; can one still assert
that the liability under the Oil Pipelines Act, is strict? It is more appropriate to maintain that
liability under the Oil Pipelines Act is determined by principles of the common law tort of
negligence. This position is informed on the grounds that liability under the Act arises in
61
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circumstances where it is shown that the polluter has neglected to protect, maintain or repair
any works, thereby causing oil  spillage and consequently injuries to others.63 Literally,  to
‘neglect’ is to fail to care properly. It follows that under the Oil Pipelines Act, there is a legal
duty of care imposed on oil companies,64 and the locus classicus on the tort of negligence is
as shown in the English case of Donoghue v Stevenson.65
5.3.4 Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 2004  66  
The  Associated  Gas  Re-Injection  Act  deals  specifically  with  the  unlawful  gas  flaring
activities of oil companies in Nigeria.67 Of utmost relevance on the prohibition of gas flaring
by the Act is section 3 (1) of the Gas Re-Injection Act,68 which provides that: ‘Subject to
subsection (2) of this section, no company engaged in the production of oil or gas shall after 1
January, 1984 flare gas produced in association with oil without the permission in writing of
the Minister.’
The above provision prohibiting gas flaring in Nigeria from the commencement of 1st January
1984 has a limitation which is that: oil and gas companies in Nigeria can only be permitted to
flare gas under the permission of the Minister of Environment, as provided in section 3 (2) of
the  Act.69 This  excuse  for  gas  flaring  can  only  be  possible  in  circumstances  where  the
Minister is satisfied that the utilisation or re-injection of the gas by the oil company is not
63
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appropriate  or  feasible.70 Section  4  of  the  Act  makes  provisions  for  penalties  which  are
connected to the unlawful flaring of gas, which include withholding of all or part of any
entitlements from the company, forfeiture of concession in the oil  field and the repair  or
restoration of any reservoir in the field in accordance with good oil field practice.71
It is pertinent to point out that the only defence which is available to oil and gas TNCs in
cases of gas flaring under the Associated Gas Re-injection Act is ‘statutory authority’. That
is,  gas flaring can only be allowed where proper permission has been obtained from the
relevant Minister. The defence of statutory authority is one of the basic defences available to
a defendant under the strict liability rule as established in  Rylands v Fletcher.72 Under the
defence of statutory authority as pointed out in chapter 1 of this research (figure 1.5.1), it was
mentioned that there are two major conditions under which the defence of statutory authority
can avail the defendant. The first condition is that the defendant must not be negligent and
secondly, the damage caused must be the inevitable consequence of the requirement under
the enabling statute.73 These latter conditions are judicially informed by the earlier English
case of Charing Cross Electricity Co v London Hydraulic Power Co.74 The facts of Charing
Cross’s case, earlier stated in figure 1.5.1 would be relevant and instructive in the current
discussion. In that case, the claimants’ underground electric cables were damaged as a result
of the escape of water maintained at high pressure from the defendants’ underground mains.
Both the claimants and the defendants were companies carrying on undertakings for profit,
for the purposes of which they had obtained statutory permission and powers under Acts of
Parliament.  The Court held the defendants liable on the grounds that the escape of water
70
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causing nuisance to the claimant was as a technical error on the defendants’ engines75 and the
‘statutory powers’ only permit  the provision of water  for industrial  purposes.  In essence,
there was no duty to maintain water under high pressure and therefore the ‘escape’ was not
the inevitable consequence of the exercise of the statutory powers.
It  follows, in the light of the above, that,  it  is not enough for the defendant to say he is
authorised under statute to carry out the activity which has caused injury to the claimant, but
it must be shown that due diligence is applied. In the English case of Dunne v North Western
Gas Board the Court of Appeal maintained inter alia, that there would be no liability if what
had been done (incident causing injury) was that which was expressly required by statute or
was reasonably incidental to that requirement and was carried out without negligence.
It has been observed that the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act76 did not make any provision
for any other familiar requirements such as that of ‘reasonable foreseeability’ and the ‘duty of
care’ in establishing the liability of the defendants as can be seen in other related torts of
strict liability, nuisance and negligence and even in other related Nigerian statutes discussed
in this chapter. It follows that the Act is silent on the position of liability of the oil and gas
companies  in  circumstances  where  gas  flaring  is  as  a  result  of  negligence,  or  accidental
emission. It is submitted that where gas is flared negligently and in clear deviation from the
ambit of the statutory mandate, liability will lie against the licence holder. It is pertinent to
add that the statutory requirement to flare gas under the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act in
such a manner that would affect fundamental rights of citizens (right to a safe environment)
has been declared null and void by a Federal High Court in Nigeria in the case of  Jonah
Gbemre  v  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Company  Nigeria  and  others.77 This  is  given
adequate consideration in the next chapter.
75
 Charing Cross Electricity Co (n 74) 782 (Lord Sumner).
76
 Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (n 66).
77
 [2005] AHRLR 151 (Federal High Court, Benin judicial division).
197
5.3.5 Petroleum Act 2004  78  
The Petroleum Act is the primary legislation in Nigeria that deals on the activities of oil and
gas  companies.79 The  Act  makes  provisions  for  liability  of  environmental  polluters  and
compensation of persons who are likely to suffer injury as a result of the negative impacts of
oil and gas exploration and production. Section 37 of the Act provides as follows:
The holder of an oil exploration licence,  oil prospecting licence or oil
mining lease shall, in addition to any liability for compensation to which
he may be subject under any other provision of this Act, be liable to pay
fair and adequate compensation for the disturbance of surface or other
rights to any person who owns or is in lawful occupation of the licensed
or leased lands.80
Again, this provision seems to be straightforward without any qualification as regards the
liability of a licensee who has caused injury to any person in lawful possession of land, and it
appears to be the benchmark for the compensation of persons who have suffered damages
generally in Nigeria. Section 9(1)(b) of the Act81 empowers the Minister to make regulations
for the prevention of air and water pollution, and consequently, the Petroleum (Drilling and
Production) Regulation82 was established as an offshoot of the powers of the Minister under
the aforesaid provision of the Act. Of immense importance to the liability of oil licensees is
Regulation 23 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation which provides that:
If the licensee or lessee exercises the rights conferred by his licence or
lease in such a manner as unreasonably to interfere with the exercise of
any fishing rights, he shall pay adequate compensation there for to any
person injured by the exercise of those first- mentioned rights.83
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The  qualification  from  the  above  provision  ‘unreasonably  to  interfere,’  seems  to  place
another  substantial  evidential  burden  on  the  claimant  in  order  to  establish  liability.84 In
essence, the claimant will have to establish that the defendant has unreasonably interfered
with his fishing rights, hence, the birth of the ‘reasonability test’ as required in establishing
the tort of negligence and other common law torts of nuisance, as well as strict liability as
discussed in the early part of this research.85
5.4 Responsibility and Compensation in Oil and Gas Pollution Incidents in Nigeria
In  considering  the  Nigerian  legislation  as  regards  responsibility  and  compensation,  the
provisions of the Oil Pipelines Act would serve as a benchmark to be considered. Of more
relevance is section 11(5)(b) of the Oil Pipelines Act which provides that: 
The holder of a license shall pay compensation to any person suffering
damage by reason of any neglect on the part of the holder or his agents,
servants or workmen to protect, maintain or repair any work, structure or
thing  executed  under  the  licence,  for  any such damage  not  otherwise
made good.86
A recent ruling by a London High Court based on a claim brought before it by residents of
Bodo  community  (Gokana  local  government  area)  in  the  Niger  Delta  region  of  Nigeria
alleging a massive devastation of fishing grounds and other basic means of their livelihood as
a result of oil spills estimated to over 250,000 barrels, predicated the compensation regime to
the Oil Pipelines Act.87 One of the key issues for determination was whether SPDC can be
liable under section 11(5)(b) of the Oil Pipelines Act to pay just compensation for damage for
damage  caused  by  oil  from  its  pipelines  that  has  been  released  as  the  result  of  illegal
bunkering and/ or illegal refining? The judge (Mr Akendhead, President of the Technological
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and Construction Court) found that the Nigerian Oil Pipelines Act does not hold oil operators
liable  for  oil  spills  caused  through  illegal  engagement  in  bunkering  and  other  criminal
activities due to the fact that such illegal activities have not been executed under licence by
the licencee (or oil operators),88 but that liability can arise against oil operators where it is
shown that a preventable damage is done to the oil pipelines  due to neglect  or failure to
protect on the part of the  licencee,  albeit  the court admitted that this may be difficult to
establish  but  ‘but  there  is  that  theoretical  possibility’.89 On  this  latter  standpoint,
commentators have observed that liability would lie against oil operators highlighted if they
failed to install surveillance or anti-tampering equipment, or if it knew the time and location
of a planned attack by suspected vandals and decided not to inform the police.90 The legal
representatives  of  the  claimants  (Bodo  community)  were  more  inclined,  based  on  the
aforesaid ruling of the court to reason that Shell could now be liable to compensate for illegal
oil theft from its pipelines if it fails to take reasonable steps to protect its infrastructure. In
this vein, Martyn Day, a representative of Leigh Day (Claimants representative) said:
This is a highly significant judgment. For years, Shell has argued that they are
only legally liable for oil spills that are caused by operational failure of their
pipelines and that they have no liability for the devastation caused by bunkered
[stolen] oil. This judgment entirely undermines that defence and states in clear
terms that Shell does have potential liability if it fails to take reasonable steps
to protect its pipelines.91
The claimants argued that under the pipelines Act, anyone who suffered damage can claim
compensation if they can show Shell was guilty of neglect in failing to ‘protect, maintain or
repair’ the pipeline, and that Shell should retain this duty of care on issues relating to illegal
88










acts against the pipeline.92 Whilst commenting on the Court’s ruling on the Bodo incidence,
Gaughram, Amnesty International’s director of global issues, observed that:
The  court’s  message  is  clear-if  you  don’t  take  adequate  measures  to
protect  your  pipelines  from  tampering,  you  could  be  liable  for  the
damages caused. The ruling has opened the door for Nigerian claimants
to demand compensation if oil leaks were a result of sabotage or theft- if
the  sabotage  or  theft  was due to  ‘neglect  on the  part  of  the  [licence]
holder or his agents, servants or workmen to protect, maintain or repair
any work structure or thing’.93
Mr Akenhead’s ruling on the Bodo community case seems to gather more social and legal
interest. Socially, the Niger Delta is seen to be one of the most polluted regions in the world
and the Bodo’s case in particular is reported to represent the largest loss of mangrove habitat
ever caused by an oil spill.94 On its legal significance, it is the first time Shell is brought
before an English court to determine key legal issues on environmental pollution in Nigeria.
In essence, the Bodo case retains a historic socio-legal background which deserves attention
of legal experts. This is more significant to the current research because it creates a legal
atmosphere and a medium to test the compatibility of the Nigerian law and the English law
on environmental liability issues as well as examining the human rights perspective of such
liability  principles  in  order  to  sustain  a  more  intellectual  argument  and  test  the  current
hypotheses of this research, particularly ‘whether the current technique of measuring liability,
particularly under tort law is clear in Nigerian law’.
 It  is shown in the  Bodo case that the ‘reasonable steps’ to be taken by oil  operators in
protection of pipelines, can, in some cases, be interpreted as including curtailing intentional
acts of sabotage.95 To this extent, oil operators would be deemed, in some exceptional cases
92
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not to have taken ‘reasonable steps’ if they fail  to comply with modern technologies that
could  safeguard  the  pipelines  and  other  installations.96 For  instance,  installation  of  anti-
tampering equipment or other sort of technology to maintain rapid surveillance would amount
to reasonable or preventable steps to avoid oil spills.  But this could not be interpreted to
include security from government agencies. In this regard Mr Akenhead maintained further
that:
…I am confident that the word “protect” cannot have been intended to
mean that protection was to involve policing or military or paramilitary
defence of the pipelines. If one takes those activities out of the verbal
equation, the usual definitions can be seen to be closer to shielding from
danger, injury or change and keeping safe and taking care of.97
These challenges witnessed by victims in obtaining legal redress in cases of environmental
pollution have instigated most communities hit by oil spills to bypass the Nigerian courts and
seek for redress in other jurisdictions.  In this  vein,  a Bonny Island Community leader in
Rivers  State  of  Nigeria,  Amasenibo  Abere,  in  response  to  a  recent  oil  spill  in  Bonny,
amounting to around 3,800 barrels was quoted to say:
It makes sense to work with a UK law firm. Normal life has stopped here
because of the spill.  This  was just  the last  of multiple  spills  we have
experienced. Shell has still not done the clean-up here. They are a big
company and if we go to the Nigerian courts, they will win.98
Abere’s stance is likely to be common amongst local victims of oil pollution in the Niger
Delta  area.  However,  this  research  is  basically  concerned  with  the  likely  issues  and
challenges confronting the dispensation of justice in oil and gas pollution cases, particularly
in a human rights perspective.
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The Nigerian courts in both cases of Anthony Atubin & ors v Shell Petroleum Development
Company Nigeria Ltd,99 and  San Ikpede v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria
Ltd100 have made it explicit that compensation cannot be made to victims where the damage
to the oil pipelines was caused by a third party.101 In the light of the provision of section 11(5)
(b) of the Oil Pipelines Act necessitating the payment of compensation by oil companies to
any person suffering damage by reason of any neglect to protect, maintain or repair any work,
structure or thing under its control, there seems to be a complex legal burden on the part of
oil TNCs in raising any sustainable defence to escape liability in cases of oil spill caused by
their equipment. This is because where a claimant alleges the incidents of pollution caused as
a result of neglect by TNCs of their equipment, even if such pollution is caused by vandals,
there would likely be the need to furnish additional evidence by oil TNCs to evidently show
that such rupture or damage was caused by a third person and not as a result of neglect, and
supposing it is established that the spill was a result of the act of a third person, it is still
incumbent on the court to verify whether such interference by a third party was as a result of
neglect on the part of the operator of its facilities.102 
It is obvious that court decisions are mostly based on the prevailing circumstances at the
jurisdiction  in  question.  The  requirement  by  the  Petroleum  (Drilling  and  Production)
Regulation, 1969 to impose liability for compensation in favour of an injured person where
fishing  rights  are  ‘unreasonably  interfered’  with,103places  an  opportunity  for  courts  to
interpret what is ‘reasonable’ in a unique and compatible manner.
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In the light of the foregoing, it is submitted that provisions of the Oil Pipelines Act 2004
(OPA) on liability must be given closer attention in determining the liability of oil operators
in oil spill claims in view of the position of the English Court in the Bodo case to the effect
that ‘there is a sufficiently comprehensive code within the OPA to cover the key aspects of
the whole process involved in the pipelines,’104 and that the statutory scheme of the OPA
retains a wider scope than the common law principles in nuisance, negligence and the rule in
Ryland v Fletcher.105 It is on this basis that the English High Court in the Bodo case resolved
that the claimants were entitled to compensation in respect to the damages resulting from the
series of spills  under the OPA at the exclusion of common law rules.106 Conversely, it  is
pertinent to add that the entire provisions of the OPA 2004 as considered are clear reflections
of common law rules, and in this vein, it is difficult to agree with Akenhead’s position that
environmental liability under the OPA can be determined at the exclusion of common law
rules.
5.5 Compensation Regime and Issues of Environmental Liability in International Law.
International  law  basically  oversees  the  relationship  between  states.  To  this  extent,
international  environmental  law focuses  on environmental  issues  that  are  obtainable  in  a
global  perspective.  It  is  a  deliberate  attempt  to  seek  for  a  uniform  body  of  rules  and
regulations that would gain consensus from across as large a number of countries as possible
in  addressing  environmental  problems.107 Bell  and  others  maintained  that  international
environmental law has no direct effect on domestic law and individuals, but it seeks to lay
down a broader framework, and indirectly  affects  states by publicizing certain significant
issues,  by laying down best  global  practices,  or  imposing political  pressure  on States  to
change their domestic laws or practices. This is compared with European Union law which
has a more direct effect on member states and individuals.108 Notwithstanding, the principles
of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) 1972 and
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the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development 1992, have had significant impact
on Nigerian law and policies as regards the need to maintain a pollution free environment as
well  as  compensating  victims  of  environmental  hazards.  Likewise  in  the  UK,  laws  and
government policies are, in some cases, influenced by various international instruments. For
example, the Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999,109 empowers the Secretary of State
to make Regulations for the purpose of implementing any obligations of the UK under the
EU or under any international agreement to which the UK is a party. Bell and others were
more precise on the nature of the obligations contained in international instruments, stating
that ‘such law is not generally binding, in the sense that EU law is, because of the lack of
sanctions available for non-compliance.’110 The latter reasoning by Bell and others may not
be sustained by many, considering Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, which provides inter alia, that state parties to the Statute may at any time declare  that
they recognise as compulsory, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning
the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;  and  the  nature  or  extent  of  the  reparation  to  be  made  for  the  breach  of  an
international obligation.111 Owing to the foregoing, it is pertinent to add that where there is
breach of an international obligation,  there are relevant international sanctions attached to
such breach.
Having considered briefly the nature of international law and its nexus to domestic law, it is
necessary  to  examine  the  measure  of  liability  in  the  principle  of  the  protection  of  the
environment as retained in international treaties and conventions. It is noteworthy that the
Stockholm and Rio Declarations are outputs of the first and second global environmental
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impact on the human environment by forging a focal common outlook on how to address the
challenge of enhancing and preserving the environment.113 A close consideration of the 27
principles  of  the  Stockholm  Declaration  reveals  that  the  instrument  supports  wide
environmental  policy  goals  and  objectives  rather  than  detailed  normative  positions.114
Gunther,  whilst  emphasising  on  the  ground-breaking  significance  and  relevance  of  the
Stockholm Declaration to environmental protection maintained that:
…Following  Stockholm,  global  awareness  of  environmental  issues
increased  dramatically,  as  did  international  environmental  law-making
proper.  At  the  same  time,  the  focus  of  international  environmental
activism  progressively  expanded  beyond  transboundary  and  cross-
sectoral  regulation and the synthesizing of economic and development
considerations in environmental decision-making.115
This document has been widely commended as an eye-opener as regards environmental rights
at national as well as international levels. In this vein, it provides that:
Man  has  the  fundamental  right  to  freedom,  equality  and  adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect
and improve the environment for present and future generations.116
This  research  is  keen  to  ascertain  the  concept  of  state  responsibility  in  environmental
pollution issues on international environmental law, hence, the need to turn to this document
and other related international instruments on their contributions to the subject matter. The
Stockholm Declaration places on nations a responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdictions  and control do not cause damage to others.  This is  specifically  provided for
under principle 21 of the document. It provides that:
 Gunther  Handl,  ‘Declarations  of  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Human  Environment
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources  pursuant  to  their  own  environmental  policies,  and  the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.117
The  above  provision  of  the  Stockholm declaration  guarantees  state’s  sovereign  rights  to
exploit  their  resources provided such activities  do not cause damage to other states.  This
provision,  with  an  independent  interpretation  seems  to  be  vague  without  any  legal
consequences against states that would likely breach the aforesaid obligation. Against this
background,  Sanford  has  submitted  that  responsibility  implies  a  corresponding  legal
obligation to provide reparation or compensation in events where the responsibility is not
complied with.118 In order to avoid a lacuna or considering principle 21 a hollow concept, the
delegates of the Stockholm Declaration adopted principle 22, which provides that:
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding
liability  and  compensation  for  the  victims  of  pollution  and  other
environmental  damage  caused  by  activities  within  the  jurisdiction  or
control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdictions.119
Again, considering difficulties in enforcing international obligations, the practicability of this
responsibility  of states in both principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm can be questioned.
Notwithstanding,  Article  235  of  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Convention  (hereinafter  UNCLOS)
provides that:
States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
They shall be liable in accordance with international law.120
In the same vein, a very significant international document, the Rio declaration, provides that:
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
Principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources  pursuant  to  their  own  environmental  and  developmental
policies,  and  the  responsibility  to  ensure  that  activities  within  their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.121
It  seems  that  the  list  of  international  instruments  projecting  the  basic  principle  of  state
responsibility is inexhaustible. This is an affirmation to the fact that the principle of state
responsibility  is  a  core  part  of  international  law.  Article  1  of  the  International  Law
Commissions’ Articles on state Responsibility proclaims that ‘Every internationally wrongful
act  of  a  State  entails  the  international  responsibility  of that  state.’122 This  Article  is  very
explicit  to the effect  that  a breach of international  law by a state  entails  its  international
responsibility,123and the grounds under which this  responsibility  can be invoked is further
provided in Article 2,  that: ‘There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct
consisting  of  an  act  or  omission  is  attributable  to  the  state  under  international  law;  and
constitutes  a  breach  of  an  international  obligation  of  the  state.’124 The  two  identifiable
elements under which the international wrongful act of a State can be established are that the
conduct in question must be linked to the state under international law, and the conduct must
constitute a breach of an international legal obligation which the state is a party at the time of
the breach.125
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The  above  mentioned  Conventions  are  products  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United
Nations. In this regard, it  is pertinent to consider an overview on the application of these
provisions by the International Court of Justice (‘the Court or the ICJ’), the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations.126 In line with the provisions of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice 1945, the Court is  vested with the powers to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it; taking into cognisance international
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognised by civilised nations
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations.127 But the Court is
not to be prejudiced or limited by the aforementioned guidelines, as the court can decide a
case ‘ex aequo et bono’ (according to equity and good conscience) provided the parties to the
dispute agree to it.128
 There exists a plethora of judicial  cases before the ICJ showcasing the doctrine of state
responsibility as a traditional concept in international law. In the case concerning Phosphates
in Morocco, between the government of Italy and the government of the French Republic,129
the ICJ was of the view that the violation of international law is an act which, would, by itself
directly attract international responsibility,  and that once an act has been attributable to a
State which is contrary to the treaty right of another State, international responsibility would
be established between the two States.130
It could be seen that the principle of state responsibility is an integral part of the body of
international  law  and  it  precedes  the  Stockholm  Declaration.  In  the  case  of  the  United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v The Government of the People’s Republic
126
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of  Albania,131 (the  Corfu  Channel  Case)  the  UK  government  claimed  that  the  Albanian
government either caused to be laid or had knowledge of the laying of mines in its territorial
waters in the Strait of Corfu without giving any prior notice of the existence of the mines as
required  by the  provisions  of  Articles  3  and 4 of  the Hague Convention 1907,132 by the
principles  of  international  law  and  by  the  ordinary  dictates  of  humanity.133 The  UK
government further claimed that two destroyers of the Royal Navy were damaged by the
mines, and this led to the death of forty-four personnel of the Royal Navy and serious injury
to the destroyer, and that the loss and damage suffered was due to the failure of the Albanian
Government  to  comply  with  its  international  obligations.  On  these  grounds,  the  UK
government  prayed  that  the  International  Court  of  Justice  should  declare  the  Albanian
government  internationally  responsible  for  the  said  loss  and  injury,  and  therefore,  make
reparation or pay compensation therein.134
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave its judgment partly in favour of Albania and
partly in favour of the United Kingdom. Whilst the ICJ observed that ‘by reason of the acts of
the British Navy in Albania waters in the course of operation in 1946, the UK violated the
sovereignty of the People’s Republic of Albania,’135 the ICJ declared the People’s Republic of
Albania  responsible  under  international  law  for  the  explosions  of  the  mines,  and  the
consequent damage and loss of human lives.136 This judgment confirmed the principle that
States retain an obligation to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
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cause harm to others. Following the  Corfu Channel case, it is clear that such responsibility
would cease to exist where the injured State is fully aware of the nature of the cause of
harm.137 Equally, the State where the harm originates should have a reasonable foresight of
the likelihood of their activities to cause harm in order to be liable. This latter position could
be challenged on the basis that the Stockholm Declaration is silent on whether the lack of
reasonable foresight of harm would act as a defence. Rather, the international principle of
State  responsibility  tends  to  establish  liability  on  the  originating  states  provided  their
activities have caused damage to others. A close analysis of the position of the International
Court of Justice would provide a clue on the measure or standard of liability applicable in
transboundary pollution cases.
The foundation for Albania’s liability as alleged by the UK government is that the minefield
which caused the explosion was laid by or with the connivance or knowledge of the Albanian
government.138 From the aforesaid, it could be seen that there are three basic elements to be
proved. The first submission that the mine was laid by the Albanian government itself was
discarded by the Court when it said:
Although  the  suggestion  that  the  minefield  was  laid  by  Albania  was
repeated  in  the  United  Kingdom statement  in  Court  on  January  18 th,
1949, and in the final submissions read in Court on the same day, this
suggestion  was  in  fact  hardly  put  forward  at  that  time  except  pro
memoria,  and  no  evidence  in  support  was  furnished.  In  these
circumstances, the Court need pay no further attention to this matter.139
In the light of the above, it is deducible that claimants, in order to establish liability, must
show satisfactory evidence linking the state to the alleged activity that has caused harm. This,
to an extent would require more of direct evidence. The Court was explicit to the fact that
knowledge of the minelaying cannot be imputed to the Albanian government merely on the
137
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grounds that the minefield which caused harm to the British warships was discovered in the
Albanian territory.140
In considering the second alternative argument, which the UK government alleged that the
Albanian government connived with the Yugoslav government through two warships to lay
the mines,141 the Albanian government denied that the mines were laid by its connivance or
help of a third party. Again, in the opinion of the Court, the allegation fell short of conclusive
evidence  that  there  is  a  case  of  connivance  or  help  from a  third  party.142 But  the  Court
expressed its misgivings on the flagrant denials of the Albanian government regarding the
series of allegations when it said:
It is true, as international practice shows, that a state on whose territory or
in whose waters an act contrary to international law has occurred, may be
called upon to give an explanation. It is also true that that state cannot
evade such a request by limiting itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the
circumstances of the act and its authors.143 
Finally, the submission by the UK government that whoever the authors of the minelaying
were, it could not have been done without the Albanian government’s knowledge was put for
consideration.  In  determining  this  issue,  the  Court  stressed on the  challenges  faced by a
victim state in establishing that the direct cause of the harm is from the defendant, having
regard to the fact that the territory is exclusively in control of the defendant. Against this
background, the Court maintained that:
By reason of this exclusive control, the other state, the victim of a breach
of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving
rise  to  responsibility.  Such  a  state  should  be  allowed  a  more  liberal
recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect
evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognised by
international decisions. It must be regarded as of special weight when it is
140
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based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single
conclusion.144
It is inferred from the above that claimants in cases of transboundary pollution should be
given a  more  liberal  recourse  in  the  course of  establishing  the liability  of  the  defendant
(pollution originating state), this is due to the fact that the place where the said explosion or
damage occurs is exclusively in possession of the defendant and there would be challenges in
obtaining any direct evidence in establishing liability.  In what could be considered as the
standard of proof in establishing liability, it is maintained that:
The Court must examine therefore whether it has been established by means of
indirect evidence that Albania has knowledge of mine-laying in her territorial
waters independently of any connivance on her part in this operation. The proof
may be drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for
reasonable doubt.145
It could be deciphered from the above that in establishing the ‘intention’ of the defendant in
the activity that has caused harm to the claimant state, the Court will rely on an indirect
evidence,  drawing  inferences  from  the  available  facts,  and  this  must  be  done  beyond
reasonable doubt. It is true that in both civil and criminal matters, the person who mobilises
the legal machinery retains the obligation to demonstrate the correctness of any assertion.146
In essence, it is proper to say that the claimant (victim state) bears the burden of proof, but
this burden could shift depending on the party who has the task to establish a fact. What is
more relevant and significant in determining the liability of the defendant, is the nature of
‘proof’  needed.  Uglow  defined  proof  in  trials  as  ‘the  designation  of  a  certain  level  of
probability that a specific fact or state of affairs exists’.147 Furthermore, the word ‘probability’
is briefly defined to mean a degree of likelihood or a degree of persuasion.148 Concisely, and
144
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in different words, standard of proof could be defined as the level of persuasion or the degree
of likelihood that a certain fact or assertions exists.
In the light of the above, and in line with the requirement of the International Court of Justice
in the Corfu Channel case, the claimant must persuade the Court or establish the likelihood
that  the defendant  had  knowledge of  the cause of  harm by drawing inferences  from the
circumstances surrounding the case, provided they ‘leave no room for reasonable doubt’. In
drawing inferences from the facts of the case to establish ‘knowledge’ of the cause of harm to
the  claimant  (UK government),  and despite  the denial  of  knowledge of  the cause  of  the
incidence by the Albanian government, the Court submits that:
The Albanian government’s notes are all evidence of its intention to keep
a jealous watch on its territorial waters…it must be concluded that the
operation  was  carried  out  during  the  period  of  close  watch  by  the
Albanian authorities in this sector. This conclusion renders the Albanian
government’s assertion of ignorance a priori somewhat improbable.149
With regards to the consideration of the Court, it is clear that the minelaying was done at a
time when the Albanian government was maintaining a close surveillance over the Corfu
Channel and nothing was done by the Albanian government to prevent the said disaster, and
this  omission  is  the  reason  for  Albanian’s  responsibility  under  international  law.  It  is
pertinent to add that by virtue of Article 17 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the  Sea,  ‘ships  of  all  States,  whether  coastal  or  land-locked,  enjoy the  right  of  innocent
passage through the territorial sea’.150
The facts and the position of the ICJ in Corfu Channel case could be compared with that of
Argentina v Uruguay151 (the Pulp Mills dispute’). The facts of the case have it that in 2006,
the Argentine Republic filed in the Registry of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter
the ‘ICJ') an application instituting proceedings against the Eastern Republic of Uruguay in
respect of a dispute concerning the breach, allegedly committed by Uruguay, of obligations
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under  the  Statute  of  the  River  Uruguay  (a  treaty  signed  by  Argentina  and  Uruguay,  in
1975).152 Argentina stated that the breach arose out of the authorization,  construction and
future commissioning of two pulp mills on the River Uruguay, which had resultant effects on
the  quality  of  the  waters  of  the  River  Uruguay  and  the  areas  affected  by  the  River.153
Consequently,  Argentina  sought  the  Court  to  adjudge  and  declare  amongst  others  that
Uruguay has engaged its international responsibility to Argentina, therefore, Uruguay shall
make full reparation for the injury caused by its breach of the obligations incumbent upon
it,154 and resume strict compliance with its obligations under the Statute of the River Uruguay
of 1975.155
The  ICJ  concludes  that  Uruguay,  by  failing  to  inform CARU  of  the  planned  works  as
required under the treaty  before issuing the authorizations  for each of the mills  failed to
comply with the obligation imposed on it by Article 7 of the 1975 Statute.156 Whilst affirming
the principle of state responsibility, it was observed in the case that:
The Court points out that the principle of prevention, as a customary rule,
has  its  origins  in  the  due  diligence  that  is  required  of  a  state  in  its
territory.  It  is  “every  state’s  obligation  not  to  allow  knowingly  its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states” (Corfu
Channel,  United  Kingdom v Albania),  merits,  Judgment,  ICJ  Reports
1949, p.22). A state is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in
order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area
under its jurisdiction causing significant damage to the environment of
another State. This Court has established that this obligation “is now part
of the corpus of international law relating to the environment” (Legality
152
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of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, ICJ Reports
1996(1), p.242, para. 29).157
As shown above,  the  Court  strictly  affirmed  its  position  on  state  responsibility  and was
guided by its earlier judgment in the Corfu Channel Case, that states must avoid activities in
their territories that would cause harm to others. However, the mention of ‘due diligence’ as a
requirement of states in their territory deserves consideration. It is submitted that the concepts
of ‘due diligence’, ‘due care’ and ‘reasonable care’ are used interchangeably as a primary
requirement in establishing the tort of negligence as discussed earlier in this research.158 For
the sake of emphasis it would be pertinent to re-consider the legal meaning of negligence as
expatiated by Lord Atkin in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson,159 where he stated, that:
…You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who
then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are
so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in question….160
In the  light  of  the above,  it  is  maintained  that  the measure  of  liability  obtainable  in  the
principle of state responsibility appears not to reflect an absolute liability161 of the defendant
in cases of harm to neighbouring state(s), rather, the defendant would be liable where it is
shown through indirect evidence that a legal duty of care is owed to the claimant,162 that there
is  a  breach  of  that  duty,  and  that  the  claimant  has  suffered  damages  as  an  inevitable
157
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consequence of the breach. In essence, it could be argued that liability under international law
is based on the ‘neighbour principle’ in the tort of negligence. Furthermore, it is maintained
that in determining the responsibility of a state in cases of environmental pollution under
international  law the  measure  of  liability  could  involve  certain  features  of  principles  of
criminal liability (for example proof beyond reasonable doubt, as shown in the Corfu Channel
Case) and tortious liability (proof of reasonable foreseeability and due diligence).
It  is  observed that  the Pulp Mills  judgment  anchoring  liability  for  international  harm on
principles  of  negligence  (prevention  and  due  diligence)163 was  reached  in  error.  This  is
because the construction of the Mills and its attendant harm was a foreseeable act, which
should  attract  a  strict  and/or  absolute  liability.  It  is  submitted  that  where  damage  is
foreseeable and there is no third party intervention, liability should be absolute, irrespective
of the claim for deployment of ‘due diligence’.
The desire  to  adopt  uniform international  rules  and procedures  for  determining issues  of
liability  and compensation in oil  and gas pollution incidents has been extensive.  Another
significant and remarkable international legal document is the International Convention on
Civil  Liability  for  Oil  Pollution  Damage 1969 (hereinafter  ‘the  1969 Convention’).164 Of
more relevance to the measure of liability involved in events of pollution in the sea is Article
III (1) of the Convention. It provides that:
Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a
ship at the time of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series
of occurrences at the time of the first such occurrence, shall be liable for
any  pollution  damage  caused  by  oil  which  has  escaped  or  been
discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.165
In looking at the exceptions, paragraph 2 of the Article provides that:
No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves
that  the  damage  resulted  from  an  act  of  war,  hostilities,  civil  war,
insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and
163
 Pulp Mills (n 151) para 101.
164
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, 29 November 1969).
165
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (n 164).
217
irresistible character or was wholly caused by an act or omission done
with intent to cause damage by a third party, or was wholly caused by the
negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or other authority
responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the
exercise of that function.166
A further exception under paragraph 3 provides that:
If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially
either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the
person who suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person,
the owner may be exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to such
person.167
A close examination of the above provisions of the Convention depicts the strict liability of
the owner of the ship; this is due to the absence of any need to prove fault. The ‘no-fault’
liability is synonymous with the doctrine of strict liability as captured in Rylands v Fletcher.
In the same vein, liability under this Convention is far from the requirement of ‘due care’ in
the tort of negligence, in the sense that the owner of a ship will not escape liability even if it
is shown that he took all reasonable steps to avoid any likely leakage of oil.
Liability  under the International  Convention on Civil  Liability  for Oil  Pollution Damage,
1969 in Article III has shown that a ship owner is strictly liable for the damage caused to a
sufferer  of  the  oil  spill.  Similarly,  the  exceptions  under  which  a  defendant  can  absolve
liability in the strict liability doctrine are in line with those listed in the Convention. These
exceptions are; Act of God,168 act of third party169and default of the claimant.170 The more
traditional defence of ‘Statutory Authority’ in strict liability is absent under the Convention.
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It is understandable that there could be no excuse to any such pollution incidence from a ship,
on the grounds that the activities of the ship owner were authorised by any sovereign body.
The defence of statutory authority could only be applicable in domestic law.
The  1969  Convention  was  widely  accepted  at  the  international  level  as  a  significant
document for civil liability of ship-owners found culpable for oil discharge at sea, but the
Convention was later revised and amended,171 leading to the adoption of the International
Convention  on  Civil  Liability  for  Oil  Pollution  damage,  1992  (hereinafter  ‘the  1992
Convention’).172 The 1992 Convention is a consolidated version of the 1969 Convention,173
and by virtue of Article II of the 1992 Convention, both legal instruments are to be read and
interpreted together as a single document. It is interesting to note that the amendment of the
1969 Convention  was with  a  view to increase  the  amount  of  compensation  accruable  to
victims of oil spills at sea. This implies that the earlier principles on liability were retained in
the 1992 Protocol. It is observed that many of the contracting parties to the 1969 Convention
have  since  adopted  the  1992  Convention  and  denounced  the  earlier  one  (the  1969
Convention), as at the time of publishing the report on liability and compensation for Ship-
Source Oil Pollution by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 2012,
not all  contracting States have done so, and as a result,  both Conventions co-exist  at  the
international level.174
The issue of joint or contributory liability is applicable to environmental pollution incidents
involving spills by oil ships. This same concept has been discussed in an earlier chapter on
strict liability, to the effect that liability can be contributory between State governments and
171
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oil operators where damage is caused to a third party as a result of the oil and gas activities.175
But under the 1992 Convention, where it is shown that an oil discharge incident,  causing
consequential damage has occurred, the owners of all the ships concerned will be jointly and
severally liable for all damage that cannot be reasonably separated.176
5.6 A Critical Overview of the Measure of Liability Applicable to International 
Environmental Law
From the above survey of the various international legal instruments on oil pollution liability,
there seems to be a bit of inconsistencies and vagueness on the measure of liability in cases of
damage or loss to victims of pollution in international  law, the Conventions are more of
normative in content.  Having considered the Stockholm Declaration,  Rio Declaration,  the
Law  of  the  Sea  Convention  and  the  International  Law  Commissions  Articles  on  State
Responsibility, it is obvious that these treaties are basically complementary and suggestive
for the need for Sovereign States to ensure that activities within their jurisdictions do not
cause harm to the environment of others. Notwithstanding, it is maintained that not all of the
aforementioned Conventions  adequately  grapple with issues bordering on the standard or
measure  of  liability  involved  in  events  of  transnational  environmental  pollution,  thereby,
creating  a wide room for the International  Court of Justice  to utilised various aspects  of
international law to decide cases before it.
It is worthy of note that, it is only the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution  Damage 1992,  that  encompasses  the circumstances  that  can  lead  to  liability  of
environmental polluters (maritime spills from ships) and the associated grounds under which
polluters could be exonerated from liability.  Despite the acceptability and efficacy of this
Convention,  it  is  limited  in  scope.  The Convention  is  exclusively  applicable  to  pollution
damage caused by oil spills on a ‘ship’,177 and liability under the 1992 Convention is imposed
on the registered ship-owner, and in the absence of registration, the person (s) owning the
175
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ship  would  bear  responsibility.178 Although the  principle  of  state  responsibility  regarding
transboundary damage is not in doubt, it is argued that the 1992 Convention addresses the
civil liability of ship-owners rather than the responsibility of states in international law.179 The
obligation under the principle of state responsibility is basically between states, it projects the
need for sovereign states not to cause harm to others. In essence, the strict liability doctrine
under the 1992 civil liability convention could be deemed to operate outside the confines of
the  state  responsibility  principle.  However,  the  1992 Convention  could  be  utilised  as  an
alternative approach to address pollution incidents of international nature, narrowly, for spills
caused by ships.
In line with the above submissions, Boyle maintained that there is no global treaty on civil
liability  for  transboundary  pollution  or  damage.180 This  proposition  cannot  be  wholly
accepted  since the  Conventions  mentioned earlier  on were  aimed at  addressing  issues  of
transboundary pollution.  But it  is admissible,  to a considerable magnitude,  that there is a
deficiency in international law on the measure of liability required to address environmental
pollution  incidents.  It  is  shown  that  there  is  reluctance  in  inculcating  the  strict  liability
doctrine within the ambit of the state responsibility principle. This is pursuant to the fact that
not many states are willing to accept ‘a no-fault liability’ for damage caused by activities
within  their  jurisdiction.181 It  is  against  this  background  that  the  International  Law
Commission in its 2003 report made suggestions on the need to concentrate on harm caused
for variety of reasons, and dealing directly with the issue of responsibility by “allocation of
loss among different actors involved in the operations of the hazardous activities”.182 It is
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obvious that within the context of oil and gas pollution, oil TNCs (being the actors in the oil
industry) will be directly liable for pollution caused in international pollution disputes. It is
submitted that states would have to develop a comprehensive legal framework for addressing
liability issues with a view to apportioning liability to the appropriate actor involved in any
incidence.
This  is  not to  undermine  or  discourage  the efforts  of  international  law-making bodies to
discountenance with the principle of state responsibility. As states in control of jurisdictions
where  hazardous  activities  have  caused  injury  would  be  responsible  for  the  purposes  of
identifying the source state therein, and consequently shifting liability on the real actor. But
where a  state,  is  the real  actor,  then liability  is  automatic  on the state.  In  line  with this
development, the Commission can proceed to develop on existing ‘private law civil liability
models.’183 One of such legal regime under private civil liability is the 1992 International
Convention on Civil Liability for oil pollution damage.
5.6.1 The Most Widely held View on the Measure of Liability for International Pollution 
Damage.
Having considered series of judicial cases and the contents of most international treaties, it is
pertinent  to  decipher  what  measure  of  liability  is  more  closely  related  to  oil  pollution
damages at the international level. The determination of such issue is necessary having regard
to the need to retain uniform principles of liability with a view to maintaining certainty in
international  proceedings.  The  key  question  here  is:  which  principles  would  apply  to
determine  liability-should  liability  be  anchored  on  the  strict  liability  doctrine,  absolute
liability  or on due diligence? There is no doubt that the principles  of strict  liability  as it
relates  to damage arising out  of accidents  or escape of harmful  substances  in potentially
hazardous activities have been introduced in some international conventions,184 even outside
the confines of oil and gas activities.185
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For the purposes of emphasis, a brief reconsideration of the Trail Smelter186 arbitration, which
was discussed in Chapter 1 of this research,187 would be relevant. Whilst deliberating on the
arbitral award in the Smelter case, it was clear that the Tribunal was inconsiderate on whether
the Trail  Smelter  Company had any intention to cause damage in line with its  activities.
Rather, the tribunal was relatively focused on whether members of the public had suffered
injury, and the likely source of the injury. This is shown when the tribunal maintained that:
… Since  the  tribunal  has  concluded  that,  on  all  the  evidence,  the
existence of injury has been proved, it  becomes necessary to consider
next the cause of the injury. This question resolves itself in two parts-
first,  the  actual  causing  factor,  and  second,  the  manner  in  which  the
causing factor has operated.188
It is concluded that liability with regards to damage arising in the  Trail Smelter  arbitration
was direct without the need to prove fault of the Smelting Company, and because there were
no listed exceptions to liability in that case as could be found in Rylands v Fletcher, it will be
appropriate to conclude that liability was absolute.
The Trail Smelter arbitral award was rendered in 1938, before the advent of many, if not all
of the relevant and significant Conventions mentioned in this research. It follows that there
could be likely changes in perception with regards issues of liability in international law.
Hence,  it  is  clear  that  ‘intention’  or  ‘foreseeability’  of  harm  is  a  basic  requirement  in
apportioning  liability  in  cases  of  international  disputes  relating  to  dangerous harm at  the
moment. This is clear in the Corfu Channel Case, when the ICJ maintained that:
The Court must  examine therefore whether  it  has been established by
means of indirect evidence that Albania has knowledge of mine-laying in
her territorial waters independently of any connivance on her part in this
 See Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (adopted in Paris, 29  July
1960), Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (adopted in Vienna, 21 May 1963) etc.
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operation. The proof may be drawn from inferences of fact, provided that
they leave no room for reasonable doubt.189
The need to  establish ‘foreseeability  of harm’ in the  Corfu Channel Case is  in  line with
requirements  under  the  strict  liability  rule,190 the  laws  of  negligence  and  nuisance.191 In
absolute liability, knowledge of the likelihood of the defendant’s activities to cause harm may
not be relevant,  provided the defendant  has caused harm to others within its  territory.  In
essence,  to  establish  absolute  liability  in  the  Corfu  Channel case,  the  ICJ may not  have
bothered with whether the Albanian authority had knowledge of the laying of the mines. This
stance is pursuant to the fact that if the concept of state responsibility is to be interpreted
absolutely  without  any  qualification  that  states  are  to  bear  responsibility  to  ‘ensure  that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states  or areas  beyond the  limits  of  national  jurisdictions’,  then the ICJ,  would not  have
entered into further analysis with a view to ascertain knowledge of the mine laying. But even
in circumstances where it is established that a party had foresight of the damage in question,
the proper standard of liability could be that of a strict liability as established in  Rylands v
Fletcher or even absolute liability where there is no third-party interference.
It has been shown in the Corfu Channel case that mere control of the territory of a state where
harm is caused to another State does not impute ‘knowledge’ or ‘fault’ on the source State.
This is evident when the Court observed that:
…But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised
by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or
ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that
it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors.192
189
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In  considering  the  applicability  of  the  strict  liability  doctrine  in  resolving  international
disputes, it is necessary to reflect that environmental polluters would be strictly liable if it can
be shown that;  (a) the state brought the ‘thing’ which has caused harm, (b) the state had
knowledge of the likelihood of the ‘thing’ to cause damage at its escape (c) the activity is a
non-natural use of land, and (d) the thing must actually escape.193 In this vein, it is clear that
in  the  Corfu Channel Case,  the  Albanian authority  had denied  having knowledge of  the
laying of the mines and the later explosions. In essence, all the aforementioned requirements
in establishing a case of strict liability cannot be established. For it is only when the Claimant
shows,  through  evidence,  that  the  defendant  was  responsible  for  the  ‘thing’  which  later
caused injury, that the other requirements can be considered.
Nevertheless, the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, discovered, through indirect evidence that
Albania must have had knowledge of the laying of the mines, since the Albanian government
was carrying out surveillance within the territory.  In this  regard,  liability  was established
against Albania for failing to prevent the disaster.194
It is interesting to note that in both the tort of negligence and the common law rule of strict
liability, ‘foreseeability of harm’ is a common element which must be proved to establish
liability.  Whilst in strict liability,  it  must be shown that the defendant brought the ‘thing’
which has caused damage, in negligence, it is not a requirement. In negligence, liability will
arise where it is shown that the defendant has failed to exercise due care to avoid acts or
omissions which could be reasonably foreseen to cause injury to his neighbour.195 In the light
of this gap between strict liability requirements and the elements in proving negligence, it is
respectfully submitted that the ICJ utilised principles of liability in negligence in determining
the culpability of Albania. Albania was liable not because they laid the mines, but because
they had knowledge of the laying of the mines and omitted to prevent it, and omission to
prevent a foreseeable damage would create liability in the tort of negligence.
193
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In  the  case  of  Argentina v Uruguay,196 the  ICJ  affirmed  that  the  obligation  under  state
responsibility is that of ‘prevention’, i.e. states are to ‘use all the means at its disposal in order
to  avoid  activities  which  take  place  in  its  territory,  or  in  any area  under  its  jurisdiction
causing significant damage to the environment of another state.’197 The Court went further to
maintain that ‘prevention’ is a customary rule in international law and has its origins in the
‘due diligence’ that is required from the state.198 The element of due diligence is synonymous
with that of ‘due care’ as required in cases of negligence.  It  follows that the standard of
liability  under  State  responsibility  is  adjudged to be in  existence  in  two-fold;  liability  is
anchored within the legal framework of the tort of negligence on one hand, as well as the rule
of strict liability under the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 on
the other.199 With regard to the latter,  Oosterveen had observed that the 1992 Convention
applies to pollution damage in the territory of a state and it provides for strict liability of the
owner of an oil tanker, with a very limited list of exceptions.200
5.8 Conclusions
The  principle  of  state  responsibility  has  been  considered  as  a  means  for  environmental
protection  both  at  domestic  and  international  levels.  The  principle  proclaims  that  whilst
Sovereign States retain the right to exploit their own natural resources, they must ensure that
activities  within  their  jurisdictions  do not  cause harm to other  States.  Whilst  it  has been
showcased that this principle of State responsibility is straightforward without any ambiguity,
there are intricacies and challenges relating to issues of jurisdiction, the measure of liability
or standard of proof through which the courts will apportion liability to an erring state. At the
196
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domestic or municipal level, there seem to be challenges where incidents of pollution occur,
this is because, issues of proper jurisdiction are easily resolved, and second: it is easier for a
State to detect legal challenges and put in place the necessary legislation to curb it. Also,
government agencies are prompt in resolving environmental challenges relating to oil and gas
pollution.
At the transboundary level, the United Nations and/or other affiliated bodies have been keen
to ensure that uniform rules are established in order to curb liability and compensation issues
in events of environmental  pollution.  This desire to ensure uniformity is triggered on the
grounds that where pollution is caused by the State or TNCs, which is partly owned or wholly
controlled by different foreign partners in a different jurisdiction, the legal complexities in
addressing such pollutions incidents could be enormous. It is noted that there are a series of
conventions  and protocols  put  in  place  in  this  regard,  but  it  is  shown that  most  of  such
conventions are precatory in nature, and this is a major challenge. Although it is admitted
that, by virtue of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, where there is
violation of an international obligation by a state, there are reparations to be made by such
states in breach of such obligation.
In the light of the current legal framework in Nigeria addressing incidents of oil  and gas
pollution,  it  has been shown that liability in Nigeria is a combination of tortious liability
principles in negligence, nuisance and the strict liability rule (as in Rylands v Fletcher). It has
been  identified  that  oil  theft  and  illegal  refining  are  the  major  causes  of  environmental
pollution in Nigeria. Unfortunately, these two latter causes are grounds under which oil TNCs
would escape liability under the law of negligence, strict liability doctrine,201 and the extant
legal framework on environmental liability in Nigeria. 
It seems that the defence of ‘act of a stranger’ as applicable in strict liability cases and that of
exercising ‘due care’ in negligence would no longer be a smooth ride to escape liability as it
is traditionally known for. This is pursuant to the fact that oil TNCs are deemed to have
possessed or made improvements in the necessary technology to curb cases of oil theft and
illegal refining. This development is shown by Justice Akenhead in his ruling relating to the
201
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Bodo Oil Spill incidence in Nigeria which was brought before the London court against Shell
PB. The court was of the view that the Nigerian Oil Pipelines Act does not hold oil operators
liable for oil spills caused through theft, but the operators would be liable if they fail to install
surveillance or anti-tampering equipment or if they knew the time and location of a planned
attack and fail to take appropriate security measures. Although, this sounds theoretical, it will
project a stricter liability against oil operators in both negligence and strict liability principle.
The  issue  of  liability  in  oil  and  gas  pollution  incidents  under  state  responsibility  at  the
international level has been adjudged to be the one of ‘prevention’, i.e. states would be liable
for want of due diligence where they fail to take appropriate measure to prevent a foreseeable
injury against their neighbouring states. This has been shown by the ICJ in both the  Corfu
Channel case and that of  Argentina v Uruguay. In essence, liability under the principle of
state responsibility seems to be more closely connected to liability in the law of negligence.
But this position of the ICJ is argued to be erroneous. The reason being that a foreseeable
damage  ought  to  attract  a  strict  or  absolute  liability,  provided  there  was  no  third-party
interference. Owing to this, the ‘due diligence’ requirement in the Donoghue case as well as
in  Argentina  v  Uruguay,  for  foreseeable  damages  can  no  longer  stand  the  test  of  time,
particularly in international law relating to state responsibility.
In another perspective, the doctrine of strict liability is conspicuously seen to be applicable in
the  1992  Convention  on  Civil  Liability  for  Oil  Pollution  Damage.  This  Convention  is
exclusively applicable to registered ship-owners who are found to have discharged oil at sea.
In circumstances where the ship is not registered, liability will be traced to the person (s)
owning the ship, and in line with Article 1(2) of the 1992 Convention,  ‘person’ includes
states or corporations owned by the state.
It is stated that there are adequate Conventions or Treaties to address the measure of liability
applicable in damages sustained in oil and gas pollution cases, but these documents will be
more  useful  if  they  are  captured  into  municipal  laws.  Although,  there  are  sectorial
Conventions  addressing  isolated  cases  of  pollution  at  the  international  level,  such as  the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992, to which Nigeria
and the United Kingdom are signatories,202 there is the need to address liability issues in oil
and gas pollution globally, both onshore and offshore. The International Law Commission
202
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(ILC) in its 2003 Report on International Liability in case of Loss from Transboundary Harm
Arising out of Hazardous Activities,203 made recommendations to deal with liability issues by
allocating losses among different actors involved in the operations of Hazardous activities.
This implies that the ILC is more inclined to address liability issues on an individual basis
rather than on the concept of state responsibility. Notwithstanding, it is submitted that the
concept of state responsibility, although a principle of international law, should be applied in
two categories; both intra and inter-state. That is, as states are under obligation not to cause
harm to other states, a state should maintain such obligation not to cause harm to her citizens.
In the next chapter,  the argument for absolute liability in fundamental rights enforcement
with regards environmental pollution caused by oil and gas activities of TNCs is raised; it is a
dialectic,  taking into consideration the legal  and economic implications  of what has been
discussed in previous chapters, as well as the relevance of legal principles mentioned in the
current chapter. In a nutshell, the crux of chapter 6 is to determine whether the standards of
liabilities  in  the  torts  of  negligence,  nuisance  and  under  the  strict  liability  rule  can  be
transformed into absolute liability in incidents of environmental pollution relating to breach
of fundamental rights of individuals in incidents of environmental pollution.
203
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                                                         CHAPTER 6
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTERS UNDER 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS: A DIALECTIC
6.1 Introduction
In the last five chapters of this research, it has been shown that a pollution-free environment
is inevitable for a healthy living and the sustenance of mankind. This is particularly shown in
the course of case law analysis and general discussions on fundamental rights as a vehicle for
environmental protection in figures 2.3 and 2.5 of this research. In view of this, governments
at various levels have put in place adequate legislation and policies, even adopting regional
and international treaties and conventions with a view to curtailing dangerous activities by
entities seen to be causing harm to humans and the immediate environment,1 and where such
harm cannot be prevented, corrective measures are taken in the way of payment of damages
and compensation to victims.2 This is obtainable both in common law principles of liability in
tort actions and fundamental rights enforcement proceedings.3 
More  light  has  been  thrown  on  common  law  tort  principles  of  environmental  liability,
particularly  in  nuisance,  negligence  and under  the strict  liability  rule.  It  is  shown in the
aforesaid principles, that there is greater burden on the claimant to show that the defendant
acted recklessly, unreasonably and or had a reasonable foresight of the harm caused amongst
others. It is argued that the aforementioned standards of proofs and defences are dictates of
various  statutory provisions  and conventional  common law rules  which are  applicable  in
Nigeria;  and  in  practical  terms  are  no  longer  serving the  purpose  for  creating  a  quality
environment  due  to  their  ‘vague  and  arbitrary  applications’,  and  in  most  cases,  the
technicalities involved are cumbersome, hence, the need to explore a new approach. In view
of these shortcomings, Kalu and Stewart have reasoned that:
1
 The Nigerian government adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights into domestic
law, likewise the UK adopted the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law.
2
 See figure 5.5 on ‘Compensation regime and issues of environmental liability in international law’.
3
 See figure 1.7 on a critical analysis of the strict liability rule and its applicability in Nigerian oil and
gas pollution liability regime.
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Litigation  in  regular  courts  have  not  helped  the  situation.  This  is
primarily because the highly scientific, technical and sophisticated nature
of the operations of oil companies makes it imperative for a plaintiff to be
well versed in this area to be able to recover damages for his losses in
suits for compensation or negligence.4
It is submitted that where a legal enactment is silent on any excuse or qualification to be
raised by environmental polluters, it is presumed that liability will be absolute,5 and this is the
premise  for  the  argument  of  an  absolute  liability  regime  within  the  framework  of
environmental  rights  enforcements  through the  instrumentality  of  the  Constitution  of  the
Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria  1999 (as  amended)  and the  African  Charter  on  Human and
People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 2004.
Even  if  these  legal  instruments  are  not  feasibly  categorical  on  the  rights  to  a  safe
environment,  it  is shown that there is no incompatibility between environmental pollution
incidents and fundamental rights violations, particularly the rights to life, dignity of human
person and private  and family life.  Rather,  it  is shown that environmental  safety and the
aforementioned rights are inextricably interwoven.
The term ‘absolute,’ in ordinary legal usage, connotes ‘without conditions or restrictions.’6 In
the same vein, The Oxford Dictionary of Law defined ‘absolute rights’ within the ambit of
environmental rights, as:
A right set out in the European Convention on Human Rights that cannot
be interfered with lawfully, no matter how important the public interest in
doing  so  might  be.  Absolute  rights  include  freedom  of  thought,
conscience,  and  religion  and  the  prohibitions  on  torture,  inhuman
treatment or punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment.7
4
 Victoria E Kalu and Ngozi F Stewart, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crises and Resolution of Oil and Gas
Related Disputes: Need for a Paradigm Shift’ (2007) 25 JENRL 244, 253.
5
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fundamental rights violations.
6
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In the light  of this,  it  is  observed that  a  combined reading of  certain  fundamental  rights
provisions  relating  to  the  right  to  a  clean  environment  appears  not  to  be  subject  to  any
limitation,  or  better  still,  they  are  unconditional  within  the  framework  of  environmental
pollution,  and  can  be  considered  as  ‘absolute  rights’,  particularly  in  the  Nigerian  legal
system. It is observed that the constitutional defences (in the Nigerian Constitution) relating
to the rights to life, dignity of human person and rights to private and family life would not
avail polluters themselves in matters pertaining to fundamental rights enforcement. 
Although,  regional  judicial  institutions  in  Africa  have  given  much  credence  to  certain
defences  which  could  vindicate  polluters  when  they  exhibit  precautionary  measures,
vigilance and diligence in handling activities of oil and gas; a different scenario seems to play
out  at  the  national  level.  Nigerian  courts  have  applied  liability  principles  in  the  tort  of
negligence and have equally affirmed to principles of strict liability as found in  Rylands v
Fletcher in claims of oil  spill  damage,  and a federal  high court  even exhibited a stricter
liability in fundamental right enforcement proceeding relating to environmental pollution by
declaring  the  defence  of  acting  through  ‘statutory  authority’  to  be  incompatible  with
constitutional rights to clean and pollution free environment.8 The only shortcoming of the
aforesaid judgement is that it is yet to go on appeal for further validity test; but it is common
knowledge that when the environment is polluted or is threatened with pollution, the rights to
life and dignity of human person as well as private and family life are violated or likely to be
violated, and it would be difficult to upturn or discountenance such a standpoint bearing in
mind the  growing support  environmental  rights  have  garnered  globally.  Oil  transnational
corporations  operating  in  the Niger  Delta  region of Nigeria  have been described as  ‘bad
parasites’ in that they carry on business in the area below internationally allowed recognised
environmental standards,9 and this has incredibly affected the enjoyment of a peaceful and
pollution-free environment. In view of this, Atsegbua had observed that ‘the denial of the
existence of environmental rights is primarily responsible for the underdevelopment of the
8
 See Jonah Gbemre (for himself and as representing Iwherekan Community in Delta State, Nigeria)  v
Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and others [2005] AHRLR 151 (Federal High Court, Benin
Judicial Division) as discussed in figure 6.4.
9
 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘Environmental rights, pipeline vandalisation and conflict resolution in Nigeria’
(2001) IELTR 5, 89.
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Niger Delta area.’10 This explains the rationale for the advancement of fundamental rights to a
safer environment in Nigeria as discussed in the current chapter.
Hence, this chapter forms the focal point of the entire research, in that it examines whether
the doctrine  of  absolute  liability  will  be applied  to  the principle  of the protection  of the
environment in cases of fundamental rights violations. It is observed that the constitutional
rights to life and dignity of person, which have been creatively and expansively interpreted to
include environmental rights, are to a large extent considered absolute rights. But the target is
not to merely impose an absolute liability on oil transnational corporations just for the sake of
obtaining bogus compensations or damages, but to ensure a higher sense of responsibility on
the  part  of  government  and  oil  operators.  In  fact,  it  is  not  necessary  that  damages  are
awarded; provided the courts make proper decisions to curtail  any form of environmental
harm. Even as the argument for an absolute liability is projected, credence is given to John
Gordon’s advice on maintaining  moderate  approaches  to environmental  liability  issues as
quoted in Abel’s article.11 Gordon aptly stated that:
I suggest there is little profit for anyone in extreme positions. Resource
development must go on; otherwise we shall all starve. The environment
must be protected; otherwise man and all livings things will perish.12
In view of the foregoing, judicial  pronouncements from foreign jurisdictions,  such as the
European Court of Human Rights, England and Wales, and Indian courts are deployed with a
view to comparing and assessing current trends and dynamics in incidents of environmental
pollution and fundamental rights violations. This approach is pertinent due to limited case-
law on the aforesaid area of law in Nigeria. At the moment, the Jonah Gbemre case13 remains
the only judicial pronouncement linking environmental pollution caused by activities of oil




 Wolman Abel, ‘Global Pollution and Human Rights’ (1972) 12 NRJ 195.
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 Abel (n 11) 201.
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 Jonah Gbemre (n 8).
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standard of liability which has raised the argument for an absolute liability. However, in FA
Akpan & Anor v Royal Dutch Shell & Anor,14 a Dutch High Court, whilst adjudicating on
environmental liability issues raised by Nigerians against Shell has reasoned that no Nigerian
ruling in which event of sabotage by third parties is considered to be an infringement of a
human right.15 This latter position deserves support only to the extent that the Federal High
Court in the  Jonah Gbemre case16 did not tackle the issue of pollution incidents caused by
‘third parties’, and the standard of liability to be applied against TNCs in events of sabotage
remains ambiguous. In view of the foregoing, it is maintained that, on a scale of zero to ten
(0-10),  where  5  represents  ‘strict  liability’  and  10  represents  ‘absolute  liability’,
environmental  liability  under  fundamental  rights  enforcement,  as  argued  in  the  current
research  should be  pinned under  9,  with  limited  space  left  for  illegal  activities  of  ‘third
parties’ where pollution is shown to be manifestly unavoidable, in events relating to illegal
oil bunkering and acts of sabotage by vandals. But even here, it is argued that liability ought
to  be  absolute  in  that  such activities  of  ‘third  parties’  are  foreseeable,  and if  TNCs are
proactive and diligent enough in curbing pollution, they would forestall such acts of third
parties.17 With this development, the current chapter showcased a gradual transformation of
traditional rules of liability in negligence, nuisance and under strict liability to an absolute
liability  in  circumstances  where  environmental  pollution  is  shown  to  infringe  on  the
aforementioned fundamental rights of citizens. To this extent, absolute liability and ‘stricter’
liability are used interchangeably; the reason being that the standard of liability in actions
relating to fundamental  rights violations,  with particular  analogy from the  Jonah Gbemre
case has projected a stronger liability than the traditional strict liability rule.
14
 District Court of The Hague Case No. C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580, 30 January 
2013<https://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-judgment-shell-oil-spill-ikot-ada-udo> 
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6.2 The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP): The Rio Declaration 1992
The Nigerian National Policy on the Environment captures the ‘polluter pays’ principle; it
succinctly  puts  that  ‘…the  polluter  should  bear  the  cost  of  preventing,  and  remediating
pollution’.18 This  seems to  be suggestive  of  an  absolute  liability  on the polluter,  but  the
provision appears to fall short of a comprehensive statement, thereby, creating ambiguity on
how it is to be applied to practical situations in events of environmental pollution. It follows
that, there is doubt on whether applicable standards of proofs on common law principles of
environmental  liability  and provisions  of  statutes  pertaining  to  environmental  liability  in
Nigeria (the most common is negligence and lack of reasonability in handling oil and gas
activities) as discussed earlier19 are to be ignored or not. The use of the word ‘should’, in the
Oxford Dictionary connotes ‘obligation or duty’ as well as ‘a desirable or expected state’.
With regards to the precatory nature of the National Policy on the Environment, it would
easily be submitted that the polluter pays principle is a desire rather than an obligation on the
polluter in the Nigerian environmental liability framework.
At the international level, the polluter pays principle is equally seen in the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development.20 Principle 16 of the Declaration provides that:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental  costs  and the  use of  economic  instruments,  taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment.21
In light of the above principle, the polluter pays principles best represents an administrative
monetary policy against polluters rather than a judicial concept. This is because there is a
18
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activities.
20
 United  Nations  Conference  on  Environment  and  Development  (Rio  de  Janeiro,  3-14  June  1992)




greater emphasis on the use of economic instruments in determining the costs of pollution.
Ward and Hicks have defined the polluter pays principle as:
…The  commonly  accepted  practice  that  those  who  produce  pollution
should bear the costs of managing it to prevent damage to health or the
environment.  For  instance,  a  factory  that  produces  a  potentially
poisonous  substance  as  a  by-product  of  its  activities  is  usually  held
responsible for its safe disposal.22
From the technical and literal meaning of the concept, the ‘polluter pays’ principle may not
be associated with any qualifications. For instance, will the polluter pay where the pollution
is  caused by an act  of  a  third  party,  or  where the  polluter  acted  reasonably,  or  was not
negligent? It is submitted that this could be answered in both the affirmative and negative.
When answering in the affirmative, attention can be given to instances where the polluter
pays principle is implemented in jurisdictions where environmental rights can be perceived as
absolute and/or where statutory provisions ignores or are silent on the aforesaid defences. In
the former, the polluter may witness challenges in raising a defence not to pay where the
fundamental right to life and other associated rights are interpreted to include environmental
rights without limitations (particularly in an absolute liability regime).23 In the latter, where
statutory provisions are silent on any defence, the court may exercise its discretion in any
direction. 
Whilst answering in the negative, it is plausible to emphasise that the vast majority of liability
principles abhors liability where polluter acted reasonably and where pollution is caused by
acts of sabotage; this is because it is technically unjustifiable to ‘compensate’ for damage that
was  not  done  with  intention.  The  case  of  Bodo  Community v The  Shell  Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd24 is instructive in this regard. A London High Court (in
London) raised the issue ‘whether  SPDC can be liable  under section 11(5)(b) of the Oil
22
 Bob Ward and Naomi Hicks, ‘What is the “Polluter Pays” Principle?’ (Grantham Research Institute at
London  School  of  Economics  in  collaboration  with  the  Guardian  )  The  Guardian (London,  2  July  2012)
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jul/02/polluter-pays-climate-change>  accessed  14  August
2015.
23
 This is seen in the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in MC Mehta v Union of India[1987] AIR SC
1086.
24
 [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC) (see issue 2). See also the discussion in figure 5.4.
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Pipelines Act 1990 to pay just compensation for damage caused by oil from its pipelines that
has  been  released  as  the  result  of  illegal  bunkering  and/or  illegal  refining?’  The  Court
resolved the issue in the negative. For the sake of clarity, section 11(5)(b) of the Oil Pipelines
Act  in  Nigeria  places  responsibility  on  oil  operators  to  pay compensation  to  any person
suffering  damage  by reason  of  neglect  to  protect,  maintain  or  repair  any  work  or  thing
executed  under  the  licence.  Similar  judgments  of  this  sort  have  been  decided  based  on
common law principles of liability and statutory provisions.
However, it would be herculean and/or almost impossible act for polluters to abscond liability
(particularly on the need to compensate those who suffered severe injuries) of any sort, in
incidents where damages are done in large scale. For instance, in the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Rig Blowout which discharged millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, BP had
denied  any  form  of  liability,  but  had  maintained  that  its  contractors,  Transcocean  and
Halliburton should retain responsibility, being the contractors directly involved in the major
spill. Regardless of this, a U.S. District Court had identified BP as the major culprit, and that
BP had acted with ‘conscious disregard of known risks, and its conduct was reckless.’25 This
apparently reveals a case of negligence on the part of Shell BP. But it would be expedient to
note that there is hardly a case of major oil spill that will not have elements of negligence in
it,  no matter  how small,  for claimants to rely upon; for recklessness can be anchored on
inadequate maintenance of oil pipelines or other major equipment, poor training of staff and
issues bordering on inefficiency in securing oil facilities.26
Furthermore,  in  resolving the  practicability  or  effectiveness  of  the  Polluter  Pay Principle
(PPP),  one  would  have  to  consider  the  existing  principles  on  liability  in  the  relevant
jurisdiction.  That is, where liability is not absolute by virtue of statutory or common law
provisions  on  environmental  pollution  caused  by  oil  and  gas,  then,  the  polluter  pays
principles (PPP) may not be seen to override such existing laws since the PPP is basically a
policy  (as  contained  in  the  National  Policy  on  Environment)  subject  to  domestic  laws.
25
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However,  the  PPP can be  seen  as  underpinning  most  of  the  regulation  or  legislation  on
pollution  affecting  land,  water  and  air,  especially  on  issues  relating  to  oil  clean-ups.
Unequivocally, it is in tandem with ordinary logic that ‘he who pollutes should pay for it’.
In the light of the above, there would be a small gap between the ‘polluter pays’ principle and
the doctrine of absolute liability. Technically, and within the context of the current research,
the  doctrine  of  absolute  liability  depicts  circumstances  where  there  are  no  known  or
stipulated excuses under the law where a polluter would rely upon as a defence to escape
liability. In essence, even if there are certain exceptions under a particular legal provision but
cannot be utilised by the polluter, or are not relevant to the subject matter, thereby barring the
polluter to rely on it, then, it is maintained that liability is absolute. For instance, section 33 of
the  Nigerian  Constitution  makes  provision for  the right  to  life,  and that  no one shall  be
deprived of his right to life except in the execution of the sentence of a Court in criminal
offence; for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or property; in order to effect a
lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; or for the purpose of
suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny; and then bearing in mind the understanding that
the right to life can be creatively and expansively interpreted to include environmental rights,
then, it could be argued that oil transnational corporations (TNCs) involved in oil and gas
pollution would not be legally privy or obliged to raise any of the aforementioned defences
since they are not in any-way relevant to the context of oil and gas pollution. This inevitably
creates an absolute liability on the polluter.
It follows that whilst the ‘polluter pays’ principle is to be materialised through a scientific or
policy to impose liability, particularly within the ambit of monetary costing of polluters in
line with the magnitude of pollution, the doctrine of absolute liability is specifically related to
legal or judicial proceedings placing liability on the polluter in circumstances where the law
does not provide a means of excuse. However, both the PPP and the doctrine of absolute
liability  are  targeted  towards  ensuring  that  the  polluter  takes  charge  of  compensation,
environmental  remediation  and  consequently  reduce  pollution;  and  in  this  vein,  may  be
considered synonymous.
From the foregoing, it would be pertinent to keep in mind that the primary aim in the current
research  is  to  examine  whether  the  doctrine  of  absolute  liability  may  be  applied  to  the
principle of the protection of the environment in cases of fundamental rights violations, and
this is quite different from the issues of compensation,  carbon pricing and environmental
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remediation as could be seen to be the primary targets of the common law tort principles of
liability discussed herein and the polluter pays principle. Albeit it is certain that the end effect
of  imposing  an  absolute  liability  on  the  polluter  within  the  ambit  of  fundamental  rights
enforcement is to achieve the latter objectives, and even more importantly to secure human
lives;  the  current  research  borders  on  the  measure  of  liability  in  fundamental  rights
enforcement proceedings, thereby deserving more technicality and attention (at present, there
is only one known complete decision bordering on environmental pollution and fundamental
rights violation)27 than can be seen in the vague concept of the polluter pays principle and
more  strictness  than  can  be  seen  in  the  common  law  liability  principles  of  negligence,
nuisance and strict liability.28 It follows that the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the doctrine of strict
liability and the doctrine of absolute liability cannot be used interchangeably. However, the
common law principles of liability as mentioned, and the polluter pays principle are not to be
undermined  in  any form,  particularly  when embodied  in  documents  with  legal  backings,
whether at state or international levels, but are knowingly discussed with a view to compare
the  concept  of  absolute  liability  within  the framework of  fundamental  rights  violation  in
events of environmental pollution.
6.3 The Rationale for an Absolute Liability Regime
It has been shown the growing and vast existence of binding legal  provisions addressing
issues  of  environmental  pollution  caused  by  oil  and  gas  activities  of  TNCs.  Also,  the
economic  importance  of  the  activities  of  oil  TNCs  have  been  highlighted  in  previous
chapters, specifically in chapter 3. It is shown that there is a prevailing conflict of interest
between  the  absolute  liability  doctrine  which  would  gain  the  support  of  victims  of
environmental pollution and the economic benefits (from oil exploration) of the state as well
as the TNCs (the polluters). The question is, why promote or raise the argument for absolute
liability  in  cases  of  environmental  pollution?  In  Nigeria,  the  menace  of  environmental
pollution caused by activities of oil and gas of TNCs, are clearly grim and reports of its effect
on  the  immediate  environment  as  well  as  inhabitants  is  globally  recognised.  A  report
27
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human rights as a tool for environmental protection in Nigeria’.
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published  by  the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme  in  2011  on  environmental
assessment  of  Ogoni  land29 (an  oil  producing  area  in  the  Niger  Delta)  clearly  affirms  a
staggering quantum of degradation on the environment. It was admitted that pollution caused
by crude oil spills is widespread, affecting land areas, sediments and swampland, and this has
happened  in  recent  times  and  over  a  period  of  decades.30 The  content  of  the  Report  is
incredibly  heart  rending, and clearly  reveals  a case of neglect  and lack of environmental
responsibility for oil spills on the parts of TNCs and government. It is noteworthy to point out
that the report covered only a modicum of geographical landscape of the series of incidents of
oil spills and its impact in the Niger Delta region.
The Nigerian Senate disclosed that Nigeria has the highest number of oil  spill incidences
among oil producing countries with no penalty regime attached to such oil spills.31 For such
disclosure to emanate from the country’s apex law-making body; there is little doubt that the
existing laws on environmental pollution, which some have been discussed in chapter 5 of
this  research  are  ineffective.  To allege  that  there  is  no  penalty  regime  would  amount  to
exaggeration; the truth lies in the many challenges (mostly on the economic grounds and lack
of awareness on environmental issues raised in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, as well as the
difficulties encountered in proving negligence on the part of TNCs) bordering on lack of will-
power on the part of the executive and unwillingness of the judiciary to apply existing laws in
strict  sense.  Although,  it  is  likely  that  allegations  of  corruption  can  be  linked  to  these
situations, it is explained in chapter 3 of this work that the government is mindful not to be
extremely harsh on oil  transnational  corporations  in  order not to frustrate  their  activities,
since crude oil production remains the mainstay of the economy.
29
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Whilst declaring open a public hearing on National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
(NOSDRA)  Amendment  Bill  2012  by  the  Senate  Joint  Committee  on  Environment  and
Ecology, the then Chairman of the Committee, Bukola Saraki observed that:
The  statistics  of  oil  spills  in  Nigeria  is  shameful;  the  impact  on  the
environment is offensive. It can no longer be business as usual. Without a
doubt, oil spillage is dealt with all over the world as an environmental
issue and a human right issue that goes to the quality of the environment
and the value of life of those impacted by spills.32
The above remark underpins one of the key hypotheses of the current research, which is to
examine  ‘whether  the  doctrine  of  absolute  liability  may  be  applied  to  the  issue  of  the
protection of the environment when the protection has been disregarded by TNCs within the
ambit of fundamental rights enforcement’. It is observed that if the doctrines of strict liability
as seen in Rylands v Fletcher, standards of proof in negligence and nuisance are applied by
the courts in cases of compensations and enforcement of ordinary rights, there would be a
need  for  a  stricter  liability,  even  absolute,  for  the  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights
(environmental  rights)  as contained in the Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter.
Although, it is borne in mind that liability principles may not be the only tools to address
pollution  problems,  a  stricter  liability  regime  would  engender  oil  companies,  including
government to improve on responsibility. 
Gaines had observed that: 
Environmental  liability  cannot  effectively  correct  every  instance  of
transnational  environmental  damage that  threatens  regional  and global
ecosystems. Neither can liability function as the principal legal device for
the articulation and enforcement of standards of behaviour to protect the
environment.33
The observation by Gaines above that  environmental  liability  principle  cannot  effectively
correct every instance of environmental damage is worthy of support. This is pursuant to the
fact that TNCs are in better positions to deploy state of the art measures (including utilisation
of modern equipment) in ensuring better safety and less substantial incidences of oil spills,
thereby  making  liability  principles  less  relevant.  On  the  other  hand,  to  conceive  that
32
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environmental liability is not the principal legal device for the enforcement of standards of
behaviour  to  protect  the  environment  cannot  be  holistically  entertained.  In  developing
countries  where environmental  pollution  is  unrelentingly  harsh,  as is  the case in  Nigeria,
there is no gainsaying that principles of liability would function as the principal legal device
for  enforcing  environmental  standards  and  protecting  the  environment.  Notwithstanding,
Gaines had admitted that ‘…if carefully designed and selectively applied, liability doctrines
can contribute significantly to the evolving world norms of an environmental stewardship,
and to the compensatory transfer of resources where appropriate.’34
Considering the observation above, it is certain that an absolute liability regime would ensure
a more transparent, accountable and efficient compensation regime, than the arbitrary and
isolated application of common law principles as shown in chapter 1. However, it must be
admitted that oil spills are inevitable in the course of oil and gas exploration and production,
and there are instances where minor spills can be ignored, particularly where no substantial
harm is caused. But even with such minor spills, a case can still lie where damage is done.
In the light of the above, the basis for the doctrine of absolute liability in fundamental rights
violations and enforcements in instances of environmental pollution is easily anchored on the
fact that ‘fundamental rights’ are given an enhanced status over and above other rights and
claims as recognised by the Nigerian Constitution and related laws; and in this regard, there
would  be  need  to  tighten  the  standard  of  liability  against  polluters  in  order  to  ensure
maximum respect and protection of environmental  rights and human dignity.  This, again,
would  spur  a  higher  responsibility  on  environmental  remediation  and  other  clean-up
measures of oil spills. In this vein, Bukola Saraki (in the Nigerian Senate) had maintained
that due to lack of penalties and cost framework much of the spills in Nigeria have been
‘ignored, neglected and in most cases never cleaned up or the sites remediated’.35
6.4 Fundamental Rights Violation in Environmental Pollution Incidents in Nigeria: A Case 
for an Absolute Liability against Oil Transnational Corporations.
Some  countries  place  more  emphasis  on  issues  relating  to  environmental  pollution  by
including certain enforceable provisions in their  Constitution,  thereby creating liability on
34
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environmental polluters,  but others do not.36 In Nigeria,  there are provisions, directly and
indirectly relating to the protection and preservation of the environment, which are enshrined
in the Constitution of the country. The most direct provision is embodied in Chapter II of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.37
In  considering  the  provision  of  the  Nigerian  Constitution  on  the  protection  of  the
environment,  section  20 of  the Constitution  of the Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria  1999 (as
amended) provides, that: ‘The state shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard
the water, air and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria.’38 One unfortunate thing about the
aforesaid section on environmental safety is that it falls within the ambit of Chapter II of the
Nigerian Constitution,  entitled,  ‘Fundamental  Objectives and Directive Principles  of State
Policy’, and are generally not enforceable owing to the fact that they are mere ‘directives’ to
be complied  with by the government,  39 as  the aforesaid provisions under Chapter  II  are
rendered unenforceable by virtue of section 6(6)(c), which provides that:
The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions
of  this  section  shall  not,  except  as  otherwise  provided  by  this
constitution,  extend to any issue or question as to whether  any act  or
omission by any authority  or person or as to whether  any law or any
judicial  decision is in conformity with the fundamental  objectives  and
directive  principles  of  state  policy  set  out  in  chapter  II  of  this
constitution.40
In  the  Nigerian  case  of  Attorney  General  of  Ondo  State v Attorney  General  of  the
Federation,41 it was held by the Supreme Court of Nigeria, inter alia, that the Nigerian Courts
36
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do not possess the jurisdiction to entertain or enforce cases brought under the provisions of
Chapter II of the Constitution except the National Assembly has enacted specific legislation
on the enforcement of such aspect of Chapter II. The Supreme Court further stated that the
‘Objectives  and  Directive  Principles’  are  only  constitutional  policies  of  governance  and
remain mere declarations which cannot be enforced. The provision, under Chapter II of the
Constitution appears to be a benchmark with which the Nigerian government can improve
and make specific laws in such areas.
In the light of the above, section 20 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria did
not create any issue of liability on environmental polluters, but only set guidelines on areas of
environmental law that should be legislated upon. But supposing the aforementioned section
of the Constitution was to be enforceable, it would have been the most reliable sword for
victims of oil and gas pollution to obtain compensation since the Constitution contains the
supreme  law  of  the  land.  In  this  regard,  the  Nigerian  Constitution  is  said  to  have
disappointingly resulted in a legal mirage.
The provision of  section 20 of the Nigerian Constitution  is  not  the end to  constitutional
mandate on environmental safety in Nigeria. Section 33(1) of the Constitution provides that,
‘Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life, save in
execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been
found guilty  in  Nigeria.’42 The  other  qualifications  under  this  right  are  in  circumstances
where the individual dies as a result of the use of reasonable force as permitted by law for the
defence of any person from unlawful violence or for the defence of property, or in order to
effect  a  lawful  arrest  or  to  prevent  the  escape  of  a  person lawfully  detained,  or  for  the
purposes of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny.43
Furthermore,  section 3(1) of the Nigerian Constitution provides that,  ‘Every individual  is
entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly-no person shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment.’44 An in-depth look at both sections 33(1)
 [2002] 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 222.
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and 34(1) reveals that no mention is made to environmental protection. It could be argued
that  parliament  had  no  intention  to  include  environmental  rights  to  the  afore-mentioned
provisions of the Nigerian Constitution.  But such presumption is rebuttable as further in-
depth look is considered in current trends in the Nigerian legal system.
For the purposes of appreciating the entire legal regime in Nigeria as regards fundamental
rights based argument for environmental protection, it is pertinent to have a full picture of the
statutory  enactments  that  forms  the  basis  for  any  fundamental  rights  claim.  It  is  worth
reiterating that Nigeria has incorporated into its legal system the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights (‘the African Charter’).45 The provisions of the Charter which stands to
be more relevant are Articles 4, 5, 16 and 24; and these rights, under the African Charter are
fundamental.  The Fundamental  Rights (Enforcement  Procedure)  Rules 200946 has defined
‘fundamental right’ to mean any of the rights provided for in Chapter IV of the Nigerian
Constitution as well as the rights stipulated in the African Charter.47
Article 4 provides, thus: ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled
to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of
this right.’ This provision is in par with sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution
mentioned  above.  Whilst  sections  33  and  34  of  the  Constitution  embodied  certain
circumstances (qualifications) under which an individual may be deprived of its rights to life
and dignity of the person, Article 4 of the Charter is silent, thereby suggesting that the right
as contained in Article 4 may be absolute. But this latter position (absolute right of Article 4)
could be discountenance with, taking into consideration the word ‘may,’ which suggests that
circumstances  could arise  where individuals  would be deprived of  the  right  as contained
therein. In the communication of  Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and
 ibid, s 34(1) (a).
45
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Another  v  The  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria,48 as  well  as  Socio-Economic  Rights  and
Accountability  Project  (SERAP)  v  The  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria,49 The  African
Commission  and  the  ECOWAS  Court  of  Justice  respectively,  appears  to  predicate
environmental  liability  in the African  Charter  regime to principles  of negligence,  that  is,
States are not liable where care, vigilance and diligence are exhibited towards preventing
environmental  pollution.  However,  this  reasoning  does  not  reflect  in  the  case  of  Jonah
Gbemre (for himself and as representing Iwherekan Community in Delta State, Nigeria)  v
Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and others,50 decided by a Federal High
Court in Nigeria. These cases are fully discussed below.
An important  point  to  note is  the supremacy of  the  Nigerian Constitution  amongst  other
statutes. In announcing the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution, section 1(1) provides:
‘This constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and
persons throughout the Federal republic of Nigeria’. In furtherance, section 1(2) provides that
‘If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution, this constitution shall
prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.’ Although there is
no contradiction between sections 33 and 34 of the Nigerian Constitution and that of Article 4
of the Charter, the point to grasp here is that the various exceptions to sections 33 and 34 of
the Nigerian Constitution would be transplanted to cover that of Article 4 of the Charter,
since the Charter is silent on any exceptions to the Article 4 rights.
Article 5 of the Charter51 provides for the right to respect of the dignity inherent in a human
being and prohibits  all  forms of exploitation  and degradation  which includes  slave trade,
torture, cruelty, inhuman or punishment and treatment. Again, this Article is in conformity
with  section  34 of  the  Nigerian Constitution  which  maintains  the  right  to  dignity  of  the
48
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human person. Furthermore, Article 16 provides that ‘Every individual shall have the right to
enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.’ This provision, in the Charter,
again is absolute, without any qualifications. This provision, unlike Article 4 and 5 of the
African Charter, has no alternative in the Nigerian Constitution. This suggests that Article 16
is unique and independent in the context of fundamental rights as discussed in this research.
Finally, Article 24 provides that ‘All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory
environment favourable to their development.’ It is interesting and noteworthy to point out
that Article 24 of the Charter is the most explicit, and devoid of any ambiguity as it relates to
the fundamental right to a safe environment. More importantly, Article 24 is absolute in the
sense  that  there  are  no  qualifications  under  which  an  individual  can  be  denied  of  a
satisfactory environment. 
The main question,  here,  is:  what amounts  to a satisfactory environment? The Charter is
silent in this regard, but in determining what could amount to a ‘satisfactory environment,’
the court would take the circumstances of the parties into consideration. It is expressed that
the dangerous activities of the respondent as well as the damage or likelihood of damage on
the immediate environment of the applicant would be given credence in determining whether
the environment has been rendered unfit for comfortable habitation. This may likely require
reports based on environmental impact assessment by experts with a view to ascertaining the
immediate  effect  of spills  on inhabitants.  Furthermore,  the greater  burden will  be on the
applicant to showcase the extent of injury or damage suffered, or the foreseeable threat on his
person.  It  would  be  necessary  to  give  a  considerable  attention  to  ‘case-law’  in  order  to
decipher the current trend of the above mentioned laws as applicable in Nigeria.
In  setting  the  legal  regime  for  fundamental  rights  actions  to  be  commenced  under  the
Nigerian  Constitution  and  the  African  Charter,  the  Fundamental  Rights  Enforcements
Procedure Rules provides that:
Any person who alleges that any of the Fundamental Rights provided for
in the Constitution or the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(Ratification and Enforcement) Act and to which he is entitled, has been,
is being, or is likely to be infringed, may apply to the Court in the State
where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur, for redress.52
52
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In the communication of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v
The Federal Republic of Nigeria,53 the complainants forwarded a communication before the
African  Commission  alleging  that  the  military  government  of  Nigeria  has  been  directly
involved  in  oil  production  through  the  State  oil  company,  the  Nigerian  National  Oil
Petroleum  Corporation  (NNPC)  in  a  consortium  with  Shell  Petroleum  Development
Corporation (SPDC), and that these operations have caused environmental degradation and
health problems resulting to the contamination of the environment among the Ogoni people
of  the  Niger  Delta  in  Nigeria.54 The  applicant  acting  through  actio  popularis  (a  lawsuit
brought by a third party in the interest of the public), further averred that the government has
not required oil companies or its agencies to produce basic health and environmental impact
studies regarding hazardous operations and materials relating to oil production, despite the
obvious  health  and  environmental  crisis  in  Ogoni  land.55 The  respondent  admitted  the
gravamen of the complaints but states that the new civilian government has embarked on
certain measures to remedy the damage caused by the oil activities in Ogoni land.56 After
series  of  adjournments,  the African  Commission found the  Nigerian  government  to  have
violated articles  4,  16,  24,  among others,  of the African Charter.57 In its  final  ruling,  the
Commission stated that: 
These rights recognise the importance of a clean and safe environment
that  is  closely  linked  to  economic  and  social  rights  in  so  far  as  the
environment affects the quality of life and safety of the individual.58
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It is submitted, in the light of the above case (SERAC v FRN) that governments who are
parties to human rights instruments, such as the African Charter, must fulfil certain minimum
duties which are internationally  accepted.  These duties  were classified in four categories,
namely:  the  duty  to  respect,  protect,  promote  and fulfil  the  rights  as  it  relates  to  a  safe
environment.59 The commission has directly expressed the fact that the right to life could be
interpreted to include environmental rights, and that such right has a higher priority over
others. This was emphasised by the Commission when it stated that ‘Given the widespread
violations perpetrated by the government of Nigeria and private actors, the most fundamental
of all human rights, the right to life has been violated.’60 This position, undeniably affirms the
global  perception  that  the  right  to  life  cannot  be  satisfactorily  protected  in  a  degraded
environment, particularly in environment enmeshed with dangerous activities of oil and gas
by TNCs. From a wide range of literature review and international judicial pronouncements,
a strong link does exist between environmental pollution and fundamental rights violation; in
essence, this remains a sacred fact and substantially undisputed.
The above case seems to be devoid of any technical challenges in establishing liability due to
the apparent  admittance  of the Nigerian  government  on the gravamen of the complaints.
Albeit the African Charter which was relied upon in the communication has no qualifications
or  exceptions  on  the  rights  to  life  and  that  of  a  safe  environment,  there  could  be
circumstances where the respondent would show that it has taken adequate steps to avert the
alleged  damages  caused  to  the  environment,  thereby  exonerating  itself  from  liability.
Literally, and in strict application of the aforementioned Charter rights, the defence of taking
adequate or reasonable steps to avert any environmental damage as a result of oil and gas
activities ought not to stand or be sustained. This position is particularly anchored on the
absolute nature of Article 24 of the African Charter which guarantees a right to a satisfactory
environment without exceptions. Conversely, Article 4 of the African Charter, which was one
of the provisions under which liability was pronounced on the Nigerian government, is to the
effect that the right to respect for life and integrity of human beings may not be ‘arbitrarily’
deprived. The choice of the word ‘arbitrarily’  which denotes carrying out actions ‘on the






polluters may escape liability once it is shown that the cause of pollution was not intentional
or that the pollution emanates despite deployment of reasonable steps; thereby indicating that
the cause (s) of pollution was not arbitrarily inflicted on inhabitants.
It was shown in the  SERAC case that the Nigerian government neglected all precautionary
measures to avert damage caused in Ogoni land, and the only precautionary measures were
belated.61 The African Commission was explicit on the measure of liability obtainable from
the provision on the right to healthy environment when it observed that:
The  right  to  a  general  satisfactory  environment,  as  guaranteed  under
article 24 of the African Charter or the right to a healthy environment, as
it  is  widely  known,  therefore  imposes  clear  obligations  upon  a
government. It requires the state to take reasonable and other measures to
prevent  pollution and ecological  degradation,  to promote conservation,
and to secure an ecological sustainable development and use of natural
resources.62
With regard to the need for states to take ‘reasonable measures’63 to avert pollution, it would
be plausible to state that such requirement falls within the parameters of the law of nuisance
and negligence. The Commission reasoned further that:
…The  government  of  Nigeria,  through  the  NNPC  has  the  right  to
produce oil, the income from which will be used to fulfil the economic
and social rights of Nigerians. However, the care that should have been
taken…and which would have protected the rights of the victims of the
violations complained was not taken.64
In the light of the foregoing, it would not be out of place to say that the African Commission
predicated its measure of liability in environmental pollution cases on common law principles
of nuisance and negligence (on duty of care).
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There  is  no  gainsaying  that  human  rights  provisions  on  environmental  protection  is  an
emerging area of the Nigerian legal system.65 However, it is maintained that the right to a
healthy  environment  ought  to  be part  of  customary law owing to its  significance.  In  the
ground-breaking  case  of  Jonah  Gbemre  (for  himself  and  as  representing  Iwherekan
Community in Delta State, Nigeria) v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd
and others,66 the applicants brought a claim for the enforcement of their fundamental rights to
life  and  dignity  of  the  human  person as  guaranteed  by sections  33  and  34 of  the  1999
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), and articles 4, 16 and 24 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act.67 The
application was brought by the plaintiffs in respect of the continuous flaring of gas by the
respondents (SPDC and others). Section 33(1) of the Constitution68 states that, ‘Every person
has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life, save in execution of
the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in
Nigeria.’ 
On the other hand, section 34(1)(a)69 of the Constitution provides that ‘Every individual is
entitled to respect for dignity of his person, and accordingly no person shall be subject to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment.’  The applicants claimed in their  motion on
notice  the  following  reliefs:  (1)  A  declaration  that  the  constitutionally  guaranteed
fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person provided in sections 33(1) and 34(1)
of the Nigerian Constitution, and reinforced by articles 4, 16 and 24 of the Charter, inevitably
includes the right to clean poison-free environment, pollution-free and healthy environment;
(2)  A  declaration  that  the  actions  of  the  1st and  2nd respondents  (SPDC  and  NNPC)
65
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respectively  in  continuing  to  flare  gas  in  the  course  of  their  exploration  and  production
activities  in  the  applicant’s  community  is  a  violation  of  their  fundamental  rights  to  life
(including healthy environment) and dignity of human person as contained in the Nigerian
Constitution and the Charter respectively among others. 
The applicants alleged that no environmental impact assessment was carried out by the 1st and
2nd respondents concerning their gas flaring activities in Iwherekan Community as required
by  the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Act,70 and  as  a  result  this  has  led  to  the
‘unrestrained, mindless flaring of gas’ by the 1st and 2nd respondents. The applicants equally
averred that no valid ministerial gas flaring certificates were obtained by any of the 1st and 2nd
respondents which could authorise them in gas flaring as required by the Associated Gas Re-
Injection Act.71
The court, granting the applicant’s application declared that the provisions of section 33(1)
and 34(1)(a) of the Constitution are guaranteed rights and they inevitably include the rights to
‘clean  poison-free,  pollution-free  healthy  environment.’72 The  court  further  held  that  the
actions  of  the  Respondents  in  the  continuous  flaring  of  gas  in  the  course  of  their  oil
exploration and production activities in the community of the Applicants is a gross violation
of  their  fundamental  right  to  life  (which  according  to  the  court  includes  a  healthy
environment) and dignity of human person as provided in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the
Nigerian Constitution73 which are clearly stated above.
The  Federal  High  Court  went  further  to  hold  that  gas  flaring  in  the  instant  case  was
inconsistent  with  the  applicant’s  rights  to  life  and/or  dignity  of  human person enshrined
Articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and
70
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Enforcement) Act.74 A combined reading of Articles 4 and 16 of the Charter provides for the
individual’s rights to life and integrity as well as the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health, and the former rights (in Article 4) are virtually the same with the
provisions in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, while Article 24 of the
Charter provides for the right to a satisfactory environment.
Nevertheless,  a  close  observation  of  section  6(6)(c)  of  the  Nigerian  Constitution  which
renders section 20 unenforceable appears to be in contradiction with the enforcement and
interpretation of sections 33 and 34 of the same Constitution by the Federal High Court in the
Gbemre case to include environmental rights. It is mentioned earlier that section 20 sets a
positive obligation on the Nigerian State to protect and improve the environment, and this
obligation  falls  within  ‘Chapter  II’  of  the  Nigerian  Constitution,  which  is  rendered  non-
justiciable by virtue of section 6.75 Sections 33 and 34 of the Constitution could be found
under Chapter IV which is entitled, ‘Fundamental Rights’. This perceived contradiction is
informed on the fact that from the provisions of section 6(6)(c) (the constitutional provision
limiting powers of the court to entertain matters arising from the Fundamental Objectives and
Directive Principles of State Policy), it could be reasoned that the framers of the Nigerian
Constitution never intended government breaches of ‘environmental rights’ to be enforceable
in the Courts of law. But in what appears to resolving the perceived contradictions between
section 20 of the Nigerian Constitution (government’s duty to protect the environment, which
is  non-justiciable)  and  the  interpretation  of  sections  33  and 34 to  include  environmental
rights, the Court of Appeal (Justice Mamman Nasir) in the case of Bishop Okogie (Trustee of
Roman Catholic  schools)  & Ors v Attorney-General  of  Lagos  State76 stated,  that:  ‘…no
provision in Chapter II can override or inhibit the provisions of Chapter IV on fundamental
rights.’  This  position  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  is  to  affirm  the  sacrosanct  nature  of  the
fundamental rights as contained in the Nigerian Constitution, particularly sections 33 and 34
as  it  relates  to  a  healthy  environment.  This  is  also  in  line  with  the  Indian  doctrine  of
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‘Harmonious  Construction’  which  seeks  to  create  a  balance  between  the  non-justiciable
provisions of the Constitution on one hand and the fundamental rights of individuals on the
other.77
Surprisingly, the applicants in the Jonah Gbemre case did not argue on the violation of the
right to private and family life under section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution in view of the
fact that the gas flaring incident could have possibly affected the quality of private lives and
the enjoyment of their homes as can be seen in majority of the cases decided by the European
Court of Human Rights, which are mentioned in chapter 2 of this research. A ruling by the
Federal High Court on this fundamental right would have been useful for legal and academic
analysis as it is the case on the other rights analysed herein.
Having regard to the aforementioned provisions and the outcome of the  Johna Gbemre’s
case, there is the tendency to conclude that the liability of oil  Transnational Corporations
under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is ‘absolute’. But such conclusion
may not be too healthy; although neither the Constitution nor the Charter made provisions as
to  the  requirements  for  establishing  the  liability  of  violators  of  the  aforementioned
fundamental rights, it is obvious that once such rights are infringed, the victim only need to
prove that it was the injurer that is responsible for such breach or likely to infringe the said
rights. It is submitted that the requirement of ‘foreseeability of harm’ as required in strict
liability cases may not be relevant in establishing the liability of the Respondents (polluters)
since these provisions are based on the fundamental  rights  of the individual.  A pertinent
question  would  be  whether  environmental  damage  is  foreseeable?  It  is  well  known that
activities of oil and gas TNCs are such that are ‘likely to cause mischief’, and in view this, oil
and  gas  pollution  are  foreseeable  damages.  Considering  the  case  of  San  Ikpede v  Shell
Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd,78 and the discussion in figure 1.7 in chapter 1,
it is trite that the Nigerian Courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that environmental
pollution caused by activities of TNCs are foreseeable acts, but the major shortcomings are
traceable to the numerous defences raised by TNCs, and most common is the defence of
77
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statutory  authority  and  act  of  a  third  party  as  shown in  Anthony  Atubin  & Ors v Shell
Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd.79
However, the requirement of ‘escape’ (as in Rylands v Fletcher) as applicable in the strict
liability doctrine will be a necessary element in a case of fundamental rights enforcement
since there cannot be said to be a breach of fundamental right of any victim as regards oil and
gas pollution where there is no oil leakage or gas flaring. In essence, there ought to be a
disaster (or likelihood of a disaster) caused by oil spillage or gas flaring which must have
threatened or violated the life of the victim (physical or mental health), or caused damage to
his integrity, or make his environment unsatisfactory as required by both sections 33(1) and
34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria80, and Article 4, 16, and 24 of the
African Charter respectively.81
Relevant  principles  on  human  rights  based  arguments  in  environmental  protection  were
emphasised in the case of Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v The
Federal Republic of Nigeria.82 In that case, the plaintiff, via actio popularis in July 2009 filed
a complaint to the ECOWAS Court of justice83 against the Nigerian government, NNPC and
six other oil firms. The plaintiffs relied on Articles 16 and 24 of the Charter which borders on
the right to enjoy physical and mental health, and the right to a safe environment respectively.
The plaintiffs submitted that the government of Nigeria has failed to promote conditions in
79
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which people can lead a healthy life due to its failure to prevent widespread pollution as a
result of the activities of oil and gas industries in the Niger Delta area.84 It was further alleged
by the plaintiffs that the Nigerian government failed to put in place ‘modalities and logistics,’
as well as appropriate laws that will regulate activities of foreign companies operating in the
Niger Delta in order to avoid human rights violations.85
The plaintiffs,  in  the  above case further  submitted  that  by failing  to  deal  with corporate
actions that harm human rights and the environment, the Nigerian government has not only
compounded the challenges of human rights abuse but has equally aided and abetted the oil
and gas companies in the Niger Delta in violations of the human rights as contained in the
African Charter.86 Whilst outlining the basic issues for determination, the ECOWAS Court of
justice stated that:
…The heart of the dispute is to determine whether in the circumstances
referred to, the attitude of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as a party to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, is in conformity with
the  obligations  subscribed  to  in  terms  of  Article  24  of  the  said
instrument…87
In response to the above issue, the ECOWAS Court of justice noted that if a state is taking all
the necessary legislative, administrative and other measures, it must ensure that ‘vigilance
and diligence’  are employed and observed towards attaining concrete results.88 The Court
further  maintained  that  despite  all  the  laws  and  agencies  in  existence,  the  Nigerian
government could not show from the pleadings a single action that has been taken in recent
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the  Niger  Delta,89 and  that  it  is  this  omission  to  act,  to  prevent  damage  and  to  hold
accountable,  environmental  polluters  that  has  characterised  the  violations  of  the  Charter
rights.90Albeit the Nigerian government denied responsibility when it alleged that it is the
duty of a license holder to take all reasonable steps to avoid damage and pay compensation to
victims of oil spill,91 the Court found the Nigerian government to have violated the aforesaid
Articles in the Charter as a result of the ‘continuous and unceasing damage’92caused to the
environment. The Court further affirmed that the Nigerian government defaulted in its duties
in terms of ‘vigilance and diligence’93as a party to the Charter.
A significant  concept  for determining liability,  which can be drawn from the above case
(SERAP v FRN) is that of ‘vigilance and diligence’. In essence, an applicant in a fundamental
rights based argument in environmental  pollution as shown above must establish that the
respondent was not diligent and vigilant regarding their duties as enshrined in the Charter.
Another similar and significant aspect of both judgments in  Johna Gbemre94 and the latter
case of  SERAP v Nigeria95 is the emphasis given to the fact that the alleged pollution was
‘continuous and unceasing’. In  Johna Gbemre’s case the Federal High Court held that the
‘continuous’ flaring of gas by SPDC in the course of their oil activities is a gross violation to
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the  Court  found  the  Nigerian  government  to  have  violated  the  aforesaid  Articles  in  the
Charter as a result of the ‘continuous and unceasing damage’ caused to the environment.97
The  question  to  pose  is:  would  the  respondents  be  exonerated  in  human  rights  based
arguments for environmental pollution if the alleged damage is temporary? Or would the
Nigerian government be said to have been diligent and vigilant if the alleged pollution is
temporary? This question can both be answered in the affirmative and in the negative. From
the judgment of the earlier  case of  SERAC v Nigeria,98 the African Commission held the
Nigerian government liable due to the absolute admittance of the complainants’ claims on the
violation of the Charter rights, although the government was said to have put in place certain
remedial measures, such measures seem belated; that is, after the alleged rights have been
violated. It follows that the primary factor for liability in fundamental rights violations as it
relates  to  environmental  pollution  is  the  fact  that  the  applicants  have  suffered  damages,
irrespective  of  whether  the  alleged  pollution  is  continuous  or  temporary.  But  this  latter
submission could be debunked and discountenance with, having regard to the recent case of
SERAP v Nigeria99 as decided by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The ECOWAS Court of
justice  seem to  be  more  concerned  about  the  seriousness  of  the  Nigerian  government  in
tackling  issues of  environmental  pollution  generally  in  awarding liability,  rather  than the
continuity, or length of time which a single pollution incident might have lasted. This could
be seen when the court stated that:
It is significant to note that despite all the laws it has adopted and all the
agencies it has created, the Federal Republic of Nigeria was not able to
point out in its pleadings a single action that has been taken in recent
years to seriously and diligently hold accountable any of the perpetrators
of  the many acts  of environmental  degradation  which occurred in  the
Niger Delta Region.100
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From the  foregoing,  it  could  be  submitted  that  environmental  polluters  are  likely  to  be
exonerated  from  liability  if  it  could  be  shown  through  evidence  any  ‘seriousness  and
diligence’ in past records, despite the occurrence of a continuous pollution in a single case
which may form the subject of the rights enforcement. But again, one could object why a
government or oil operator who has been consistent in ‘diligence and vigilance’ as regards a
pollution-free environment would allow a particular pollution activity to be continuous. In all
circumstances, the applicant must show damage or the likelihood of any damage to be caused
in  order  to  institute  and  succeed  a  claim  in  human  rights  based  arguments.  This  latter
submission is buttressed in the light of the provision of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement
Procedure  Rules  that  any  person  who  alleges  that  any  of  the  rights  in  the  Nigerian
Constitution or Charter which he is entitled to has been, is being, or is likely to be infringed
may apply to  a  competent  court  for  redress.101 It  is  hereby settled  that  an applicant  may
institute an action where there is a likelihood or an impending threat to the violations of the
Constitutional  and Charter  rights,  and liability  does not necessarily  has to  be based on a
‘continuous  and unceasing  damage’.  But  in  this  instance,  the  Court  could  only  grant  an
injunction  to  restrain  the respondent(s)  from infringing on the Fundamental  rights  of  the
applicant.  Compensation  and or  damages  could  not  be  awarded since  no  harm has  been
suffered.
6.4.1 The Technical Meaning of the Term ‘Absolute’ and its Usage within the Framework of 
Fundamental Rights Violations
Attempts have already been made to explain the term ‘absolute liability’.102 But within the
context of modern legal usage of the term, there seem to be disparities in its application; in
some instances, the doctrine of strict liability is used as a synonym for absolute liability. For
instance, in the dictionary of law by Curzon, ‘strict liability in criminal law’ was used to
denote ‘absolute liability’.103 In this context, an offender is held criminally responsible for
particular offences, whether he has any mens rea or not. To this extent, there would be little
101
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inconvenience in using the terms ‘absolute liability’ and ‘strict liability’ interchangeably; in
the English case of  Whitehouse v Gays News,104 the House of Lords held that guilt of the
offence of the criminal offence of blasphemous libel did not depend on the accused having
intent to blaspheme. Lord Viscount was categorical in this regard when he observed:
What I regard as of great significance is that in none of what I regard as
the leading cases on the publication of a blasphemous libel is there to be
found  any  direction  to  the  telling  that  it  had  to  be  proved  that  the
defendant intended to blaspheme, and I have not found in any decided
case any criticism of the omission to do so.105
But  even  where  mens  rea is  irrelevant  in  holding  an  accused  responsible,  other  general
defences in criminal liability could still prevail, or even the same statute could provide some
criminal defences. For example, there is the Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions)
Act,106 particularly section 6 of the Act which imposes criminal liability on polluters of the
environment ranging from carrying and dumping of harmful waste in the air, land or waters
of Nigeria save with the consent of a lawful authority.107 It follows that, permission can be
taken from the proper authorities to pollute the environment. Black’s Law Dictionary is not
too helpful in unveiling the legal meaning of absolute liability; there are only cross references
between ‘absolute liability’, ‘strict liability’ and ‘liability’ with a definition of liability. But
the  Black’s  has  defined  ‘Absolute’  to  mean  ‘free  from  restriction,  qualification,  or
condition’.108
Garner, in ‘A dictionary of modern legal usage’ used the phrases ‘strict liability, absolute
liability,  and liability  without  fault’  to  mean  ‘liability  that  does  not  depend  upon actual
negligence or intent to harm’, suggesting that strict liability is the most common term in both
104
 [1979] AC 617.
105
 Whitehouse v Gays News (n 142) 642.
106
 Cap H1 LFN 2004.
107
 ibid, section 1(2).
108
 Bryan A Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, Thomson West 2004) 7.
260
American  English  and  British  English,  whilst  equally  admitting  that  some  writers  do
distinguish between strict and absolute.109 Having considered the doctrine of strict liability
under  Rylands v Fletcher in chapter 1 of this  research,  it  is common knowledge that the
doctrine of strict liability, despite being a principle that is perceived not to require the proof
of fault to establish the liability of the defendant, there are a handful of remarkable defences
which the defendant can raise to escape liability. In this vein, Rogers, whilst observing the
non-absolute nature of the doctrine of strict liability had said that, ‘Liability under the rule is
strict in the sense that it relieves the claimant of the burden of showing fault; however, it is
far from absolute since there are a number of wide-ranging defences.’110
The above remark brings one closer to the concept of absolute liability as being applied to
fundamental rights enforcement. It clearly depicts a sort of liability as seen in the Rylands v
Fletcher case, but this time, without any defences. The Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary had
defined  the  term  ‘absolute’  to  mean  ‘complete  and  unconditional’.111 In  the  same  vein,
Stewart and Burgess have defined ‘absolute liability’ as:
A phrase to describe a case where liability attaches to a person on the
happening of given condition and despite any care that person may have
taken and despite any facts suggesting the happening was outwith human
foresight.112
The above definition clearly indicates liability imposed on a defendant; which is devoid of
the requirements of due care (required in negligence) as well  as reasonable foreseeability
(required in both nuisance and strict liability) on its part. This, without any ambiguity isolates
and differentiates  the concept  of  absolute  liability  from the aforementioned common law
doctrines. The Oxford Dictionary of Law is even closer to the description of the absolute
liability concept within the ambit of environmental rights. It defined ‘absolute right’ as:
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A right set out in the European Convention on Human Rights that cannot
be interfered with lawfully, no matter how important the public interest in
doing  so  might  be.  Absolute  rights  include  freedom  of  thought,
conscience,  and  religion  and  the  prohibitions  on  torture,  inhuman
treatment or punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment.113
The aforesaid definition was compared with ‘qualified right’, which denotes a right that can
be interfered with on proportionate legitimate aim,114 and the term ‘proportionality’ is said to
be applicable within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights where the
expression ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is contained in the Article.115 Although, there
is logical classification between ‘absolute rights’ and ‘qualified rights’ as seen above, there
seem not to be any remarkable difference amongst the Convention rights in terms of the
proportionality of interference on the part of government. Despite the importance placed on
the Convention rights, it has been shown through case law, both at regional (European Court
of Human Right) and domestic application (in Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd)116 in the
UK that such rights, based on the doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation can be interfered
with, when it is shown that government has taken reasonable steps to protect the interest of
the individual.
In the light of the above, and in light of the meaning ascribed to the concept of ‘Absolute
liability’,  the  most  common being  ‘complete  and unconditional’,  it  is  submitted  that  the
Convention rights are far from being absolute. In fact, the definition of ‘absolute right’ in the
Oxford Dictionary of law suggesting some Convention Rights cannot be interfered with, ‘no
matter how important the public interest in doing so might be’ could in effect, be considered
misleading. In practical terms, all such rights are ‘qualified’ in view of the doctrine of the
Margin of Appreciation. This latter stance is more particularly hinged on the provision of
section  1(2)  of  the Human Rights  Act  (in  UK) to the effect  that  the Conventions  rights
(including subsequent protocols) are to have effect for the purposes of the Act subject to any
113
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designated derogation or reservation.117 Davis distinguished between ‘absolute  rights’  and
‘qualified or restricted rights’ under the Convention Rights. The former, according to Davis
secure  some  freedoms  by  imposing  duties  on  states  that  must  be  performed  in  all
circumstances, like the right not to be tortured in Article 3.118 In the latter, like Article 8 right
(right to private life), it is clear that there are instances where the law can be legitimately
utilised to restrict the exercised of such right.119
An argument  for  absolute  liability  is  not  vindictive,  and  not  necessarily  geared  towards
punishing or penalising TNCs, but a call to spur a high sense of responsibility irrespective of
the  amount  of  compensation  that  would  follow after  being  declared  absolutely  liable  for
spills.  It  follows  that,  governments  may  choose  to  enact  laws  to  cut  down the  costs  of
compensations  to be paid by TNCs, but it  is  only logical  under the current research that
where activities of oil and gas interfere with fundamental rights of inhabitants, there should
be no excuse whatsoever.
From  the  foregoing,  it  is  imperative  to  ask:  will  the  polluter  be  liable  for  breach  of
environmental rights where pollution incidents are traceable to acts of sabotage from third
parties? It is worthy of note that the Federal High Court in  Jonah Gbemre did not grapple
with  the  aforementioned  issue.  However,  in  FA Akpan  & Anor  v  Royal  Dutch  Shell  &
Anor,120 the  second  plaintiff  (Melieudefensie)  moved  for  a  declaratory  judgment  whilst
making  reference  to  the  Jonah  Gbemre case  in  a  Dutch  Court,  that  SPDC is  liable  for
affecting Akpan’s (first plaintiff) right to physical integrity due to the contamination of his
environment. The District Court of The Hague, in dismissing the request, reasoned inter alia,
that  in  Gbemre,  the  Court  ruled  that  SPDC had  infringed  a  human  right  by  its  ‘active
conduct’ by deliberately flaring gas during a long period. Meanwhile in Akpan (case at issue),
117
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SPDC cannot be blamed for any active conduct except negligence; noting that there have
been no Nigerian ruling in which event of sabotage by third parties is considered to be an
infringement  of  a  human  right.121 The  position  of  the  District  Court  of  Hague  deserves
support. Notwithstanding, the current argument for an absolute liability is anchored on the
fundamental nature of the rights captured in Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution, and in
this regard, it is maintained that government owes a duty to preserve the aforesaid rights, and
this entails securing oil and gas facilities in order not to violate rights of law-abiding citizens.
From the  analysis  in  figure  6.4  above,  there  is  much  to  be  argued  within  the  Nigerian
jurisdiction, that if law is to be followed within the strict sense of legal positivism, then one
would be left with no other option than submitting that liability in environmental rights are
absolute. To reiterate on the most relevant constitutional and statutory provisions on the right
to a clean environment would be useful on this proposition. For sections 33 and 34 which
borders  on  the  rights  to  life  and  dignity  of  human  person  respectively,  have  no  known
exceptions  or qualification  under  which a respondent  in an action for fundamental  rights
enforcement relating to environmental pollution would rely on to escape liability. 
For the sake of clarity, the constitutional defences for the right to life are execution of the
sentence of a court, defence of person from unlawful violence or property, to effect lawful
arrest or prevent escape of detained persons, suppressing in riot, insurrection or mutiny. The
aforesaid are the only defences known in the Nigerian Constitution regarding the right to
life.122 In the same vein the only grounds under which the right  to dignity of the person
(inhuman  or  degrading  treatment)  can  be  interfered  with  are  events  of  forced  labour  in
consequence of the sentence or order of a court, labour required of members of the armed
forces,  any  labour  reasonably  necessary  in  the  event  of  any  emergency  or  calamity
threatening the life or well-being of the community, compulsory national service which forms
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Again, virtually all of the decided cases by the European Court of Human Rights discussed in
chapter 2 of the research were fully or partially premised on the violation of applicants’ rights
to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence,124 which is provided for in
Article 8(1) of the Convention rights, and in Nigeria, similar provision is found in section 37
of  the  Nigerian  Constitution  (Right  to  private  and  family  life)  and  the  same  exceptions
applicable to Article 8(1) as seen in Article 8(2) of the Convention rights (such right can be
interfered  with where necessary in the interest  of national  security,  public  safety,  for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others and for the interest of the economic well-being of the state)
are equally found and applicable to the right to private and family life as seen in section 45(1)
(a) and (b) of the Nigerian Constitution, except the defence relating to the ‘economic well-
being of  the state’  which is  clearly missing in  the Nigerian  Constitution.  This  ordinarily
presupposes that  the individual’s  right to private  and family life  in Nigeria  could not  be
interfered with on the basis of economic activities or benefits of the State. 
Although, the right to respect for private and family life was not argued in the Nigerian case
of Jonah Gbemre v SPDC, it is submitted that looking at the arguments of the applicants in
the cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights (arguments ranging from effect of
toxic emission, smells, noise and polluting fumes from industrial plant) for interference with
the right to private and family life, there is no gainsaying that oil and gas pollutions replete in
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria would amount to violation of the right to private and family
lives of inhabitants as provided for in section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution. To understand
vividly the conditions under which the right to private and family life can be restricted or
derogated from in Nigeria, the provision of section 45(1)(a) and (b) would be necessary. It
provides that:
Nothing in sections 37, 38,…of this Constitution shall invalidate any law
that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society-(a) in the interest of
defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
(b)  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  other
persons.125
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Looking at the above provision (section 45 of the Nigerian Constitution), it is plausible to
hold that oil and gas activities do not amount to, or correspond with any of the defences
mentioned therein. The constitutional mandate of the right to respect for private and family
life  would  have  been  substantially  weakened  within  the  ambit  of  fundamental  rights
proceedings relating to oil and gas pollution if the ‘interest of economic well-being of the
state’ is included in section 45(1)(a) and (b) above. This is because, oil and gas activities of
oil  TNCs,  as  mentioned,  are  economically  beneficial  to  the  state,  and  in  view  of  this
development, it is submitted that a victim of oil and gas pollution approaching the Court with
an argument for breach of the right to private and family life in Nigeria, can be assured of a
stricter liability than the existing common law and statutory liability principles applicable in
Nigeria, and technically speaking, liability can be considered absolute in this regard.
Article 24 of the African Charter was even more absolute without any reservation when it
provides  that  ‘All  peoples  shall  have  the  right  to  a  general  satisfactory  environment
favourable to their development’.126 In the light of the foregoing, it would be probable in law
to state that where the Constitution or statute is silent as to any defence or exception, the
presumption that such a defence is required would be rebutted. Conversely, in FA Akpan &
Anor v Royal Dutch Shell & Anor,127 as mentioned earlier, The District Court of The Hague
reasoned  that  SPDC cannot  be  blamed  for  any active  conduct  in  breach  of  fundamental
environmental rights except negligence; noting that there have been no Nigerian ruling in
which event of sabotage by third parties is considered to be an infringement of a human
right.128
It is argued that it would be incompatible with provisions of the Constitution and even of the
African Charter (which is given higher priority) for environmental polluters to raise any of
the defences in the common law torts of negligence, nuisance or strict liability as mentioned
earlier  in fundamental  rights enforcement  proceedings; for in strict  compliance with legal
positivism, those defences are not known to the Nigerian Constitution, and it could be argued
126
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that bearing in mind the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution, all defences of act of a third
party,  exercise  of  due  care  and reasonability  and statutory  authority  as  found in  the  Oil
Pipelines  Act,  Associated  Gas  Re-Injection  Act  and  the  Petroleum  Act  as  mentioned  in
chapter 5 of this research, are to the extent of their inconsistency void.129
In view of the above, it is submitted that owing to the importance attached to fundamental
rights to a healthy environment argued in this research, it is wise for the Courts to improve
and tighten the measure of liability (beyond that of nuisance, negligence and under the strict
liability rule) in favour of victims of oil and gas pollution incidents in environmental rights
enforcement  as  seen  in  the  Jonah Gbemre case  due  to  the  importance  of  environmental
protection and the need for TNCs to exhibit seriousness in handling their activities vis-à-vis
the environment.
 6.4.2 The Legal Duty of Vigilance and Diligence
In the case of Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v The Federal
Republic of Nigeria130 mentioned above, the ECOWAS Court of justice laid much emphasis
on the requirement of ‘vigilance and diligence’ on the part of government to avoid liability in
cases of environmental right violations. The Court was more specific when it observed that it
is this omission to act, to prevent damage and to hold accountable, environmental polluters
that has characterised the violations of the Charter rights.131 Whilst the term ‘diligence’ can
easily be linked to the requirement of due care in the common law principle of negligence,
‘vigilance’ appears to be vague and hollow in legal usage. A reference to the Black’s Law
Dictionary defines vigilance as:
Watchfulness; precaution; a proper degree of activity and promptness in
pursuing  one’s  rights,  in  guarding  them  from  infraction,  and  in
discovering  opportunities  for  enforcing  one’s  lawful  claims  and
demands.132
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Hence, to be vigilant is to be ‘watchful and cautious’, to be ‘on the alert’ and to be ‘attentive
to discover and avoid danger’.133 Whilst  diligence has been defined as ‘care:  caution; the
attention and care required from a person in a given situation’.134 In view of the above, it
follows that both vigilance and diligence, require ‘caution’ and ‘watchfulness’, it would be
legally  convenient  to  say  both  terms  are  synonymous.  Could  it  be  probable  to  say  that
liability for oil and gas pollution at the regional level (in West Africa and Africa as a whole)
is hinged on the common law principle of negligence and not absolute liability? In the case of
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v The Federal Republic of
Nigeria,135 it  was  emphasised  by  the  African  Commission  that  the  right  to  a  healthy
environment imposes obligation upon a government to take reasonable and other measures to
prevent pollution,136 and the care needed to protect the rights of the victims was not taken.137
It is noted that the duty of ‘prevention’ is said to have originated from the requirement of
‘due diligence’,138 and the duty of care, prevention and due diligence are all elements of the
tort of negligence. The case of Donoghue v Stevenson is always useful whenever the law of
negligence is mentioned. For the sake of emphasis reference would be made again.  Lord
Atkin in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson,139 observed that:
…You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you
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then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are
so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in question...140
To what extent is the  Donoghue case still  relevant? It  is submitted that the above  obiter
dictum from Lord Atkin covers legal requirements in the torts of negligence, nuisance and
under the strict liability rule. The reason being that it raises the need to exercise due care (in
negligence), to be reasonable (in nuisance) and the element of reasonable foreseeability (in
strict  liability,  nuisance  and  negligence)  which  are  adequately  discussed  in  chapter  1.
Ordinarily, under common law, once damage is foreseeable, as can be seen in the  Rylands
case, liability is considered strict, and there is no further consideration whether the defendant
exercised due care or not.141 In another hand, it has been shown in Nigerian domestic law that
proof of lack of ‘due care’ is necessary to establish liability against TNCs in Nigeria, even
where damage is foreseeable.142
Considering the relevance of the concept of vigilance, it is submitted that it is a clear effort to
sustain the duty imposed by law with regard to the need to exercise due care in upholding
environmental  rights  promoted  by  the  African  Charter.  For  instance,  the  deployment  of
security agents in securing oil pipelines and installations would obviously amount to an act of
vigilance.  Notwithstanding,  there may not  be any harm in using the terms diligence  and
vigilance interchangeably since it is obvious that both terms are geared towards protecting
and preventing foreseeable harm on the citizenry and to abhor a state of recklessness.
It is worth asking whether one can be diligent without being vigilant. The crux is that both
terms stand to achieve the same goal of environmental protection, as diligence would entail
vigilance.  Nevertheless,  a  better  connotation  can  only  be  given  by  the  court  after  due
consideration  of  available  evidence  on  measures  taken  by  polluters  and  the  prevailing
circumstances.  Whilst  there  are  limited  exceptions  in  the  African  Charter  under  which
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are  mindful  of  the  dangers  involved  in  toeing  the  line  of  imposing an  absolute  liability
regardless of measures taken by government and TNCs to avert environmental degradation,
particularly  bearing  in  mind  the  economic  importance  of  crude  oil  and  gas  trade  to  the
nation’s economy.
The justification for exonerating a polluter which has shown vigilance as emphasised in the
SERAP case143 can  be  linked  to  the  legal  maxim  ‘vigilantibus  non  dormientibus  jura
subveniunt,’ which is to the effect that the laws help those who are watchful, not those who
sleep.144 In view of this, it may sound unjustifiable to punish polluters who have taken all
necessary measures to prevent violation of environmental rights in the African Charter and
Nigerian Constitution.
6.5 Transformation of Negligence, Nuisance and Strict Liability to Absolute Liability
It is settled that both the ECOWAS Court of justice in SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria
and the African Commission in SERAC v The Federal Republic of Nigeria are inclined toward
the principles applicable in the tort of negligence in resolving environmental rights violation
proceedings. Do we now suppose that the same measure of liability is applicable in municipal
law in Nigeria? In the case of Hatton and others v United Kingdom,145 the Grand Chamber of
the European Court of Human Rights had observed that the role of the European Convention
on Human Rights was essentially a subsidiary one, and that national authorities had direct
democratic legitimation, and were, in principle, better placed than an international Court to
evaluate local needs and conditions. In the same vein, despite the relevance of the judgments
of the ECOWAS Court of Justice as well as the African Commission, it is certain that the
Nigerian  Courts  are  better  placed to  evaluate  local  needs  and conditions.  However,  it  is
expedient  to  note  that  the  Community  Court  of  Justice,  ECOWAS  has  jurisdiction  to
determine cases of human rights violations that occur in any Member State and its decisions
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are binding.146Victims of environmental pollution, therefore, are entitled to approach the court
in alleged fundamental rights violations.
In the Nigerian cases of San Ikpede v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd,147
Machine Umudje & Anor v Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd.148 The
courts have affirmed the application of the strict liability doctrine in Nigeria, which imposes a
stricter liability than that in the common law of negligence. For the strict liability doctrine is
otherwise considered a liability without fault; the defence of ‘diligence and vigilance’ does
not exonerate the polluter from liability as it is clearly demonstrated in the case of Rylands v
Fletcher.  Furthermore,  in  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Company  of  Nigeria  Ltd v  Abel
Isaiah and others,149 the trial Court as well as the Court of Appeal did affirm the plaintiff’s
claim  for  damages  in  negligence  and strict  liability  under  Rylands  v  Fletcher.  The  only
shortcoming on the latter case was the position of the Supreme Court that a State High Court
lacks  jurisdiction  to  entertain  issues  on  petroleum  mining  operations  which  includes
environmental pollution caused by oil and gas activities. It is submitted that the doctrine of
strict  liability  is  fully  appreciated  and  utilised  by  the  courts  in  deciding  issues  on
environmental pollution caused by oil and gas, and in view of this, there is no doubt that the
doctrine has come to stay in the Nigerian liability framework. However, elements of the strict
liability rule, the common law of negligence and nuisance are incorporated into extant laws
on environmental liability in Nigeria, particularly, the Oil Pipelines Act 2004.150
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The focal point of this research is on the enforcement of fundamental environmental rights.151
Having observed via case law, that the strict liability principle is applicable to ordinary rights
related to compensation and damages in environmental matters, it  is argued that a stricter
liability is deployed in fundamental rights enforcement. Such liability, as closely examined
above is absolute in that where fundamental rights to life and dignity of the human person are
violated, a polluter would not escape liability if it furnishes the court with evidence to the
effect that activities were done with due diligence and vigilance, or that it was an act of a
third party, or that there was statutory authority to embark on the said activities leading to
violation of rights. In fact, this was explicit when the Federal High Court in the case of Jonah
Gbemre,152 held that section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 2004153 as
well  as  the  section  1  of  the  Associated  Gas  Re-Injection  (continued  flaring  of  Gas)
Regulations section 1.43 of 1984, under which gas flaring may be permitted are inconsistent
with the applicant’s rights to life and or dignity of human person as captured in sections 33(1)
and 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution respectively, and articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African
Charter as mentioned earlier, and are therefore unconstitutional, null and void by virtue of
section 1(3) of the same Constitution (which provides for the supremacy of the Nigerian
Constitution).154
In the Nigerian case of San Ikpede v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd,155
the plaintiffs satisfied the Court with the prerequisite elements in a claim under strict liability
doctrine which the Court aligned reasons with, but refused to accept the claim under Rylands
v Fletcher on the ground that the activities of the defendant (SPDC) fell under the defence of
151
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‘statutory authority’, noting that the defendants are operating under a licence from the Federal
government. In the light of the aforesaid, it is submitted that the defence of statutory authority
is a remarkable defence in actions under strict liability doctrine, and if by virtue of the Jonah
Gbemre case above, such a defence is declared incompatible with the Nigerian Constitution
under fundamental rights enforcement, then, it is certain that a stricter liability will be visited
on polluters.  This  submission is  made,  bearing  in  mind the shortcoming  with  the  Jonah
Gbemre case, being a judgment of the Federal High Court which has not yet been subjected
to further tests of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Despite this shortcoming, it is
practically valid and rational, with regard to the importance of the right to life and dignity of
human person for a conclusion to be made that a law or regulation permitting environmental
pollution is inconsistent with the inherent right to life. As there is no doubt that a harmful
environment poses a great threat to human life.
It  is  further  maintained  that  if  the  defence  of  statutory  authority  can  be  considered
incompatible with the Constitutional rights to life and dignity of human person, it would be
plausible  and  healthy  to  reason  and  conclude  that  the  other  defences  in  strict  liability,
particularly, ‘acts of a third party’ which is mostly raised by TNCs, is not a justifiable ground
to escape liability in fundamental rights proceedings; and in view of this stance, liability in
would be considered absolute.
6.6 The Measure of liability in Fundamental Rights Violation Claims: A Brief Comparative 
Analysis between the Nigerian and Indian Jurisdictions.  
It is worthy to briefly take a glance into the Indian legal system, particularly, the role of the
Indian Constitution vis-à-vis the issues of human rights and the principle of the protection of
the  environment.  This  move  is  pursuant  to  the  fact  that  the  Drafters  of  the  Nigerian
Constitution of 1979 relied on the Indian Constitution to frame the Fundamental Objectives
and Directive  Principles  of  State  Policy,  including  provisions  on the  environment,156 and
certain provisions in the Indian Constitution were known to be ignored.157 In this regard, the
Nigerian Court of Appeal did make reference to the Indian Constitution and the decision of
the  Indian  Supreme  Court  in  Madras v  Champakam,158 whilst  attempting  to  resolve  the
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perceived  conflict  between the non-justiciability  provisions  in  Chapter  II  of  the  Nigerian
Constitution and the fundamental rights as enshrined in Chapter IV.159 It would therefore be
constructive and beneficial  to consider the gap, if any, on the application of fundamental
rights  principles  between  the  Indian  judicial  system  and  its  counterpart  in  Nigeria,
particularly  owing  to  the  fact  that  both  jurisdictions  were  under  British  rule,  and  have
inevitably obtained major parts of the English legal system; a close analysis, therefore would
reveal the jurisprudential and procedural innovations both jurisdictions have made so far.
Article 21 of the Constitution of India160 provides that: ‘No person shall be deprived of his
life  or  personal  liberty  except  according to  procedure  established by law.’  The aforesaid
provision of the Indian Constitution on the fundamental right to life underpins the majority of
decided cases on the nexus between human rights and environmental protection in the Indian
legal  system.161 It  follows,  through judicial  precedent  that  ‘life’  is  not  only  limited  to  a
physical existence but also the quality of life.162 The Indian Supreme Court has corroborated
the all-encompassing nature of the term ‘life’ to include human dignity and everything that
makes life more suitable when Justice Bhagwati reasoned that:
We think  that  the  right  to  life  includes  the  right  to  live  with  human
dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life
such  as  adequate  nutrition,  clothing  and  shelter  over  the  head  and
facilities for reading, writing, and expressing oneself in diverse forms.163
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In the light of the above, it would be plausible to hold that the right to life has a broader
interpretation beyond the ordinary meaning of ‘existence’. Although there is no mention of
environmental  protection  as  an  element  of  the  fundamental  right  to  life  in  the  above
observation by Justice Bhagwati, the right to a healthy environment, free from pollution has
been inculcated in the subsequent case of Virender Gaur v State of Haryana164 by the Indian
Supreme Court when it observed that:
Article 21 protects the right to life as a fundamental right. Enjoyment of
life… including the right to live with human dignity encompasses within
its ambit, the protection and preservation of the environment, ecological
balance free from pollution of air and water, sanitation, without which
life  cannot  be  enjoyed.  Any  contra  acts  or  actions  would  cause
environmental  pollution.  Environmental,  ecological,  air  and  water
pollution, etc., should be regarded as amounting to a violation of Article
21. Therefore, a hygienic environment is an integral facet of the right to a
healthy environment… There is a constitutional imperative on the State
Government and the municipalities, not only to ensure and safeguard a
proper  environment  but  also  an  imperative  duty  to  take  adequate
measures to promote, protect and improve both the man made and the
natural environment.165
The  above  observation  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  India  is  an  expansive  and  coherent
interpretation  of  the  fundamental  right  to  life  to  include  environmental  rights.  This
observation is in line with what is obtainable in the English jurisdiction and the Nigerian
legal system as shown in the discussion in chapter 2. The Indian Constitution, just like its
counterpart in Nigeria,166 contains certain provisions under the Fundamental Objectives and
Directive  Principles  of  State  Policy  which  are  related  to  environmental  protection,  and
equally  non  justiciable.167 On  the  other  hand,  part  III  of  the  Constitution  set  out  its
fundamental  rights  which  are  enforceable.  Article  21 which  sets  out  the  right  to  life,  as
164




 The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter II of the Nigerian
Constitution have been discussed to be non-justiciable except such provisions are incorporated into an Act of the
National Assembly (see discussions in figure 2.5).
167
 The directive principles of state policy are outlined in Part IV of the Indian Constitution and article 37
of the Indian Constitution is to the effect that matters under part IV cannot be enforced in a law court.
275
interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court to include environmental rights,168 falls under part
III.  Certainly,  legal arguments may erupt on the intentions of the Constitution drafters to
include  environmental  rights  as  fundamental  rights  (under  right  to  life),  since  principles
relating to environmental protection are meant to be mere declaratory as ordinary Objectives
of the State.
It is interesting to note that the Indian Judiciary has developed a constitutional doctrine of
‘harmonious construction’.169 The essence of the doctrine is to strike a balance or create a
harmonious  interpretation  between  any  perceived  conflict  of  interest  between  the  non-
justiciable provisions as found in part IV and the fundamental rights as contained in part III
of the Constitution.  The doctrine is to the effect that the States are under a discretionary
obligation to implement the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy
under  part  IV of  the  Constitution  but  it  must  be  carried  out  in  such a  manner  that  will
conform  with  the  fundamental  rights  of  citizens.170 This  same  doctrine  of  harmonious
construction is reflected in Nigeria in the position of the Court of Appeal in Bishop Okogie
(Trustee of Roman Catholic schools) & Ors v Attorney-General of Lagos State171 to the effect
that: ‘…no provision in chapter II can override or inhibit the provisions of Chapter IV on
fundamental rights.’
The measure of liability which is retained by the Indian Judiciary for individuals or corporate
bodies who have caused injury or damage to others as a consequence of their engagement in
hazardous or inherently dangerous activities, was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of  MC Mehta v Union of India.172 Again, it is noteworthy to mention that the Indian
168
 Virender Gaur v State of Haryana (n 164).
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 The doctrine of harmonious construction has been emphasised in the cases of MH Quaresh v State of
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 Okon (n 35).
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case-law in this regard is relevant owing to the fact that both Nigeria and India were under
British  rule  and  have  consequently  retained  English  common  law  rules  in  determining
liability  of  different  sort.  Whilst  addressing  the  issue  whether  the  English  rule  of  strict
liability as emphasised in the case of Rylands v Fletcher173 would be applicable in violation of
Constitutional rights, particularly, the violation of Fundamental Rights to life as captured in
Article 21, the Indian Supreme Court was of the view that the principle in Rylands’ case
evolved at a time when the standard of science and technology was still very low compared to
what is obtainable at the moment (1986, when the judgment was delivered), and as a result,
the doctrine of strict liability cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability
consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social
structure in India. This observation of the Supreme Court of India is pursuant to the fact that
law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast
with  the  economic  developments  taking place  in  the  country.  In  analysing  the  nature  of
liability involved in India vis-à-vis the liability for environmental polluters, the Court stated
that:
…We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous
or  inherently  dangerous industry which poses  a  potential  threat  to  the
health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the
surrounding  areas  owes  an  absolute  and  non-delegable  duty  to  the
community  to  ensure  that  no  harm  results  to  anyone  on  account  of
hazardous or inherently nature of the activity which it has undertaken.
The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be
conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on
account  of  such  activity,  the  enterprise  must  be  absolutely  liable  to
compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to
say  that  it  had  taken  all  reasonable  care  and  that  the  harm occurred
without any negligence on its part.174
The above position of the Indian Supreme Court is a true reflection of the doctrine of absolute
liability,  as  the  Court  has  equally  made  it  very  explicit  that  none  of  the  exceptions  as
173
 [1861] All ER Rep 1 (HL) the strict liability rule in the case of  Ryland v Fletcher as discussed in
chapter 1 of this research provides that a person who for his own purpose brings on to his land and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima
facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. There are series of defences which a
defendant could raise, thereby making liability strict, but not absolute.
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applicable  in  strict  liability175 will  exonerate  any  enterprise  involved  in  such  hazardous
damage. It could be extrapolated in light of the above that the nature of liability which is
utilised  in  tortious  actions  varies  from  that  applicable  in  Constitutional  cases  under
fundamental rights enforcement. Whilst the nature of liability applicable in torts of nuisance,
negligence and strict liability cases as well as in enforcement of the Convention rights are
clearly spelt out in the English legal system as discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of the research,
the applicable standard of liability involved in fundamental rights enforcement relating to
environmental  pollution incidents in Nigeria  and India seem to be vague in that it  is  not
clearly captured in specific codes, thereby prompting the courts to exercise their  inherent
discretions  in giving meaning to  the law in this  emerging area.  This latter  submission is
informed on the basis that sections 33 and 34 of the Nigerian Constitution and Articles 4, 16
and 24 of the African Charter respectively are silent on the standard of liability involved in
cases of violations of fundamental rights. This is equally the case in Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution. Consequently, due to the fundamental nature of these rights, the courts are more
obliged to develop liability principles relating to breach of these environmental rights in a
stricter or absolute sense than is obtainable in other claims bordering on ordinary rights.
In another striking case of Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India,176 where the release
of highly toxic substance by the Union Carbide Corporation (defendant) was said to have led
to the deaths of over 2,500 persons and more than 200,000 people maimed for life,177the
Madhya Pradesh High Court, while holding the defendant liable for the damages caused to its
victims, aligned reasoning with the position of the Supreme Court in MC Mehta178 as regards
the  principle  of  absolute  liability.  The  defendant  was  held  liable  without  any  of  the
exceptions as applicable in the English doctrine of strict liability. It is apparent in the light of
175
 The defences which can be raised by a defendant  in a strict  liability claim are fully discussed in
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the  MC Mehta case and the  Union Carbide Corporation case that the doctrine of Absolute
liability holds sway mostly in cases of fundamental rights violations in India.
In view of the above decisions of the Indian Courts on the correlation between fundamental
rights to life, enjoyment of private and family life, and human dignity on one hand and the
enjoyment  of  an  environment  free  from pollution  on  the  other,  it  is  clear  that  the  three
primary jurisdictions given consideration in this research (Nigeria, English and Wales as well
as India) are unanimous to the fact that environmental pollution would violate and generate
the  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights  proceedings  in  the  aforementioned  jurisdictions.
Whilst  common  law  and  statutory  provisions  relating  to  environmental  liability  are  still
prevalent  in  the  aforesaid  jurisdictions,  it  is  shown  that  the  Indian  courts  are  far  more
determined to implement an absolute liability regime against industries engaged in hazardous
or inherently dangerous activities within the ambit of fundamental rights enforcement, and
this has been shown in a plethora of decided cases, most particularly in MC Mehta v Union of
India,179 which was a decision of the Supreme Court.  This reminds us, once more of the
initial hypothesis of this thesis, which is to ‘examine whether the doctrine of absolute liability
may be applied to the principle of the protection of the environment in cases of fundamental
rights violations by oil and gas operators.’
In the English and Wales jurisdiction, it is clear that the Human Rights Act of 1998 which
embodied the European Convention Rights, particularly in section 1(2) is unambiguous to the
fact that the Convention rights as applicable in UK are subject to ‘any designated derogation
or reservation’, and in the English case of  Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd,180 a public
authority  will  be exonerated from any form of violation of the Convention rights if  such
authority is seen to have acted reasonably. Furthermore, Article 8(2) of the Convention rights
permits violation of individual right to enjoyment of private and family life in circumstances
where the incident amounting to the alleged violation is one that is for the economic well-
being of the state. It is maintained that the standard of liability in the English jurisdiction,
both in human rights cases on the one hand and common law and statutory liability regarding
to  hazardous  activities  causing  harm to  others  on  the  other,  hovers  around principles  of
179
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tortious  liability  under  the  strict  liability  rule,  nuisance,  negligence  because  of  the
requirement of public authorities acting ‘reasonably’, which is a requirement anchored on the
aforesaid common law principles.181 Hence, there could not be identified any stricter liability
standard attached to Human Rights or Conventions rights proceedings other than the ones
applicable in the aforementioned tortious liability principles.
It would be plausible to reason that the position of the Federal High Court in the Nigerian
case of Jonah Gbemre,182 which declared null and void the relevant sections of the Associated
Gas  Re-Injection  Act  permitting  flaring  of  gas  on  the  basis  that  such  flaring  violates
applicants’  fundamental  rights  relating  to  the  environment  as  captured  in  the  Nigerian
Constitution and African Charter, is in tandem with the position of the Indian Supreme Court
in the MC Mehta case and others discussed above. This is clearly instructive to the extent that
where activities of oil and gas operators causes harm to inhabitants, it will not be a defence to
say that such injury was caused in the course of activities permitted or obliged by statute, or
that a licence holder acted reasonably without negligence in a case of fundamental rights
enforcement. It is argued that this development had incidentally triggered an absolute liability
(or a stricter liability than the common law strict liability rule) regime within the ambit of
fundamental rights. But unlike the Indian case law in this regard which is affirmed by the
Supreme Court, the position of the Federal High Court in the  Jonah Gbemre case is still
subject to further validity tests, that is, the Nigerian Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
are yet  to  give any ruling on this;  but until  that  is  done,  the  Jonah Gbemre verdict  still
remains subsisting, logical and far-reaching. However, it would be pertinent to point out that
as at the 4th of April, 2016, when an application to search the case file of the aforementioned
case (Jonah Gbemre v SPDC) was put forward before the Assistant Director Litigation at the
Federal High Court (Benin Division), it was confirmed that there is no pending appeal on the
courts’ verdict, meanwhile the judgment was delivered in 2005.
6.7 Conclusions
The basis  of this  chapter  is that:  if  there are fundamental  rights and ordinary rights;  and
ordinary rights are treated with strict liability principles or principles in the common law torts
181
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of negligence and nuisance in the Nigerian environmental liability regime, then it is worthy
task to test or examine whether a breach of the fundamental rights relating to environmental
safety could be visited with a stiffer or an absolute liability regime. The purpose for such an
examination, as is the purpose of the entire research, is to create an alternative platform under
fundamental  rights  enforcement  proceedings  for  victims  of  environmental  pollution  in
Nigeria, and this is manifestly expedient owing to the numerous challenges encountered by
victims of environmental pollution who pursue their claims via common law principles of
liability and existing statutory regimes (particularly the Oil Pipelines Act 2004) applicable in
Nigeria.
It has been shown that every jurisdiction retains its peculiar features and legal background,
defined by economic,  political  and social factors, and although the English law principles
were still retained in Nigeria and India, the law is modified and departed from the English
practice on grounds of prevailing peculiarities and conditions in respective jurisdictions and
subject matters. This is more evident in the sphere of environmental rights enforcement. The
prevailing  principle  for liability  under the Convention rights as applicable in the English
Jurisdiction is reflected in the doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation which tends to strike a
balance between the interests of the individual and the state.`
In Nigeria, the right to life could only be interfered with in accordance with the execution of a
court order, for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or property, to effect arrest
and when supressing riot or similar activities. Also, with regards to the right to dignity of
human  person,  such  right  can  be  interfered  during  required  labour  of  the  armed  forces,
community labour and labours during national service. Albeit the Federal High Court seems
to be silent on the measure of liability to be applied on violations of the constitutional right to
life and dignity of human person, which has been interpreted to include environmental rights
in Jonah Gbemre v SPDC Nigeria,183 it is argued that such liability is absolute. In that case,
the defendants were held responsible for ‘continuous flaring’ which was said to have violated
certain fundamental rights to life and dignity of the person. It is admitted that,  there is a
scintilla  of  ambiguity  on  how  ‘absolute’  liability  could  be  in  cases  of  violations  of
fundamental rights in Nigeria, but the Court has demonstrated its direction toward an absolute
liability regime when it rendered the defence of ‘statutory authority’, (basically deployed in
legal claims under strict liability, nuisance, negligence and others) to be incompatible with
183
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fundamental  rights  to  life  and  dignity  of  human  person  within  environmental  rights
enforcement. 
The ECOWAS Court of justice has maintained that States must ensure that ‘vigilance and
diligence’ are employed in activities which could lead to violations of individual rights to a
safe  environment.  The  concept  of  ‘diligence’  is  in  line  with  principles  of  the  tort  of
negligence,  but  the  term  ‘vigilance’,  appears  to  be  a  vague  concept  within  legal
jurisprudence; nonetheless, this has been interpreted to mean an intensified effort by the state
to be diligent;  hence, vigilance could be utilised as a litmus test or lens to determine the
extent of ‘diligence’ exercised by the state or TNCs. In India,  the courts  have been very
explicit to the fact that the common law doctrine of strict liability could no longer stand in
cases of constitutional rights violations, and that liability in such cases is ‘absolute’.184
Also, it is reasoned that the obligations and laws derived from the Fundamental Objectives
and Directive Principles of State Policy in the Nigerian Constitution could only be considered
to be ordinary rights (particularly when encoded in statutes) as against the fundamental rights
contained in the sections of the enforceable parts of Constitution, except provisions of the
African  Charter  which  has  benefited  enhanced  status  from  the  Fundamental  Rights
(Enforcement  Procedure)  Rules  2009.  The  relevance  of  the  discussion  on  the  aforesaid
ordinary  rights  is  that  they  are utilised  as  a  means for  testing  whether  there can  be any
improvement on the standard of liability to be conferred on polluters in fundamental rights
enforcement proceedings.
It is conclusively stated that owing to the defences attached to the strict liability rule and
other  common  law  torts,  as  embodied  in  the  extant  statutory  schemes  regarding
environmental pollution claims in Nigeria, such as the defence of ‘statutory authority’, ‘acts
of  a  third  party’  and  others,185 the  aforementioned  liability  principles  cannot  sustain  the
current challenges of environmental abuse pursued through fundamental rights proceedings,
hence the need to create a legal ambience for constitutional rights to augment by retaining the
doctrine of absolute liability. In this vein, absolute rights would connote those fundamental
184
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rights under the Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter that cannot be interfered with,
no matter how important the public interest in doing so might be. This is because issues of
convenience should not be seen to override fundamental rights, due to their constitutional
supremacy.
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                                             CONCLUSIONS
A key research question is asked: will the polluter be absolutely liable in fundamental rights
enforcement proceeding predicated on the violation of the rights to life, dignity of human
person  and  enjoyment  of  private  and  family  life  where  environmental  protection  is
disregarded  by  oil  transnational  corporations  (TNCs)?  This  question  is  answered  in  the
affirmative after a critical analysis of existing principles of liability in Nigeria, ranging from
existing English common law liability rules and statutory provisions on oil and gas pollution
claims on one hand, and the provisions of Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 as
well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement)
Act 2004 on the other.
It is trite that the Nigerian legal system maintains substantial similarities with English law,
Nigeria being a former colony of Britain. Such legal similarities are mostly seen where there
are lacunas in the Nigerian legal system. One major source of Nigerian law is the ‘received
English law’, the ‘received English law’ includes; the common law, doctrines of equity and
the statutes of general application, being laws made before 1900.1 This simply implies that
the  English  common  law  is  automatically  received  in  Nigeria  but  Subject  to  Nigerian
legislation  and  policies2 which  have  emerged  due  to  the  peculiar  demands  based  on
jurisdictional differences. Whilst it has been noticed that oil and gas pollution incidents are
very frequent in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta region, it is clear that such cases of
pollution are less frequent in the United Kingdom. This explains the frequent concern and
attention given by patriotic Nigerians on issues of environmental pollution; as it is equally
reflected  in  this  current  research,  prompting  an  argument  for  absolute  liability  via
fundamental rights enforcement proceedings.
Victims of environmental pollution have always explored means to seek for compensation,
and in most cases, such desire for redress has led both victims and polluters to end up in
courts.  The courts are then left  with the larger onus in framing a standard for measuring
1
 VI Mbu, ‘Problems of the Nigerian Legal System in the light  of the Analytical  Jurisprudence  of
Norzick and Rawls’ (1994) 6 SLJIL 111, 117.
2
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liability of oil operators based on available evidence. It is this burden of proving the liability
of TNCs and other cases of environmental harm caused by individuals that has raised liability
principles in the torts of nuisance, negligence, strict liability, and even an absolute liability in
the current research.
In the English common law jurisdiction, the concept of strict liability was first made vivid in
the case of  Rylands v Fletcher.3 In this  doctrine,  certain elements  are needed in order to
establish the strict liability of polluters or those who have caused harm to others. In proving a
case of strict liability, the claimant must show that the defendant brought something to his
land; that the thing is of the kind that is likely to do mischief if it escapes; that the thing is a
non-natural use of land, and that the thing finally escaped. All these elements were discussed
in  chapter  1  under  figure  1.3.  The doctrine  of  strict  liability  has  actually  raised  a  lot  of
academic  debate  on  whether  having  regard  to  the  need  to  establish  the  aforementioned
ingredients, it can still be said that the defendant is ‘strictly liable’ for his activities which had
caused damage to the claimants. Some scholars and writers are of the view that the doctrine is
fault-based, that is, the claimants must be able to establish the aforementioned ingredients
thereby establishing that  the defendant  is  at  fault  before the courts  can establish liability
based on the available evidence. Adherents of this school of thought are of the view that strict
liability  rule  under  Rylands v Fletcher is  only  an extension  of  existing  principles  of  the
common law tort of nuisance and negligence, which are generally ‘no liability without fault’
concepts.
On the other hand, some scholars are of the contention that the doctrine of strict liability does
exist,  and  it  is  unique  and  relevant  to  contemporary  issues  of  environmental  harm.
Contenders of this latter standpoint are of the view that the rule of strict liability is applicable
to cases of hazardous substances or activities of the defendant. It is noted by AJ Waite4 in his
analysis of the case of Transco Plc v Stockport MBC,5 that there are circumstances, however
small, in which it is justifiable for the courts to impose liability without fault, particularly
3
 [1861-73] All ER Rep 1 (HL).
4
 Andrew J Waite, ‘Deconstructing the rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ (2006) 18 JEL 423.
5
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where the dangerous nature of the substance or activity is foreseeable. The requirement of
foreseeability of harm of the dangerous activities of the defendant has been considered by the
House of Lords in the cases of Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Plc,6
and later in Transco Plc v Stockport MBC7as a unique feature of strict liability torts.
In chapter 1 of this research, a brief comparative analysis between the torts of negligence and
that of the strict liability rule under Rylands v Fletcher was showcased (see figure 1.4.3). It is
contended by Gerhart8 that the rules of strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher can best come
under the tort of negligence. It is maintained, in the light of Gerhart’s contention, that there
are areas of differences between the common law tort of negligence and the rule of strict
liability. In negligence, it is obvious that the claimant must contend that the defendant owed
him a legal duty of care, and that the breach of such duty has caused him (defendant) injury
or damage. The primary requirement therefore in a case of negligence is to determine via
preponderance of evidence whether the defendant exercised ‘reasonable care’ or not. Where
it is established from the balance of probabilities that the defendant was ‘reckless’ over the
outcome of his  activities  towards his  neighbour,  then liability  will  be imposed where the
neighbour can show damages suffered. On the other hand, it is made obvious in the light of
the  Transco9 case  that  the  primary  requirement  of  strict  liability  cases  under  Rylands v
Fletcher is that the defendant must have the foresight of the dangerous nature of his activities
or substance. With regards to the latter stance, it is observed that foreseeability of harm is
both  a  requirement  in  negligence  and  nuisance.  But  under  the  strict  liability  rule,  the
foreseeability of the escape of such dangerous thing is irrelevant insofar as damage is caused
to the claimant (victim). It follows that, the fact that the defendant was ‘reckless’ over the
escape of the dangerous thing is irrelevant in determining liability under Rylands’s rule, but
proof of ‘recklessness’ in the tort of negligence is a sine qua non.
6
 [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL).
7
 Transco (n 5).
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 Peter M Gerhart, ‘The Death of Strict Liability’ (2008) 56 Buff  L Rev 245, 246.
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Another aspect of the common law which is said to have given hand to the doctrine of strict
liability as established in Rylands v Fletcher is the tort of nuisance. Turner and Hodge have
pointed out that ‘actions in nuisance can lie for oil spills, nasty smells, noise and anything
else  which  affects  nearby  land  or  the  comfort  and  convenience  of  the  occupiers  of  that
land’.10 There is no doubt that the torts of nuisance and strict liability offences as established
in the  Rylands case,  share similar  features.  In the tort  of nuisance,  the defendant  can be
exonerated from liability where he can show that he has done what is reasonable in order to
avoid the risk of harm.11 In essence, the lack of ‘reasonable use’ of land by the defendant will
attract liability against the defendant in nuisance. Lord Goff in the Cambridge Water Co Ltd
v Eastern  Counties  Leather  Plc12 has  convincingly  established  that  there  are  no  striking
differences between the tort of nuisance and that of strict liability in  Rylands v  Fletcher. It
was made clear in the Cambridge Water case that foreseeability of harm of the substance or
activities of the defendant is a prerequisite in both torts of nuisance and the strict liability
rule.13 In essence, in both cases of nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, the defendant
cannot be liable for a harm which he could not foresee. However, Lord Goff pointed out a
possible area of difference between strict liability rule and the tort of private nuisance when
he said:
… It  would  moreover  lead  to  a  more  coherent  body of  common law
principles if the rule were to be regarded essentially as an extension of
the law of nuisance to cases of isolated escapes from land, even though
the  rule  as  established  is  not  limited  to  escapes  which  are  in  fact
isolated.14
10
 Chris Turner and Sue Hodge, Unlocking Torts (2nd edn, Hoder Arnold 2007) 300.
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Furthermore, Lord Hoffmann in the Transco15 case made reference to Lord Goff’s position in
Cambridge  Water  case,  pointing  out  that  the  novel  feature  of  liability  under  Rylands v
Fletcher is that the defendant will be liable even if he could not reasonably have foreseen that
there  would  be  an  escape.16 In  view  of  the  aforesaid  remark  and  in  light  of  recent
considerations, it is submitted that the doctrine of strict liability is still in existence, but the
doctrine is  not  ‘absolute’  having regard to the need to establish ‘foreseeability  of harm’,
coupled with the defences associated with the doctrine. However, there is no doubt in the
English jurisdiction that ‘oil and gas’ are considered as ‘dangerous things’ having regard to
the cases of Batcheller v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co,17 and that of  Colour Quest Ltd v Total
Downstream UK plc,18 as discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis. It is maintained that in order to
avoid unnecessary regime of instability in the legal system, all principles and requirements
relating to the strict liability of oil and gas pollution be encoded into statutes.
At  the  international  level,  most  conventions  and  treaties  have  emphasised  the  need  for
polluters to be directly responsible to the consequences of their ultra-hazardous activities. It is
shown that issues of strict liability can be found in international conventions and treaties. One
relevant international decision where the doctrine of strict liability has found its way in, is the
Trail Smelter Arbitration.19 But this case, looking at the attitude of members of the arbitral
tribunal not to seek for requirements of foreseeability of harm and or other defences in strict
liability, makes it almost probable to conclude that liability was absolute.
In the light of the analysis of the Nigerian laws on environmental pollution in chapter 5 of
this research, and the analysis of decided cases in Nigerian courts in chapter 1, it is clear that
15
 Transco (n 5).
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18
 [2009] EWHC 823 (Com Ct), [2009] All ER (D) 311.
19
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untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_iii/1905-1982.pdf > accessed 10 July 2013.
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the  doctrine  of  strict  liability  has  found  its  way  in  the  Nigerian  legal  system  with  its
limitations. The victims of oil and gas pollution can raise claims under the doctrine of strict
liability in Nigeria through existing laws and reliance on case-law. In the Nigerian cases of
San Ikpede v Shell  Petroleum Development  Company Nigeria  Ltd,20 Machine  Umudje  &
Anor  v  Shell-BP  Petroleum  Development  Company  Nigeria  Ltd,21 Shell  Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd v Abel Isaiah and others,22 and a couple of others, it is
clear  that  the  Nigerian  Courts  are  versed  and  open  to  the  application  of  strict  liability
principles in cases of oil and gas pollution. 
Also, by virtue of section 11(5)(c) of the Oil pipelines Act 200423 provides, inter alia, that the
holder of a licence shall pay compensation to any person who has suffered damage as a result
of any breakage or leakage from pipeline or any other installation. The only qualification in
the aforementioned provision is  that  a victim of such pollution cannot  be entitled to any
compensation where the breakage or leakage was as a result of his default or the malicious
act of a third party. It is obvious that this provision is the statutory version of the rule in
Rylands v Fletcher since the burden to prove that the damage was caused by the claimant or a
third  party  will  rest  on  the  defendant.  Even  at  this,  it  is  argued  that  once  damage  is
foreseeable,  TNCs should  be held  absolutely  liable,  since  activities  of  ‘third  parties’  are
equally foreseeable acts that can be curtailed by TNCs.
By virtue of section 37 of the Petroleum Act 2004,24 the holder of an oil exploration licence
in addition to any other liability is liable to pay ‘fair and adequate compensation’ for the
disturbance  of  surface  or  other  rights  to  any person who is  in  lawful  occupation  of  the
licensed land.  Although this  section seems to restrict  compensation  to persons who have
20
 [1973] MWSJ 61 (Ovie Whiskey J).
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personal interest in the polluted land, liability here is strict since the section is concerned
about  additional  compensation  to  victims  irrespective  of  the nature  of  any other  liability
which the defendant will be subjected to.
Other statutes such as the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 2004,25 Associated Gas Re-Injection
Act,26 Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act 2004,27 establishes varying kinds of
liability  on  environmental  polluters,  except  where  such  pollutions  occur  with  reasonable
precaution on the part of polluters or with the permission of the Nigerian government. It is
submitted that such exceptions (exercise of reasonable care and statutory authority) might not
exonerate the polluter from liability where the pollution caused is said to have breached the
fundamental rights of the victims as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution.  Generally,  in
determining  whether  oil  operators  are  negligent,  the  courts  would  likely  utilise  similar
standards  as  that  of  the  Bolam  Test as  found  in  the  case  of  Bolam v Friern  Hospital
Management Committee.28 This would require the court to consider whether the polluter acted
in line with global best practices in the events leading to pollution.
It is observed that considering the defence of ‘statutory authority’ under the strict liability
rule and under the aforesaid statutes in Nigeria with regard to environmental pollution cases,
it would be plausible to conclude that the rule of strict liability as known in Rylands is not
necessarily effective or applicable in Nigeria since the defence of statutory authority (which
is major defence under the rule), if applied would automatically curtail the need to institute
legal actions against TNCs. Owing to this, the courts traditionally rely on the standards of
liability in the torts of negligence and nuisance in cases of environmental pollution. That is,
the Courts are more concerned whether TNCs acted with ‘due care’ or ‘reasonably’ in their
activities with a view to determine liability.
25
 Cap O6 LFN 2004.
26
 Cap A25 LFN 2004.
27
 Cap H1 LFN 2004.
28
 [1957] 2 All ER 118.
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At an international level, it is maintained that the current liability regime is in favour of the
standard of liability required in the tort of negligence, particularly because of the need to
prevent harm from befalling others, and prevention of harm is a key element in negligence. In
the case of Argentina v Uruguay29 (the ‘pulp mills dispute’) the International Court of Justice
observed the applicability of the principle of negligence in the following remark:
The Court points out that the principle of prevention, as a customary rule,
has  its  origins  in  the  due  diligence  that  is  required  of  a  state  in  its
territory.  It  is  “every  state’s  obligation  not  to  allow  knowingly  its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states” (Corfu
Channel,  United  Kingdom v Albania),  merits,  Judgment,  ICJ  Reports
1949, p.22). A state is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in
order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area
under its jurisdiction causing significant damage to the environment of
another State. This Court has established that this obligation “is now part
of the corpus of international law relating to the environment” (Legality
of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, ICJ Reports
1996(1), p.242, para. 29).30
It  is  observed that  the  Pulp  Mills judgment  anchoring  liability  for  international  harm on
principles  of  negligence  (prevention  and  due  diligence)31 was  reached  in  error.  This  is
because the construction of the Mills and its attendant harm was a foreseeable act, which
should  attract  a  strict  and/or  absolute  liability.  It  is  submitted  that  where  damage  is
foreseeable and there is no third-party intervention, liability should be absolute, irrespective
of the claim for deployment of ‘due diligence’.
In the same vein, the African Commission in the communication of  Social and Economic
Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v The Federal Republic of Nigeria,32 and the
ECOWAS Court of Justice in the case of Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project
29
 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) [2010] ICJ Rep14.
30
 Pulp Mills (n 29) [101].
31
 Pulp Mills (n 29) para 101.
32
 [2001] AHRLR 60 Communication 155/96, decided at the 30 th ordinary session, October 2001 of the
African commission.
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(SERAP)  v  The Federal  Republic  of  Nigeri,33 have emphasised  on the need for  states  to
exhibit reasonableness and care34 as well as ‘vigilance and diligence’35 respectively, with a
view  to  prevent  environmental  pollution  which  directly  affects  the  rights  to  a  healthy
environment of citizens. It is observed that these aforesaid requirements are all elements of
the common law torts of nuisance and negligence.
In another perspective, the doctrine of strict liability is conspicuously seen to be applicable in
the  Convention  of  Civil  Liability  for  Oil  Pollution  Damage  1992  (which  Nigeria  is  a
signatory).  This  Convention  is  exclusively  applicable  to  registered  ship-owners  who  are
found to have discharged oil at sea. In circumstances where the ship is not registered, liability
will be traced to the person (s) owning the ship, and by virtue of Article 1(2) of the 1992
Convention, ‘person’ includes states or corporations owned by the state.
Also, it is noteworthy to mention that judges are inclined to express independent opinions on
the basis of their perceptions on legal issues, particularly where the law is ambiguous. This
explains the concept of case law in legal parlance. Lord Denning affirmed this concept in the
case of Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation,36 when he said:
We sit here to find out the intention of parliament and ministers and carry
it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the
enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis.37
The  above  position  is  practically  seen  in  the  series  of  cases  relied  upon  in  the  current
research,  where  judges  have  creatively  and  expansively  interpreted  statutory  and
33
 Socio-Economic  Rights  and  Accountability  Project  (SERAP)  v  The  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria
[2012] Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS (Judgment N0 ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12).
34
 SERAC v FRN (n 32) [52], [54].
35
 SERAP v FRN (n 33) [112].
36
 [1950] 2 All ER 1226 (CA).
37
 Magor’s case (n 36) at 1236.
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constitutional provisions. The judgment of the Federal High Court in the Jonah Gbemre case
is instructive in this regard.
It  is  shown that  the terms  human rights and fundamental  rights,  in  most cases,  are  used
interchangeably. But in more practical terms, fundamental rights are those rights recognised
by  various  statutes  or  laws  and  could  be  enforced  when  violated.  Notwithstanding,  the
significance of the concept of human rights (which is basically associated with natural law) is
not  to be totally  overruled,  because at  the time when natural  law philosophers and other
apologists considered principles of natural law as constituting ‘law’, the legal regime was
remarkably  dominantly  centred  on  divine  or  religious  norms,  and such laws  or  religious
norms were seen to be enforced within the society where they apply. However, it is clear that
as the people’s awareness on the concept of law progresses, it became obvious that some laws
or rights are glaringly inalienable and deserves to be encoded and given higher status, thereby
necessitating the embodiment of principles of fundamental rights. But even at this, the human
rights and fundamental rights are still  used interchangeably. In line with the Fundamental
Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 applicable in Nigeria, ‘human right’ is used as a
mother term to include fundamental right, and specifically, ‘fundamental rights’ are defined
to mean any of the rights provided for in Chapter IV of the Constitution, and includes any of
the rights stipulated in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and
Enforcement) Act 2004.38 Nevertheless, it  is worth mentioning that the current research is
concerned with making environmental pollution a matter of fundamental right.
Having  established  the  special  value  attached  to  fundamental  rights,  it  is  said  that  the
violations of the rights to life, dignity of the person as well as private and family life, at both
municipal and international levels include a violation of environmental right (the right to a
safe environment), even if the latter right is not explicitly stated in most world treaties and
domestic laws as discussed in the body of the research. This inclusion of environmental right
to the aforesaid rights has been described as a genuine display of the Courts’ discretionary
jurisdiction in creatively and expansively interpreting legal provisions. It is observed that an
environment  degraded  by  pollution  is  contrary  to  satisfactory  living  conditions  and  the
development of personality, as well as harmful to physical and moral health. In essence, it is
concluded that once the environment is polluted by activities of TNCs, the aforementioned
fundamental rights, are directly violated. It follows that, the right to life is dependent on the
38
 Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, Ord I, r 2.
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right to a balanced and healthy environment, and issues of environmental protection should
be unequivocally linked with provisions of fundamental rights.
Having considered the nature of liability involved in torts of nuisance, negligence, and strict
liability  under  Rylands v Fletcher,  it  is argued that  the measure of liability  obtainable in
events of infringement of the rights to life and dignity of human person ought to be stricter,
even  absolute,  due  to  their  enhanced  status  over  and  above  ordinary  claims;  for  the
importance  of  fundamental  rights  have  been affirmed by the  Nigerian  courts  in  different
occasions.
Absolute liability has been utilised within the context of this research as a phrase to depict a
case where liability attaches to a person on the happening of given condition and despite any
care that person may have taken and despite any facts suggesting the happening was beyond
human foresight, and without any requirement to raise the common law defences of Act of a
stranger, statutory authority and others that could exonerate liability of defendants in a case
of strict liability as found in Rylands v Fletcher (see figure 6.4.1), and having established a
correlation between environmental pollution caused by oil and gas activities of TNCs and the
violation of fundamental rights to life, dignity of human person and private and family life as
captured  in  the  Nigerian  Constitution  as  well  as  the  right  to  a  satisfactory  environment
provided for in the African Charter (which is now a municipal enactment in Nigeria), it is
concluded that these rights as contained in the aforesaid enactments have no known defence
or excuse which is relevant within the activities of oil industries to be raised in a proceeding
for the enforcement of fundamental rights in an environmental perspective (see figures 6.4
and 6.4.1).
The constitutional  defences  for the right  to life  are  execution of the sentence of a court,
defence  of  person from unlawful  violence  or  property,  to  effect  lawful  arrest  or  prevent
escape of detained persons, suppressing in riot, insurrection or mutiny. The aforesaid are the
only defences known in the Nigerian Constitution regarding the right to life. In the same vein
the  only  grounds  under  which  the  right  to  dignity  of  the  person (inhuman  or  degrading
treatment) can be interfered with are in the circumstance of forced labour, in consequence of
the sentence or order of a court, labour required of members of the armed forces, any labour
reasonably necessary in the event of any emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-
being of the community, compulsory national service which forms part of the education and
training of citizens as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. Article 24 of
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the African Charter was even more absolute without any reservation when it provides that
‘All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their
development’. 
In view of the foregoing, and in view of the established link between environmental pollution
incidents  and fundamental  rights  violation  in  Chapter  IV of  the  Nigerian  Constitution,  it
would be plausible in law to conclude that where the Constitution or statute is silent as to any
defence or exception, the application and argument for such a defence would be rebutted,
since the drafters never contemplated for such an extraneous defence. In essence, it would be
incompatible with provisions of the Constitution and even of the African Charter (which are
given higher priority) for environmental polluters to raise any of the defences in the common
law of negligence, nuisance or strict liability in a case for fundamental rights enforcement;
for in strict compliance with legal positivism, those defences are not known to the Nigerian
Constitution,  and it  could be argued that  bearing in mind the supremacy of the Nigerian
Constitution, all defences of Act of a third party, exercise of due care and reasonability and
statutory authority as found in the Oil Pipelines Act, Associated Gas Re-Injection Act and the
Petroleum Act  as  mentioned  in  chapter  5  are  to  the  extent  of  their  inconsistencies  with
constitutional provisions, void. This latter stance was affirmed by a Federal High Court in
Nigeria in the case of Jonah Gbemre (for himself and as representing Iwherekan Community
in Delta State, Nigeria) v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and others.
Furthermore, it is mentioned that where the environment is polluted via activities of oil and
gas of oil transnational corporations in Nigeria, victims who can show that the quality of their
private lives and the enjoyment of their homes have been affected, and who intend to institute
proceedings under fundamental rights enforcement would deem it fit to raise arguments for
violation of the right to private and family life as provided for in section 37 of the Nigerian
Constitution. It is maintained in the current research that environmental pollution should not
only be a matter of ‘human right’ but a matter of fundamental right due to the direct effect of
pollution incidents on human life.
On the other, the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the African Commission are seen to be
inclined to a regime of principles of negligence in determining cases of violation of human
rights relating to environmental pollution incidents. This can equally be described to be the
case in England and Wales, as the municipal courts have subscribed to the doctrine of the
Margin of Appreciation developed by the European Court of Human Rights, which ordinarily
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is a joint application of liability principles in nuisance and negligence rather than an absolute
liability for the Convention rights.
The research identified five key challenges among others in obtaining environmental justice
within the ambit of fundamental rights enforcement, namely: the economic benefits of the
state,39 the defence of ‘act of third party’40 frequently raised by TNCs to escape liability, the
lack of public awareness in promoting environmental rights,41 vagueness and technicalities in
in extant common law principles in establishing environmental liability against TNCs, and
the lack of direct  constitutional  provisions to a  safe environment.  The economic grounds
argument  is  developed and expansively interpreted  to explain  the ineffectiveness  or  non-
implementation of existing laws in holding environmental polluters (particularly TNCs) liable
for  environmental  damage,  and  consequently  violating  fundamental  rights  to  a  safe
environment.  It is concluded that the key reason for the reluctance of some governments,
particularly  in  developing  nations  to  inculcate  fundamental  rights  to  a  pollution-free
environment  in  their  Constitution  vis-à-vis  activities  of  oil  and  gas  is  the  fact  that  oil
transnational corporations have been a major source of the economic live stream of these
nations, and to open the door of fundamental rights enforcement in environmental matters is
to open a flood gate of arbitrary and a plethora of judicial cases against these corporations,
and if this is allowed, there is the tendency of victims obtaining series of court injunctions
and compensations  against  oil  industries,  thereby obstructing  the  profits  and activities  of
these companies and consequently having a direct effect on the fortunes of the nation.42 
It is observed that if such rights (environmental rights) are overtly enshrined and recognised
in the Nigerian Constitution, the Nigerian courts would be flooded with legal actions relating
to fundamental rights enforcement and this is primarily due to the growing number of oil
39
 See discussion in chapter 3 of the research
40
 See chapter 6 of the research.
41
 See chapter 4 of the research.
42
 See Chapter 3 of thesis on the analysis of bottlenecks connected to implementation of an absolute
liability regime in fundamental rights enforcement.
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spills in the country, particularly in the Niger Delta area where oil pollution incidents are
predominant.  In  the  Nigerian  case  of  Allar  Irou v Shell  BP,43 the  court  had  refused  an
injunction to restrain the defendant (Shell BP) from continuous pollution of the defendant’s
land on the grounds that such an injunction would curtail the activities of the company which
serves as a major source of income to the State. In this regard, it is observed that the Indian
courts have made far-reaching jurisprudential innovations in the area of environmental rights
enforcement more than can be seen in Nigeria. This is glaring in the position of the Indian
Supreme Court in MC Mehta v Union of India  and other related cases mentioned in figure
6.6.
It is recommended that since oil and gas activities are the mainstay of the Nigerian economy,
and in effect cannot be truncated on grounds of economic well-being of the state, principles
of liability should be strengthened with a view to improving responsibility whilst  making
issues of compensation moderate and bearable on the part of transnational corporations. It is
concluded  that  enforcing  fundamental  rights  to  safe  environment  would  secure  higher
standards of environmental  quality  and these rights should be directly  incorporated in an
enforceable  Part  of  the  Nigerian  Constitution,  preferably  under  Chapter  IV  of  the
Constitution which deals on ‘Fundamental Rights’.
It is observed in the course of the research that TNCs have escaped and/or reduce the gravity
of culpability in environmental pollution cases in a vast majority of the decided cases owing
to the fact  that  most pollution  incidents  are traceable to  ‘acts  of third parties’  caused by
sabotage. To avoid clumsy repetitions, it is submitted that this defence may not sustain TNCs
in  cases  bordering on breach of  environmental  rights  indirectly  reflected  in  the Nigerian
Constitution, 1999 and the African Charter, 2004 for two main reasons. One, it is maintained
that  if  the rights  to  life,  dignity  of  human person,  and private  and family  life  are  to  be
expansively interpreted as contained in the Nigerian Constitution and African Charter, then
the defence of ‘act of third party’ and other traditional defences in common law bordering on
environmental liability may not sustain TNCs.44 Notwithstanding, in  FA Akpan & Anor v
43
 No W/81/71, Warri High Court, November 26, 1973.
44
 See arguments in figures 6.4, 6.4.1 and 6.5.
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Royal Dutch Shell  & Anor,45 a Dutch Court has refused to uphold breach of fundamental
rights relating to a clean environment  instituted by a Nigerian,  on the grounds that  Shell
(defendant) can only be liable for pollution incidents where negligence can be established,
but not where pollution is caused by third parties.
Second, it is submitted that ‘acts of third parties’ are foreseeable, and if TNCs are proactive
and diligent  enough in curbing pollution,  they would forestall  such acts  of ‘third parties’
owing  to  the  obligation  of  government  and  TNCs  to  protect  oil  and  gas  facilities, 46
particularly within the perspective of fundamental rights enforcement.47 
It is on the basis of the foregoing that the research came up with the conclusion that on a
scale of zero to ten (0-10), where 5 represents ‘strict liability’ and 10 represents ‘absolute
liability’,  environmental  liability  under  fundamental  rights  enforcement,  as  argued in  the
current research should be pinned under 9, with limited space left for illegal activities of
‘third parties’ where pollution is shown to be manifestly unavoidable in events relating to
illegal oil bunkering and acts of sabotage by vandals. This is predicated on the fact that in
practical adjudication of oil and gas cases, courts are willing to consider the ‘acts of third
parties’ and the efforts put in place by TNCs to address such foreseeable incidents. Owing to
this, it is concluded that liability under fundamental rights enforcement will be stricter that
the measure of liability applicable in the common law torts of nuisance, negligence and under
the strict liability rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
It  is  maintained  that  fundamental  rights  enforcements  within  the  ambit  of  environmental
pollution  is  a  nascent  area of  the  law.  In view of  this,  the issue of  public  awareness  in
addressing  environmental  challenges  was  raised.48 The  concept  of  public  awareness  is
45
 District Court of The Hague Case No. C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580, 30 January 
2013<https://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-judgment-shell-oil-spill-ikot-ada-udo> 
accessed 12 January 2016. 
46
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1973 (TCC) [93] on the possibility for an absolute liability against TNCs where damage is foreseeable and
preventable under the traditional rules of liability and the Oil Pipelines Act, 2004.
47




enumerated  with  a  diverse  consideration  of  complementary  aspects  such  as:  access  to
information  on  environmental  matters,  public  participation  in  environmental  decision-
making,  and  access  to  justice  in  environmental  disputes.  It  is  stated  that  TNCs,  local
operators and government at all levels must intensify measures to disseminate environmental
information to the locals, particularly in areas prone and well-known for oil spills,49 and this
must  be  done  timely.  In  the  same  vein,  public  participation  should  be  encouraged.  An
example of public participation in environmental decision making which appears practical on
the part of government and TNCs is the Joint Investigation Visit during oil spills, which is
shown to involve representatives of communities who have directly suffered from oil spills.50 
It is maintained that deployment of the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) by
Shell and other oil operators which encourages an engagement with host communities, will
create a platform for views to be exchanged, and through such and similar avenue, public
participation would evolve and consequently address environmental concerns. The African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights which is now a municipal law in Nigeria promotes
public participation to the effect that every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in
the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives. In the
same  vein,  the  National  Policy  on  Environment  clearly  supports  the  principle  of  public
participation.  However,  it  is  seen that  there is  substantial  gap in regular  communications
between locals  on one  hand and government  and TNCs on the other.  This  is  evident  in
plethora of reported cases of marginalisation, impunity and display of reckless behaviours on
the part of oil operators and government. In view of this, it is recommended that there should
be regular engagements with stakeholders in the host communities via town hall meetings
that would encourage greater level of public participation.
A remarkable aspect of the concept of public awareness on environmental matters is the issue
of access to environmental justice.51 This underpins the usefulness of the current research in
 See figure 3.5.
49
 See figure 4.3.
50
 See figure 4.4.
51
 This is discussed in figure 4.5.
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the sense that enforcement of fundamental rights relating to environmental pollution would
not generate reasonable effect or given much credence if victims of environmental pollution
are unable to access the courts for justice. In view of this, it is recommended that government
must  take  measures  to  cut  down  perceived  bottlenecks  in  the  area  of  jurisdictions,  by
allocating to State High Courts complete jurisdiction to entertain civil causes and matters
relating to mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural
gas). This is due to the proximity of State High Courts to inhabitants of oil producing areas
and locals, and also the increased number of State High Courts as against limited number of
Federal High Courts (which currently retain exclusive jurisdiction on oil mining) as shown in
section 251 of the Nigerian Constitution. Notwithstanding, it has been argued that victims of
environmental pollution can enforce environmental rights via State High Courts in line with
the special jurisdiction vested by the Nigerian Constitution under Chapter IV.52
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